Australia's new submarines - What do we need?

[tim31]

*snip analysis of NZDF*

That was great fun. Now do the ADF!

[JointStrikeFighter]

Oh yes please do

[PainRack]

Go fuck your mother you little shit stain. You think I don't know my own history? NZ's constitutional evolution had nothing to do with failure of British global strategy, let alone falling into any one's sphere of influence, especially considering the Canberra pact was aimed at America, ffs, but with the maturation of our self identity since 1915, we simply did not need Britain at a certain point, although that happened faster for Australia, and they did have issues with the UK, but they are not NZ. Why else do you think we did not, formally, gain independence until 1947?.

That SORT of is the whole point, isn't it? Both New Zealand and Australia had been a Dominion for years before WW2. One simply cannot point to mere maturity of the political process and say, there, that's the reason we became independent.

A critical push factor was the fact that the British global defence strategy saw its zenith during WW2 and as a result, other than culture/history,there remained no more ties that bonded ANZAC to the mother country.

And frankly, given the current contribution of New Zealand, one can argue that it has a greater effect on world politics than Indonesia, Malaysia or Singapore, countries which retains much larger and complex conventional forces.

[Stuart]

Oh yes, I will grant you that thought has occurred, within the Labour party only; but most of us on the right here tend to think it was from false premises, that is to say an ideologically imposed mental vacuum leading to faulty conclusions.

I don't think that the basic premises of the 2002 Defence Review can be faulted. NZ is a long way from anywhere, it hasn't got anything that people want and it's too small to support armed forces large enough to make it an important ally unless resources are concentrated on something that makes it a valuable ally With the Navy reduced to patrolling and policing home waters and the Air Force restricted to the same tasks plus carrying things, that left funding available to be concentrated on the Army. The questionable presumption was that a dramatic increase in defense funding could not be made available. That was a dubious proposition in 2002 although it is probably correct today. In that sense, 2002 was a wasted opportunity, although I doubt even a major increase in funds would have justified saving the Skyhawks.

You are right about the economy, but what you are not seeing is the way the forces spent the money they had, which was badly and that accounts for a lots of the 1980's issues. Spending millions on certain fire control 'computers' when a hundred or so calculators could have done the job for a few thousand, for example.

That really reflects what I said about the New Zealand Armed Forces trying to be smaller versions of major forces instead of making fundamental priority decisions. That artillery fire control system is a good example. For armies that have a lot of artillery and a lot of troops to support with that artillery, those systems are a godsend. They allow targets to be switched very quickly, guns to be massed on target and then dispersed to provide general support, then massed again. They also allow ammunition supplies to be matched to requirements etc etc. But, for an army with a handful of guns and a handful of troops to support, those facilities just are not needed. It's like somebody getting dressed up in full Hell's Angels regalia and then going out to ride a bicycle.

As for the gear..well have a word with some of the people who excersized with us as I have..the gear was crap, but we made fools of a lot of overconfident allies at certain levels.

As I said, the great strength of the New Zealand Armed Forces was and is superb personnel. That's why concentrating on the Army makes so much sense. It leverages assets and applies force multipliers to advantages rather than just carrying on in the same old way.

Ok. You are getting your history mixed up here, in a major way. ANZAC frigates were a 1980's choice by Labour, mainly for political reasons; Navy wanted Dutch frigates, Kortenaars (sp?) and the last Leander, Canterbury, was retired a few years ago, replaced by L421, the new Canterbury.

I know the history of the ANZACs very well. Basically the New Zealand Government saw the opportunity of getting a couple of new frigates cheap by piggy-backing the 8-ship Australian program. In isolation that wasn't a bad idea. What it did mean was that the decisions were made in Australia. Saying the NZG chose ANZAC for political reasons isn't entirely accurate. They chose to piggy-back the Australian program for economic reasons and the Australians made the selection of MEKO-200 for largely political reasons. The NZG was stuck with it. They did wave their hand and say they didn't like MEKO-200 but they were pretty bluntly told that they were buying two ships out of ten so would they please shut up and take what they were given. And they did. Now, serious questions can be asked about whether buying those MEKO-200s at all was a good idea although it should be noted that the last experience of buying used-British wasn't too thrilling. Leanders were good ships but were expensive to crew and run. Essentially they'd reached the point where age meant maintaining them was reaching the levels of buying a new ship (for a British-built ship, that's around 20 years. For Dutch-built ships, it's closer to 30). The big debate was really about the third frigate for which an option was held (and allowed to lapse). One can argue that either way; my own feeling is that the frigates were of such limited value that probably letting the third ship lapse was the right decision.

The army was always an expeditionary force and had been since 1910 or so, based on the Boar war experience. Right up to the 1950's the plan was to raise a division and go and thump people a long way away, if we could get a lift and the gear. From the 60's onwards it was a deployable light infantry brigade. If you look closely at the territorial reserve you can still the shadow of the old division planning.

This is really where things have changed dramatically since 1945 and I don't think the implications of those changes were fully understood until the late 1980s and for New Zealand until a decade after that. In 1945, another light infantry brigade was an OK contribution. It had its uses even if it was poorly equipped. By the late 1980s it was simply in the way. It absorbed transport lift that could be better used to support modern formations. In 1945, offering an infantry brigade was something substantial and concessions could be gained in exchange for it. By 1990, a poorly equipped infantry brigade was a liability and concessions had to be offered to gain its acceptance. It took the New Zealand Army a decade to understand the implications of that. What this meant was that the force had to be equipped to a standard that, once again, made it an asset not a liability and it had to be provided with the lift that allowed it to deploy independently.

(snip)

The P3's..no ASM's: plan was to look at Harpoon, but that hasn't come about. We only ever got enough to track one sub at a time, but aI doubt we could do that now and their replacement may not be a modern equivalent like P8.

The P-3K2 is Harpoon-capable; for-but-not-with. The presumption (a correct one) is that Harpoons could be obtained very easily if they were needed

Restoring the Jet trainers/fast jet ability . . nasty rumor started by me a few others, but you never know what might happen if the Singaporeans do send their pilots to Ohakea as I have been reading about recently.

I hope not. Utter waste of money. There are much, much higher priorities than buying a handful of fast jets (small numbers mean very high per capita operating expenses)

C130's: that upgrade is a disaster we hope will not reach Aussie SH2G levels. C17 in the RNZAF: they wanted A400M, but as that has turned to custard the replacement will be probably be C130J and anything more will be spare capacity on Aussie C17. Their is a rumor about C27 as an Andover replacement, which wouldn't go astray for a lot of pacific island work, in conjunction with a pair of C17's, but I doubt it from the POV of platform redundancy, perception of cost.

The C-130 problems have a long way to go before they reach Australian SH-2 levels. That being said, a lot of the problems are due to the age of the aircraft and buying new ones would have been a better investment. One obvious choice is to go to the C-130J, the other plan mooted is the C-27/C-17 mix. That's expensive but with Protector out of the way, the money is available - especially since the US procurement of the C-17 is ending and Boeing is desperate for all the orders it can get to keep the line open.

They wanted two battalions worth, but forgot about training and attrition reserves, made up some bullshit about only wanting one battalions worth and an independent squadron on reflection, to cover the error. As it happens I think they should have more of the other varieties in addition to what they have, and some tracked fighting vehicles. But the issue is not gear, even if they could get it, its lack of people, most of the LAV fleet are up on blocks at Linton, I think, as a result.

They are; about half the fleet is in long-term storage and are up for sale. The "other variants" are needed and the Army is looking for swapsies. There is also talk of a switch to Strykers funded by sale of most of the existing LAVs

Lots of lessons to be learned..some of which I cannot mention here

You don't have to - I know them.

but planning was piss poor at navy and at government level.

Much worse than that. The problems with Canterbury were systemic, not isolated. Basically nobody knew what questions to ask and nobody had the gumption to ask which questions to ask (bad New Zealand trait here that keeps biting the NZDF in the ass - they will not go to other people for help when they are stuck. Australians have a lesser version of the same syndrome). Essentially, Canterbury is a militarized version of the commercial ferry Ben-My-Chree. She was a relatively short fat ship optimized for short-haul ferry duties in the relatively calm and placid waters of the Irish Sea. Nobody ever thought to ask wht that made a suitable basis for a long-duration military surveillance and transport mission in the wild waters of the South Pacific. In passing it's fun watching the crew go apeshit when they lose lateral control of an LCVP hanging from a crane. I haven't had so much of a laugh since I watched a crew with a wrecking ball discover they'd knocked down the wrong building. Nobody from the people doing the program oversight flew over to the UK and watched the Ben-My-Chree at work. Then there was the whole thing about accepting an OPC design that the Australian Navy had thrown out the window. But I digress. . . . .

Heard that PM Clark actually said that they should have got a third frigate as well as the patrol ships on reflection on Timor and other activities, but it was to late by then for various reasons, mainly budgetary and political.

The third frigate was actually the third MEKO-200 and that option lapsed in November 2003 so I doubt if it was really on. Anyway, MEKO-200 isn't really that hot. They're OK now since they are existing assets and they make a useful heavy mob to back up the OPVs. If we could turn the clock back, it would have made more sense to buy (say) four or six French Floreal class frigates than two or three MEKO-200s. Floreal is a grossly under-rated design, primarily because people keep thinking of it as a frigate when its actually an OPV. If we had a clean-slate option today, buying a quartet of Absalom class frigate-transports would make a lot of sense. The problem is neither option is really open

Us on the right of the debate here in NZ want spending back at 2% or 1.5% minimum, which would allow the restoration of a lot of lost equipment, and decent equipment levels, but as alluded to above, thats not the problem, the real problem is lack of people, gear means naught with out well trained people and we still have a recruitment problem.

Exactly. That's a problem that affects nearly everybody these days. The shortage of people pretty much defines which options are accessible. I think the 2002 Defense Review actually did a pretty good job of balancing things; the execution may have been flawed in some respects but even there, the NZG did a whole lot better than some countries I can think of (accusing stare: British government goes bright red and shuffles its feet). A lot of the problems are due to inexperience. New Zealand simply hasn't managed large, modern defense programs before and they tripped over their own feet. The real criticism is that they wouldn't hire in help from people who had done such things before.

[Thanas]

Why exactly are the MEKO 200 that bad? From what I hear, the Braunschweig class corvette and the Brandenburg class frigates are pretty decent designs. (Though yes, the sterns needed some strengthening.)

[Stuart]

Why exactly are the MEKO 200 that bad?

There's nothing particularly bad about them, its just that there's nothing particularly good about them. They're typical small frigates designed for the export market and priced for a quick sale. So, everthing on them is the cheapest kit that can be found. A problem peculiar to the MEKO series is that their weapons and sensor systems are containerized; they're delivered to the ship already fitted into a standardized container and that container is then lowered into a standardized receptacle. You may remember about two years ago, the U.S. Navy adopted this approach for LCS and called it a revolutionary development which rather surprised Blohm + Voss (aka Boom and Fuss) who had been doing it for twenty years and RDM who had been doing it for thirty. But I digress . . .

The problem is that the decks have to have additional headspace to make the containers fit and that results in internal volume not being used very efficiently. So MEKO-200s tend to be underarmed for their size.

From what I hear, the Braunschweig class corvette and the Brandenburg class frigates are pretty decent designs. (Though yes, the sterns needed some strengthening.)

The F-123 (Brandenburg) and F-124 Sachsen are both modified MEKO-360 designs (the F-122 Bremen is a German half-sister of the Dutch Kortenaer which, in turn is a Dutch version of the British Type 22). MEKO-360 is the destroyer version of the MEKO-200 (the numbers give design displacement; MEKO-140 = 1,400 tons, MEKO-200 = 2,000 tons, MEKO-360 = 3,600 tons). Only five original MEKO-360 class were built, four going to Argentina and one to Nigeria where she served for many years with great distinction as a floating bordello. The MEKO-360 was a much better design than 200 simply because it was larger and could absorb the inefficiency in use of internal volume more easily.

The K-130 Braunschweig class are not happy ships. They're based on the next-generation MEKO-A140. Unfortunately, the German Navy "improved" the design. As a result it's slow (designed for 28 knots, can barely make 25) and has maneuverability problems that required a bow-thruster to be fitted. They were pretty much a mistake; originally the plan was to build 15 but that was cut short in favor of the F-125 frigate when the K-130s deficiencies became obvious.

[Thanas]

Only five original MEKO-360 class were built, four going to Argentina and one to Nigeria where she served for many years with great distinction as a floating bordello.

Wait, what?

[Stuart]

That's right. She was about the only part of the Nigerian Navy that actually performed to her (revised) spec. When she joined the multinational force operating off Sierra Leone, her arrival was marked by joyous outbursts of enthusiastic cheering from the crews of the other warships. The UN officials were the only ones around who didn't understand why.

One day I'll tell you how the Nigerian Navy managed to sink two frigates by removing all the cockroaches.

[Simon_Jester]

A problem peculiar to the MEKO series is that their weapons and sensor systems are containerized; they're delivered to the ship already fitted into a standardized container and that container is then lowered into a standardized receptacle.

So this is a net bad thing, then, because of the wasted volume? Better to custom-build the equipment mounts or... what?

You may remember about two years ago, the U.S. Navy adopted this approach for LCS and called it a revolutionary development which rather surprised Blohm + Voss (aka Boom and Fuss) who had been doing it for twenty years and RDM who had been doing it for thirty. But I digress . . .

Now I find myself irresistibly curious: What did Blohm und Voss do to get the nickname?

One day I'll tell you how the Nigerian Navy managed to sink two frigates by removing all the cockroaches.

[Thanas]

That's right. She was about the only part of the Nigerian Navy that actually performed to her (revised) spec. When she joined the multinational force operating off Sierra Leone, her arrival was marked by joyous outbursts of enthusiastic cheering from the crews of the other warships. The UN officials were the only ones around who didn't understand why.

Eh....did her crew just have a certain well-deserved reputation and a high percentage of women aboard or did the officers really ran a prostitution ring out of her?

One day I'll tell you how the Nigerian Navy managed to sink two frigates by removing all the cockroaches.

Interesting....

[tim31]

Eh....did her crew just have a certain well-deserved reputation and a high percentage of women aboard or did the officers really ran a prostitution ring out of her?

Must be a Navy thing

[Stuart]

Now I find myself irresistibly curious: What did Blohm und Voss do to get the nickname?

It's just one of those nicknames people came up with

GEC-Marconi became Gak-Macaroni

Krupp-Atlas became Crap-Witless

Janes Fighting Ships became janes Frightening Slips

Duilin and Gartze became Dubious and Ghastly

and so on.

[Stuart]

Eh....did her crew just have a certain well-deserved reputation and a high percentage of women aboard or did the officers really ran a prostitution ring out of her?

The Navy ran a prostitution ring in her. Whores first class used the officer's cabins, then down through the ranks until the girls at the bottom did it standing in the engine rooms. (Touch of hyperbole there but that's more or less how it worked). The ship was alongside, never went to sea but spent her time rocking gently.

Interesting....

Basically, what happened was that the ships were never cleaned and were heavily infested. So much so that opening a hatch would sweep a path through inches of roaches on the deck. The ships was literally seething with the things. Anyway, finally there was an effort to clean them up with the ships being fumigated and then people shovelling dead cockroaches into skips. It was that bad. Then they found that the ship's water and septic system was also infested with roaches. The pipes were literally blocked with the things. So, it was decided the best way of cleaning them out was to pour acid down the piping. So they did, concentrated sulphuric acid. Only, then they discovered that, before deserting en masse, the crew had stolen all the naval-standard copper piping in the ship and replaced it with commercial grade PVC pipes. The moment the acid hit that, it ate straight through them. The acid then poured into the ship's bilges (we're talking tens of gallons of the stuff) and ate through the ship's bottoms. Both ships sank at their moorings. In 1996, both ships were written off but eventually one was salvaged and rebuilt

[Thanas]

Jeesus. Any links for both stories and was somebody ever punished for this sort of incompetence?

[Simon_Jester]

Wow. Just... wow. No wonder the Somalians don't have anything left to patrol piracy with; they're probably at least as messed up as Nigeria is on this front if not more so.

Now, I'm completely misrepresenting the incident, but I can't resist:

Welcome to the Nigerian Navy! Our motto: "Careful! That's a load-bearing cockroach!"

[Stuart]

Jeesus. Any links for both stories and was somebody ever punished for this sort of incompetence?

The Enymiri class story was in Combat Fleets of the World with pictures of the half-dissolved ships sitting on the bottom. It's amusing to note that these two ships are very rarely mentioned in Nigerian naval articles.

The bit about the Aradu was also mentioned in Combat Fleets. She served as a bordello from around 1988 to 95. She's still around but she's a real mess.

I don't think anybody was ever punished for any of this stuff. Too many fingers in the till for that. There comes a point where corruption is so established that there is nobody left to say otherwise.

[Stofsk]

I like the bordello ship story. It at least is harmless when compared next to 'lol lets get rid of all the cockroaches oh whoops ok we just sank the bloody ships'

[Lonestar]

Must be a Navy thing

She was the SUPPO for the first half of my being on the Bunker Hill. She ain't pretty, and she sucked(har har) at that job. She accidently ordered 30 pallets of "Vanilla Coke", and, of course, nothing else would be bought until the crew worked through them. When this finally set in they all mysteriously disappeared one evening doing circles off the coast of Southern California.

[tim31]

I heard it from you first

Was there a live fire .50 exercise that night as well?

[Sea Skimmer]

The Enymiri class story was in Combat Fleets of the World with pictures of the half-dissolved ships sitting on the bottom. It's amusing to note that these two ships are very rarely mentioned in Nigerian naval articles.

Do you know which edition by chance? The latest one is on Google but shows the one of the things afloat, also mentions it had an engine room explosion in 2004. How the hell that works with a diesel powered ship is beyond me, using unrefined crude for fuel in the best Imperial Japanese traditions maybe?

[Stuart]

The details and pictures are in the 1990/91 edition page 397. The incident actually happened in April 1987. The two ships were the Otobo and the Dorina; the Dorina was so badly corroded by the acid she was left in situ then scrapped in 1996; the Otobo was raised and taken to OARN, Genoa for repairs in 1989. Nothing had happened by 1998 and IIRC she was eventually used as an alongside training hulk.

PS. When Aradu turned up for a refit after her collisions (she had three in one year), the dockside workers found a torpedo firmly rusted into one of her torpedo tubes. There were rude jokes about that given her primary operational role.

[Scottish Ninja]

How on earth does acid eat through the bottom of a ship's hull?

[Shroom Man 777]

It ate through its ballast piping or whatever, not its hull. Same effect though, had the water flood in.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

How on earth does acid eat through the bottom of a ship's hull?

All ships have a network of pump, pipes, to pump water out, to pump water in, either for sanitation, refuse disposal etc. So if that stuff got destroyed, along with all the pump systems, water just floods in.

[Stuart]

How on earth does acid eat through the bottom of a ship's hull?

Concentrated sulphuric acid + steel = hole.

In fact, the damage extended far beyond the ship's bottom. I was looking at a picture last night and the acid damage extends throughout the whole ship. There's massive black-stained damage to the superstructure as well.