A Failure in Generalship

[jegs2]

This is a long piece, written by an active-duty US Army lieutenant colonel (LTC), but well worth reading. I'll post an excerpt here:

"You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict." — Frederick the Great

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq's grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.

The Responsibilities of Generalship

Armies do not fight wars; nations fight wars. War is not a military activity conducted by soldiers, but rather a social activity that involves entire nations. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted that passion, probability and policy each play their role in war. Any understanding of war that ignores one of these elements is fundamentally flawed.

The passion of the people is necessary to endure the sacrifices inherent in war. Regardless of the system of government, the people supply the blood and treasure required to prosecute war. The statesman must stir these passions to a level commensurate with the popular sacrifices required. When the ends of policy are small, the statesman can prosecute a conflict without asking the public for great sacrifice. Global conflicts such as World War II require the full mobilization of entire societies to provide the men and materiel necessary for the successful prosecution of war. The greatest error the statesman can make is to commit his nation to a great conflict without mobilizing popular passions to a level commensurate with the stakes of the conflict.

Popular passions are necessary for the successful prosecution of war, but cannot be sufficient. To prevail, generals must provide policymakers and the public with a correct estimation of strategic probabilities. The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in applying force to achieve the aims of policy. The general describes both the means necessary for the successful prosecution of war and the ways in which the nation will employ those means. If the policymaker desires ends for which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible for advising the statesman of this incongruence. The statesman must then scale back the ends of policy or mobilize popular passions to provide greater means. If the general remains silent while the statesman commits a nation to war with insufficient means, he shares culpability for the results.

However much it is influenced by passion and probability, war is ultimately an instrument of policy and its conduct is the responsibility of policymakers. War is a social activity undertaken on behalf of the nation; Augustine counsels us that the only purpose of war is to achieve a better peace. The choice of making war to achieve a better peace is inherently a value judgment in which the statesman must decide those interests and beliefs worth killing and dying for. The military man is no better qualified than the common citizen to make such judgments. He must therefore confine his input to his area of expertise — the estimation of strategic probabilities.

There is much more to the article, and it is well worth the time to read.

[Patrick Degan]

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.

The generals did advise the maladministration with the correct estimates of strategic probabilities, but Georgie the Stupider and his neocon puppeteers were far too busy with their circle-jerk to fantasies of global hegemony and virtual rulership of the Middle East to be bothered to listen. 'Twasn't the generals who thought invading with only 15,000 troops would be a good idea but Donald Rumsfool —who later dismissed any and all professional and lay criticism of the conduct of the war with his famous remark that "you go to war with the army you have, not the army you want".

[CmdrWilkens]

Yes but just as with the JCS during Vietnam the Generals who advised the administration of this had a duty to the American public (or at the least Congress) to bluntly and willingly inform them of the strategic error in the making. There is no relief in saying that they told the Presidnet and his advisors it wa a bad choice if they did not also make the WHOLE of the policymaking establishment aware of the error to be committed. Certainly others are to blame (not the least of which is the total failure of the House and Senate to truly investigate the claims behind the accusations levelled at Hussein) but those General Officers, appointed to their posts and confimred by the Senate of the United States, having sworn an oath to preserve protect and defend the constituiton and by extension the people of the United States, owed it to that Congress and that people to fully voice their grave concerns over the coming war, the near total silence and aquiescence was a virtual repeat of Vietnam and equally lamentable.

[Enforcer Talen]

Well, if he retires the generals who speak up, he is only going to get yes-men. Which, iirc, became the case.

[Stormbringer]

The article is full of crap and the officer that wrote it ought to be ashamed of himself. I can't imagine any officer truly in the know would have honestly say that the military itself is to blame; this article smells like a juicy bit of apologist career buffing.

The overwhelming evidence from Cobra Two to Fiasco to pretty much any other source will tell you that the military wanted a much more sensible, much larger, and better prepared plan. They were overruled by Donald Rumsfeld, who is a civilian answered to George Bush, and it was his decision (enforced by much browbeating) to cut the forces and try things his way. Like McNamara in Vietnam, Rumsfeld forced the military to fight stupid and they could only say "yes, sir" and try to make abject stupidity work.

And post war, the biggest makes were made once again by civilian leadership, some times at odds with their own plans. Things like Bremer disbanding the Iraqi Army, which contradicted all the planning and in fact was done almost unilaterally. That's but one of the myriad of dumb decisions which were made entirely outside of the military's hands yet screwed them over.

And on top of that, the civilian leadership has fallen down badly in terms of providing meaningful support to the troops, things like using and procuring appropriate gear instead of the latest gee whiz, pork barrel toy out the procurement pipeline. Or things like establishing a proper oversight of the many rebuilding projects which were supposed to follow (which would have made things easier on the military).

I could go on and on and on. Blaming the military for the mess that is the Iraq War, and of course it's spill over effect on Afghanistan, is disgusting. The military has served well in circumstances which can only be described as monumentally unfair and horrific. The blame should rest squarely on the shoulder of George W. Bush and his administration.

[Stormbringer]

Yes but just as with the JCS during Vietnam the Generals who advised the administration of this had a duty to the American public (or at the least Congress) to bluntly and willingly inform them of the strategic error in the making. There is no relief in saying that they told the Presidnet and his advisors it wa a bad choice if they did not also make the WHOLE of the policymaking establishment aware of the error to be committed. Certainly others are to blame (not the least of which is the total failure of the House and Senate to truly investigate the claims behind the accusations levelled at Hussein) but those General Officers, appointed to their posts and confimred by the Senate of the United States, having sworn an oath to preserve protect and defend the constituiton and by extension the people of the United States, owed it to that Congress and that people to fully voice their grave concerns over the coming war, the near total silence and aquiescence was a virtual repeat of Vietnam and equally lamentable.

That assumes that Congress would even want to hear it. Remember this was a time when Bush was riding high on an apparent victory in Afghanistan and Congress was packed with Republican yes-men and spineless Democrats. America and it's leaders weren't in the mood to listen and Bush was prepared to squash anyone that tried.

It's rather hard to blame the JCS or other ranking officers when the simple truth is people didn't want to hear it.

[Chris OFarrell]

The cynical part of me has to ask if this is the Government starting to slowly try and shift blame.

Find some willing Colonel to write this thing (promise him a full Colonelcy in a few months) and start the process of 'Oh well we went in with the best of intentions but the military didn't have a clue how to plan the whole thing, its clearly all their fault!!'

[Stormbringer]

The cynical part of me has to ask if this is the Government starting to slowly try and shift blame.

Is there really a question? The Bush Administration is now facing tough questions and massive public displeasure. There is no doubt at all that a good many are trying to shift the blame or just muddy the waters enough. At least half the resigned or fired officials are writing ass covering tell-alls, why not start the process while in office?

Besides, it's not like they haven't spewed bullshit about the role of Rumsfeld versus the military since Day One.

[Enforcer Talen]

That would just suck, really. All that work and lives, and the military gets blamed for not doing it right.

Hope not. >_<

[Ritterin Sophia]

Wow... what a coincidence that the War Czar was appointed mere days ago!

[Uraniun235]

America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy.

What a bullshit argument. The CIA had a ton of answers for the administration; the administration just didn't like those answers.

(Strangely, my reply seems totally applicable to either of the conflicts referenced by the author.)

[Lonestar]

The overwhelming evidence from Cobra Two to Fiasco to pretty much any other source will tell you that the military wanted a much more sensible, much larger, and better prepared plan. They were overruled by Donald Rumsfeld, who is a civilian answered to George Bush, and it was his decision (enforced by much browbeating) to cut the forces and try things his way. Like McNamara in Vietnam, Rumsfeld forced the military to fight stupid and they could only say "yes, sir" and try to make abject stupidity work.

In all fairness, Franks came off looking like a gigantic Turd in both those books. He basically set his spam filter for "Joint Chiefs" and kept them out of the loop for any war planning.