What if the USSR was a Nazi ally during WW2?

[Beowulf]

Near the end of fighting in the European Theater, the Germans were so far off on their bomb project, that they decided to use natural uranium in their AP shells (same physical properties as DU, but with all the U-235 still inside).

[Sidewinder]

Near the end of fighting in the European Theater, the Germans were so far off on their bomb project, that they decided to use natural uranium in their AP shells (same physical properties as DU, but with all the U-235 still inside).

Were they attempting to use uranium's natural density to create armor-piercing shells, or were they trying to create a gun-type tactical nuclear weapon?

[atg]

Near the end of fighting in the European Theater, the Germans were so far off on their bomb project, that they decided to use natural uranium in their AP shells (same physical properties as DU, but with all the U-235 still inside).

Were they attempting to use uranium's natural density to create armor-piercing shells, or were they trying to create a gun-type tactical nuclear weapon?

I believe it was for AP shells.

[Sidewinder]

Near the end of fighting in the European Theater, the Germans were so far off on their bomb project, that they decided to use natural uranium in their AP shells (same physical properties as DU, but with all the U-235 still inside).

Were they attempting to use uranium's natural density to create armor-piercing shells, or were they trying to create a gun-type tactical nuclear weapon?

I believe it was for AP shells.

I find it surprising they'd use natural uranium for AP shells instead of... I dunno... high-carbon steel. Isn't uranium very expensive? Or was it dirt-cheap until AFTER the bombing of Hiroshima?

By the way, in case anyone's wondering what Hitler could've done to make the US declare war so early, let's just say he tried to keep the US out of the war by launching a terror attack on US soil. (Yes, I know the Black Tom explosion occured in 1916, but someone as obsessed with the past as Hitler might try to repeat history-- in the worst possible way.)

[phongn]

I find it surprising they'd use natural uranium for AP shells instead of... I dunno... high-carbon steel. Isn't uranium very expensive? Or was it dirt-cheap until AFTER the bombing of Hiroshima?

They had quite a bit of it laying around from their canceled nuclear weapons program and other alternatives were becoming increasingly scarce.

I honestly don't think that America would have the bomb if Germany didn't fall. I just watched a special on it and many of the last minute advances that made the Manhattan project successful occurred after Germany fell. There was a literal rush between the soviets and the Americans to nab German scientists before the other side got to them. Germany even had an almost working bomb, yet lacked a few innovations which the Americans had to make it work.

I think you should be very careful about what you watch on television specials, because this is totally and utterly wrong. Operation Alsos indicates that the Allied effort had surpassed the German one by 1942.

Incidentally, the German program was canceled in 1943 and they were many years away from any working nuclear weapon.

Also I think if early there was an alliance between Germany and Russia, the USA would not have had the problems it did with Japan. Japan was an aggressor against communist Prussia and communist china. Chinese relations are shot to pieces because the US and the allies are going to do everything they can to get the powerful Japaneses military to crush the communists in the east. So there is no Pearl Harbor but there is a far eastern front opened up against the Prussians which I can not see the Japaneses turning down. Instead of going it alone against Korea and China, they have active support in pushing even further into russia.

You might note that Japan was also smacking down Nationalist China, much to the displeasure of the United States. Japan's long-term war aims were also to have an Asia ruled by Asians and their long-term strategic goals required the resources of areas guarded by the Philippine Islands. This would likely bring Japan and the US into conflict at some point (though the decision to go-ahead with Pearl Harbor was close; this alternate timeline might have Japan deciding to cancel it).

And what of this nonsense about a Far Eastern front by Japan against Russia? Japan is not going to poke the Bear if they can help it - they tried at Khalin Gol and got smacked down, hard. They didn't even try it in OTL when the Soviets were busy fighting Germans - and you say that they're going to try attacking a virtually untouched USSR? Ludicrous!

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

The German program was largely stifled in no small part due to the British covert efforts to sabotage the program (destruction of related materials etc.).

Of course, the Germans placed Heisenberg in charge despite the fact that he was quite well known to be a class one idiot for an experimentalist. The guy was allowed to graduate despite having screwed his lab component of his studies.

[Pelranius]

I thought Heisenberg was in charge of building the German reactor (it was a good thing the Allies stopped him from turning it on at the end of the war, or he would have made a large portion of Deustchland glow green).

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

I thought Heisenberg was in charge of building the German reactor (it was a good thing the Allies stopped him from turning it on at the end of the war, or he would have made a large portion of Deustchland glow green).

I am not entirely sure what his position was, but I remember reading somewhere that he was a person of high importance in the program at the very least. A wiki article (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werner_Heisenberg) cited a book that stated that he was in charge in some way.

Of course, yes, his bumbling ability in experimental Physics might have sent Germany imploding.

[K. A. Pital]

The USSR was a Nazi Ally from 1939 to 1941 - Look at the joint invasion of Poland together.

This is called "co-belligerence". And technically, the USSR was very careful in it's territorial aquisitions. It was cautious enough to wait until it was absolutely clear Britain and France won't be doing jack shit about Hitler's invasion, and then moved in to seize territories.

I have a book somewhere here titled "The Deadly Embrace" on Nazi-Soviet relations during that period. I believe that the Soviets kept on sending trains full of crucial materials right across the border to the very last minute on 22 June 41.

The amount of trade between the both was insignificant in the grand scheme of things, and Germany also "kept sending trains" up to 22 June 1941, the trade went bothways.
Germany bought from the USSR (in costs):

Yellow - grain
Green - cotton and flax
Dark grey - oil products
Light grey - metals and ores
Orange - all else
Red - payments for transit of goods

In the "ores and metals" catergory the main positions were metals (half of it) and platinum (one third of it). The rest - iridium, chrome and manganese ore. The whole sum of our shipments to Germany constituted 426 million mark + 23 million for the transit of goods.

In absolute figures:
Grain - 1,27 million ton
Cotton - 100 thousand ton
Flax - 9 thousand ton
Oil products - 907 thousand ton

As one can see, the shipments were rather small. Only the oil products constituted a somewhat considerable part of German consumption (~10%).

What did trade with Germany give to the USSR in exchange?

Dark grey - coal
Light grey - metals
Blue - ships and vessels
Green - military orders
Light orange - industrial equipment
Orange - industrial machinery (lathe, presses, benches, steel-cutters, etc..)

The total sum of goods received was 250 million mark.

The industrial equipment was delivered only on 43 million mark, including license payments (~16% from total German shipments). In metals - it was quality high-grade steel, tubes, metae, wire.

The equimpent received breaks down the following way. Out of 43 million mark paid for industrial equipment, 12,7 million were for steel-cutting machines. The rest went on mining equipment (9,7 million, mostly excavators), oil industry equipment (8,9 million, mostly diesels and electric motors), equipment for chemical industry (4,4 million), equipment for electric stations and locomobiles (2,7 million). The number of steel-cutting machines received by this transfer was 1440 (a minor number - in 1940 the Soviet industry produced over 58 000 such machines).

All in all, the trade was fairly minor for both of the participants.

[Sean Mulligan]

Being a very smart ass; the OP of this story was correct....

The USSR was a Nazi Ally from 1939 to 1941 - Look at the joint invasion of Poland together.

I have a book somewhere here titled "The Deadly Embrace" on Nazi-Soviet relations during that period. I believe that the Soviets kept on sending trains full of crucial materials right across the border to the very last minute on 22 June 41.

The Soviet Union only invaded Poland to prevent the Germans from going all the way to the Soviet border. The occupation of territory that otherwise would have fallen under Nazi rule probably saved many lives and helped the Soviets win the war by increasing the distance between the Moscow and the border of German occupied territory.

[Sean Mulligan]

Being a very smart ass; the OP of this story was correct....

The USSR was a Nazi Ally from 1939 to 1941 - Look at the joint invasion of Poland together.

I have a book somewhere here titled "The Deadly Embrace" on Nazi-Soviet relations during that period. I believe that the Soviets kept on sending trains full of crucial materials right across the border to the very last minute on 22 June 41.

[K. A. Pital]

The Soviet Union only invaded Poland to prevent the Germans from going all the way to the Soviet border. The occupation of territory that otherwise would have fallen under Nazi rule probably saved many lives and helped the Soviets win the war by increasing the distance between the Moscow and the border of German occupied territory.

Not only. The USSR cleverly played on the imperialist war between German and British empires, while at the same time consolidated the holdings of old Tsarist Russia in Eastern Europe.

The problem was, that, despite being industrially developed far more than the Tsarist Russia, the international weight of the USSR was downplayed because of the Revolution.

Stalin had two alternatives - face being the periphery of the world, or try to re-instate Russia as a great power. He chose the 2nd way and crafted the Soviet foreign policy strategy around this goal - trying to increase the Soviet influence in Europe, first and foremost.

[Sidewinder]

Being a very smart ass; the OP of this story was correct....

The USSR was a Nazi Ally from 1939 to 1941 - Look at the joint invasion of Poland together. :)

I have a book somewhere here titled "The Deadly Embrace" on Nazi-Soviet relations during that period. I believe that the Soviets kept on sending trains full of crucial materials right across the border to the very last minute on 22 June 41.

The Soviet Union only invaded Poland to prevent the Germans from going all the way to the Soviet border. The occupation of territory that otherwise would have fallen under Nazi rule probably saved many lives and helped the Soviets win the war by increasing the distance between the Moscow and the border of German occupied territory.

Are you out of your goddamn mind?

Although officially labeled a "non-aggression treaty", the pact included a secret protocol, in which the independent countries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania were divided into spheres of interest of the parties. The secret protocol explicitly assumed "territorial and political rearrangements" in the areas of these countries. Subsequently all the mentioned countries were invaded, occupied or forced to cede part of their territory by either the Soviet Union, Germany, or both...

For its part, the Soviet Union was not interested in maintaining a status quo, which it saw as disadvantageous to its interests, deriving as it did from the period of Soviet weakness immediately following the 1917 October Revolution and Russian Civil War. Helping Germany grow strong had accordingly been Soviet policy from 1920 to 1933. A fourth partition of Poland was suggested a regular intervals, satisfying Lenin's imperative that Versailles be undermined by destroying Poland...

Soviet leaders adopted the position that war between what they characterized as rival imperialist countries was not only an inevitable consequence of capitalism, but by weakening the participants would also enhance conditions for the spread of Communism...

In March 1939, Hitler's denunciation of the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact was taken by the Soviets as a clear signal of Hitler's aggressive intentions. Soviet foreign minister Litvinov, in April, outlined a French, British, Soviet alliance, with military commitment against Fascist powers, but Chamberlain's government procrastinated (partly because the Soviets demanded too much – impossible troop commitments, a Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, complete reciprocity and the right to send troops through Poland). However, Chamberlain, who already on 24 March had, with France, guaranteed the sovereignty of Poland, now on 25 April signed a Pact of Mutual Assistance with Poland. Consequently, Stalin no longer feared that the West would leave the Soviet Union to fight Hitler alone; indeed, if Germany and the West went to war, as seemed likely, the USSR could afford to remain neutral and wait for them to destroy each other.

If you continue talking bullshit about how the heroic Stalin ordered the INVASION OF POLAND to SAVE POLAND FROM THE NAZIS, I might as well stamp "Stalinist stooge" on your forehead. Don't forget, Stalin ordered the mass murder of tens of thousands of Polish citizens in 1940.

[Sean Mulligan]

Being a very smart ass; the OP of this story was correct....

The USSR was a Nazi Ally from 1939 to 1941 - Look at the joint invasion of Poland together.

I have a book somewhere here titled "The Deadly Embrace" on Nazi-Soviet relations during that period. I believe that the Soviets kept on sending trains full of crucial materials right across the border to the very last minute on 22 June 41.

The Soviet Union only invaded Poland to prevent the Germans from going all the way to the Soviet border. The occupation of territory that otherwise would have fallen under Nazi rule probably saved many lives and helped the Soviets win the war by increasing the distance between the Moscow and the border of German occupied territory.

Are you out of your goddamn mind?

Although officially labeled a "non-aggression treaty", the pact included a secret protocol, in which the independent countries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania were divided into spheres of interest of the parties. The secret protocol explicitly assumed "territorial and political rearrangements" in the areas of these countries. Subsequently all the mentioned countries were invaded, occupied or forced to cede part of their territory by either the Soviet Union, Germany, or both...

For its part, the Soviet Union was not interested in maintaining a status quo, which it saw as disadvantageous to its interests, deriving as it did from the period of Soviet weakness immediately following the 1917 October Revolution and Russian Civil War. Helping Germany grow strong had accordingly been Soviet policy from 1920 to 1933. A fourth partition of Poland was suggested a regular intervals, satisfying Lenin's imperative that Versailles be undermined by destroying Poland...

Soviet leaders adopted the position that war between what they characterized as rival imperialist countries was not only an inevitable consequence of capitalism, but by weakening the participants would also enhance conditions for the spread of Communism...

In March 1939, Hitler's denunciation of the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact was taken by the Soviets as a clear signal of Hitler's aggressive intentions. Soviet foreign minister Litvinov, in April, outlined a French, British, Soviet alliance, with military commitment against Fascist powers, but Chamberlain's government procrastinated (partly because the Soviets demanded too much – impossible troop commitments, a Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, complete reciprocity and the right to send troops through Poland). However, Chamberlain, who already on 24 March had, with France, guaranteed the sovereignty of Poland, now on 25 April signed a Pact of Mutual Assistance with Poland. Consequently, Stalin no longer feared that the West would leave the Soviet Union to fight Hitler alone; indeed, if Germany and the West went to war, as seemed likely, the USSR could afford to remain neutral and wait for them to destroy each other.

If you continue talking bullshit about how the heroic Stalin ordered the INVASION OF POLAND to SAVE POLAND FROM THE NAZIS, I might as well stamp "Stalinist stooge" on your forehead. Don't forget, Stalin ordered the mass murder of tens of thousands of Polish citizens in 1940.

Well Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain both said that the occupation of Eastern Poland by the Soviet Union was justified. Why is it that the Germans waited two years to announce the discovery of the Katyn massacre and they only announced it after their defeat at Stalingrad when they needed a propaganda victory? The accusations against the Soviets seems suspicious to me both because of the timing and how som ultra right elements are using the Katyn Massacre to justify holocaust denial and denying the legitimacy of the Nurenburg trials.

[Sidewinder]

Well Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain both said that the occupation of Eastern Poland by the Soviet Union was justified.

Please provide the source of this information, so we can determine this isn't just you regurgitating Soviet propaganda.

Why is it that the Germans waited two years to announce the discovery of the Katyn massacre and they only announced it after their defeat at Stalingrad when they needed a propaganda victory? The accusations against the Soviets seems suspicious to me both because of the timing and how som ultra right elements are using the Katyn Massacre to justify holocaust denial and denying the legitimacy of the Nurenburg trials.

STOP REPEATING SOVIET PROPAGANDA!

The Western Allies had an implicit, if unwilling, hand in the cover-up in their endeavour not to antagonise a then ally, the Soviet Union. The resulting Polish-Soviet crisis was beginning to threaten the vital alliance with the Soviet Union at a time when the Poles' importance to the Allies, essential in the first years of the war, was beginning to fade due to the entry into the conflict of the military and industrial giants, the Soviet Union and the United States. In retrospective review of records, it is clear that both British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt were increasingly torn between their commitments to their Polish ally, the uncompromising stance of Sikorski and the demands by Stalin and his diplomats.

The picture of exhumations of Polish dead at Katyn Forest (1943) was distributed by the Nazi German Ministry of propaganda.In private, Churchill agreed that the atrocity was likely carried out by the Soviets. According to the note taken by Count Raczyński, Churchill admitted on April 15 during a conversation with General Sikorski: "Alas, the German revelations are probably true. The Bolsheviks can be very cruel." However at the same time, on April 24 Churchill assured the Soviets: "We shall certainly oppose vigorously any 'investigation' by the International Red Cross or any other body in any territory under German authority. Such investigation would be a fraud and its conclusions reached by terrorism." Unofficial or classified UK documents concluded that Soviet guilt was a "near certainty", but the alliance with the Soviets was deemed to be more important than moral issues, thus official version supported the Soviet version, up to censoring the contradictory accounts. Churchill's own post-war account of the Katyn affair is laconic. In his memoirs, he quotes the 1944 Soviet inquiry into the massacre, which predictably proved that the Germans had committed the crime, and adds, "belief seems an act of faith."

The fact that the Nazis were responsible for the mass murder of 6,000,000 Jews does NOT mean the Soviets were innocent of the mass murder of 14,540 Poles. (Links to more information on the Katyn massacre is available at the Wikipedia site, including a Reuters article.)

[PeZook]

Well Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain both said that the occupation of Eastern Poland by the Soviet Union was justified.

They did not ever say this, as far as I know. They have agreed with Stalin they were willing to use the modified Curzon line as the basis of a post-war border if, and only if Poland received compensation in the form of Germany's eastern lands, and they only did that because the need to humor Stalin. The Red Army was marching west, and took upon itself the brunt of the fighting. Quite frankly, the Soviets were more important than the Poles at the time. This does not make the 1939 Soviet invasion justified in any way, either morally or legally.

Why is it that the Germans waited two years to announce the discovery of the Katyn massacre and they only announced it after their defeat at Stalingrad when they needed a propaganda victory? The accusations against the Soviets seems suspicious to me both because of the timing and how...

They announced it two years after the discovery, when they needed a propaganda victory because, uh...they needed a propaganda victory?

You do know that Katyn was under soviet occupation at the time of the massacre, right? What, did the Germans murder all those Soviet POWs, bury them on soviet controlled territory and then went "Hey, look what the soviets did!"

It's not like every historian to ever investigate the Katyn massacre concluded it was NKVD's work, no sir...

...som ultra right elements are using the Katyn Massacre to justify holocaust denial and denying the legitimacy of the Nurenburg trials.

Using Katyn to deny the holocaust is just as fallacious as claiming the Soviets have to be innocent because Germans murdered people. When atrocity A was comitted by one side, and atrocity B by the other, how does B invalidate A?

The Soviet Union only invaded Poland to prevent the Germans from going all the way to the Soviet border. The occupation of territory that otherwise would have fallen under Nazi rule probably saved many lives and helped the Soviets win the war by increasing the distance between the Moscow and the border of German occupied territory.

It may have saved many lives of Red Army soldiers in 1943-1944, but 1 800 000 Poles displaced to Siberia, of whom 1/4 to 1/2 died there, were certainly less than happy about it.

[K. A. Pital]

The antagonism between two empires and systems was deadly. Stalin, certainly, thought that Hitler would be a less dangerous enemy for Russia after a year-long war against the Western powers. Hitler followed his "divide and conquer" method. The fact that this Pact could ever come to be signified the full depth of the french and british diplomacy and foreign policy for several years. In favor of the Soviets I must say, that it was vitally important to move the initial starting positions of the German armies as far as possible to the West, for the Russians to have time to collect their forces from all remote ends of their enormously sized empire. In the minds of the Russians forever engraved were the catastrophes, which their armies suffered in 1914, as they tried to advance on the Germans, without finishing the mobilization. And now their borders are a lot more Eastern than they were during the first war. They need to, by force or lies, to occupy the Baltic and the greater part of Poland, before they are attacked. Even if their policy was callous calculation, it was also highly realistic at the time.

Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in Britain, reported from a meeting with Churchill on 6 Oct 1939 the following to his superiors in Moscow:

Churchill understands clearly that the USSR should be the master of the Eastern territories of Baltic shores, and he is quite glad that the Baltic countries are being incorporated into our state, not the German one. This is historically correct and at the same time it limits Hitler's possible "lebensraum". Here the interests of Britain and the USSR don't collide, but are congruent.

When Churchill excused the actions of British politicians who were acting against the embetterment of Soviet-British relations, he said to Maisky:

You should understand that this sudden turn in Soviet politics in the end of August (the M-R Pact - S.B.) was a great shock to Britain. During the first two months of the war we also did not know what your position is... Many expected that you'll become our open enemy in several days".

Concerning Soviet territorial claims, Churchill said the following during the talks:

England not only cannot object to the realization of Soviet demands, but also has a moral obligation to make it easier for the USSR to achieve them, because Russia has lost it's positions, including the Baltic, because of the previous war on the Entente side and because it, by it's sacrifices and struggles, especially in the beginning of the war, saved France and made it possible for the allies to win in the end.

Acknowledging that our demands to Finland are fully valid (well-founded), he (Churchill) wanted to say that his best hopes are that we'll try not to use force against Finland, because this would leave a heavy impression in England and would make the embetterment of Anglo-Soviet relations impossible for a long time

The politicians of Britain and United States full well understood the necessity of Soviet annexation of the Baltics - here's what Halifax, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Britain telegraphes to the British ambassador in the US on 18 June 1940 - that Stalin, acting quite rationally, creates in the Baltics "a strong strategic border on both land and sea, in case, if he will have to defend against German agression".

That's about the views of Churchill and the politicians of the Allies.

The fact that the Nazis were responsible for the mass murder of 6,000,000 Jews does NOT mean the Soviets were innocent of the mass murder of 14,540 Poles.

To be fair, the Nazis were not only responsible for the deaths of ~6 million Jews, but also over 17 000 000 Soviet civilians - Slavs, Jews, Roma, all "inferior races". Around 2,5 million Soviet POWs also died in Nazi captivity.

The executed in Poland were several thousand POWs. And it's not as if Poland hasn't earlier been at fault for the deaths of thousands of Soviet POWs during the 1920's conflict. There was a lot of bad blood between USSR and Poland, that's why this atrocity happened in the first place.

If you continue talking bullshit about how the heroic Stalin ordered the INVASION OF POLAND to SAVE POLAND FROM THE NAZIS, I might as well stamp "Stalinist stooge" on your forehead.

The invasion was not "heroic", but it was a realpolitik measure which was needed to protect the USSR. Not Poland, but the Soviet Union. The whole idea that the USSR would for some reason pursue Poland's or Britain's national interests in damage to it's own is ridiculous; the USSR wasn't some sort of altruist doo-gooder, it was a country which sought dire alliances to allow for some measure of protection for itself.

The monumental failure of Franco-British-Soviet talks to form any sort of coherent alliance left the USSR no other choice but the Pact. This was also realized by Churchill:

Munich and a lot of other things have made the Soviet government certain, that neither Britain nor France would fight unless attacked directly, and that even in this case there'd be little use from both of them.

Here's Churchill on Poland, Munich, etc.:

...When all those advantages and all this help were thrown away, Britain, leading France after it, took on itself territorial guarantees to Poland - the same Poland, which just half a year earlier took part in the robbery and destruction of the Czechoslovak state with the huger of a hyena. We had to fight for Czechoslovakia in 1938, when Germany could hardly bring half-a-dozen trained divisions on the Western front, and the French, having 60-70 divisions, could without doubt break the Rhein or the Rhur bassin. But all this was thought to be unwise, uncareful, not worthy of modern democratic views. But yet, two democracies have at last put their life on the table for the territorial integrity of Poland. In history, which as they say is a long raw of crimes, madness and catastrophes of humanity, after the most thoughtful inquiry we will hardly find anything similar to such most sudden turn from the 5-6 year lasting policy of appeasement and the certainity to go to war in far worse circumstances and in the greatest possible scale...

Quite frankly, the Soviets were more important than the Poles at the time. This does not make the 1939 Soviet invasion justified in any way, either morally or legally.

Of course. Just like Germany was more important than the Czechs at the time. This does not make the Polish 1938 invasion justified in any way, either morally or legally.

It may have saved many lives of Red Army soldiers in 1943-1944, but 1 800 000 Poles displaced to Siberia, of whom 1/4 to 1/2 died there, were certainly less than happy about it.

Cannot be true.

Deportations 1940-1941:
1) "osadniks" - 140000–141000
2) families of deportees - 61000
3) refugees - 78000-79000
4) deportee settlers - 34000-44000

The total number of 1940-1941 deportees was ~320 000 polish citizens.

To study the deportations - beginning from the resolutions of USSR goverment for the first relocation operation (end of 1939) and until the amnesty done on 12 Aug 1941, the following archival materials were used:

- documents of the convoy forces of NKVD USSR, which are stored in the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA);

- documents of the labour settlements (OTP, later OTSP) of tue GULAG NKVD USSR, which are stored in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF)

- directives for 1940 deportations: resolutions of the Politbureau CC VKP(b), Orders of the Soviet of the People's Kommisars of the USSR (Sovnarkom), which are stored in the Archive of the President of Russian Fdereation (APRF) and the GARF, also the instructions for deportations in 1940-1941 - in RGVA and GARF.

The results of all those document analysis are presented in a short form below:

In 1940, three deportations were done, on 10 Feb, 13 Apr and 29 June. In May and June 1941 the fourth operation was run. The deporation was done in a day, the loading on railway carriages took more time. Usually the trains were en route around 2-4 weeks [...]

Using the archives of the konvoy forces we created a list of 208 echelons which transported the deportees from BSSR and USSR into the depth of USSR. The total number of such echelons was 211 [..]
Lists by surname were not found, but because of the documents on the number of almost each echelon, we could pin with certainity the number of polish citizens who were deported in 1940: in Feb. - 139000-141000, in Apr - 61 000 and in june-july 75 000.
The counting methodic and the numeration of echelons with deportees is explicitly described in our monography, which contains the list of those echelons: Gurjanow A. Cztery deportacje // KARTA: Niezalezne pismo historyczne (Warszawa). 1994. Nr. 12. S. 114–136.

Concerning deportee deaths:

In the documents detaling the movement of settlers (spetzposelentsy), of particular importance is the information about the number of dead per quartal, which allows to determine the overall death level of polish settlers during 1940-1941. Since the settlement till 1 July 1941 [...], i.e. for 16 months of settlements, 10 864 people died - 7,7% of all people arrived, which translates to a yearly death rate of 5,8%.

[...]
If, for a more correct comparison of the categories of settlers we take into account the regions and republics to which they were settling, the yearly death coefficients as per the OTSP statistics from 1 Oct 1940 to 1 July 1941 would be 5,9% for "osadniki" and 2,9% for refugees.

[PeZook]

Re: quotes

What these quotes say is basically "We understand why the Soviets did this, and it was strategically prudent for them to do it." So they acknowledged the invasion and annexation of the Baltics and Polish eastern marshes was understandable, but do not try to justify it with international law or moral cocerns, save for poorly understood "historical correctness". Few Allied politicians really understood, say, the difference between Belorussians and Russians.

The executed in Poland were several thousand POWs. And it's not as if Poland hasn't earlier been at fault for the deaths of thousands of Soviet POWs during the 1920's conflict. There was a lot of bad blood between USSR and Poland, that's why this atrocity happened in the first place.

The problem people have with Katyn isn't the number of murdered officers, it's the method. POWs who died in Polish custody in 1920 died of disease, sometimes hunger and exposure, because Polish POW camps were ill-prepared to handle the unexpected amount of prisoners. It's still horrible, and the outrage understandable, but the crucial difference is that Katyn prisoners were interned in POW camps for months, and then all shot in the back of the head by the NKVD. There was bad blood, but it was not a random act of violence between soldiers of two nation-states that hold a grudge against each other ; it was calculated and cold-blooded murder, ordered by authorities and carried out efficiently and brutally by a state agency.

The invasion was not "heroic", but it was a realpolitik measure which was needed to protect the USSR. Not Poland, but the Soviet Union. The whole idea that the USSR would for some reason pursue Poland's or Britain's national interests in damage to it's own is ridiculous; the USSR wasn't some sort of altruist doo-gooder, it was a country which sought dire alliances to allow for some measure of protection for itself.

However, Stalin not only decided to invade these territories in order to create a "buffer zone" - he fully intended to keep them as part of the USSR, even after the war, when the USSR didn't need a buffer against Germany anymore.

Quite frankly, the Soviets were more important than the Poles at the time. This does not make the 1939 Soviet invasion justified in any way, either morally or legally.

Of course. Just like Germany was more important than the Czechs at the time. This does not make the Polish 1938 invasion justified in any way, either morally or legally.

Naturally. I'm far from attempting to justify the 1938 invasion in any form, and I'm not going to whitewash the pre-war Polish government.

Cannot be true.

Deportations 1940-1941:
1) "osadniks" - 140000–141000
2) families of deportees - 61000
3) refugees - 78000-79000
4) deportee settlers - 34000-44000

The total number of 1940-1941 deportees was ~320 000 polish citizens.

I checked your source, and it's been confirmed by the Breslau University. I cited the 1.8mln number from "Powstanie '44" by Norman Davies (Polish edition, p. 60), which was probably taken in line with published estimates from the 1990s. However, the work by Gurjanow seems to be the latest on the topic, and uses primary sources, so it's probably more accurate. It's also accepted in "Europa nieprowincjonalna", the lates Polish book on the subject of the Eastern Marshes.

In other words, you're right, I was wrong

Though take note - colonel Czeslav Grzelak, in his book "Kresy w czerwieni", makes a statement that the numbers above should be treated as a lower limit, since it's possible there are document related to these deportations still locked up in Russian archives that were not released yet.

I'll concede to you on deportee death rates, since I was unable to find a better source than "Powstanie '44", which doesn't cite a source itself.

[K. A. Pital]

So they acknowledged the invasion and annexation of the Baltics and Polish eastern marshes was understandable, but do not try to justify it with international law or moral cocerns, save for poorly understood "historical correctness".

Of course not. International law and, well, national interest pursuit often don't go hand it hand. That's the sad truth. And "moral concerns"? Morality and politics are very loosely tied.

There was bad blood, but it was not a random act of violence between soldiers of two nation-states that hold a grudge against each other ; it was calculated and cold-blooded murder

Sure. But I may also note that the murder was rather pointless, and only 15 000 of the interned 40 000 POWs have been shot. So, even if it was cold and cruel murder, it was rather random. It wasn't soundly backed, just randomly decided by the Politbureau.

However, Stalin not only decided to invade these territories in order to create a "buffer zone" - he fully intended to keep them as part of the USSR, even after the war, when the USSR didn't need a buffer against Germany anymore.

Stalin's "intentions" after the war were not some sort of pre-destined policy. They came about due to the escalating hostility between the USSR and Western Allies. Remember, at first Stalin allowed contact with the Polish Government and said that Poland will have it's government restored. However, during 44-45 the breach between the Allies grew stronger as the West sought covert ties with Germany (of which Stalin was informed by our razvedchiki, and, well, he was rather alarmed by such a turn of events even if the incident itself didn't bring any Nazi-American alliance). By 1945, it was clear that there is increasing antagonism, and the USSR created another "buffer zone" from the East European territories. Remember, not all East European countries had immediately fallen under Soviet influence, the governments were installed gradually as the blood worsened between USSR and the West.

Naturally. I'm far from attempting to justify the 1938 invasion in any form, and I'm not going to whitewash the pre-war Polish government.

Well, that's sort of what I meant to say, that national interests and international law, moral concerns not always go hand in hand. People sometimes forget that their own governments behave the same way as most other governments with a pretense at influence - dominate, aquire, annex, control and try to exert influence.

I cited the 1.8mln number from "Powstanie '44" by Norman Davies (Polish edition, p. 60), which was probably taken in line with published estimates from the 1990s.

Oh, I see. Well, that's rather common for the pre-archival sources to exaggerate deportee numbers, deaths, etc. Remember, historians were Cold Warriors, and most of them didn't yet get to see the archives. The common Cold War trend was to exaggerate greatly the deportations, repressions, executions in the USSR, until the opening of the archives - for political purpose, obviously. Sometimes exaggerate greatly, to an unrealistic scale even from demographic perspectives (like claiming 20 million dead from the Great Terror, 60 million dead, or other similar nosense). And Gurjanow's work is very good and based on hard documental evidence - the "Memorial" foundation literally overturned whole tomes of archival material to study deportations in the USSR.

[PeZook]

Of course not. International law and, well, national interest pursuit often don't go hand it hand. That's the sad truth. And "moral concerns"? Morality and politics are very loosely tied.

Ok, this entire tangent was just an attempt to counter the "saved more lives" angle. Saving lives (expecially Polish lives) had nothing to do with the invasion, it was a strategically calculated move.

Sure. But I may also note that the murder was rather pointless, and only 15 000 of the interned 40 000 POWs have been shot. So, even if it was cold and cruel murder, it was rather random. It wasn't soundly backed, just randomly decided by the Politbureau.

I'm not entirely sure if it being random makes it better or worse, but this distinction is pretty much irrelevant

Stalin's "intentions" after the war were not some sort of pre-destined policy. They came about due to the escalating hostility between the USSR and Western Allies. Remember, at first Stalin allowed contact with the Polish Government and said that Poland will have it's government restored. However, during 44-45 the breach between the Allies grew stronger as the West sought covert ties with Germany (of which Stalin was informed by our razvedchiki, and, well, he was rather alarmed by such a turn of events even if the incident itself didn't bring any Nazi-American alliance). By 1945, it was clear that there is increasing antagonism, and the USSR created another "buffer zone" from the East European territories. Remember, not all East European countries had immediately fallen under Soviet influence, the governments were installed gradually as the blood worsened between USSR and the West.

I'm not sure about that. I mean, the deportations started immediately after the invasion, and Stalin was insistent the modified Curzon line was the one and only legal border between the USSR and Poland, right from the very first talk on the subject with the Allies. It's easy to understand where this comes from - resentment at the 1921 Riga treaty - but all argument that could justify a reasonable claim to these lands came from force of arms, rather than historical, ethnic reasons or - least of all - legal reasons.

Well, that's sort of what I meant to say, that national interests and international law, moral concerns not always go hand in hand. People sometimes forget that their own governments behave the same way as most other governments with a pretense at influence - dominate, aquire, annex, control and try to exert influence.

Ah, I see. To clarify: I was not trying to make the USSR into some sort of Evil Space Empire, nor make the Poles moral paragons of virtue. I was just trying to counter the attempt at morally justifying the invasion by another poster.

Oh, I see. Well, that's rather common for the pre-archival sources to exaggerate deportee numbers, deaths, etc. Remember, historians were Cold Warriors, and most of them didn't yet get to see the archives. The common Cold War trend was to exaggerate greatly the deportations, repressions, executions in the USSR, until the opening of the archives - for political purpose, obviously. Sometimes exaggerate greatly, to an unrealistic scale even from demographic perspectives (like claiming 20 million dead from the Great Terror, 60 million dead, or other similar nosense). And Gurjanow's work is very good and based on hard documental evidence - the "Memorial" foundation literally overturned whole tomes of archival material to study deportations in the USSR.

Yes, I was surprised at the disparity between your numbers and ones gave by Davies, since "Powstanie '44" is a rather recent work. This is why it took me three days to respond, I had to visit the library and do some reading.
It's understandable this number is wrong in "Powstanie '44", since the it isn't about the deportations, but about the 1944 uprising. Still, shame on him

[K. A. Pital]

Ok, this entire tangent was just an attempt to counter the "saved more lives" angle. Saving lives (expecially Polish lives) had nothing to do with the invasion, it was a strategically calculated move.

I agree. If anything, it was to save the USSR, not Poland. Being used as a buffer zone for the upcoming war definetely sucks. If it saved more lives, then only in hindsight. The idea that Hitler would've gotten to Arkhangelsk line in 1941 is pretty terrifying though, historical perspective-wise... I don't think either of us would be here to talk about this at all.

I'm not entirely sure if it being random makes it better or worse, but this distinction is pretty much irrelevant

Quite so.

I'm not sure about that. I mean, the deportations started immediately after the invasion

Yet, the 1941 amnesty and following contact with the Polish government. The Soviet diplomacy was always fluent enough to keep all ways out open and never "force itself into a cage".

...and Stalin was insistent the modified Curzon line was the one and only legal border between the USSR and Poland, right from the very first talk on the subject with the Allies

One of Stalin's tasks in the war was to regain the territories and world power position of the Tsarist Russia. He was pretty clear that he will try to do it through "manuever" between the fighting German and British Empires which have gotten involved into a new war (in one of his speeches IIRC). But it's questionable that he would've risked open confrontation with his allies at that. The USSR, as I said, was rather cautious in it's territorial aquisitions. For example, it didn't join the Germano-Polish war until it was completely clear that Poland is defeated completely and neither France nor Britain would care to assist it in the nearest time.

It's easy to understand where this comes from - resentment at the 1921 Riga treaty - but all argument that could justify a reasonable claim to these lands came from force of arms, rather than historical, ethnic reasons or - least of all - legal reasons.

Of course. And, some of the 1940 aquisitions were arguably ethnically backed as well - the West Belorussian lands. In these places the USSR was greeted as the liberator of Slavic people (who weren't exactly having an easy time there, as I'm sure you know).

Yes, I was surprised at the disparity between your numbers and ones gave by Davies, since "Powstanie '44" is a rather recent work. This is why it took me three days to respond, I had to visit the library and do some reading. It's understandable this number is wrong in "Powstanie '44", since the it isn't about the deportations, but about the 1944 uprising. Still, shame on him.

Ah, I see. Just out of curiosity - what does the book say about the Uprising? The Allied aid, Soviet aid? Strategic circumstances of the uprising? Or it mostly goes with the common "Soviets abandoned Polish uprising" motto? I'm familiar with some general western historiography on the subject (mostly Cold War, and I didn't find it being superb quality...). But I haven't read this particular Davies book to my shame (some other books by him, though, I have).

[PeZook]

The idea that Hitler would've gotten to Arkhangelsk line in 1941 is pretty terrifying though, historical perspective-wise... I don't think either of us would be here to talk about this at all.

That would definitely suck. For all Soviet atrocities in the occupied Polish lands and the suffering they caused, it was but a small part of what Germans managed to accomplish with what little time they had.

In the scenario above, well...
We're looking at total annihilation. Complete, down to the last man. Poland would rightfully be called Eastern Germany, since there wouldn't be a single Pole left to claim his land back. And, well...Russia would get it worse.

Yet, the 1941 amnesty and following contact with the Polish government. The Soviet diplomacy was always fluent enough to keep all ways out open and never "force itself into a cage".

The amnesty didn't change Soviet claims on the territories conquered in 1939, though. Albeit their lines changed from "Poland ceased to exist on this day!" to "You will have your country back one day, when Germany falls!"

One of Stalin's tasks in the war was to regain the territories and world power position of the Tsarist Russia. He was pretty clear that he will try to do it through "manuever" between the fighting German and British Empires which have gotten involved into a new war (in one of his speeches IIRC). But it's questionable that he would've risked open confrontation with his allies at that. The USSR, as I said, was rather cautious in it's territorial aquisitions. For example, it didn't join the Germano-Polish war until it was completely clear that Poland is defeated completely and neither France nor Britain would care to assist it in the nearest time.

I don't doubt Stalin was a shrewd strategist and politician, and his strategy obviously worked (the current border is the modified Curzon line, after all). His maneuver was shrewd, and he read Western politicians brilliantly. I guess the fact western men of state couldn't differentiate between Russians and other Slavs helped justify his claims a lot. Well, the current results are clear - Poland could make a historical claim to the Eastern Marshes, but it would be pointless to do so now, since they are now inhabitated almost completely by Ukrainians, Latvians and Belarussians.

Of course. And, some of the 1940 aquisitions were arguably ethnically backed as well - the West Belorussian lands. In these places the USSR was greeted as the liberator of Slavic people (who weren't exactly having an easy time there, as I'm sure you know).

Arguing from an ethical standpoint, Soviets should've let the Belarussians form their own republic, let them have a free referendum to say if they want to join the USSR or not, and protect the Poles living there from revenge. But that's ideal la-la land, and what happened was sometimes the opposite. Belarussians seem to have dropped from the fire onto the frying pan, to be honest.

Ah, I see. Just out of curiosity - what does the book say about the Uprising? The Allied aid, Soviet aid? Strategic circumstances of the uprising? Or it mostly goes with the common "Soviets abandoned Polish uprising" motto? I'm familiar with some general western historiography on the subject (mostly Cold War, and I didn't find it being superb quality...).

Well, I haven't actually read it yet, I'm 200 pages in and just finishing the background on the Uprising. What Davies has done in that book, and what I like, is place the Uprising in the context of the war, rather than present is as a completely separate event (many books are guilty of doing that). Half the book concerns what happened before the Uprising, giving an overview of Polish involvement in the war, changing standing of Poland amongst the allies, interaction between Soviets and Poles, a bit of history on Polish-Soviet relations before and after the war, etc.
He is harsh on the Soviets, and we've caught him on one error together in this discussion already But I've got no idea how he's going to present Soviet non-involvement. He seems to try and avoid judgement, though, at least from what I've read, and concentrates on causes and effects of decisions, rather than placing blame.

But I haven't read this particular Davies book to my shame (some other books by him, though, I have).

How do you find the quality of his works, in general? Sometimes, it seems to me he's almost prouder of Poland and Polish history than an average Pole

[K. A. Pital]

Poland would rightfully be called Eastern Germany, since there wouldn't be a single Pole left to claim his land back. And, well...Russia would get it worse.

Germanization... in several dozen years, there would be Germans, Poles who managed to relate with Germans, and, well, dead Poles. As for Soviet Union, there would be dead Slavs and slave Slavs.

Albeit their lines changed from "Poland ceased to exist on this day!" to "You will have your country back one day, when Germany falls!"

Yeah. This shift IMHO could've had more real consequences if the "Cold War" interaction didn't proceed as it went in reality.

Arguing from an ethical standpoint, Soviets should've let the Belarussians form their own republic, let them have a free referendum to say if they want to join the USSR or not, and protect the Poles living there from revenge.

The politics of the war day were quite less deliberate in what related to ethnical tensions and relations. Not just in the USSR, but also the US and other countries.

How do you find the quality of his works, in general? Sometimes, it seems to me he's almost prouder of Poland and Polish history than an average Pole.

Not that bad. Though he's certainly a Polonophile, his works often contain a multitude of useful facts gathered in one place - something that I find useful for historic works. Some parts are rather dull and contain various rants. I skip the rants and move on to the presented facts, usually. The problem with Davies is that his more interesting works are probably outdated by the multitude of materials that are available now from Polish and Soviet archives (like the Russo-Polish 1920's war material), but I would certainly welcome him doing an analysis of, say, Ukraino-Polish wars during the Nazi invasion of the USSR, and the earlier Ukraino-POlish conflicts during hte Revolution - though, there's quite a lot of material on that already.

[PeZook]

Germanization... in several dozen years, there would be Germans, Poles who managed to relate with Germans, and, well, dead Poles. As for Soviet Union, there would be dead Slavs and slave Slavs.

It's interesting to note even during the worst terror of Stalinist USSR, and it's gigantic Gulag system, rules for commoners seemed pretty simple. Stay put, work good, toe the party line and don't amass too much power, and you'll be fine. Under the Nazis, it seemed the occupation was totally insane and random. One day the SS seizes people according to their race, the next day - completely randomly. When a high official notices Polish boys are often blue-eyed and blonde, in a few days you get a completely new insane "racial adjustment" operation involving children. I find it amazing people managed to function in an environment where, if you went out to work and didn't know about some new crazy scheme by the occupation authorities, you could get arrested when you were just fine an hour before. Hell, things could change when you worked, and suddendly you became illegal for some reason.

Yeah. This shift IMHO could've had more real consequences if the "Cold War" interaction didn't proceed as it went in reality.

Yeah, for one - Poland could've benefitted from the Marshall Plan if not for the immediate start of the Cold War.

How do you find the quality of his works, in general? Sometimes, it seems to me he's almost prouder of Poland and Polish history than an average Pole.

Not that bad. Though he's certainly a Polonophile, his works often contain a multitude of useful facts gathered in one place - something that I find useful for historic works. Some parts are rather dull and contain various rants. I skip the rants and move on to the presented facts, usually. The problem with Davies is that his more interesting works are probably outdated by the multitude of materials that are available now from Polish and Soviet archives (like the Russo-Polish 1920's war material), but I would certainly welcome him doing an analysis of, say, Ukraino-Polish wars during the Nazi invasion of the USSR, and the earlier Ukraino-POlish conflicts during hte Revolution - though, there's quite a lot of material on that already.

I noticed the rants as well, but the fact you can look up relevant facts quickly in his books is a major plus. Although I must say his Polonophillia sometimes is grating even to me Like when he espouses Pilsudski as some incredibly progressive, democratically minded visionairre rather than just a strong-willed and charismatic, if thick-headed leader. Still, he does better than many Polish writers who are often clouded by martyr's complex, and sometimes are downright whiny.

[K. A. Pital]

It's interesting to note even during the worst terror of Stalinist USSR, and it's gigantic Gulag system, rules for commoners seemed pretty simple. Stay put, work good, toe the party line and don't amass too much power, and you'll be fine.

Yeah. The repression itself has touched a large number of people, in absolute terms (several million, with ~1m executed from 1927-1953 - which means lots of relatives who have suffered), but relative to the overall population (150m) it was fairly minor (that's why many people remember living just fine in Stalin's time, like, say, my great grandmother (1917-2002). Stalin was very popular among the bulk of people who weren't directly touched by repressions. Even Germans had to face the reality of Stalin's regime versus their propaganda when they invaded ... and found their propaganda totally inadequate.

By contrast, the Ostministerium proposed super-intensive cleansing with the sole goal of "preparing" the Eastern Territories for future German settlers. Moscow and Leningrad as the two major population centers (with each housing several million citizens) were to be completely annihilated without an itch.

Poland could've benefitted from the Marshall Plan if not for the immediate start of the Cold War.

Quite so. In fact, the rapid worsening relations have caused a major pain in the ass for both sides of the conflict.