The Death of the Revolution in Military Affairs

[Vympel]

Link

On War #224
July 2, 2007

The Death of the RMA

By William S. Lind

In the 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article where I and four colleagues first laid out the Four Generations of Modern War, we foresaw two potential futures. One, the way the world has gone, was 4GW. The other, the direction the Pentagon has taken, became known as the Revolution in Military Affairs, or, more recently, Transformation. This vision of future war, a vision anchored in hi-tech, high-price "systems," is, I am happy to report, militarily dead.

While its corpse still twitches in Iraq and Afghanistan, its obituary was published in April, in Israel, when the Winograd Commission published its report (is Winograd, one wonders, the city in Galicia where old Polish generals go to die of cirrhosis?) On May 29, a summary of its findings by Haninah Levine was made available by the Center for Defense Information. The defense industry fat cats must have read it and wept.

The Winograd Commission was established to examine the Israeli debacle in Lebanon last summer. According to the Levine summary, its first lesson is, "Western militaries are in active state of denial concerning the limitations of precision weapons." Speaking of the then-IDF Chief of Staff General Dan Halutz — Israel's first and, I suspect, last Chief of Staff drawn from the Air Force — Levine writes:

Halutz encouraged the civilian leaders to believe that Israel could launch a precision air and artillery offensive without getting dragged into a broad ground offensive … the failure of Halutz and the General Staff to appraise the enemy's abilities correctly at the outbreak of the war stemmed not from incorrect intelligence or analysis, but from a willed denial of the limitations of the IDF's precision weapons.

In how many valleys of Afghanistan is the same sad lesson being taught? In how many towns of Diyala province in Iraq, or streets in Sadr City?

Levine continues,

The Winograd Commission traces studiously the origins of the General Staff's error of judgment. The commission outlines the changes which took place in Israeli military doctrine over the preceding decade in response both to strategic developments … and to technological developments — the so called "revolution in military affairs,” whose keystone is the advent of precision air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapon systems…

The first lessen of the Second Lebanon War is … that wishful thinking concerning the capabilities of precision weapon systems overpowered the General Staff' s analytical abilities … Faith in advanced air and artillery systems as magical "game-changing" systems absolved the General Staff from the need to consider what capabilities (such as distributed and hardened facilities) the enemy possessed, and led the IDF into a strategic trap it had recognized in advance.

This lesson, I think, can be extrapolated in two useful ways in the American context. First, the strategic or more precisely doctrinal, trap set by the RMA has long been recognized. The trap, quite simply is that for the RMA to succeed, it had to contradict the nature of war.

The RMA reduces war to putting fires on targets. It promises to use new technology to make everything targetable. But this means it also promises to eliminate uncertainty, to make war transparent, to eliminate the quality that defines war, the independent hostile will of the enemy. In other words, it is bunk. The fact that it is bunk was evident to a great many people from the outset, even people in Washington.

Why, then, did it get as far as it did (it remains DOD policy even today)? Here we can extrapolate again from the Winograd Commission's finding: The RMA's hi-tech systems are indeed magically "game changing." But the game they change is the budget game, not war. The RMA has given the Pentagon such magical results as bomber aircraft that cost more per unit than the Navy's ships (the B-2), three fighters for one billion dollars (the F-22), and the most magical system of all, the Army's Future Contract System, a system no one can describe but costs more than any program in any other service. Boy, that's magic! Even the Wizard of Id must be jealous.

The fact is, Pentagon policy has nothing to do with war, which has a great deal to do with why we are losing two wars. The Pentagon is the last Soviet industry. It is not about producing a product, least of all a product that works. It is solely, entirely, about acquiring and justifying resources. That the RMA does supremely well.

The defeat in Lebanon seems to have confronted the RMA in Israel with the unpleasant reality of the outside world. Will two defeats have the same effect on Washington? Perhaps, but don't bet on it. Half a trillion dollars a year can buy a great deal of political magic.

William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.

[Ace Pace]

Quick nitpick, the Winograd report published in April is not the full report, but an interim version.

[Chris OFarrell]

Its fucking stupid to claim the B2 and F-22 are worthless non game changing technologies. They are expensive sure. But the F-22 fills the same role as the F-15, its just a whole lot better at it and keeps the USAF dominant. The B2 is a deep penetration bomber that can do things the B52 and B1's simply can't.

Okay the whole BS Future Combat system and Land Warrior system are bunk but for rather different reasons.

[Darth Wong]

Its fucking stupid to claim the B2 and F-22 are worthless non game changing technologies.

OK then, explain how are they allowing the US armed forces to change the game.

They are expensive sure. But the F-22 fills the same role as the F-15, its just a whole lot better at it and keeps the USAF dominant. The B2 is a deep penetration bomber that can do things the B52 and B1's simply can't.

The fact that they have genuine features and capabilities does not mean that those capabilities are actually changing the game. Explain how they have changed the game. Show me, for example, how B2 bombers are making a difference in Iraq.

Okay the whole BS Future Combat system and Land Warrior system are bunk but for rather different reasons.

The author explained quite succinctly what's wrong with these new weapon systems; they cost ungodly amounts of money and don't actually make a difference in terms of the outcome of military operations. What the fuck is YOUR argument?

[Chris OFarrell]

Its fucking stupid to claim the B2 and F-22 are worthless non game changing technologies.

OK then, explain how are they allowing the US armed forces to change the game.

The F-22 allows USAF pilots to get a 'first look first kill' ability against hostile aircraft, even relatively new advanced aircraft.
It can get into a killing position against hostile fighters deep inside their airspace and knock them down without them being seen.
It can perform the same precision guided air to ground stealth attacks the F-117 could, but unlike the F-117 which needed escorts to defend it against hostile fighters, it is perfectly capable of escorting itself.
Its sensors and communications technology give the pilot situational awareness never before seen by any fighter pilot in the sky, letting him know at a glance what is going on around him, and to some extent through datalinking, function as something of a command and control node.

In short, its just the next step of the evolution in air to air combat. You started off with visual range gunfights, then entered the age of guided missiles, then more advanced from of C2, C3 and C4i capibilities, now the F-22 combines a great deal of this into a single package.

They are expensive sure. But the F-22 fills the same role as the F-15, its just a whole lot better at it and keeps the USAF dominant. The B2 is a deep penetration bomber that can do things the B52 and B1's simply can't.

The fact that they have genuine features and capabilities does not mean that those capabilities are actually changing the game. Explain how they have changed the game.

The Air to Air fighter game has been quite radically changed by the introduction of the Stealth Fighter, which the F-22 is the first real example of. Now I grant you it hasn't seen combat as of yet, but extensive testing (including very large scale and very intense exercises of hundreds of aircraft against hundreds more) has shown the F-22 simply dominates.

If your F-22's can penetrate through the best air defenses the other guy can put up to bomb and shoot down with near impunity, then by definition, hasn't the game changed? The same way Aircraft Carriers in WW2 changed the game of naval warfare? The same way the tank changed the battlefields of WW1?
Whole IADS technologies become as obsolete and useless as 18" guns on BB's against Dive Bombers in WW2, they have to be redesigned to deal with this threat in new ways (like new sensor technology, new platforms e.t.c.). Granted I'm sure countermeasures will exist in the end, but the game HAS changed.

Show me, for example, how B2 bombers are making a difference in Iraq.

Thats a hell of a non sequitur. I never claimed in my post that these system in of themselves would win the war singlehanded. As part however of an integrated military using combined arms, they have a very specific use. A B2 might not be of much use against some guy with an IED, but the platform you use to kill that IED is probably going to be of no use against the target you would need a B2 to attack, like a heavily defended hard target deep inside some nations airspace.

Air power cannot and will not win the war on its own, but stuff like the F-22 and B2 *DOES* change the way the air war game is played. Dramatically.

Okay the whole BS Future Combat system and Land Warrior system are bunk but for rather different reasons.

The author explained quite succinctly what's wrong with these new weapon systems; they cost ungodly amounts of money and don't actually make a difference in terms of the outcome of military operations. What the fuck is YOUR argument?

The F-22, the B2 DO fucking make a HUGE difference in the outcome of military operations. You want to attack a nation which actually has a credible air defense system, like say Iran? The F-22 and the B2 will make it possible to penetrate this defense system and decisively defeat it with far less casualties on the US side, in far less time and at far less risk.

The B2 is combat proven in what it can do, the F-22 is not, but as I commented above, in exercises against the best the rest of the US military can put up against it, it has changed the game completely, almost all the time crack F-15, F-16, F-18 pilots are all just looking bewildered when they get back on the ground and saying something like "I never even saw he was there".

The Land Warrior system and the future combat system on the other hand, unlike the F-22 or B2, DO NOT WORK. I can't put it more simply then that. Land warrior for example would require a solider to use a weapon which is far less lethal, workable and rugged then what he has today. It would require them to carry around an absurd amount of technology on their person which is not up to field use ruggedness, easily compromised, far too expensive, complex and so on. In short, it doesn't help, it hinders.

The 'Future combat system' has been combat proven not to be workable in any way shape or form. Unlike the F-22 and B2 which exist and have been proven to perform, future combat (the idea of getting rid of traditional heavy armor oriented force structures and go for a light, mobile high tech structure) the theory being that mobility and technology will compensate for the lack of heavy firepower.
The theory doesn't work. Iraq has shown bluntly that heavy protection and raw firepower is still key, not fast movement and technology alone. Its also shown to be logisticly unworkable. For example, the idea being that in order to BE mobile, the FCS would need to be generally air deployable by C-130 transports rapidly to a hot spot in large numbers, that is just plain impossible by rational standards.

Land warrior and FCS, neither have met their project objectives in any sense of the word. Neither provide an edge to either the people on the ground or the wider combined arms military to be worth the cost in money or tradeoffs in using these systems.
The F-22 and B2 on the other hand have shown that they DO work and that they DO provide a critical edge to the USAF, which in turn benefits the US military.

To put it bluntly, neither the F-22 program nor the B2 program were EVER part of the 'transformational military' the US has been pushing (thank you Donald Rumsfeld). That was heavily based around the 'future combat' and 'land warrior' systems, the idea being that you can use IT and other advanced technology to make a US soldier far more lethal by being able to do stuff like call in instant fire support from all manner of sources with cool stuff like individual HUD's and Voice commands, defend himself with cool air bursting programed grenade launchers targeted by external sensors. That with FCS technology like vehicles with incredably 'smart weapons', sensors and so on would render traditional concepts of heavy armor, heavy vehicles/weapons and so on, worthless.

None of that has proven true and I am perfectly happy to see it die. MY objection is labeling the F-22 and B2 programs with the same sticker, they HAVE proven themselves in their respective roles as massive improvements over their parents -the F-15 and B-52/B1-B - ... unlike FCS, which the heavy armored brigades in the Iraq war showed up rather quickly when the going got tough and the tough had big fucking guns.

[metavac]

The F-22 allows USAF pilots to get a 'first look first kill' ability against hostile aircraft, even relatively new advanced aircraft.
It can get into a killing position against hostile fighters deep inside their airspace and knock them down without them being seen.
It can perform the same precision guided air to ground stealth attacks the F-117 could, but unlike the F-117 which needed escorts to defend it against hostile fighters, it is perfectly capable of escorting itself.
Its sensors and communications technology give the pilot situational awareness never before seen by any fighter pilot in the sky, letting him know at a glance what is going on around him, and to some extent through datalinking, function as something of a command and control node.

This is still a list of features from the brochure. I'd like to actually see some longitudinal evaluations of the B-2's operational and programmatic history vis a vis other platforms. I'm not turning much up in my search for free, public domain studies.

[Vympel]

Chris, your objection is I think operating on a misconception of Lind's argument, to quote him from another article:-

Perhaps the most serious deficiency in the American armed forces is the fact that both of our ground forces, the U.S. Army and the United States Marine Corps, remain Second Generation military organizations (so do the Navy and the Air Force, but in the kinds of wars we are likely to fight, they don't much matter).

and this (referring to the fact that in the first 4.5 months of 2007, the US has dropped more bombs than it did in all of 2006):

Nothing could testify more powerfully to the failure of U.S. efforts on the ground in Iraq than a ramp-up in airstrikes. Calling in air is the last, desperate, and usually futile action of an army that is losing. If anyone still wonders whether the "surge" is working, the increase in air strikes offers a definitive answer: it isn't.

Worse, the growing number of air strikes shows that, despite what the Marines have accomplished in Anbar province and General Petraeus's best efforts, our high command remains as incapable as ever of grasping Fourth Generation war. To put it bluntly, there is no surer or faster way to lose in 4GW than by calling in airstrikes. It is a disaster on every level. Physically, it inevitably kills far more civilians than enemies, enraging the population against us and driving them into the arms of our opponents. Mentally, it tells the insurgents we are cowards who only dare fight them from 20,000 feet in the air. Morally, it turns us into Goliath, a monster every real man has to fight. So negative are the results of air strikes in this kind of war that there is only one possible good number of them: zero (unless we are employing the "Hama model," which we are not).

(later in the article he refers to the Air Force's idea that it can win anything through airpower a myth)

When he speaks about "war" he's talking in the most macro, conceptual sense (specifically fourth generation war), not the tactical minutae of what this or that particular platform can or cannot do. Specifically, the context of the article above is Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan - not WW3 with a 21st century USSR, for example. The argument is that the B-2, the F-22, the FCS- they're all worse than useless in 4GW.

[Howedar]

I don't completely agree with that statement - to my knowledge, the F-22 hasn't lost any capability over the F-15 (not -E, mind), and the B-2 can function somewhat as a bomb truck. They're certainly not good values for the money in these sorts of roles, but "worse than useless" is an exaggeration.

Unless you're talking about FCS, of course.

[Medic]

When he speaks about "war" he's talking in the most macro, conceptual sense (specifically fourth generation war), not the tactical minutae of what this or that particular platform can or cannot do. Specifically, the context of the article above is Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan - not WW3 with a 21st century USSR, for example. The argument is that the B-2, the F-22, the FCS- they're all worse than useless in 4GW.

I can appreciate that distinction but if we happen to really need high-end capability platforms like those 2 aircraft they are NOT going to be researched, developed, produced and fielded quick enough to respond to a threat justifying their existence. In the absence of stealth, effective air defenses effectively kick you out of their territory hundreds of miles laterally and many miles vertically, and you have to rely on weapons that can launch from outside that coverage, cruise missile spam, whatever.

As far as whether or not these platforms are useless in the context of wars we're fighting, I doubt it. F-22, and -35 can equip external stores to increase loiter times and payload when that coveted stealth is unnecessary. The B-2's bombtruck applications aren't the best in the world simply cause we bought fuck all of 21 of them and at any given point something like 15 are ready to go? In it's case, I think we can distinguish idiotic acquisition practices from it's actual utility.

[MKSheppard]

William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.

Googling it:

A politically and culturally conservative think tank whose main focus is on the Culture War.

BAD VYMPEL! BAD!

Anyway, he's full of shit on 95% of that article. The war in lebanon failed because Israel was not willing to do what needed to be done, not because Israel relied too much on Hi tech. FYI; Israel fired off so many MRLS rockets against hizbollah positions that we had to actually begin resupplying them by air IIRC. What failed was the political will to execute the war plan that the IDF had developed before the war.

The Pentagon is the last Soviet industry. It is not about producing a product, least of all a product that works.

Yeah, I guess all the "dead" fighter pilots who gone up against the F-22 in ACM are just faking it and are liars when they say "I never even saw him!"

[MKSheppard]

Oh I love this

Nothing could testify more powerfully to the failure of U.S. efforts on the ground in Iraq than a ramp-up in airstrikes. Calling in air is the last, desperate, and usually futile action of an army that is losing. If anyone still wonders whether the "surge" is working, the increase in air strikes offers a definitive answer: it isn't.

No, it means that we're actually finding targets worth of airstrikes. And Mr. Lind seems to think that we should waste manpower by storming fortified positions, instead of calling in "RMA" airstrikes to blow it to fuck (and the defenders as well)

[Darth Wong]

Yeah, I guess all the "dead" fighter pilots who gone up against the F-22 in ACM are just faking it and are liars when they say "I never even saw him!"

The ability to perform well on your own tests is worthless if those tests do not accurately reflect realistic scenarios.

Both you and O'Farrell are wanking over a lot of ridiculous Red Storm Rising wargame scenarios that have nothing to do with the actual requirements of the military. Ooooh, the super-expensive F22 can beat lesser fighter planes in simulated combat! Tell me what difference that's making in Afghanistan or Iraq.

No, it means that we're actually finding targets worth of airstrikes.

The fact that you bomb something does NOT prove that it was wise to do so.

[MKSheppard]

Tell me what difference that's making in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Considering that the F-22 is only just now entering squadron service, with the second IIRC squadron converting to F-22s; well obviously it's not making a difference right now, due to limited numbers.

But when it enters in full service, it's going to bring a lot of new capabilities to the table. Like being able to carry eight SDBs, and two AIM-9s and two AIM-120s internally, which will enable full flight performance; which means a single F-22 will be able to hit far far more targets than a F-15 would from the same location; due to it flying significantly higher and faster, which means more performance from gliding weapons.

And do I have to point out that the cold war Legacy B-1B; designed to penetrate soviet air defenses and drop nuclear gravity bombs and fire SRAMs was one of the first aircraft the USAF had over A-stan in 2001, dropping bombs in close support of special forces?

The fact that you bomb something does NOT prove that it was wise to do so.

Superiority through overwhelming firepower has been a western doctrine of war since we first realized that we couldn't win a war by sending thousands of men in waves against machinegun nests.

[Beowulf]

Yeah, I guess all the "dead" fighter pilots who gone up against the F-22 in ACM are just faking it and are liars when they say "I never even saw him!"

The ability to perform well on your own tests is worthless if those tests do not accurately reflect realistic scenarios.

Both you and O'Farrell are wanking over a lot of ridiculous Red Storm Rising wargame scenarios that have nothing to do with the actual requirements of the military. Ooooh, the super-expensive F22 can beat lesser fighter planes in simulated combat! Tell me what difference that's making in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Prove the scenario isn't realistic.

Just because the Iraqi insurgent forces don't have fighter planes doesn't mean all of our future opponents will be so handicapped. The problem your having, like a number of planners before you, is that your trying to equip the military to fight the last war. In doing so, you remove capabilities that might be useful in the next war. You might as well ask what difference the US sub fleet is making in A-stan or Iraq.

Additionally, the capabilites given by the F-22 and the B-2 provide a deterrent against conventional war. Knowing that your conventional army will be beaten soundly prevents someone from even thinking about starting a conventional war.

[Medic]

Range and loiter time seem to be 2 critical requirements in wars like Afghanistan and Iraq, since air superiority is default, we simply need to be in the right place at the right time to assist ground forces.

To state the obvious though, complaining about the F-22 and B-2 in the context of this thread is like crying that every war henceforth will be like Iraq and Afghanistan, which I wouldn't put money on. (if for no other reason in the short-term, our ground forces are stretched about as far as they can be overseas)

[Knife]

Anyway, he's full of shit on 95% of that article. The war in lebanon failed because Israel was not willing to do what needed to be done, not because Israel relied too much on Hi tech. FYI; Israel fired off so many MRLS rockets against hizbollah positions that we had to actually begin resupplying them by air IIRC. What failed was the political will to execute the war plan that the IDF had developed before the war.

Sorry, but I view it as one and the same. High speed, low drag, expensive-reach out and touch some one weapons not only suck the money out of infantry units; but also give the politicians the idea that they can engage in combat operations with little or no friendly casualties.

This is a good thing for them, since body bags are hard on public opinion on their ventures. However, every single time, it seems, we get into these situations, what's really needed is boots on the ground. A shit load of boots at that, with training to go with it. Not as sexy as shiney things and not as politically viable as 'no casualties' type weapons since grunts get killed in ground ops.

So, yeah, I think that bit of the article was dead on. The head shed was blinded by uber tech easy on the eyes toys that they didn't see the real threat.

[Darth Wong]

The problem your having, like a number of planners before you, is that your trying to equip the military to fight the last war.

A rather ironic statement for someone who's defending the Red Storm Rising plan.

In doing so, you remove capabilities that might be useful in the next war.

The next war won't happen by itself; someone has to make it happen. America is virtually immune to conventional invasion due to geographical factors, so all of its wars are going to be overseas "interventions". Equipping the military accordingly is hardly shortsighted; failure to do is shortsighted.

Additionally, the capabilites given by the F-22 and the B-2 provide a deterrent against conventional war. Knowing that your conventional army will be beaten soundly prevents someone from even thinking about starting a conventional war.

Describe some scenarios where this would be important, then. And explain why those hypothetical scenarios are more important than the current reality in Afghanistan and Iraq (which, by the way, was predicted by virtually everyone back in the 90s as the future of warfare).

[Darth Wong]

To state the obvious though, complaining about the F-22 and B-2 in the context of this thread is like crying that every war henceforth will be like Iraq and Afghanistan, which I wouldn't put money on. (if for no other reason in the short-term, our ground forces are stretched about as far as they can be overseas)

The question is not whether those platforms have real capabilities. The question is whether that vast amount of money could have been better spent elsewhere.

[MKSheppard]

Sorry, but I view it as one and the same. High speed, low drag, expensive-reach out and touch some one weapons not only suck the money out of infantry units; but also give the politicians the idea that they can engage in combat operations with little or no friendly casualties.

Except that such high-speed, low drag reach-out-and-touch the enemy weapons kill him before he's even in touch with your infantry. Anyway, such weapons are becoming increasingly cheap: the US Army for example, is making all future MRLS rounds be Guided MRLS, which only costs $14,000 per rocket; it's giving Army units the equivalent of air support 24/7/365 in all weather, since it's just as accurate as a JDAM out to 70 klicks.

[MKSheppard]

which only costs $14,000 per rocket

made a boo-boo. The extra cost per rocket, over a conventional unguided MRLS is $14k, not the total rocket cost

[Darth Wong]

You're still assuming that the enemy looks and acts like a conventional army.

[MKSheppard]

Equipping the military accordingly is hardly shortsighted; failure to do is shortsighted.

We had not-quite a few programs in the works during the Cold War, which most likely would have been implemented in the Cancelled Block III Abrams Tank (the M1A2 was Block II).



In September 1992, the Tactical Systems Division of Rockwell International announced that it had been awarded a $194,713 six-month study contract for a family of SLID (Small, Low-cost Interceptor Device) concepts for short-range point defence by the US Army's Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC). The Rockwell SLID concept envisions small, less than 4.5 kg, low-cost short-range hit-to-kill vehicles similar to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 'Brilliant Pebbles' programme. These would be capable of high agility lateral manoeuvres and have no propulsion except from a mortar-type launcher mounted on the roof of the vehicle.

The SLID would give a self-defence capability to armoured vehicles, including tanks, and other point targets being attacked by missiles, projectiles or low-flying aircraft. A Circular Error of Probability (CEP) of 50 mm is expected as a requirement to hit incoming missiles reliably.

As far as I know, SLID was killed in the post-cold war cutbacks or by Shinkenski:

Boeing Website says it would have been live fired in '98, no word on it since

A lot of things were killed to pay for Shinkenski's Stryker Brigades which would have been "more revelant" in "the post cold-war" world.

[MKSheppard]

You're still assuming that the enemy looks and acts like a conventional army.

The first combat use of GMRLS was a single rocket fired against a sniper nest. It of course hit and destroyed the sniper.

In fact, the Iraqis actually want more GMRLS, since it is just as accurate as an aircraft launched JDAM, but with a smaller warhead, meaning less of the neighborhood goes up.

[MKSheppard]

More to the point, we're using a lot of Cold War Legacy, designed to fight conventional armies equipment quite heavily in Iraq.

Like for example the TOW; which can kill just about any tank in the world today. What's it being fired against? Buildings full of terrorists, as the warhead can penetrate concrete quite handily and still make a mess out of whoever is on the other side.

[Knife]

You're still assuming that the enemy looks and acts like a conventional army.

The first combat use of GMRLS was a single rocket fired against a sniper nest. It of course hit and destroyed the sniper.

In fact, the Iraqis actually want more GMRLS, since it is just as accurate as an aircraft launched JDAM, but with a smaller warhead, meaning less of the neighborhood goes up.

So 14k per rocket sounds good to you against one sniper? What about the other theoretical sniper two clicks back? Just use another 14 thousand dollar rocket? That is, after the 25 thousand dollar Predator spots him?

Surgical strike is quite fine, I'm all for it. Use the shiney toys for that. But replacing ground troops with shiney toys isn't working, won't work and is an epidemic in US military as of late.