Did Hitler & The 3rd Reich Save Western Europe?

[Omeganian]

Hmm... first of all, this discussion certainly got more interesting.

Well, the built part of statistics gives 128 as a maximum for an area. As for 2500... Well, Zhukov says nowhere it's the figure for the western borders, for the Molotov line. These figures are completely different. It seems more likely that the 2 500 is the figure is for the entire Soviet border. Out of these, a little over one third (if the 2 500 are in the built section), or less than a quarter (if they were in the operable section, since they were armed) belonged to the Molotov line. This proves that the Molotov line wasn't exactly considered top priority, but little else.

Actually, that's the table I was speaking about when talking about documentary evidence. It provides the numbers of pillboxes in construction, the numbers of hardpoints built, et cetera. Zhukov indeed talks about the overall construction, not about the new border fortifications in particular. I've already mentioned the 880 number, right? Now, there were ~4900 pillboxes in progress, much like I said. If you can provide similar documents for the Germans, do so.

BTW, are there any witnesses describing all these thousands of bunkers in construction, or were they mostly existing on paper?

As to the quality of Molotov line fortifications - their depth was constantly rising. When Stalin line FRs mostly had a depth of 1-5 km, new FRs were projected with greater depth (sometimes up to 15 km), 5 km being the lowest FR depth.

How much of that was actually being done?

Besides, Khrenov argued for a limited effort on the Molotov line (simple field fortifications a-la Kursk, nothing long-term, permanent or very large). Stalin rejected that in favour of full-scale construction.

Seems logical if you don't expect a war soon. Or if you don't want to hinder your advancing forces with a lot of trenches.

Construction of defence lines during Kursk and Stalingrad battle was limited to fast field defence and agile defence (use of tanks as defence weapons, for example). Around 200 pillboxes were constructed in Stalingrad. In Kursk, I'm not sure howmany. Perhaps none. Most of the sources speak about mass construction of trenches, etc[. but none about construction of long-term concrete pillboxes and artillery positions. Please be so kind as to explain yourself.

All these things are needed even if you have pillboxes. But there seems to have been some shortage of that in 1941.

You construct pillboxes mostly if you intend to defend in a few years, and seeing the Molotov Line progress, it seems to be scheduled for something like 1943-4. But I have some trouble believing that's when Stalin expected to have a war with Germany.

[snip quotes about conservation of fortified regions]

As I'm sure you know, the conservation of old fortifications is a well-known fact and perfectly sound measures when you have a limited amount of manpower and resource to man a line.

And why were they allowed to fall into such a bad state during the "conservation"?

Looking in Halder's diary, electronic version... searching for "fortification"...

So - anti-tank ditch, 120 pillboxes without armament, "active defence".

These are the figures for the beginning of November.

Ответ: В Восточной Пруссии — долговременные оборонительные сооружения облегченного типа, на остальных участках — укрепления полевого типа.

So - "light" long-term fortifications in Eastern Prussia, "field fortifications" (no permanent fortification lines) in other regions. In essence, a defence that can only work with a fully mobilized Army defending it. No long-term static defences.

That's the final plan, right before the Barbarossa order is issued. A decision to build a light line for an offensive war. Up until then, there was a certain chance it'll be needed for defense, so a final decision about its character wasn't made.

Germany and Britain make an anti-Soviet pact and the whole war changes to unimaginable scenarios.

That's, BTW, one of Suvorov's arguments that Stalin couldn't delay his offensive for too long - that such a pact could be signed, to his great disadvantage. But after Stalin attacked? Well, there did seem to be certain attempts by Britain to convince Stalin to attack.

Halder constantly complained in 1941 that the the tank divisions lost 50% or more of their tanks - and advanced.

Pardon me, but Halder didn't "constantly complain" about that. He merely noted the progression of losses in initial tank strength in his diary. Germany lost a half of the pre-war tank number slated for the invasion (~2000) till November 1941. Bule constantly noted that tank losses reach 50% during later months of 1941. In July, i.e. during the initial battles, the tank losses were (according to Bule's report, once again) "on an acceptable level", "not exceeding 20%".

Танковая группа Гота своим северным флангом вышла к Западной Двине в районе Дриссы и встретила здесь упорное сопротивление противника. Дороги труднопроходимы. Большое количество машин вышло из строя в результате аварий. Штаб танковой группы Гота доложил, что в строю осталось лишь 50% штатного количества боевых машин.

а. Доклад о степени боеспособности подвижных соединений. Потери в танках составляют в среднем 50%{214}. Потери личного состава в основном не превышают численности полевых запасных батальонов, которые уже полностью израсходованы. 20.7 в Варшаву прибудут шесть новых маршевых батальонов для 2-й и 3-й танковых групп.

а. В докладной записке от 23.7 1941 г. на имя начальника генерального штаба уже сообщалось, что перед началом новых операций 2-й и 3-й танковым группам понадобится десятидневная передышка для пополнения и что после этого танковые дивизии будут иметь примерно 60-70% того танкового парка, который был у них 22.6 1941 г.

Гудериан считает, что его войска в своем теперешнем составе способны наступать, имея 50% укомплектованности. Гот полагает, что его войска способны наступать при 60% укомплектованности.

You do realize that such plans wouldn't have been worth much once the war would have started? Suvorov constantly states that not only the enemy, the Soviet forces were deceived as well. ... The German divisions on the secondary directions were also spread rather thin. Don't forget, according to Suvorov, the main attack was to be to the south, since a deployment to the north "ran a risk of prolonged battle". And there, the Germans had somewhat less forces.

That's bullshit. No one deceived the Germans or the Soviets. The forces received plans which were sound (from what the pre-war doctrine said).

Maybe the April plans, but it seems the ones in May were not treated seriously. And they do seem to have parts not quite matching the primary objective of not allowing the enemy in (Just got a new book of articles in support of Suvorov, has an article with a lot of analysis on the subject).

densities in the South were worse than those in the North.

Directly on the border, maybe, but in general, the KOVO was more powerful.

Besides, if the USSR was concentrating for a South attack, why the borderline in KOVO and OdVO had a 6,5:1 German numerical superiority?

If you want the enemy's attention away from your primary position. you should start the movement and concentration with the secondaries.

"Breathrough tank" and "breakthrough development tank" are different things. KV is the first, BT is the second. One makes a breach, the other goes in.

What is the T-34, then? And yes, I'm fully aware that BTs are breakthrough development tanks - how is that relevant to my point, that breaching German defences (especially if their more serious ones were to be concentrated in East Prussia) without breakthrough tanks is not a sound plan?

To the north, there were the 3rd and 6th mechcorps. Together, just under 200 KV. More on their way.

Even the BT-7 did not reach the armour thickness of the PzKpfwIII, achieving a top front armour of 22mm.

Considering the BT series were built for speed more than armor, that's natural.

As for the T-50, it was already a 14-tonner, not a 10-tonner. And yes, it was better than early Pz.Kpfw.IIIs, but was it better than the later models with 50-mm KwK, starting 1940 onwards? No. It would have better armour, but obviously inferior armament.

Actually, the T-50's gun seems to have had a slightly higher muzzle velocity.

Inferior to the MG-equipped Pz-I? Damn, what was the guy smoking? ... 25 mm on the turret. A few dozen were even equipped with additional 50 mm layers. The German 30 mm, while somewhat stronger, isn't quite shell proof either. ... And their 20 mm on Pz II met said requirements? ... They could either capture destroyed tanks, or tanks which broke down. In the first case, there is little to inspect, in the second, of course the engine is run down.

The generals gave an all-around characteristic. The very light Soviet tanks like the T-37A, T-38 would obviously be inferior to the very light German machines (Pz.I and II);

Well, Halder did describe Pz I as "a burden for the army", so I don't think a lot could be inferior to that.

the Pz.II Ausf. C (1000 constructed, 1938-1940) had a frontal armour of 29-35 mm.

Did it?

http://afvdb.50megs.com/germany/pz2.html

And obviously the Pz.IIs no longer met OKH demands - that's why Pz.IIIs and IVs were in production.

But so was Pz II

As for aviation gasoline, "not a problem"? Let me remind you - the Soviet Union had a problem with high-grade fuel production. Zhukov was extremely dissappointed with the gasoline engine requirements, high fuel consumption, etc.

Use of aviation engines was a common tendency in the 30's. Not only in USSR.

According to Zaloga's book, "the two M1930 arrived in USSR early in 1931 having been shipped from the USA under the guise of agricultural tractors" (they left USA in 1930). Suvorov states in a later book that it was simply a fig leaf - an attempt by both countries to hide that they are trading. And he states that the Aberdeen Proving Ground still has the original documents. If there is a mistake, everyone made it back then.

Yes, it's a mistake. I'm not sure why one should then rely on an obsolete and inaccurate book in anything, because other statements have a similar proportion of falsehoods in them.

Why should I believe that book is the one mistaken?

And Zhukov had no statements outside of his memoirs?

None that would support Rezun's writings, sadly. If you know something I don't, please show.

Some sources mention Zhukov complaining about the BT's performance on sandy terrain.

http://3v-soft.clan.su/news/ljogkij_tan ... -06-16-126

Suvorov admits his mistake about the BT vs T-26 numbers. Claims that he had no access to precise numbers, and indirect methods gave a somewhat incorrect figure.

Why bother with his books, then?

Why not? It's not like he stopped his research.

You tacitly ignored falsehoods about the BT speed

Zaloga gives a figure of 100 kph for BT-2 - which was definitely the tank produced then, and such or greater figures are often given for the Christie prototypes.

[K. A. Pital]

BTW, are there any witnesses describing all these thousands of bunkers in construction, or were they mostly existing on paper? ... How much of that was actually being done?

Shifting the issue? Where are the German documents detailing the construction of permanent fortifications? I can only ask a few times before I run out of patience. As for witnesses - sure, there were. Grodno FR, Brest FR, for example. There were not only witnesses of construction, but folks who fought there. Zhukov, who oversaw the construction, remembers it too. There were even financial documents (for example, allocation of 17 953 920 roubles to the Grodno FR).

Some stuff to read: here and here. I hope you'll find it interesting. There are some photographs of Soviet permanent unfinished fortifications from the time, actually.

As for the quality, I already said they were planned deeper (and obviously built deeper; look up data on the Grodno FR if you like). The quality is a matter of plan, not that of execution. The Stalin line had fulfilled the fortified region depth requirements, even if it's construction wasn't fully completed anyhow. Same goes for the new border line.

And why were they allowed to fall into such a bad state during the "conservation"?

Because many of the old Stalin line fortifications fell into that state even prior to 1939... Don't ask me why - typical neglect, bad maintenance, long-term poor service. Many were never even fitted out or manned properly - the Stalin line had newer parts of it erected at the same time as older parts fell into neglect and disrepair. It's well-documented.

Some were flooded prior to the USSR getting new territories due to poor construction:

НКО СССР тов. Ворошилову
13 февраля 1939 г.

Несмотря на долгое строительство и дооборудование Псковского и Островского УР, они не могут считаться в настоящее время боевспособными. Из-за неправильно спроектированного и построенного внутреннего оборудования большинства ДОТ они не могут быть заняты войсками... до половины сооружений на 20-40 см заполнены водой, появившейся из-за неправильной оценки глубины грунтовых вод. В то же время водопровод не работает... Электрооборудование укрепрайонов отсутствует... В жилых помещениях УР высокая влажность и спертый воздух...

So half of pillboxes in the Pskov and Ostrovsky FRs of the Stalin line literally sunk in 20-40 cm of water even prior to February 1939. But how is that related to the construction of the new line? Abandonment of pillboxes that were badly built and sunk doesn't seem to me a bad idea. Does it seem such to you?

Seems logical if you don't expect a war soon. Or if you don't want to hinder your advancing forces with a lot of trenches.

Seriously, man - you're getting ridiculous. Give me that weed you're smoking. How can own trenches "hinder" an offensive? Did they hinder the Soviet counteroffensive at Kursk, perhaps? And yes, long-term fortifications seem logical if you don't expect a war soon. Army re-organization is also logical if you don't expect a war soon. These thus indicate that the USSR hardly expected a war soon.

All these things are needed even if you have pillboxes. But there seems to have been some shortage of that in 1941.

Fixed defence has problems. It's conceptually centered around forts, which, if lacking in cover, will leave gaping holes between them with literally nothing. Eben Emael was a fortress, but once knocked out, the entire area fell to German advance faster than you can say "utinni". However, in pre-war times, there was an over-reliance on fixed defence, because many nations thought of slow, WWI-like offensives, long pre-hostility periods, which would make forts invaluable strongholds upon which the enemy will not intrude. The idea that the enemy can simply penetrate some areas, ignore forts and strike deep was a novel theory; and the Germans were about the only Army who truly tried in in practice.

You construct pillboxes mostly if you intend to defend in a few years, and seeing the Molotov Line progress, it seems to be scheduled for something like 1943-4. But I have some trouble believing that's when Stalin expected to have a war with Germany.

Stalin actually didn't expect to have a war with Germany at all, at first. The pre-war thinking was dominated with the ideas of long pre-hostilities and sitzkriegs between very powerful nations. France came as a shockingly rude surprise.

That's the final plan, right before the Barbarossa order is issued. A decision to build a light line for an offensive war. Up until then, there was a certain chance it'll be needed for defense, so a final decision about its character wasn't made.

So you admit after Barbarossa was issued, nolong-term defences were erected? *shrugs* What's the issue then? Germany resolved to commit to a future offensive; end of story. The USSR meanwhile spends shitloads of roubles on a new defence line with permanent fortifications (some of it owing to old-style thought, certainly).

That's, BTW, one of Suvorov's arguments that Stalin couldn't delay his offensive for too long - that such a pact could be signed, to his great disadvantage. But after Stalin attacked? Well, there did seem to be certain attempts by Britain to convince Stalin to attack.

If the USSR attacked, such a pact would be more likely, not less likely.
As for tank losses - the report from July 23 is quite indicative:

Генерал Буле: Потери в танках в общем не превышают пределов допустимого. Безвозвратные потери составляют в среднем 20%. ... Потери в автомашинах в общем в пределах нормы.

General tank losses and rrecoverable losses are different things. Let's not confuse the two, all right? Conducting an offensive with 50-70% strength is possible - one needs to look at what exactly the units lost, and what was their supply situation. How many cars they have lost? How many men?

Maybe the April plans, but it seems the ones in May were not treated seriously.

What is "treating plans seriously", anyhow? Had the USSR resolved to attack in 1940, "plans for covering the border" would've been utterly useless. They'd have a reverse-Barbarossa on the table. Please explain.

Directly on the border, maybe, but in general, the KOVO was more powerful. ... If you want the enemy's attention away from your primary position. you should start the movement and concentration with the secondaries.

KOVO was large. How was KOVO "more powerful" in general? KOVO and ODVO in total had 1 412 136 men, the German Army Group South opposing it had 1 508 500 men. Where in the South did the USSR reach a greater concentration on the border, than the Germans achieved? I.e. where could they attack at all? Frankly - nowhere, but let's see your idea.

To the north, there were the 3rd and 6th mechcorps. Together, just under 200 KV. More on their way.

You said the USSR was perfectly fine with dropping heavy tanks and streaming into East Prussia with light tanks only, if the resoruce of T-34 and KV is poor. Now you change your tune?

Considering the BT series were built for speed more than armor, that's natural.

They were simply light wheeled tanks. *shrugs* Crappy armour was a rule of thumb for such tanks. It also ired Zhukov. That's why the RKKA stopped making them in 1940, and shifted to heavier and better armoured tanks on the average, in all departments. And all of them were tracked - track resource has risen and the usefulness of BT track conservation on-march was lost.

Actually, the T-50's gun seems to have had a slightly higher muzzle velocity.

Depending on the armament, sure. As it does for the Germans. The T-50 had the 45-mm 20-K gun.

Well, Halder did describe Pz I as "a burden for the army", so I don't think a lot could be inferior to that.

Soviet commanders described the T-37A and T-38 as a "burden for the army" as well. Yes, most other tanks were better.

the Pz.II Ausf. C (1000 constructed, 1938-1940) had a frontal armour of 29-35 mm.

Did it? http://afvdb.50megs.com/germany/pz2.html

Actually, yes. Latter Ausf.C were up-armoured all the way to 34,5mm, and since Ausf.F improved to 35mm overall for the modification. And answering your question - "but so was the Pz II" - the up-armoured Pz.Kpfw II Ausf.F was in production in 1941-1942. Not the one with 14,5 mm armour.

Use of aviation engines was a common tendency in the 30's. Not only in USSR.

Of course. It did pose a problem for the USSR, though, like I said - high-grade fuels were very problematic for Soviet oil processing industry. It got most high-grade fuel through lend-lease, which then was mixed with Soviet fuel to increase volume. I'm not sure how your note refutes my point, if at all?

Why should I believe that book is the one mistaken?

Because you shouldn't mix M.1932 and M.1931? *eyes suspiciously*

Some sources mention Zhukov complaining about the BT's performance on sandy terrain.

That's not what Rezun said, however. There's no quote likewise. Besides, the article you quote completely buries the idea that the BTs were so well-designed for hard roads - they had poor design, which impacted road performance as well:

Основные нарекания вызывал двигатель М-17, в основном из-за его невысокой надёжности. Карбюраторный мотор был к тому же очень прожорливым. За высокие показатели мощности и запаса хода приходилось платить большим расходом ГСМ. Общая ёмкость всех бензобаков составляла 790 л, а расход топлива на 1 км при движении на колёсах достигал 1,5—1,6 л, но этот недостаток в целом был устранимым. Хуже обстояло дело со специфическими недостатками колёсно-гусеничной схемы. Резиновые бандажи при движении на колёсах по шоссе с твёрдым покрытием (таким как булыжник или асфальт) начинали разрушаться уже после 100 км пробега.

So asphalt roads and stone paved roads were not that good for the BTs... and that's why finally after track resource improved, the USSR abandoned all wheeled tank projects. Period.

Why not? It's not like he stopped his research.

Falsehoods are not research. Konev did not move from his district, all units of the FSE did not move to the border, first BT tanks did not have a speed of 100 kph, the KhPZ did not produce 22 tanks per day, BT tanks were perfectly usable on Soviet territory (their deficiencies were universal and generals were more irritated with their poor armour and fuel hunger than with anything else), BT manuals forbade combat on wheels, Su-2 was not to be built in a series of 150 000, ... etc. Sorry, but his latter books have the same quality as "Icebreaker" and contain similar falsehoods. Need proof? Choose a book.

Zaloga gives a figure of 100 kph for BT-2 - which was definitely the tank produced then, and such or greater figures are often given for the Christie prototypes.

Zaloga is wrong. The BT-2 never reached a speed of 100 kph. Christie prototypes were made in the USA, with far more precise technologies. They also could march on wheels and tracks without wearing out after many hundreds of km. Soviet BTs had tracks and wheels wear out often after the first few hundred km.
Worse yet: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/БТ-2

Необходимо отметить, что среднетехническая скорость танка была существенно ниже максимальной и составляла на гусеницах 25 км/ч по шоссе и 22 км/ч по просёлку, а на колёсах — 22 км/ч по шоссе

Or, you can read this document - a report on first BT-2 trials.

Максимальная скорость до 65-70 км/час, не больше.

Танк испытывался только на колёсах, причём испытания показали, что средние скорости по шоссе не превышают 30-35 км/час.

Tests ran only on wheels. Average speeds of 30-35 kph on-road, top speed on wheels 65-70 kph. Sorry. Zaloga eats this along with Rezun. Should've read the math, so to say.

As for Christie prototype (M1931, or the Medium T3 tank), their speed is likewise no secret. It's 74 kph top on road, on wheels - or 2-4 kph higher than that of the BT-2. I'm not sure where you took the "100 kph" figure from. Stop smoking the Rezun-Zaloga weed, if you still are.

[Omeganian]

Some stuff to read: here and here. I hope you'll find it interesting. There are some photographs of Soviet permanent unfinished fortifications from the time, actually.

So, 814 bunkers were complete from Baltica to Peremyshl, and the Germans have counted 1113 bunkers in all. 299 incomplete bunkers... Doesn't look very impressive.

As for the quality, I already said they were planned deeper (and obviously built deeper; look up data on the Grodno FR if you like). The quality is a matter of plan, not that of execution. The Stalin line had fulfilled the fortified region depth requirements, even if it's construction wasn't fully completed anyhow. Same goes for the new border line.

I looked. Main efforts on the first line of defense. Besides, 15 km? That's the minimum distance for the first line of a defending division according to FM-39. Army level, according to the December conference, should have 2-3 times as much. No, we have no adequate depth, neither existing nor planned.

And why were they allowed to fall into such a bad state during the "conservation"?

Because many of the old Stalin line fortifications fell into that state even prior to 1939... Don't ask me why - typical neglect, bad maintenance, long-term poor service. Many were never even fitted out or manned properly - the Stalin line had newer parts of it erected at the same time as older parts fell into neglect and disrepair. It's well-documented.

Some were flooded prior to the USSR getting new territories due to poor construction:

НКО СССР тов. Ворошилову
13 февраля 1939 г.

Несмотря на долгое строительство и дооборудование Псковского и Островского УР, они не могут считаться в настоящее время боевспособными. Из-за неправильно спроектированного и построенного внутреннего оборудования большинства ДОТ они не могут быть заняты войсками... до половины сооружений на 20-40 см заполнены водой, появившейся из-за неправильной оценки глубины грунтовых вод. В то же время водопровод не работает... Электрооборудование укрепрайонов отсутствует... В жилых помещениях УР высокая влажность и спертый воздух...

So half of pillboxes in the Pskov and Ostrovsky FRs of the Stalin line literally sunk in 20-40 cm of water even prior to February 1939. But how is that related to the construction of the new line? Abandonment of pillboxes that were badly built and sunk doesn't seem to me a bad idea. Does it seem such to you?

So, you give me a description of two of the weakest fortified areas, on a secondary direction, in a place with generally difficult conditions, as a reason for a neglection of the entire line, including the primary directions - the example I gave was about the Kiev FA. (Suvorov, BTW, did mention in the Icebreaker that the Stalin Line was scheduled for massive upgrades, but they were cancelled). Also, on the Far East, there was no neglection.

Seems logical if you don't expect a war soon. Or if you don't want to hinder your advancing forces with a lot of trenches.

Seriously, man - you're getting ridiculous. Give me that weed you're smoking. How can own trenches "hinder" an offensive?

The anti tank defenses can often make the area difficult to pass in both directions.

Did they hinder the Soviet counteroffensive at Kursk, perhaps?

It doesn't seem as fast as the German advancement during Barbarossa.

And yes, long-term fortifications seem logical if you don't expect a war soon. Army re-organization is also logical if you don't expect a war soon. These thus indicate that the USSR hardly expected a war soon.

Then why the massive glider production and pilot training in 1941?

The idea that the enemy can simply penetrate some areas, ignore forts and strike deep was a novel theory; and the Germans were about the only Army who truly tried in in practice.

And the Soviets saw the Germans doing all that. All the more reason to make trenches - they can be made in a line from Baltic to Black, in which case you can't go around them.

You construct pillboxes mostly if you intend to defend in a few years, and seeing the Molotov Line progress, it seems to be scheduled for something like 1943-4. But I have some trouble believing that's when Stalin expected to have a war with Germany.

Stalin actually didn't expect to have a war with Germany at all, at first. The pre-war thinking was dominated with the ideas of long pre-hostilities and sitzkriegs between very powerful nations. France came as a shockingly rude surprise.

And we are talking about after France.

That's the final plan, right before the Barbarossa order is issued. A decision to build a light line for an offensive war. Up until then, there was a certain chance it'll be needed for defense, so a final decision about its character wasn't made.

So you admit after Barbarossa was issued, nolong-term defences were erected?

The intel reports I gave links to mention enough of that. They are all December or later.

The USSR meanwhile spends shitloads of roubles on a new defence line with permanent fortifications (some of it owing to old-style thought, certainly).

Mind elaborating on where said old style thought is reflected?

http://rkka.ru/docs/real/pu39/10.htm

http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/sov-new-1940/52.html

That's, BTW, one of Suvorov's arguments that Stalin couldn't delay his offensive for too long - that such a pact could be signed, to his great disadvantage. But after Stalin attacked? Well, there did seem to be certain attempts by Britain to convince Stalin to attack.

If the USSR attacked, such a pact would be more likely, not less likely.

Why? What did Britain have against Stalin attacking?

General tank losses and rrecoverable losses are different things. Let's not confuse the two, all right?

The reversible losses hardly contribute to offensive ability. Except as a dead weight slowing down the advance.

Maybe the April plans, but it seems the ones in May were not treated seriously.

What is "treating plans seriously", anyhow? Had the USSR resolved to attack in 1940, "plans for covering the border" would've been utterly useless. They'd have a reverse-Barbarossa on the table. Please explain.

The plans contain a large amount of defensive action inside the Soviet territory - in direct contradiction to the stated objectives of not allowing the enemy there. However, they are absent in this plan.

BTW, all plans seem to have one thing in common - they are to be executed by orders from Moscow. No contingency for the scenario of Germans having the initiative.

Directly on the border, maybe, but in general, the KOVO was more powerful. ... If you want the enemy's attention away from your primary position. you should start the movement and concentration with the secondaries.

KOVO was large. How was KOVO "more powerful" in general? KOVO and ODVO in total had 1 412 136 men, the German Army Group South opposing it had 1 508 500 men. Where in the South did the USSR reach a greater concentration on the border, than the Germans achieved? I.e. where could they attack at all? Frankly - nowhere.

Nowhere - yet.

To the north, there were the 3rd and 6th mechcorps. Together, just under 200 KV. More on their way.

You said the USSR was perfectly fine with dropping heavy tanks and streaming into East Prussia with light tanks only, if the resoruce of T-34 and KV is poor. Now you change your tune?

To the north, a secondary attack was planned, to prevent the enemy from transferring to the south. The advancement wouldn't have been as fast.

That's why the RKKA stopped making them in 1940, and shifted to heavier and better armoured tanks on the average, in all departments. And all of them were tracked - track resource has risen and the usefulness of BT track conservation on-march was lost.

Suvorov writes the same in his latest book.

Actually, the T-50's gun seems to have had a slightly higher muzzle velocity.

Depending on the armament, sure. As it does for the Germans. The T-50 had the 45-mm 20-K gun.

And T-70. Apparently, the gun was considered quite adequate for a light tank.

the Pz.II Ausf. C (1000 constructed, 1938-1940) had a frontal armour of 29-35 mm.

Did it? http://afvdb.50megs.com/germany/pz2.html

Actually, yes. Latter Ausf.C were up-armoured all the way to 34,5mm, and since Ausf.F improved to 35mm overall for the modification. And answering your question - "but so was the Pz II" - the up-armoured Pz.Kpfw II Ausf.F was in production in 1941-1942. Not the one with 14,5 mm armour.

And the Soviets have abandoned the T-26 and BT by then.

Why should I believe that book is the one mistaken?

Because you shouldn't mix M.1932 and M.1931? *eyes suspiciously*

I see many sources about the M.1931 being sold as tractors. What are yours?

Why not? It's not like he stopped his research.

Falsehoods are not research. Konev did not move from his district,

District? He was an army commander since May. And the army started relocation weeks before the war. And which district are you talking about? Suvorov states Konev "moved from" one front and one district, and the transfer to the west was from yet another district. Whether Konev already went himself to the west before his entire army is hardly a major point (mind showing me where Suvorov said he did?).

Su-2 was not to be built in a series of 150 000,

How many, then? And what about the pilot training?

Sorry, but his latter books have the same quality as "Icebreaker" and contain similar falsehoods. Need proof? Choose a book.

The Last Republic, for starters.

Zaloga gives a figure of 100 kph for BT-2 - which was definitely the tank produced then, and such or greater figures are often given for the Christie prototypes.

Zaloga is wrong. The BT-2 never reached a speed of 100 kph. Christie prototypes were made in the USA, with far more precise technologies. They also could march on wheels and tracks without wearing out after many hundreds of km. Soviet BTs had tracks and wheels wear out often after the first few hundred km.

http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks-medium/bt-5.asp

http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks-medium/bt-2.asp

Необходимо отметить, что среднетехническая скорость танка была существенно ниже максимальной и составляла на гусеницах 25 км/ч по шоссе и 22 км/ч по просёлку, а на колёсах — 22 км/ч по шоссе

Or, you can read this document - a report on first BT-2 trials.

It seems to be a report on BT-1; the Christie prototypes.

Максимальная скорость до 65-70 км/час, не больше.

Танк испытывался только на колёсах, причём испытания показали, что средние скорости по шоссе не превышают 30-35 км/час.

Tests ran only on wheels. Average speeds of 30-35 kph on-road, top speed on wheels 65-70 kph. Sorry. Zaloga eats this along with Rezun. Should've read the math, so to say.

So, the American prototype performed badly on Soviet roads. Considering Halder's complaints about said roads 10 years later, hardly an indication.

As for Christie prototype (M1931, or the Medium T3 tank), their speed is likewise no secret. It's 74 kph top on road, on wheels - or 2-4 kph higher than that of the BT-2. I'm not sure where you took the "100 kph" figure from. Stop smoking the Rezun-Zaloga weed, if you still are.

112, actually.

http://www.afvnews.org/christanks.html#m1931.html

Несколько особый вид танка – это танк колесно-гусеничный типа Кристи (американский) с огромной быстроходностью (на гусеницах до 40-60 км/ч, на колесах – 65-110 км/ч).

[K. A. Pital]

Doesn't look very impressive.

For what, less than one year of work? Sure it does.

No, we have no adequate depth, neither existing nor planned.

If you noticed I never said the depth was adequate, but that Molotov line had a greater depth than Stalin line. *shrugs* Try reading, not typing. And besides, in 1940: http://rkka.ru/handbook/doc/nko-300640.htm

So, you give me a description of two of the weakest fortified areas, on a secondary direction, in a place with generally difficult conditions, as a reason for a neglection of the entire line

"Neglection of the entire line"? Entire? Down to the last pillbox? Prove it, then.

Also, on the Far East, there was no neglection.

http://rkka.ru/handbook/doc/ur1939.htm
You can see that the old Zabaikalsk FR were abandoned in favour of a new FR.

It doesn't seem as fast as the German advancement during Barbarossa.

The Soviet forces passed their own defences without delay. It was the German resistance which then slowed them down, nes pa?

Then why the massive glider production and pilot training in 1941?

Because there was a reform of the airforce? New machines, new pilots? "Massive" pilot training - what, the 30 or so thousand planned for 1941? *shrugs* I'm not sure anything needs to be explained here either.

And the Soviets saw the Germans doing all that. ... And we are talking about after France.

The USSR went alongside the Wehrmacht as it steamrolled over France? *eyes suspiciously* Or the USSR was busy with it's own deals, perhaps? Military inertia is very strong. Changes do not come fast. Besides, peacetime allowed for making fortifications.

The intel reports I gave links to mention enough of that. They are all December or later.

You should provide German documents. Try paying attention.

Mind elaborating on where said old style thought is reflected?

See above. http://rkka.ru/handbook/doc/nko-300640.htm

Why? What did Britain have against Stalin attacking?

What did Britain have? Well, for starters, Britain's rulers were always opposed to anyone dominating continenal Europe. Which would happen if the USSR or Germany won single-handedly. So yes, they would have reasons to oppose a Soviet move into Europe. All the more so since "strange war" and the Polish issue were things that could be worked over. Britain would have another "Operation: Unthinkable" on Churchill's table, but this time who knows what Churchill would say, right? *laughs*

The reversible losses hardly contribute to offensive ability. Except as a dead weight slowing down the advance.

Depends on the time which is spent to restore offensive capacity of lost machinery. Nothing more and nothing less.

The plans contain a large amount of defensive action inside the Soviet territory - in direct contradiction to the stated objectives of not allowing the enemy there. ... The plans contain a large amount of defensive action inside the Soviet territory - in direct contradiction to the stated objectives of not allowing the enemy there. However, they are absent in this plan. BTW, all plans seem to have one thing in common - they are to be executed by orders from Moscow. No contingency for the scenario of Germans having the initiative.

You see, there are varying degrees of "bad", and plans should take into account a bad development. However, no Soviet unit action plan obviously took into account a development as bad as IRL. I'm not sure what's the issue here. As for the April plan - it's a prime example of old-style thinking and bad planning combined. Just read some passages:

В период отмобилизования и сосредоточения войск - упорной обороной, опираясь на укрепленные районы, прочно прикрывать наши границы и не допустить вторжения противника на нашу территорию.

Essentially, the USSR thought that it's unmobilized forces could hold down the enemy using Fortified Regions (which were rapidly constructed, but obviously were not finished yet). In essence, the command felt certain that the start of the war would begin with a German attack weak enough that it could be fended off by forces still not concentrated, merely "using Fortified Regions as a base". A grievous error, to say the least - but like I said earlier, the USSR hardly learned much from the German blitzkrieg, although it did learn something. But this "something" took a lot of time to trickle down.

Nowhere - yet.

As you can see, the Soviet command assumed falsely that it could withstand the German onslaught long enough to concentrate forces while border units hold the Germans off. So obviously no Soviet units were in a position to attack. The Soviet plans presumed concentration could be done after an attack. This is evident not only in this plan, but also in divisional plans. Bad planning, bad learning. *shrugs*

To the north, a secondary attack was planned, to prevent the enemy from transferring to the south. The advancement wouldn't have been as fast.

Perhaps so. But I'm not sure it's then anyhow relevant to Rezun. We're just discussing the feasilibility of Soviet pre-war planning, which is irrelevant to Rezun's fantasies about Soviet lightning strikes.

Suvorov writes the same in his latest book.

If wheeled tanks became unviable after track resource rose and if wheeled tanks were used in the same fashion and for the same reasons in other nations until that happened... um... that kinda defeats the whole theory of "wheeled tank = agressive weapon", a theory which is bullshit from the get go anyway.

And T-70. Apparently, the gun was considered quite adequate for a light tank. ...
And the Soviets have abandoned the T-26 and BT by then.

Obviously. I'm not sure what the problem is. Wasn't the Pz.Kpwf II latter series also light tanks? The USSR abandoned the BT because it (after some hurdles, obviously) could make tracked, not wheeled tanks with enough resource. The Pz.Kpfw II was a light tank which was not a wheeled tank.

I see many sources about the M.1931 being sold as tractors. What are yours?

24 декабря 1930 года машины отбыли из США в СССР. Обе стороны не делали тайны относительно объектов сделки: Кристи уведомил госдепартамент США о том, что он продал "Амторгу" два танка и без проблем получил разрешение на их вывоз. Следует отметить, что американский конструктор не до конца выподнил свои обязательства: машины, отправленные в СССР, не имели башен с вооружением, а комплект документации был неполным. За это с Кристи удержали 25 тыс долларов, чем он был недоволен и отказался переехать на работу в Советский Союз. По договору Кристи обязался информировать советскую сторону о всех изменениях, вносимых в конструкцию этих машин, но отказался это сделать. Однако оставшийся в США В.Д Свиридов без особых трудностей приобрел чертежи у помощников Кристи.

Вскоре нужда в деньгах заставила американского конструктора пойти на поклон к представителям СССР, котрым он предложил купить новейший образец - "летающий танк" - М1932. Машина была приобретена нашей стороной за 20000 долларов и тайно (госдепартамент США наложил запрет на продажу) летом 1932 года переправлена в Советский Союз, где получила название - БТ-32. Она прошла испытания и была даже показана на военном параде в Харькове.

Что касается М1931, то танки, прибывшие в СССР в начале 1931 года, подверглись всестороннему изучению и испытаниям. В марте машину №2051 доставил на полигон в Кубинку, где ее показали высшему и старшему командному составу РККА и членам правительства. 13 февраля 1931 года постановлением РВС СССР танк приняли на вооружение под индексом БТ-2.

http://www.redtanks.bos.ru/bt.htm

Whether Konev already went himself to the west before his entire army is hardly a major point (mind showing me where Suvorov said he did?).

District commander general-lieutentant I.S. Konev joined all forces in his district into the 19th Army, rose to the head of this army and covertly went out to the West, leaving his entire district without any military control

In reality, Konev became the commander of the Army, occupying both positions of a district and army commander, and he did not move anywhere; but remained in the district HQ instead.

How many, then? And what about the pilot training?

The decree of 7th Dec.1940 planned a series of 1150 Sukhoi close-range bombers for 1941. Pilot training? 150 000 bomber pilots were nowhere to be seen in the RKKA Air Forces.

http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks-medium/bt-5.asp http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks-medium/bt-2.asp

Sorry, but you'll need to do better than that. Sources for trials, official documents, tank driving instructions or any other primary source... would you kindly? Here is a table which specifies exact speeds for the entire BT family, including prototypes (inc. the A-20) from the very first to the very last.
http://militera.lib.ru/tw/pavlov_zheltov_pavlov/13.html
The maximum speed reached is 90 km for the D-38. All other tanks have lower speeds.

The Last Republic, for starters.

First chapter is just wishful thinking - "Why didn't Stalin take part in the parade or for this special occasion abandon the tradition of horseriding?" I doubt Rezun has mystically linked to Stalin's mind to explain that. The idea that Stalin should've abandoned horseriding is about as probable as the idea that he decided to give his trusted generals due. Very first chapter, and already a conspiracy theory - "Stalin killed Frunze". Without any proof, just stated as a fact. Later one more quote: "...and in Nazi Germany people went to the 1st May demonstration with the same red flags as the Soviet people". Where's the proof? In Germany, 1st May was a "Day of National Labour" and all communist, socialist and trade unionist demonstrations were banned. Which red flags could unfurl on that day in Germany?

Second chapter, Rezun the economist graces us:

State intervention in the economy (even with best intents) always has negative consequences. The population is pauperized and runs away

Once again, little proof if anything. Most modern economies are heavily interventionist. Later Rezun rambles that "economic freedom can be introduced anywhere with the same results" (it was introduced with obviously disastrous results in Russia and Latin America, now that more than 20-30 years passed since the events we can even estimate the damage). Rezun says Britain suffers a brain drain of scientists (3-4 a day) due to "mild socialism". He never proves any statements. Britain is actually a major recipient of aspiring scientific folks from poorer nations. Regadless...

Chapter 3 is a conspiracy theory from beginning to end - there are no documents that would suggest the USSR controlled either NSDAP or Hitler in any fashion. Chapter 4 is just general talk once again without any proof, including repeating the conspiracy theory in Chapter 3 that Hitler was a Soviet agent. Soviet-German cooperation, for examle, in 1926-1933 hardly had anything to do with Hitler's Nazi Germany.

Chapter 5 is once again author's fantasies on why a nation with ravaged post-war industry did not build the Palace of Soviets. No facts, just rambling.

Chapter 6. Anti-communist ramblings, no facts. Conspiracy theories again. I've already noted that German communists and social democrats did not have a majority to overthrow Hitler, because smaller parties joined the NSDAP. Ergo, even if the German communists and social democrats were united, that wouldn't change the outcome of the vote. At all. Hitler wouldn't have "lost" in Germany, alas.

Chapter 7. Ramblings.

Chapter 8. Rezun thinks lend-lease to the USSR would have happened in spite of a Soviet agression against Germany. Nuff said. The whole chapter extolls the Allies versus the Axis, ignoring just one minor thing. In 1941, Hitler had the Axis. In 1941, the USSR did not yet have the Allies.

Also, once again the story about tractors. Rezun refers to "papers in Aberdeen training grounds". Which papers? Number, reference? Which papers say the M.1931 was sold illegally to the USSR?

Chapter 9. Bullshit about Britain being "on the brink of starvation" and "defeat" due to the U-boat war of the Germans. Sadly enough (for the Germans) they never came close even to choking US supplies to Britain like they did in World War I. Britain never seriously faced defeat or starvation. Even during "Happy Time".
http://www.usmm.org/battleatlantic.html

Chapter 10 and 11. "Impassable Mannerheim line". Nuff said.

Chapter 12. Winter War "a great victory" of the Red Army. Really?

Chapter 13. Idiotic ramblings about how diesels are defensive and gasoline engines are "offensive". In the end diesels were chosen, but Rezun just keeps rambling. Zhukov is "the bloodiest commander ever" (his losses are on par with other commanders), Tukhachevsky is a bad commander. *laughs*

Chapter 15. Nonsense comparisons ("Hitler should've had 70 000 tanks to combat all 24 000 of Soviet battle-ready and non-combat capable tanks"), when in reality Hitler only needed to have superiority immediately next to the border in concentration. Which he did and successfully defeated the RKKA in the June-July 1941 "border battles".

Chapter 16. "All Hitler's tanks were obsolete". Really? Including the 20-tonners? Then goes nonsense about how light tanks are "Mongol cavalry" which can kill heavy tanks. It's so funny. Were this shit not peddled as "history", perhaps it'd have some value.

In the same chapter Rezun says that the T-26 had the same quality as German tanks, same engine and gear parameters and higher firepower. Really? We already compared the T-26 to German 20-tonners, didn't we?

A lot of statements how Soviet tanks were "completely superior" (they weren't, as we found out). Rezun says the T-III and T-IV were "irrational" and thus light. They were not, as we found out - they were medium tanks which had better characteristics than Soviet light tanks, obviously. And the added tons of weight actually gave them a thicker defence, so it was not "irrational".

No original research. Nothing. Only ramblings.

[D.Turtle]

Chapter 3 is a conspiracy theory from beginning to end - there are no documents that would suggest the USSR controlled either NSDAP or Hitler in any fashion.

Chapter 4 is just general talk once again without any proof, including repeating the conspiracy theory in Chapter 3 that Hitler was a Soviet agent.

Wait, what?!

How the hell can anyone reach that conclusion?!

[Serafina]

Chapter 3 is a conspiracy theory from beginning to end - there are no documents that would suggest the USSR controlled either NSDAP or Hitler in any fashion.

Chapter 4 is just general talk once again without any proof, including repeating the conspiracy theory in Chapter 3 that Hitler was a Soviet agent.

Wait, what?!

How the hell can anyone reach that conclusion?!

Now wait a minute - people are not only reading such utter nonsense - but they are also believing it? And they use such books as sources?

That a fanatical leader of an ideology that saw communism as it's greatest enemy who started a WAR against communism and exterminated thousand of communists in his own country is a communist agent is pretty much the most absurd thing i have ever heard.
If the USSR had had that much influence in Germany, why not just let the red parties win the elections?

[K. A. Pital]

Oh, missed something.

It seems to be a report on BT-1; the Christie prototypes. ... So, the American prototype performed badly on Soviet roads.

Christie prototypes had higher speeds than Soviet tanks. The M1928, although never shipped to the USSR, had a top speed of 112 kph on wheels. Besides, the shipped M1931 was listed as BT-2.
http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?opt ... 50&lang=en
So first you need to stop using incorrect data, erroneous sources and then, perhaps, we can talk.
EDIT: Oh damn, your own source clearly shows the M.1931's speed (not the M.1928, the first T-3 prototype), had a speed of 46 mph max, just like I said:
http://www.wwiivehicles.com/usa/tanks-m ... -m1931.asp
So Foss' monography at least makes no errors regarding the M.1931, it seems.

Try listing primary documents, if you want to prove that M1931, not M1928, had a top speed of 112 kph. Try listing primary documents (like I did about BT-2 tests) that would prove BT-2 had a speed of 100 kph. Go on. I'm sure you can.

Listing erroneous fluff books or websites does not constitute an argument. Learn it good, once and for all. Unless you do, I'll lock the thread because it's getting tiresome. Either documental proof of your (or, for that matter, Rezun's) statements, or nothing.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Oh, missed something.

It seems to be a report on BT-1; the Christie prototypes. ... So, the American prototype performed badly on Soviet roads.

Christie prototypes had higher speeds than Soviet tanks. The M1928, although never shipped to the USSR, had a top speed of 112 kph on wheels. Besides, the shipped M1931 was listed as BT-2.
http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?opt ... 50&lang=en
So first you need to stop using incorrect data, erroneous sources and then, perhaps, we can talk.

Try listing primary documents, if you want to prove that M1931, not M1928, had a top speed of 112 kph. Try listing primary documents (like I did about BT-2 tests) that would prove BT-2 had a speed of 100 kph. Go on. I'm sure you can.

Listing erroneous fluff books or websites does not constitute an argument. Learn it good, once and for all. Unless you do, I'll lock the thread because it's getting tiresome. Either documental proof of your (or, for that matter, Rezun's) statements, or nothing.

I'm surprised you had this much patience Stas. As I pointed out a page or so ago, this guy is making stonewalling, an art.

[K. A. Pital]

To further note (because not all of our members understand Russian) - the USSR allocated 685 million roubles in 1940 to the construction of defence lines (this top secret report to Stalin and Molotov), out of the 24 billion roubles of total war produce[1] in 1940. That is almost 3%. Hardly looks like "a ruse". In 1939 the USSR allocated 726 million - even more. It seems Omeganian was not aware of the documents detailing the financing.

For a comparison, let's recall that France spent ~3 billion francs on the Maginot line. In the 1930s, the value of the franc rapidly depreciated, so a Soviet rouble was first worth 3 francs, then ~4,5 at peak depreciation, and in 1939 it was probably around 3 again (no time to look into the minutiae now). Which means in 1940 the USSR allocated almost about as much, financially, as France did on it's Maginot line. Obviously this concerns both West and East, since the USSR had to face two threats - Germany and Japan. However, for just one year, 1940, this is quite enough evidence to demonstrate that this was hardly a ruse.

If anyone can produce a similar document regarding how many reichsmark Germany spent on their fortification in 1941, I'd be all ears. Incidentally, the same document lists the FRs which were to be conserved - Kingisepp, Pskov and Kiev FRs. Nothing about the conservation or the fictional "abandonment" of the entire old line.

The following document of 25 June 1940:
http://rkka.ru/handbook/doc/nko-250640.htm
is a note to Stalin from Voroshilov detailing the plans for FR construction. It has the following statement:

In one month to develop and put on the agenda of a Commitee of Defence meeting a perspective plan of FR construction, planned for a term of 2 years (until the end of the third 5-year plan), which proposes the creation of a second fortified region line

So, quite obviously, the allocations proposed that a new line would be finished in mid-1942. Not in mid-1941.

By contrast, one can also look at the effort in the German OWB line:
http://www.fsgfort.com/DB/F034/06/Text.htm
Germany did not rely heavily on fixed fortification. Perhaps it was the smartest thing they did in the entire interbellum and early war period - after all, it would take a lot of spending to build it up, and that would mean fewer submarines, ships, planes and land weapons. Spending is finite, alas.

[TC Pilot]

At the risk of just beating a dead horse on the matter, I've been reading Shirer's Rise and Fall of the Third Reich and just got to the part where he talks about a top secret memorandum written by Field Marshall von Blomberg in mid-'37 that Germany had no reasonable fear of attack from any of the major European powers in the near-future (including the Soviet Union). Hitler went on in November of that year to explain that Germany likely had until '43 before the balance of rearmament tipped back out of Germany's favor.

[D.Turtle]

By contrast, one can also look at the effort in the German OWB line:
http://www.fsgfort.com/DB/F034/06/Text.htm
Germany did not rely heavily on fixed fortification. Perhaps it was the smartest thing they did in the entire interbellum and early war period - after all, it would take a lot of spending to build it up, and that would mean fewer submarines, ships, planes and land weapons. Spending is finite, alas.

Didn't the Siegfried Line cost more to construct than the Maginot Line?

[K. A. Pital]

By contrast, one can also look at the effort in the German OWB line:
http://www.fsgfort.com/DB/F034/06/Text.htm
Germany did not rely heavily on fixed fortification. Perhaps it was the smartest thing they did in the entire interbellum and early war period - after all, it would take a lot of spending to build it up, and that would mean fewer submarines, ships, planes and land weapons. Spending is finite, alas.

Didn't the Siegfried Line cost more to construct than the Maginot Line?

Oh, my bad - I only thought about the East when I wrote that. Yeah, it probably did, although the Reichsmark vs. the franc estimates will obviously suffer for various reasons. I've looked for the relative mass of concrete utilized for both fortifications as a good estimate. The Germans poured 6 mio. tons of concrete into the West line, and France probably poured around 4,5-5 mio (estimated weight by volume). Which means the Germans spent 1-1,5 mio. more on their fortification.

Unlike what they thought of France, however, they never considered either the USSR or Poland to be a serious threat. Even when they planned the Soviet campaign, they were sure that the USSR was in no shape to attack (and thus they decided to only rely on field fortification - if they really thought an attack was possible, relying on field fortification alone was dicey).

However, in a large part this owed to the change in view of the German generals. If one reads Halder's diaries, he would note that Halder says "fixed fortifications' time has passed" and says that "active defence" is the new cool thing - i.e. having a mobilized army relying on field defences rather than a massive network of fixed defences, which, however, lack the necessary mobility and flexibility offered by the new strategy. If one juxstaposes the German and Soviet opinion of fixed fortification in 1940, one would note that they were completely different.

[Omeganian]

Doesn't look very impressive.

For what, less than one year of work? Sure it does.

Less than 10% of the planned bunkers being in progress?

No, we have no adequate depth, neither existing nor planned.

If you noticed I never said the depth was adequate, but that Molotov line had a greater depth than Stalin line. *shrugs* Try reading, not typing. And besides, in 1940: http://rkka.ru/handbook/doc/nko-300640.htm

The December conference talks about much greater depths. Why was there no change in the barely started building accordingly?

So, you give me a description of two of the weakest fortified areas, on a secondary direction, in a place with generally difficult conditions, as a reason for a neglection of the entire line

"Neglection of the entire line"? Entire? Down to the last pillbox? Prove it, then.

Kiev - allowed to rust. Minsk - after the Germans attack, the locks are removed with crowbars (no one kept track of the keys). In other words, the most important directions are in a state which shows no one expects to use them in the future.

Also, on the Far East, there was no neglection.

http://rkka.ru/handbook/doc/ur1939.htm
You can see that the old Zabaikalsk FR were abandoned in favour of a new FR.

The forces were to be transferred into the new FR. On the western border, there were no new FR to be transferred to, so we can hardly compare the cases. In summer 1940 on the Far East:

за это лето части 1-й Краснознаменной армии почти на 100 процентов выполнили план оборонных работ, буквально преобразили старые укрепленные районы, там, где можно было, сделали солидные предполья, создали несколько новых укрепрайонов и значительно преобразили приморскую границу вообще.

Then why the massive glider production and pilot training in 1941?

Because there was a reform of the airforce? New machines, new pilots? "Massive" pilot training - what, the 30 or so thousand planned for 1941? *shrugs* I'm not sure anything needs to be explained here either.

Chapter 12 of the M Day needs to be explained.

And the Soviets saw the Germans doing all that. ... And we are talking about after France.

The USSR went alongside the Wehrmacht as it steamrolled over France?

You think they were ignorant of their ally's progress?

*eyes suspiciously* Or the USSR was busy with it's own deals, perhaps? Military inertia is very strong. Changes do not come fast.

Doesn't seem to be the case on the December conference.

The intel reports I gave links to mention enough of that. They are all December or later.

You should provide German documents. Try paying attention.

And what do the documents say, that it can disprove the reports of the people who saw the bunkers with their own eyes?

Mind elaborating on where said old style thought is reflected?

See above. http://rkka.ru/handbook/doc/nko-300640.htm

And what about 1941?

Why? What did Britain have against Stalin attacking?

What did Britain have? Well, for starters, Britain's rulers were always opposed to anyone dominating continenal Europe. Which would happen if the USSR or Germany won single-handedly. So yes, they would have reasons to oppose a Soviet move into Europe.

At what stage would they have started the opposition?

The reversible losses hardly contribute to offensive ability. Except as a dead weight slowing down the advance.

Depends on the time which is spent to restore offensive capacity of lost machinery. Nothing more and nothing less.

And the Soviets preferred to waste no time on that. Different approaches.

In essence, the command felt certain that the start of the war would begin with a German attack weak enough that it could be fended off by forces still not concentrated, merely "using Fortified Regions as a base".

If the plan is to be executed in response to a Moscow order, the most logical explanation is that the war won't begin with a German attack at all. Besides:

Учащимся прививалась мысль, что войны в нынешнюю эпоху не объявляются, что агрессор стремится иметь на своей стороне все преимущества внезапного нападения. Принималось как должное, что с самого начала в операции вступят главные силы противостоящих друг другу противников со всеми вытекающими отсюда стратегическими и оперативными особенностями.

To the north, a secondary attack was planned, to prevent the enemy from transferring to the south. The advancement wouldn't have been as fast.

Perhaps so. But I'm not sure it's then anyhow relevant to Rezun. We're just discussing the feasilibility of Soviet pre-war planning, which is irrelevant to Rezun's fantasies about Soviet lightning strikes.

The Soviet pre-war planning stated that "The deployment of the main forces to the north has the danger of leading to protracted combat".

Кристи уведомил госдепартамент США о том, что он продал "Амторгу" два танка

And according to the book "BT Tanks":

Кристи уведомил Госдепартамент, что он продал "Амторгу" два трактора.

District commander general-lieutentant I.S. Konev joined all forces in his district into the 19th Army, rose to the head of this army and covertly went out to the West, leaving his entire district without any military control

In reality, Konev became the commander of the Army, occupying both positions of a district and army commander, and he did not move anywhere; but remained in the district HQ instead.

Was he supposed to remain there? BTW, it doesn't say he went out, but that he moved the army.

How many, then? And what about the pilot training?

The decree of 7th Dec.1940 planned a series of 1150 Sukhoi close-range bombers for 1941. Pilot training? 150 000 bomber pilots were nowhere to be seen in the RKKA Air Forces.

к началу 1941 года была подготовлена 121 тысяча летчиков (ВИЖ, 1984, N 6, с. 5).

(121 thousand just by the Osoaviakhim).

Комсомол поставил перед молодежью задачу: всемерно развивая массовый авиационный спорт, подготовить 150 тысяч летчиков-спортсменов. Эта задача оказалась по плечу нашим юношам и девушкам". (Здравствуй, небо. С-5)

Главное управление ГВФ в феврале-апреле 1941 года развернуло десятки учебных эскадрилий, в которых обучались тысячи курсантов. Они получили дополнительно 1048 учебных самолетов

So, over a 150 000 pilots already, with enough skill for a very simple bomber. All that fuel spent just for fun?

As for the orders for plane building - Suvorov said the main building would have been during the war. Peacetime orders aren't worth much under these circumstances.

http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks-medium/bt-5.asp http://www.wwiivehicles.com/ussr/tanks-medium/bt-2.asp

Sorry, but you'll need to do better than that. Sources for trials, official documents, tank driving instructions or any other primary source... would you kindly? Here is a table which specifies exact speeds for the entire BT family, including prototypes (inc. the A-20) from the very first to the very last.
http://militera.lib.ru/tw/pavlov_zheltov_pavlov/13.html
The maximum speed reached is 90 km for the D-38. All other tanks have lower speeds.

PT-1 also had 90 kph, and it was actually a heavier modification.

http://bronetehnika.narod.ru/pt1/pt1.html

Also, the movie "Tractorists" does seem to show BT's making about 70 kph tracked.

The Last Republic, for starters.

First chapter is just wishful thinking - "Why didn't Stalin take part in the parade or for this special occasion abandon the tradition of horseriding?" I doubt Rezun has mystically linked to Stalin's mind to explain that. The idea that Stalin should've abandoned horseriding is about as probable as the idea that he decided to give his trusted generals due.

Horseriding seems to be abandoned in the September Parade.

Which red flags could unfurl on that day in Germany?

The flag of the Nazi Germany seems quite red to me. Yes, there are some minor differences. And a minor difference in the holiday name.

Later Rezun rambles that "economic freedom can be introduced anywhere with the same results" (it was introduced with obviously disastrous results in Russia and Latin America, now that more than 20-30 years passed since the events we can even estimate the damage).

Wild capitalism and economic freedom are not exactly the same.

He never proves any statements. Britain is actually a major recipient of aspiring scientific folks from poorer nations.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ ... years.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/th ... 12463.html

Chapter 4 is just general talk once again without any proof, including repeating the conspiracy theory in Chapter 3 that Hitler was a Soviet agent.

Well, the fact that both him and the German communists revolted the same day does seem suspicious (and so is Hitler's silence about the circumstances).

Soviet-German cooperation, for examle, in 1926-1933 hardly had anything to do with Hitler's Nazi Germany.

So what? It had a lot to do with the war raped Germany. And with the future Nazi generals.

Chapter 5 is once again author's fantasies on why a nation with ravaged post-war industry did not build the Palace of Soviets. No facts, just rambling.

Did it remain war ravaged?

Chapter 7. Ramblings.

Explain.

Chapter 8. Rezun thinks lend-lease to the USSR would have happened in spite of a Soviet agression against Germany. Nuff said. The whole chapter extolls the Allies versus the Axis, ignoring just one minor thing. In 1941, Hitler had the Axis. In 1941, the USSR did not yet have the Allies.

Not "ignoring", "leaving for the next two chapters".

Also, once again the story about tractors. Rezun refers to "papers in Aberdeen training grounds". Which papers? Number, reference? Which papers say the M.1931 was sold illegally to the USSR?

Suvorov states the document is clearly displayed in plain sight, which kinda removes the need for numbers (perhaps it would be better if someone will go to that museum and check; anyone living nearby?).

Chapter 9. Bullshit about Britain being "on the brink of starvation" and "defeat" due to the U-boat war of the Germans. Sadly enough (for the Germans) they never came close even to choking US supplies to Britain like they did in World War I. Britain never seriously faced defeat or starvation. Even during "Happy Time".
http://www.usmm.org/battleatlantic.html

It was bad enough to melt down the fences. The British would have welcomed the relief. Even better (for the Soviets) would have been if Britain would have been invaded, of course...

Chapter 10 and 11. "Impassable Mannerheim line". Nuff said.

Defenses are not just concrete. But yes, he exaggerated a bit.

Chapter 12. Winter War "a great victory" of the Red Army. Really?

They broke through, they learned enough to change the army organization, they put a division near the nickel mines important to Germany - well, not as bad as it's usually pictured.

Zhukov is "the bloodiest commander ever" (his losses are on par with other commanders),

If you'll please show me an order by another commander which says to execute the families of everyone who surrenders to the enemy.

Tukhachevsky is a bad commander. *laughs*

Уже 5 недель продолжалось наше безостановочное наступление, 5 недель стремились мы найти живую силу врага, для того чтобы в решительном ударе окончательно уничтожить его живую силу. 5 недель белополяки неизменно уклонялись от решительного столкновения в силу расстройства своей армии, и лишь только на Висле, подкрепленные новыми формированиями, рискнули они на это дело. Заранее мы не знали, где встретим главное сопротивление противника — на Висле или за Вислой. Но мы знали одно, что где-нибудь мы его главные силы найдем и разгромим в решительном столкновении.

A commander who advances for five weeks without knowing where the enemy forces are is not a bad commander? Whatever it is you are smoking, I suggest you quit. Sounds highly poisonous.

Chapter 16. "All Hitler's tanks were obsolete". Really? Including the 20-tonners?

Some problem with definitions, yes. And it's chapter 15, BTW.

Then goes nonsense about how light tanks are "Mongol cavalry" which can kill heavy tanks.

Except he says the exact opposite. He says they cannot kill them (at least in a direct confrontation), but they can outmaneuver them, and win without a fight.

In the same chapter Rezun says that the T-26 had the same quality as German tanks, same engine and gear parameters and higher firepower. Really? We already compared the T-26 to German 20-tonners, didn't we?

He talks about 1939, when the 20-tonners (well, some were still 15-tonners) were about 10% of the German tank forces. And their armor was thinner back then (the first variants actually had 15 mm, just like T-26). Besides, Suvorov doesn't talk about "engine and gear parameters", he talks about mobility. Now, 30 kph vs 40kph is quite comparable, especially if you take into account a minor advantage in ground pressure.

A lot of statements how Soviet tanks were "completely superior" (they weren't, as we found out). Rezun says the T-III and T-IV were "irrational" and thus light. They were not, as we found out - they were medium tanks which had better characteristics than Soviet light tanks, obviously.

In 1939 - 15 ton tanks which had about the same armor and armament as the Soviet 10-tonners. Lower weight is not an insignificant advantage on its own.

And the added tons of weight actually gave them a thicker defence.

Except the tank design wasn't meant for such a weight. The ground pressure in later models was rather high, for example. And where is that thicker defense? The 15 tonners' armor was 15 mm, just like T-26. 5 tons seems a bit too much difference for just the engine.

the shipped M1931 was listed as BT-2.

And what was BT-1 (or simply BT), then? The page you are giving does seem to view "Christie" as synonymous to BT without any numbers.

In 1939 the USSR allocated 726 million - even more. It seems Omeganian was not aware of the documents detailing the financing.

So, 1939 - the Stalin Line is largely complete, but upgrades are needed. In 1940, a new defense line is built from scratch, on a longer border... and the allocations are reduced. Hmmm... How does that contradict Suvorov?

Which means in 1940 the USSR allocated almost about as much, financially, as France did on it's Maginot line. Obviously this concerns both West and East, since the USSR had to face two threats - Germany and Japan. However, for just one year, 1940, this is quite enough evidence to demonstrate that this was hardly a ruse.

The tens of thousands of people working on the other side in May don't look like a ruse either. So what, the Germans intended to defend then?

Incidentally, the same document lists the FRs which were to be conserved - Kingisepp, Pskov and Kiev FRs. Nothing about the conservation or the fictional "abandonment" of the entire old line.

The FR where the locks were forced open is Minsk FR, bunkers of the Novograd-Volynsky FR were dug up during the first days of the war, so, apparently, said list isn't final.

BTW, burying a bunker is not the most efficient way of conserving it.

The following document of 25 June 1940:
http://rkka.ru/handbook/doc/nko-250640.htm
is a note to Stalin from Voroshilov detailing the plans for FR construction. It has the following statement:

In one month to develop and put on the agenda of a Commitee of Defence meeting a perspective plan of FR construction, planned for a term of 2 years (until the end of the third 5-year plan), which proposes the creation of a second fortified region line

So, quite obviously, the allocations proposed that a new line would be finished in mid-1942. Not in mid-1941.

The RL figures don't quite match either schedule (Suvorov mentions that some FR's were assigned secondary priority of building later). Especially considering said plan supposedly includes the restoration and reinforcing of the Stalin Line.

By contrast, one can also look at the effort in the German OWB line:
http://www.fsgfort.com/DB/F034/06/Text.htm
Germany did not rely heavily on fixed fortification. Perhaps it was the smartest thing they did in the entire interbellum and early war period - after all, it would take a lot of spending to build it up, and that would mean fewer submarines, ships, planes and land weapons. Spending is finite, alas.

Suvorov views that line as a counterpart to the Stalin Line - a good defense line (in concept, at least), abandoned once Germany started shifting its borders.

BTW, the proper Soviet use for the FR's, as seen on the Stalin Line before 1939 (and on the Far East later) is to merely use them as a skeleton for the field defense of an entire division if not a corps. So, the reliance on fixed defense can be argued. Doesn't look like a bad approach to me.

[Samuel]

Wild capitalism and economic freedom are not exactly the same.

Yeah, and communism and Marxism are not exactly the same. Care to show how "economic freedom" would have achieved better results?

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ ... years.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/th ... 12463.html

The findings will fuel concerns that Britain's failure to defend its manufacturing, science and university base is pushing highly skilled workers overseas and risks damaging long-term productivity.

The scale of the emigration as a share of the total skilled workforce is also high. At 16.7 per cent - or one in six graduates - it is much higher than any other major industrialised country. In contrast, France has lost just 3.4 per cent of its graduates, the lowest level of any large country.

France is more socialist than England. The reason the article gives is that England trains fewer professionals and the ease of movement to Canada, Australia and the United States, not socialism.

Well, the fact that both him and the German communists revolted the same day does seem suspicious (and so is Hitler's silence about the circumstances).

Yes, I can't imagine why an individual who believes the communists are trying to take over the republic and the government is powerless to stop them would stag a revolt at the same time.

It was bad enough to melt down the fences. The British would have welcomed the relief. Even better (for the Soviets) would have been if Britain would have been invaded, of course...

Well yes, it would have provided the British with large amounts of German war material and prisoners they could use. Or do you honestly think the Germans could prevail against the British navy?

[K. A. Pital]

Less than 10% of the planned bunkers being in progress?

Over 15%, actually (880 out of 5807 built, a few hundred in construction). Most similar defence lines were built in ~4 years, if not more. And all that completed in precisely one full year. Mind showing me which large-scale permanent defence lines (Maginot, Siegfried or other) had a superior rate of construction?

The December conference talks about much greater depths. Why was there no change in the barely started building accordingly?

Because... defence depth of units is not the same as feasible defence depth for fortifications of the time? You continue mixing concepts?

Kiev - allowed to rust. Minsk - after the Germans attack, the locks are removed with crowbars (no one kept track of the keys). In other words, the most important directions are in a state which shows no one expects to use them in the future.

I re-iterate the question - prove the entire line was abandoned. You said so - prove it. More importantly, tell me how were abandoned the Karelsk FR, the Ostropol FR, Letichev FR and Mogilev-Yampolsk FR. All those FRs were sites of major battles. Moreover, some old border FRs were re-armed in 1941. For example, on June 11 the Letichev FR was re-armed with 13 45-mm guns, 4 37-mm guns and . Care to explain? Kiev was put on conservation. Minsk was just not properly manned - not "abandoned", old FRs had sentry units assigned to patrol and keep them. But considering the Stalin line was never properly and fully manned, I fail to see how this is relevant to the issue. A report of April-May 1941 details this quite good:

Кадрами гарнизоны УР в настоящее время не обеспечены. Средняя численность гарнизона составляет в настоящее время не более 30% от штатной (реально - 13-20%) и не может быть увеличена ввиду отсутствия жилья и тылового обеспечения... Штатная численность пульбатов также не соответствует задачам обороны укреплений, так как может частично прикрыть не более 60% огневых сооружений.

So - no living quarters on the old border fortifications that could support it being fully manned, ergo, only a 13 to 30% manpower. And you're saying the Stalin line was 100% manned at some point? Care to prove when and where?

В 1938-39 гг. службами Наркомата обороны и Наркомата Внутренних дел была проведена широкая инспекция укреплений старой госграницы, показавшая их практическую небоеспособность. Вот выдержки из некоторых протоколов упомянутой инспекции:

* "НКО тов. Ворошилову 5 января 1939 г. ... По сообщению Особого отдела БВО строительство Слуцкого УР идет весьма неудовлетворительно... Из 91 объекта, намеченного к строительству по плану 1938 г. построено только 13... Работа была развернута со значительным опозданием, так как чертежи и планы объектов были высланы из Инженерного управления с опозданием в несколько месяцев... Л.Берия"
* " НКО тов, Ворошилову 17 января 1939 г. По сообщению НКВД Украины, строительство УР КОВО находится в явно неудовлетворительном состянии. Утвержденный НКО план строительства на 1938 г. не выполнен, также как и планы предыдущих лет... Из 284 намеченных по плану сооружений на 2 декабря было забетонировано 86... 60 сооружений, в том числе 30 ДОТ и 30 командно-наблюдательных пунктов из-за отсутствия чертежей, не представленных отделением инженерных войск КОВО, со строительства совершенно сняты... Присланные Инженерным управлением чертежи внутреннего оборудования сооружений имеют целый ряд серьезных недостатков, вследствие которых нарушается не только нормальная работа в них, но и пользование ими... В строящемся Шепетовском УР совершенно выпали из плана строительства узлы 7, 8 и 9, в результате чего между Шепетовским и Староконстантиновским УР образовались неперекрытые ворота более 60 км... В Новоград-Волынском УР в плане строительства не оказалось 19-го сооружения, утвержденного Генеральным штабом РККА... Отсутствуют чертежи внутреннего оборудования многих объектов... Запланированные материалы не соотвествуют потребностям строительства... Практика бетонирования сооружений на ряде объектов проводится вопреки существующим инструкциям НКО... В Каменец-Подольском УР при бетонировании сооружений (в частности № 53) бетон возле амбразур утамбован не был, в результате чего после бетонирования пришлось дополнительно заливать образовавшиеся пустые места, чем значительно снижена прочность сооружений... В Остропольском УР бетонные стены оказались на 15 см тоньше установленного значения... Особенно много дефектов отмечено в строительстве Остропольского и Каменец-Подольского УР... Л.Берия"
* "НКО СССР тов. Ворошилову 13 февраля 1939 г. Несмотря на долгое строительство и дооборудование Псковского и Островского УР, они не могут считаться в настоящее время боевспособными. Из-за неправильно спроектированного и построенного внутреннего оборудования большинства ДОТ они не могут быть заняты войсками... до половины сооружений на 20-40 см заполнены водой, появившейся из-за неправильной оценки глубины грунтовых вод. В то же время водопровод не работает... Электрооборудование укрепрайонов отсутствует... В жилых помещениях УР высокая влажность и спертый воздух... Центры снабжения УР не построены... Продовольственные склады отсутствуют... Из-за неграмотного планирования УР их огневые сооружения не могут вести огонь на дальность более 50-100 м, так местность имеет бугры, овраги и невырубленные леса. ДОС ь 3, установлен на склоне оврага и не может быть замаскирован из-за постоянных оползней, а имеющийся в нем орудийный полукапонир бесполезен, так как располагается ниже уровня окружающей местности... Для расширения секторов обстрела необходимо снять около 120 000 кубометров земли, а также вырубить до 300 га леса и кустарника... Амбразуры ДОТ расчитаны на применение пулеметов "Максим", но оборудованы станками неизвестной конструкции, ... предназанченными скорее всего для пулемета Гочкиса давно снятого с вооружения. Орудийные полукапониры не оборудованы броневыми заслонками и служат источником проникновения в ДОТ талых вод и осадков... Артиллерийское вооружение УР состоит из 6 устаревших полевых орудий 1877 года, к которым нет снарядов... Охрана территории УР не ведется. В ходе работы комиссия неоднократно встречала местных жителей, проходящих в непосредственной близости от огневых сооружений для сокращения пути между поселками... Л.Берия"
* "В ЦК КП(б) Украины О состоянии КиУР 11 января 1939 г. ... Киевский укрепрайон на сегодня представляет только лишь скелет предместной позиции , состоящей в основном из пулеметных сооружений ... и совершенно не обеспечен положенным оборудованием. Из 257 сооружений, имеющихся в районе, только 5 готовы к боевому действию... Левый и правый фланги не защищены и имеют свободный проход для противника (левый - 4 км, правый - 7км). В центре зоны УР ... образован мешок (разрыв в 7 км), через который открыт свободный проход противнику непосредственно к Киеву. Передний край долговременной полосы удален от центра Киева лишь на 15 км, что дает возможность обстрела противником Киева, не вторгаясь в укрепрайон... Из 257 сооружений у 175 отсутствует нужный горизонт обстрела из-за рельефа местности (бугры, горы, крупный лес и кустарник). Планировочные работы по УР, несмотря на указания правительства, оттягиваются выполнением на военное время, тогда как эти работы необходимо проводить немедленно. Только по 3-му участку необходимо для планировочных работ снять более 15 000 кубометров земли, а это не менее 4-х месяцев работы... Всего же ... по укрепрайону необходимо снять не менее 300 000 кубометров земли и вырубить до 500 га леса и густарника. ... 140 огневых сооружений оборудованы пулеметными заслонками обр. 1930 г., которые при стрельбе закрываются автоматически и способствуют поражению бойцов из своих же пулеметов рикошетированными пулями. О небоеспособности КиУР и непринятии мер комендантом КИУР Особый отдел КОВО неоднократно информировал командование КОВО, но, несмотря на это, до сего времени ничего не предпринято... Зам. Народного комиссара Внутренних дел УССР Б.Кобулов"
* В ЦК КП(б) Украины О состоянии Могилев-Ямпольского Укрепленного района ... На территории Могилев-Ямпольского укрепленного района имеется 297 огневых сооружений, из коих 279 ДОТов и 18 артиллерийских полукапониров... Материальная часть огневых сооружений находится в неудовлетворитеольном состоянии. На территории 2-го сектора обороны имеется 9 огневых артиллерийских полукапониров. Из них 3 сооружения - "Скала", "Партизан" и "Мюд" не имеют фильтровентилляционного оборудования... В связи с происходящим переоборудованием огневых сооружений, артиллерийских полукапониров на территории УР в казематах царят хаос и беспорядок... Электропроводка во многих ОПК перепутана и совершенно не обеспечивает их электроосвещение... Полукапонирная артиллерия в огневых сооружениях находится в неудовлетворительном состоянии. Все пушки собраны из некомплектных деталей разных пушек. Формуляров на пушки не имеется. Пушки, находящиеся в сооружениях 1932 г., только в 1937 г. подверглись разборке и чистке, вследствие чего вся матчасть пушек внутри имеет следы ржавчины. Пружины накатников пушек большей частью собраны неправильно (вместо левой поставлена головная правая пружина), что при стрельбе приводило к самоотвинчиванию головки цилиндра компрессора и ствол пушки после нескольких выстрелов мог сойти с установки. В двух пушках вместо веретенного масла была налита олифа, забивающая отверстие маслопровода, что могло привести к разрыву цилиндра компрессора... УР до сих пор не укомплектован ... средним комсоставом. Комсостав, приписанный из отдаленных мест и городов (Саратова, Москвы, Ленинграда), сможет прибыть в УР лишь через 5-6 дней, после объявления мобилизации... При существующих штатах рядового состава пульбаты не смогут выполнить возложенных на них задач, так как в роте по штату имеется 21 пулеметчик, а рота должна обслуживать 50 сооружений... Кадрами артиллеристов пульбаты совершенно не обеспечены... При наличии артиллерии пульбаты по штатам совершенно не имеют артиллерийских мастеров, которые могли бы вести технический надзор за капонирной артиллерией... Зам. Наркома внутренних дел УССР Кобулов"

So where, when were the Stalin line fortifications, inluding the Kiev FR and such, "completed", "fully manned" and combat-capable? Care to explain?

The forces were to be transferred into the new FR. On the western border, there were no new FR to be transferred to, so we can hardly compare the cases. In summer 1940 on the Far East:

за это лето части 1-й Краснознаменной армии почти на 100 процентов выполнили план оборонных работ, буквально преобразили старые укрепленные районы, там, где можно было, сделали солидные предполья, создали несколько новых укрепрайонов и значительно преобразили приморскую границу вообще.

On the contrary, we can and will compare the cases. The new FRs were being built on the new border, and to the FRs which was completed, forces were assigned and deployed. The old FRs were never fully completed, fully and properly manned or anything like that.

Chapter 12 of the M Day needs to be explained.

Why anything there needs any special explanation? 121 thousand pilots who passed the OSOAVIAKHIM courses are not, sadly, what one could call trained military professionals. Even the trained and formally educated for many years (!) fighter and bomber pilots of the USSR in 1941 had 30-180 flight hours on the average, whereas a German pilot had an average of 450 flight hours. If the trained RKKA pilots in 1941 were of such low quality, the "121 000 pilots" prepared by the OSOAVIAKHIM are hardly even a factor here. Conspiracy theories notwithstanding, the quality of the Soviet Air Force personnel was exceptionally low.

You think they were ignorant of their ally's progress? ...Doesn't seem to be the case on the December conference.

Yes, because they were. Otherwise they wouldn't plan for "defence with unmobilized and unconcentrated forces". Which was a complete disaster. Like I said, it's a complete contrast with the Germans. If you can prove that the USSR did NOT adhere to a doctrine of defending with unmobilized and unconcentrated forces, feel free to prove me wrong. It's kinda hard with the above quote, but sure, do.

And what do the documents say, that it can disprove the reports of the people who saw the bunkers with their own eyes?

How much concrete and money was allocated. How many were actually built, as opposed to being ruse constructs. You know, like the documents I've provided. You provided nothing. Sorry, but that won't do. Where are the German documents similar to the Soviet 1938-1941 documents on the construction of fortifications, reports and such? Show them.

Mind elaborating on where said old style thought is reflected?

See above. http://rkka.ru/handbook/doc/nko-300640.htm

And what about 1941?

So you admit that on the 30 of June 1940, when France has fallen, the Soviet Union planned for (remember, the first decisions to erect parts of the Molotov line came on 26 June) old-style, absolutely inadequate defence strategy of defending fixed fortifications with undeployed, unconcentrated forces? *laughs* Then you probably admit that the Molotov line was a prime example of the Soviet leadership's military inertia and a complete lack of understanding.

Moreover, the December conference (see Tyulenev's report on defensive operations) hardly changed anything. Where does Tulenev state that FRs are useless if not supported by a fully deployed and concentrated Army? He doesn't.

What does Timoshenko state about the German operations in France?

Ряд успешно проведенных на Западе прорывов в войне 1939 — 1940 гг. породил у некоторых исследователей мысль о кризисе современной обороны.

Такой вывод не обоснован.

Его нельзя делать из того, что ни на польском, ни на французском фронтах немцы не встретили должного отпора, который мог бы быть им оказан при надлежащем использовании противниками существующих средств обороны (механизация оборонительных работ, разнообразный арсенал инженерных средств, мощные огневые противотанковые средства).

He thinks that pre-war views on fixed defence are not invalidated. He says that "mechanized defense engineering", "various engineering facilities" and "powerful anti-tank means" can change (sic!) the situation and fixed defence will win the day again. Nowhere does he say that the fixed defence should be supported by a fully mobilized Army. The critical issue (Germans deploying and attacking before Poles or French deployed) is ignored utterly!

The "depth of 100 km" is planned for the entire defence line. The fortification lines are only planned for tens of kilometers:

Тактическая оборонительная зона (схема 2) является главной зоной сопротивления, где должны быть сосредоточены основные усилия обороны и где наступление противника должно быть сломлено.

Она включает в себя:

а) полосу обеспечения — глубиной до 10 — 15 км, которая создается с целью задержать и измотать наступающего противника и выиграть время для подготовки оборонительной полосы. Полоса обеспечения оборудуется заграждениями; в ней действуют разведывательные части и передовые отряды;

б) главную полосу сопротивления — глубиной до 8 — 10 км, имеющую назначением остановить и расстроить атаку противника, на ней располагаются основные силы обороны;

в) вторую полосу обороны, — где располагаются корпусные резервы; она должна преградить доступ в глубину прорвавшимся подвижным частям противника и служить исходным рубежом для контратак из глубины.

За последнее время дебатируется вопрос: как предохранить войска, плотно занимающие передний край главной полосы сопротивления, от организованного артиллерийского огня противника в период артиллерийской подготовки.

Имеется мнение: войска на этот период оттягивать в укрытия в глубину обороны. Вряд ли это возможно сделать в современных условиях, учитывая темпы танковой атаки и ее авиационное сопровождение.

This is all Timoshenko on the December conference. Try showing me where exactly Timoshenko employed "new thinking" different from what is specified in the June 30 note about FRs.

At what stage would they have started the opposition?

Who knows? *shrugs* Politics is always an unknown.

And the Soviets preferred to waste no time on that. Different approaches.

The USSR spent a lot of time restoring broken machines during operations in Finland. Do explain yourself, do prove the Soviet strategy was to drop large fractions of equipment which was unusuable due to breakdown.

If the plan is to be executed in response to a Moscow order ... Besides:

This is a note which specifies the nature of defence inside the USSR. It shows how pathetically misguided the views of the Soviet command were. Quite obviously the idea that the enemy would still allow your forces to concentrate and counterattack was stupid. The post-France 1940 notes on defence, and the December 1940 conference show that the Soviet General Staff considered old methods of defence quite adequate. Regardless of what Zhukov himself thought, Timoshenko, Voroshilov and Stalin seemed to be content with what they did, said and wrote.

The Soviet pre-war planning stated that "The deployment of the main forces to the north has the danger of leading to protracted combat".

Yeah, because the South with it's plains, etc. was better suited for war operations. This rationale also made Soviet HQ consider that the Germans' main attack vector will come in the deep South-West, as opposed to being centered around the entire Soviet logistic network.

And according to the book "BT Tanks":

Кристи уведомил Госдепартамент, что он продал "Амторгу" два трактора.

Well, if Christie lied to the U.S. State Department, frankly, that is no business of the Amtorg. They made a deal which Christie had signed. If Christie was really such a jackass, well... what can I say? Business comes first. Considering Christie was willing to ship M1932 illegally, it's quite possible he circumvented the law with the M1931 too. But I'd like to see primary evidence of that, if there is.

Was he supposed to remain there? BTW, it doesn't say he went out, but that he moved the army.

No, "it BTW" doesn't. It "BTW" says that "BTW" Konev moved out and left the district without ANY MILITARY CONTROL. Literally.

So, over a 150 000 pilots already, with enough skill for a very simple bomber. All that fuel spent just for fun?

"Enough skill"? *laughs* If Soviet pilots in the RKKA VVS had 30-180 hours on the average, I fear to think how many these "pilots" had.

As for the orders for plane building - Suvorov said

I don't care what he "said". I want primary, documental proof. Do you understand? Prove that there was a plan to build 150 000 planes of the Su-2 model. Rezun says there was a plan. Rezun doesn't refer to the archives either, or to anything. He just claims it without any proof or source. Do prove it, then, if Rezun himself cannot.

PT-1 also had 90 kph, and it was actually a heavier modification.
http://bronetehnika.narod.ru/pt1/pt1.html

Do you just quote without reading, or? The PT-1 had a whopping' 580 horsepower engine (M-17F) versus that of 400 hp (M-5-400) for a serial BT-2.

Also, the movie "Tractorists" does seem to show BT's making about 70 kph tracked.

You can measure the speed by the camera, or what? How does a movie constitute proof?

Sorry, but that's a complete failure on your part.

Horseriding seems to be abandoned in the September Parade.

How is it relevant for the Victory Parade?

The flag of the Nazi Germany seems quite red to me. Yes, there are some minor differences.

The national flag of Germany is not "the same red flag" which was held on May Day. May Day flags are simple red banners, not state banners.

Wild capitalism and economic freedom are not exactly the same.

Rezun says any state involvement period is bad. I don't care what you think, Omeganian. Rezun made a statement, not you. Go read it again.

Well, the fact that both him and the German communists revolted the same day does seem suspicious (and so is Hitler's silence about the circumstances).

Conspiracy theories. Documents, please.

So what? It had a lot to do with the war raped Germany. And with the future Nazi generals.

So... *shrugs* Perhaps then France and Britain should have starved the Weimar Republic and mass-murdered it's population? You know, because... they're future Nazis all right? I'm not sure how the Soviet aid to the Weimar Republic equals same aid to Nazi Germany. The cutoff in cooperation post-1933 pretty much proves my point. You... had no point to begin with.

Did it remain war ravaged?

The USSR only restored it's industrial potential in the early 1950s (and that combined with the German reparations, anyhow). The Soviet Union's people were still living in horrid conditions, because a lot of the housing was destroyed and the Stalin-era housing construction was atrociously slow, which led to a problem with urbanized populations' not getting enough area (essentially, much like in the Industrial Revolution-era Britain). So the USSR shifted to cheap mass construction of housing and other priorities. The "Palace of the Soviets" as one of the architectural legacies of Stalinism was abandoned as an idea. Before Stalin died, though, new and new projects came out as the Soviet Union's economy restored its pre-war levels. The attack on "Stalin's Empire" architectural style done in post-Stalinist times first removed Iofan from the play, and later simply annihilated the idea of the Palace itself. Khrushev tasked the new architctects in 1956-1959 with such conditions that the Palace became unviable and impossible to construct (on the two locations chosen). The project was killed on purpose.

Explain.

Rezun makes irrelevant mockery of old Soviet historiography (which was largely under the impact of Stalinism and operated with closed archives - lest we mention the "7 million human losses", long-term used as official figures). Old Soviet historiography is absolutely irrelevant and useless junk. By mocking it Rezun doesn't add anything to the historical science, which has long moved past the realm of stipulations and into the realm of documents.

Not "ignoring", "leaving for the next two chapters".

Yeah, except nothing in those chapters indicates that the USA or Britain would remain sided with the USSR if it attacked. Trade and cooperation agreements? Pfft. The USSR had a "Trade and Cooperation Agreement" with Nazi Germany in 1939-1941.

It was bad enough to melt down the fences. The British would have welcomed the relief. Even better (for the Soviets) would have been if Britain would have been invaded, of course...

Which fences? The British Empire never faced naval defeat, starvation, air defeat (in fact, in the air Britain defeated Germany in 1940), or anything like that. Better for the USSR if Britain had been invaded? Sure. One minor problem - Germany had no means to invade Britain. Such an invasion would end in complete disaster. But I'm sure you know that, too.

Defenses are not just concrete. But yes, he exaggerated a bit.

Not just "a bit". The Soviet defeats were not a matter of fortification alone. The Finnish fortification was typical of the period. There's nothing "great" in that, no more "great" than the German defeat of certain forts on the Maginot Line, defeat of Eben-Emael, etc. etc. Fortified regions were taken before (1929, KVZHD - the Sungari FR of the Chinese), etc.

They broke through, they learned enough to change the army organization, they put a division near the nickel mines important to Germany - well, not as bad as it's usually pictured.

Certainly not. But not a great victory at all. It was bad, because the USSR expected to utterly crush Finland and occupy it once the conflict began (there could be some speculation as to pre-war goals, but once it started, the USSR was expecting a full surrender). The USSR "learned" little. The Finnish debacle was extolled as a "great victory" by Timoshenko, who was once again peddling the idea of the strength of fixed fortification. The reorganization they started was absolutely necessary, but you know... reorganization is usually what you do when your Army suffers defeats. If it stimulated the RKKA to reform, that means the RKKA performed inadequately in combat - a pretty much well-known fact, which can be proven by lots of examples.

If you'll please show me an order by another commander which says to execute the families of everyone who surrenders to the enemy.

It's not unprecended, such orders were issued in the Civil War (hmm, why not mention Tukhachevsky?). I'm not sure how this is supposed to prove Zhukov's especial brutality when in reality this order was deemed illegal by the PUBalt and itself was probably a misinterpretation of the Order 270. So in reality, no one was executed. Zhukov's unit losses were on par with other commanders. I re-iterate - where is the evidence?

A commander who advances for five weeks without knowing where the enemy forces are is not a bad commander? Whatever it is you are smoking, I suggest you quit. Sounds highly poisonous.

Not knowing where enemy forces are when your forces lack aviation and modern means of intelligence is a common occurence. In the chaos of the Civil War it was more than common; and yet once again very common in the chaos of 1941; despite there being GOOD commanders, they often did not know where the enemy was. The counterstrike of the 6th MK is a prime example. On the other hand, Tukhachevsky developed a theory of mechanized operations in the USSR, which was later accepted by Stalin. How is he a bad commander, then?

Some problem with definitions, yes.

How were the 20-tonners obsolete?

Except he says the exact opposite. He says they cannot kill them (at least in a direct confrontation), but they can outmaneuver them, and win without a fight.

Except that's idiotic - he stipulates a win on a strategic scale with light tanks as "cavalry" moving "on roads and on wheels" (prohibited unless on-march). That is impossible when confronting a DEPLOYED Army. And the RKKA could not pre-empt the Werhmacht in deployment. Besides, it didn't even TRY.

He talks about 1939, when the 20-tonners (well, some were still 15-tonners) were about 10% of the German tank forces. And their armor was thinner back then (the first variants actually had 15 mm, just like T-26). Besides, Suvorov doesn't talk about "engine and gear parameters", he talks about mobility. Now, 30 kph vs 40kph is quite comparable, especially if you take into account a minor advantage in ground pressure.

Except they had superior armament and superior facilities from communications to crew emplacement. So... where's the superiority?

In 1939 - 15 ton tanks which had about the same armor and armament as the Soviet 10-tonners. Lower weight is not an insignificant advantage on its own.

The Ausf.B and Ausf.C of the Pz.IV already existed by 1939, as did the Ausf D. and Ausf E. varians of the Pz.III. On the other hand, serial production of T-34 and KV started only in June 1940 and Feb 1940 correspondingly. So in 1939, the Germans had two types of tanks which were already superior to Soviet light tanks.

Except the tank design wasn't meant for such a weight. The ground pressure in later models was rather high, for example. And where is that thicker defense? The 15 tonners' armor was 15 mm, just like T-26. 5 tons seems a bit too much difference for just the engine.

I'm sorry, 285 hp and 300 hp engines versus 90 hp in the T-26? *laughs* "Just for the engine", indeed. The T-26s light weight offered no advantage with such a pathetically weak engine.

And what was BT-1 (or simply BT), then? The page you are giving does seem to view "Christie" as synonymous to BT without any numbers.

The BT-1 designation did not formally exist in the USSR, IIRC. Simply BT, yeah. The Christie M.1931 displayed the exact same characteristics as stated for in U.S. sources, actually.

So, 1939 - the Stalin Line is largely complete, but upgrades are needed

The Stalin line condition is well described above.

The tens of thousands of people working on the other side in May don't look like a ruse either. So what, the Germans intended to defend then?

How? If they "work", but are not allocated concrete for permanent fortifications, that is a ruse. No permanent defence line; just field defences.

The FR where the locks were forced open is Minsk FR, bunkers of the Novograd-Volynsky FR were dug up during the first days of the war, so, apparently, said list isn't final.

Minsk was probably unmanned and guarded (but the above list of Stalin line FRs having only 15-20% personnel on the average is indicating that it's quite probable even those FRs were never properly manned )

The RL figures don't quite match either schedule (Suvorov mentions that some FR's were assigned secondary priority of building later). Especially considering said plan supposedly includes the restoration and reinforcing of the Stalin Line.

The USSR had a tendency of overestimating terms (see: the Plan of building battleships in 1937). But even those optimistic terms were not aimed for 1941.

Suvorov views that line as a counterpart to the Stalin Line - a good defense line (in concept, at least), abandoned once Germany started shifting its borders.

It's not a "good defence line", and neither is the Stalin line, which was 90% MG dots, and only less than 10% artillery.

BTW, the proper Soviet use for the FR's, as seen on the Stalin Line before 1939 (and on the Far East later) is to merely use them as a skeleton for the field defense of an entire division if not a corps. So, the reliance on fixed defense can be argued. Doesn't look like a bad approach to me.

It's a bad approach because it is considered adequate before forces concentrate. War has shown this false.

[K. A. Pital]

To condense the above:
1) The construction on the Molotov line was not a ruse and was in tempoes, scale and quality of fortification fully corresponding to the most advanced fixed fortification lines of the time. Contrary statements require proof, which has not been displayed. Besides, the construction of defence lines does not par se indicate a nation is preparing for agression or defence (see Siegfried line, Chinese and Japanese defence lines and FRs in Manchuria). All major and even lesser powers, including France, Germany, USSR, Poland in Europe had offensive plans. The construction of border defence lines by those great powers did not indicate that any of them were particularly more or less prone to war.

However, the unfinished fixed defence effor demonstrates the expectation of several years of peacetime on part of the Soviet leadership, because otherwise the spending would've been unnecessary. The absence of a serious German fixed defence effort signifies exactly that.

2) The German effort as par Halder himself was based on field defence, not on large-scale permanent concrete fortification. Omeganian failed to show any German documents proving any serious fixed defence construction effort in the East 1940-1941 at all.

3) The Soviet approach as of mid-1940 (post-France) and post-December 1940 ("No crisis in modern defence") further solidified the Soviet views that fixed defence could be efficient even with unmobilized and unconcentrated forces; it would allow forces to fend off an initial assault while the bulk still mobilizes. It's laid out in plain language in the June 30 note and never overturned in any fashion on the "December conference" Omeganian likes to refer to. The chief believers in this were Stalin, Voroshilov and Timoshenko.

4) Omeganian has shown no proof whatsoever that the Christie M1931 (index-less BT) or the BT-2 had a speed of 100 kph as Rezun stipulates. The speeds of M1928, PT-1 (a 580 hp engine tank) and D-38 (90 kph) are irrelevant. There are no primary sources that demonstrate any speeds other than the ones I've quoted.

5) Omeganian has shown no documental proof whatsoever for Rezun's claim that Hitler was a Soviet agent.

6) Omeganian has not shown any documental proof of the production plan for Su-2 bomber being an insanely high number of 150 000 machines.

7) Omeganian failed to support Rezun's assertion that in 1939 the Germans had no tanks superior to the Soviet counterparts. In reality, the latter models of the 15-20 tonners were coming out; and even the models with armour comparable to the T-26 - early Pz.III and IV models - had a more powerful engine and armament, obviously (the 37-mm KwK or the 75-mm KwK in case of Pz.IV).

Omeganian has failed to prove Rezun's thesis that wheeled tanks are (a) "agressive weapon" (b) designed to combat on wheels and on-road (c) only respected in the USSR (d) unusable on Soviet territory. Instead he fully agreed that the wheeled tanks were employed and developed by many nations, deployed for reasons of track conservation on-march, and fully abandoned by the time track resource rose high. Combat on roads was prohibited by the manual, contrary to Rezun's statements. Tanks were used for 630 km long marches without problem in Mongolia and ZabVO where scant few modern roads were present. Likewise without much problem (except for motorhour exhaustion) the BT marched during the June 1941 counterstrikes like e.g. the 6th MC counterstrike. In fact, Omeganian has all but conceded on all the above points.

9) Omeganian admitted that Rezun falsely described the Winter War as a "great victory" for the RKKA.

I'm not sure this debate has any reasons to continue. Omeganian needs to demonstrate primary documental evidence in support of:
# Hitler being a Soviet agent
# M1931 or BT-2 having speeds in excess or equal to 100 kph (obviously not for M1928, PT-1, D-38 or other machines)
# German large-scale construction of fixed defences in the East in 1941 (at least comparable with the Soviet New Border Line)
# Su-2 planned in a series of 150 000 machines
# Konev left his district
# Stalin line being a "good defence line" which was "properly manned" or "properly armed", as he claimed (and as did Rezun)

Failure to prove or concede on the above 6 factual claims will result in the thread being locked.

[Ilya Muromets]

Would it be possible to have this topic moved to the General Archives section after it gets locked? I've been silently following this debate, and the refutations of Rezun's claims have been really informative. It'd be good to have this thread as a go-to source on this board.

[Omeganian]

Less than 10% of the planned bunkers being in progress?

Over 15%, actually (880 out of 5807 built, a few hundred in construction).

Suvorov gave a figure of 17 out of 80 bunkers completed on the banks of San on the German side. Looks comparable.

Most similar defence lines were built in ~4 years, if not more. And all that completed in precisely one full year. Mind showing me which large-scale permanent defence lines (Maginot, Siegfried or other) had a superior rate of construction?

No peacetime army. No peacetime industry. Why should we take peacetime building rates as a standard? Why not, for example, the Siegfried Line?

The December conference talks about much greater depths. Why was there no change in the barely started building accordingly?

Because... defence depth of units is not the same as feasible defence depth for fortifications of the time? You continue mixing concepts?

Tyulenev viewed the Finnish defenses as the most fitting for the modern times. With a 78 km depth. After all, the Soviets had no choice back then but to consider it exemplary defense.

Kiev - allowed to rust. Minsk - after the Germans attack, the locks are removed with crowbars (no one kept track of the keys). In other words, the most important directions are in a state which shows no one expects to use them in the future.

I re-iterate the question - prove the entire line was abandoned. You said so - prove it. More importantly, tell me how were abandoned the Karelsk FR, the Ostropol FR, Letichev FR and Mogilev-Yampolsk FR. All those FRs were sites of major battles.

Of course, after the invasion, an attempt was made to restore some of their fighting capability. After all, whether the fortifications have guns or not, a soldier sitting in a bunker often has at least a meter of concrete between him and the enemy.

Moreover, some old border FRs were re-armed in 1941. For example, on June 11 the Letichev FR was re-armed with 13 45-mm guns, 4 37-mm guns and. Care to explain?

Re armed? it had over 300 bunkers. A mere dozen old guns brought there could easily mean a deception attempt.

Kiev was put on conservation. Minsk was just not properly manned - not "abandoned", old FRs had sentry units assigned to patrol and keep them.

And we saw the quality of said "patrols" in the Kiev FR.

But considering the Stalin line was never properly and fully manned, I fail to see how this is relevant to the issue. A report of April-May 1941 details this quite good:

Кадрами гарнизоны УР в настоящее время не обеспечены. Средняя численность гарнизона составляет в настоящее время не более 30% от штатной (реально - 13-20%) и не может быть увеличена ввиду отсутствия жилья и тылового обеспечения... Штатная численность пульбатов также не соответствует задачам обороны укреплений, так как может частично прикрыть не более 60% огневых сооружений.

So - no living quarters on the old border fortifications that could support it being fully manned, ergo, only a 13 to 30% manpower. And you're saying the Stalin line was 100% manned at some point? Care to prove when and where?

В Полоцком УР, например, помимо уровских подразделений и частей находился 4-й стрелковый корпус. УР был разделён на два участка: в северном – 50-я стрелковая дивизия, в южном – 5-я.

В Минском УР помимо уровских частей находился 16-й стрелковый корпус. В северном участке – 100-я сд, в южном – 13-я (Главный военный совет РККА. 13 марта 1938 г. – 20 июня 1941 г. Документы и материалы. М., 2004. С. 383).

Всё это было до 1939 года. До подписания пакта.

The fixed defenses seem to be problematic. But forces for field defenses are present.

В 1938-39 гг. службами Наркомата обороны и Наркомата Внутренних дел была проведена широкая инспекция укреплений старой госграницы, показавшая их практическую небоеспособность. Вот выдержки из некоторых протоколов упомянутой инспекции:

* "НКО тов. Ворошилову 5 января 1939 г. ... По сообщению Особого отдела БВО строительство Слуцкого УР идет весьма неудовлетворительно... Из 91 объекта, намеченного к строительству по плану 1938 г. построено только 13... Работа была развернута со значительным опозданием, так как чертежи и планы объектов были высланы из Инженерного управления с опозданием в несколько месяцев... Л.Берия"
* " НКО тов, Ворошилову 17 января 1939 г. По сообщению НКВД Украины, строительство УР КОВО находится в явно неудовлетворительном состянии. Утвержденный НКО план строительства на 1938 г. не выполнен, также как и планы предыдущих лет... Из 284 намеченных по плану сооружений на 2 декабря было забетонировано 86... 60 сооружений, в том числе 30 ДОТ и 30 командно-наблюдательных пунктов из-за отсутствия чертежей, не представленных отделением инженерных войск КОВО, со строительства совершенно сняты... Присланные Инженерным управлением чертежи внутреннего оборудования сооружений имеют целый ряд серьезных недостатков, вследствие которых нарушается не только нормальная работа в них, но и пользование ими... В строящемся Шепетовском УР совершенно выпали из плана строительства узлы 7, 8 и 9, в результате чего между Шепетовским и Староконстантиновским УР образовались неперекрытые ворота более 60 км... В Новоград-Волынском УР в плане строительства не оказалось 19-го сооружения, утвержденного Генеральным штабом РККА... Отсутствуют чертежи внутреннего оборудования многих объектов... Запланированные материалы не соотвествуют потребностям строительства... Практика бетонирования сооружений на ряде объектов проводится вопреки существующим инструкциям НКО... В Каменец-Подольском УР при бетонировании сооружений (в частности № 53) бетон возле амбразур утамбован не был, в результате чего после бетонирования пришлось дополнительно заливать образовавшиеся пустые места, чем значительно снижена прочность сооружений... В Остропольском УР бетонные стены оказались на 15 см тоньше установленного значения... Особенно много дефектов отмечено в строительстве Остропольского и Каменец-Подольского УР... Л.Берия"
* "НКО СССР тов. Ворошилову 13 февраля 1939 г. Несмотря на долгое строительство и дооборудование Псковского и Островского УР, они не могут считаться в настоящее время боевспособными. Из-за неправильно спроектированного и построенного внутреннего оборудования большинства ДОТ они не могут быть заняты войсками... до половины сооружений на 20-40 см заполнены водой, появившейся из-за неправильной оценки глубины грунтовых вод. В то же время водопровод не работает... Электрооборудование укрепрайонов отсутствует... В жилых помещениях УР высокая влажность и спертый воздух... Центры снабжения УР не построены... Продовольственные склады отсутствуют... Из-за неграмотного планирования УР их огневые сооружения не могут вести огонь на дальность более 50-100 м, так местность имеет бугры, овраги и невырубленные леса. ДОС ь 3, установлен на склоне оврага и не может быть замаскирован из-за постоянных оползней, а имеющийся в нем орудийный полукапонир бесполезен, так как располагается ниже уровня окружающей местности... Для расширения секторов обстрела необходимо снять около 120 000 кубометров земли, а также вырубить до 300 га леса и кустарника... Амбразуры ДОТ расчитаны на применение пулеметов "Максим", но оборудованы станками неизвестной конструкции, ... предназанченными скорее всего для пулемета Гочкиса давно снятого с вооружения. Орудийные полукапониры не оборудованы броневыми заслонками и служат источником проникновения в ДОТ талых вод и осадков... Артиллерийское вооружение УР состоит из 6 устаревших полевых орудий 1877 года, к которым нет снарядов... Охрана территории УР не ведется. В ходе работы комиссия неоднократно встречала местных жителей, проходящих в непосредственной близости от огневых сооружений для сокращения пути между поселками... Л.Берия"
* "В ЦК КП(б) Украины О состоянии КиУР 11 января 1939 г. ... Киевский укрепрайон на сегодня представляет только лишь скелет предместной позиции , состоящей в основном из пулеметных сооружений ... и совершенно не обеспечен положенным оборудованием. Из 257 сооружений, имеющихся в районе, только 5 готовы к боевому действию... Левый и правый фланги не защищены и имеют свободный проход для противника (левый - 4 км, правый - 7км). В центре зоны УР ... образован мешок (разрыв в 7 км), через который открыт свободный проход противнику непосредственно к Киеву. Передний край долговременной полосы удален от центра Киева лишь на 15 км, что дает возможность обстрела противником Киева, не вторгаясь в укрепрайон... Из 257 сооружений у 175 отсутствует нужный горизонт обстрела из-за рельефа местности (бугры, горы, крупный лес и кустарник). Планировочные работы по УР, несмотря на указания правительства, оттягиваются выполнением на военное время, тогда как эти работы необходимо проводить немедленно. Только по 3-му участку необходимо для планировочных работ снять более 15 000 кубометров земли, а это не менее 4-х месяцев работы... Всего же ... по укрепрайону необходимо снять не менее 300 000 кубометров земли и вырубить до 500 га леса и густарника. ... 140 огневых сооружений оборудованы пулеметными заслонками обр. 1930 г., которые при стрельбе закрываются автоматически и способствуют поражению бойцов из своих же пулеметов рикошетированными пулями. О небоеспособности КиУР и непринятии мер комендантом КИУР Особый отдел КОВО неоднократно информировал командование КОВО, но, несмотря на это, до сего времени ничего не предпринято... Зам. Народного комиссара Внутренних дел УССР Б.Кобулов"
* В ЦК КП(б) Украины О состоянии Могилев-Ямпольского Укрепленного района ... На территории Могилев-Ямпольского укрепленного района имеется 297 огневых сооружений, из коих 279 ДОТов и 18 артиллерийских полукапониров... Материальная часть огневых сооружений находится в неудовлетворитеольном состоянии. На территории 2-го сектора обороны имеется 9 огневых артиллерийских полукапониров. Из них 3 сооружения - "Скала", "Партизан" и "Мюд" не имеют фильтровентилляционного оборудования... В связи с происходящим переоборудованием огневых сооружений, артиллерийских полукапониров на территории УР в казематах царят хаос и беспорядок... Электропроводка во многих ОПК перепутана и совершенно не обеспечивает их электроосвещение... Полукапонирная артиллерия в огневых сооружениях находится в неудовлетворительном состоянии. Все пушки собраны из некомплектных деталей разных пушек. Формуляров на пушки не имеется. Пушки, находящиеся в сооружениях 1932 г., только в 1937 г. подверглись разборке и чистке, вследствие чего вся матчасть пушек внутри имеет следы ржавчины. Пружины накатников пушек большей частью собраны неправильно (вместо левой поставлена головная правая пружина), что при стрельбе приводило к самоотвинчиванию головки цилиндра компрессора и ствол пушки после нескольких выстрелов мог сойти с установки. В двух пушках вместо веретенного масла была налита олифа, забивающая отверстие маслопровода, что могло привести к разрыву цилиндра компрессора... УР до сих пор не укомплектован ... средним комсоставом. Комсостав, приписанный из отдаленных мест и городов (Саратова, Москвы, Ленинграда), сможет прибыть в УР лишь через 5-6 дней, после объявления мобилизации... При существующих штатах рядового состава пульбаты не смогут выполнить возложенных на них задач, так как в роте по штату имеется 21 пулеметчик, а рота должна обслуживать 50 сооружений... Кадрами артиллеристов пульбаты совершенно не обеспечены... При наличии артиллерии пульбаты по штатам совершенно не имеют артиллерийских мастеров, которые могли бы вести технический надзор за капонирной артиллерией... Зам. Наркома внутренних дел УССР Кобулов"

So where, when were the Stalin line fortifications, inluding the Kiev FR and such, "completed", "fully manned" and combat-capable? Care to explain?

Which means that the need for upgrades was serious, and the attitude was lousy even earlier than Suvorov initially stated. And the amount of work needed doesn't look that large compared, for example, to the Volga-Don Canal.

The forces were to be transferred into the new FR. On the western border, there were no new FR to be transferred to, so we can hardly compare the cases. In summer 1940 on the Far East:

за это лето части 1-й Краснознаменной армии почти на 100 процентов выполнили план оборонных работ, буквально преобразили старые укрепленные районы, там, где можно было, сделали солидные предполья, создали несколько новых укрепрайонов и значительно преобразили приморскую границу вообще.

On the contrary, we can and will compare the cases. The new FRs were being built on the new border, and to the FRs which was completed, forces were assigned and deployed. The old FRs were never fully completed, fully and properly manned or anything like that.

Nor the new ones. Certainly not when the people when removed. The building didn't even start then.

When there was a suggestion by Voroshilov to remove the people from the FR's in 1939(the expansion of the army showed certain shortages, and for some reason, that was one of the parts reduced to compensate) the Baltic countries were not taken yet. Some of the abandoned Stalin Line was still on the border. Yet the people were removed (except for the borders with Finland and Romania, curiously, which were hardly the most aggressive countries), and the units dissolved. 26 000 people. And Voroshilov stated that people for the new FR's will be needed in 1941, not 1943.

Chapter 12 of the M Day needs to be explained.

Why anything there needs any special explanation? 121 thousand pilots who passed the OSOAVIAKHIM courses are not, sadly, what one could call trained military professionals. Even the trained and formally educated for many years (!) fighter and bomber pilots of the USSR in 1941 had 30-180 flight hours on the average, whereas a German pilot had an average of 450 flight hours. If the trained RKKA pilots in 1941 were of such low quality, the "121 000 pilots" prepared by the OSOAVIAKHIM are hardly even a factor here. Conspiracy theories notwithstanding, the quality of the Soviet Air Force personnel was exceptionally low.

Whether well trained or not, we are talking about resources being spent. In a socialistic country, that means a purpose. Especially considering the quantities (you did read the second half of the chapter, right? The one about shortened courses for military pilots).

You think they were ignorant of their ally's progress? ...Doesn't seem to be the case on the December conference.

Yes, because they were. Otherwise they wouldn't plan for "defence with unmobilized and unconcentrated forces".

What do you mean "otherwise, they wouldn't". If they expected the Germans to have the initiative and attack first, then, yes, such an approach looks ridiculous. But if it's the USSR which concentrates and attacks first, the Germans (reacting directly to Soviet forces concentrating) are unlikely to prepare and launch a full scale attack before the Soviets are ready. A more likely scenario is hastily prepared attacks attempting to disrupt the gathering of the forces - of the exact type the covering plans expected.

Which was a complete disaster. Like I said, it's a complete contrast with the Germans. If you can prove that the USSR did NOT adhere to a doctrine of defending with unmobilized and unconcentrated forces, feel free to prove me wrong. It's kinda hard with the above quote, but sure, do.

In order to incorrectly estimate the forces needed to defend, you first of all need to incorrectly estimate the amount of forces which is likely to attack. To underestimate the use of the element of surprise. Zhukov's (well, Bagramyan's, actually) report shows none of that. In fact, it states explicitly that the best way to defend your air forces is to strike at as many enemy airfields as possible - and that implies a massive attack on a completely unprepared opponent.

Besides, if your forces are "unmobilized and unconcentrated", then most certainly the defense can't be expected to have reserves, which the Soviets state to be necessary.

And what do the documents say, that it can disprove the reports of the people who saw the bunkers with their own eyes?

How much concrete and money was allocated. How many were actually built, as opposed to being ruse constructs. You know, like the documents I've provided. You provided nothing. Sorry, but that won't do. Where are the German documents similar to the Soviet 1938-1941 documents on the construction of fortifications, reports and such? Show them.

There are reports about materials brought. Cement, iron, armored caps from the Maginot Line, 2-3 daily trains of gravel to a single station... Where are your documents to contradict?

Moreover, the December conference (see Tyulenev's report on defensive operations) hardly changed anything. Where does Tulenev state that FRs are useless if not supported by a fully deployed and concentrated Army? He doesn't.

Выводы: исходя из выше намеченной расстановки сил и средств для обеспечения надлежащей тактической, оперативной плотности [их] во всей полосе оборонительной операции, потребуется иметь боевой состав обороняющейся армии в составе 4 — 5 стрелковых корпусов или 12 — 15 стрелковых дивизий, 1 — 2 танковых дивизий, 4 — 5 артиллерийских полков Резерва Главного командования, 20 артиллерийских дивизионов, противотанковые средства, 2 — 3 зенитных артполка и одна авиадивизия, в числе которой до 3-х полков должно быть истребительной и штурмовой авиации. Для выполнения ряда специальных оборонительных работ потребуются до 3 — 4 саперно-инженерных батальонов и батальон мотопехоты для борьбы с парашютными десантами.

Состав и расположение сил в обороне при наличии УР будет иметь несколько иной характер. Однако наличие оперативного резерва с мехчастями обязательно и в этих условиях.

Without an FR - a fully mobilized army. With an FR - "somewhat different", but reserves and tanks are needed.

And, of course, everyone talks about maneuvering as an integral part of the defense.

What does Timoshenko state about the German operations in France?

Ряд успешно проведенных на Западе прорывов в войне 1939 — 1940 гг. породил у некоторых исследователей мысль о кризисе современной обороны.

Такой вывод не обоснован.

Его нельзя делать из того, что ни на польском, ни на французском фронтах немцы не встретили должного отпора, который мог бы быть им оказан при надлежащем использовании противниками существующих средств обороны (механизация оборонительных работ, разнообразный арсенал инженерных средств, мощные огневые противотанковые средства).

He thinks that pre-war views on fixed defence are not invalidated. He says that "mechanized defense engineering", "various engineering facilities" and "powerful anti-tank means" can change (sic!) the situation and fixed defence will win the day again. Nowhere does he say that the fixed defence should be supported by a fully mobilized Army. The critical issue (Germans deploying and attacking before Poles or French deployed) is ignored utterly!

Опыт войны показывает, что современная оборона не может ограничиться одной тактической зоной сопротивления, что против новых глубоких способов прорыва необходим второй и, пожалуй, третий оперативный эшелон обороны, состоящий из оперативных резервов, специальных противотанковых частей и других средств, опирающийся на подготовленные в тылу оборонительные противотанковые районы или рубежи.

При этих условиях оборона приобретает вновь свою устойчивость и сохраняет все права гражданства и в будущем.

In other words; some people are saying that modern defense is dead. Nonsense. However, in order to be viable in modern times, the defense requires modifications - more depth, more reserves. Now, how can a defense which is not manned have reserves? How can it use its full potential? I don't think Timoshenko ignores the issue of the German element of surprise - it's simply taken for granted.

The "depth of 100 km" is planned for the entire defence line. The fortification lines are only planned for tens of kilometers:

Тактическая оборонительная зона (схема 2) является главной зоной сопротивления, где должны быть сосредоточены основные усилия обороны и где наступление противника должно быть сломлено.

Она включает в себя:

а) полосу обеспечения — глубиной до 10 — 15 км, которая создается с целью задержать и измотать наступающего противника и выиграть время для подготовки оборонительной полосы. Полоса обеспечения оборудуется заграждениями; в ней действуют разведывательные части и передовые отряды;

б) главную полосу сопротивления — глубиной до 8 — 10 км, имеющую назначением остановить и расстроить атаку противника, на ней располагаются основные силы обороны;

Tyulenev said it should be at least double whenever possible. And the other components in the Molotov Line seem to be lacking. Especially the support strip. Also, Timoshenko states that in front of these defenses there should be an empty space of 30-50 km if possible. Now, that is most certainly absent IRL.

And the Soviets preferred to waste no time on that. Different approaches.

The USSR spent a lot of time restoring broken machines during operations in Finland. Do explain yourself, do prove the Soviet strategy was to drop large fractions of equipment which was unusuable due to breakdown.

Finland was hardly an operation where speed was an issue.

Из средств обеспечения нужно брать с собой нагруженный боеприпасами трактор «Ворошиловец», в задачи которого входит стягивать с дороги аварийные машины. Заниматься службой эвакуации не будет времени. Достаточно аварийные машины стянуть с дороги. После этого ремонтные средства придут вместе с пехотой и будут восстанавливать материальную часть после окончания боя. Нагромождение ремонтных средств увеличит количество машин, людей и потребует увеличения снабжения. Для текущего ремонта каждый экипаж должен иметь при себе инструмент и наиболее ходовые запасные части.

Pavlov states that in the fast advancing mechcorps, minor repairs which can be done by the crew are to be performed, but anything serious is simply solved by pulling the machine off the road. The slower units will come and see to it.

If the plan is to be executed in response to a Moscow order ... Besides:

This is a note which specifies the nature of defence inside the USSR. It shows how pathetically misguided the views of the Soviet command were. Quite obviously the idea that the enemy would still allow your forces to concentrate and counterattack was stupid.

If the enemy is expected to have the initiative - yes. But where's the evidence that was the expected scenario?

And according to the book "BT Tanks":

Кристи уведомил Госдепартамент, что он продал "Амторгу" два трактора.

Well, if Christie lied to the U.S. State Department, frankly, that is no business of the Amtorg. They made a deal which Christie had signed. If Christie was really such a jackass, well... what can I say? Business comes first. Considering Christie was willing to ship M1932 illegally, it's quite possible he circumvented the law with the M1931 too. But I'd like to see primary evidence of that, if there is.

Well, Suvorov says where to find it.

So, over a 150 000 pilots already, with enough skill for a very simple bomber. All that fuel spent just for fun?

"Enough skill"? *laughs* If Soviet pilots in the RKKA VVS had 30-180 hours on the average, I fear to think how many these "pilots" had.

Enough to follow the leader. Suvorov says they were meant for work in large groups, and in conditions of limited opposition. The need for evasive skills wouldn't have been large.

As for the orders for plane building - Suvorov said

I don't care what he "said". I want primary, documental proof. Do you understand? Prove that there was a plan to build 150 000 planes of the Su-2 model. Rezun says there was a plan. Rezun doesn't refer to the archives either, or to anything. He just claims it without any proof or source. Do prove it, then, if Rezun himself cannot

He refers to a quote about the plane being designed with the possibility of very large numbers in mind.

Also, the movie "Tractorists" does seem to show BT's making about 70 kph tracked.

You can measure the speed by the camera, or what? How does a movie constitute proof?

If the approximately 5.5 meter length of the tank passes in less than seven shots, conclusions can be drawn. Of course, since a filming speed can be adjusted, I cannot insist on that part.

Horseriding seems to be abandoned in the September Parade.

How is it relevant for the Victory Parade?

What are the arguments for the claim it couldn't be abandoned then?

Wild capitalism and economic freedom are not exactly the same.

Rezun says any state involvement period is bad. I don't care what you think, Omeganian. Rezun made a statement, not you. Go read it again.

His statement is that communism cannot survive except alone. Perhaps he overdid it a bit with the commentaries.

So what? It had a lot to do with the war raped Germany. And with the future Nazi generals.

So... *shrugs* Perhaps then France and Britain should have starved the Weimar Republic and mass-murdered it's population? You know, because... they're future Nazis all right?

I don't think I'm the only one to say they really overdid it with the Treaty of Versailles.

I'm not sure how the Soviet aid to the Weimar Republic equals same aid to Nazi Germany.

Germany was a favorable country for starting a war.

The cutoff in cooperation post-1933 pretty much proves my point.

How? Judging from World War II, what the Soviets did by then was quite sufficient. What reason did the Soviets would have had to continue the cooperation? Time to play the other side.

Did it remain war ravaged?

The USSR only restored it's industrial potential in the early 1950s (and that combined with the German reparations, anyhow).

Would the cost of the skyscrapers built after the war in Moscow have been insufficient to at least get started?

The Soviet Union's people were still living in horrid conditions,

Just like when the building started.

Explain.

Rezun makes irrelevant mockery of old Soviet historiography (which was largely under the impact of Stalinism and operated with closed archives - lest we mention the "7 million human losses", long-term used as official figures). Old Soviet historiography is absolutely irrelevant and useless junk. By mocking it Rezun doesn't add anything to the historical science, which has long moved past the realm of stipulations and into the realm of documents.

He provides examples from 1993. Since the book was sent into printing in 1994, and published in 1995 (probably with some last moment modifications), "long" would be an incorrect word. Besides, are you certain the historical science moved on? The 2008 book The Stalin and Molotov Lines, for example, still uses Zhukov's false description of the January games.

Not "ignoring", "leaving for the next two chapters".

Yeah, except nothing in those chapters indicates that the USA or Britain would remain sided with the USSR if it attacked.

Such things are never guaranteed. But what is the guarantee that they would have become hostile to the point Stalin couldn't have at least bought the necessary goods (if the shortage would have been severe enough without the losses of 1941)? What could the attack change? Besides, Suvorov also mentions some blackmailing material, and that is generally worth more than some pieces of paper.

It was bad enough to melt down the fences. The British would have welcomed the relief. Even better (for the Soviets) would have been if Britain would have been invaded, of course...

Which fences?

Iron railings were being scrapped due to metal shortages.

If you'll please show me an order by another commander which says to execute the families of everyone who surrenders to the enemy.

It's not unprecended, such orders were issued in the Civil War (hmm, why not mention Tukhachevsky?).

Yeah, on one side, a man who used chemical weapons to suppress revolts, on the other, a man who nuked his army. Also, civil wars and ordinary warfare are often played by different rules.

I'm not sure how this is supposed to prove Zhukov's especial brutality when in reality this order was deemed illegal by the PUBalt and itself was probably a misinterpretation of the Order 270.

It wasn't just illegal - it scared the army away from the battle-lines. Malenkov overturned it. And taking hostages is a war crime. On this scale - an unheard of war crime.

Zhukov's unit losses were on par with other commanders.

Including his pointless battering in 1942?

A commander who advances for five weeks without knowing where the enemy forces are is not a bad commander? Whatever it is you are smoking, I suggest you quit. Sounds highly poisonous.

Not knowing where enemy forces are when your forces lack aviation and modern means of intelligence is a common occurence.

For five weeks? Even cavalry could have scouted throughout Poland if organized properly. Which wasn't done.

On the other hand, Tukhachevsky developed a theory of mechanized operations in the USSR,

Arguable. It is often stated to be Triandaffilov. Halder states the idea was proposed by Buddeniy. Zhukov in his memoirs, when talking about the first experimental regiment, talks about Voroshilov, Shaposhnikov and Triandaffilov, not Tukhachevsky.

How is he a bad commander, then?

Well, he stated that an amphibious tank is always superior to an ordinary one, he proposed completely unrealistic plans for the size of the Soviet army, in 1935, he gave some completely ridiculous estimate of the German military strength, he wanted to rebuild tractors and trucks into tanks (without replacing the engines)... I'll say he had some problems.

BTW, Suvorov claims he never met a Tukhachevsky supporter who read Tukhachevsky's works.

Some problem with definitions, yes.

How were the 20-tonners obsolete?

0.94 kg/sq.cm. ground pressure.

Except he says the exact opposite. He says they cannot kill them (at least in a direct confrontation), but they can outmaneuver them, and win without a fight.

Except that's idiotic - he stipulates a win on a strategic scale with light tanks as "cavalry" moving "on roads and on wheels" (prohibited unless on-march). That is impossible when confronting a DEPLOYED Army.

"Roads and wheels" are not mentioned in the corresponding chapter of The Last Republic. He talks about operations in the deep rear; away from the enemy army. So long as a breach is made for you, the deployment of the army doesn't change that much.

And the RKKA could not pre-empt the Werhmacht in deployment. Besides, it didn't even TRY.

The covering plans simply don't take the deployment into account.

In 1939 - 15 ton tanks which had about the same armor and armament as the Soviet 10-tonners. Lower weight is not an insignificant advantage on its own.

The Ausf.B and Ausf.C of the Pz.IV already existed by 1939, as did the Ausf D. and Ausf E. varians of the Pz.III. On the other hand, serial production of T-34 and KV started only in June 1940 and Feb 1940 correspondingly. So in 1939, the Germans had two types of tanks which were already superior to Soviet light tanks.

And they only had 300 of them. The Soviets had 30 T-26 for each of the mediums, and 500-600 T-28; their own medium tank (mostly with armament similar to Pz IV, being rearmed with a better one).

Except the tank design wasn't meant for such a weight. The ground pressure in later models was rather high, for example. And where is that thicker defense? The 15 tonners' armor was 15 mm, just like T-26. 5 tons seems a bit too much difference for just the engine.

I'm sorry, 285 hp and 300 hp engines versus 90 hp in the T-26? *laughs* "Just for the engine", indeed. The T-26s light weight offered no advantage with such a pathetically weak engine.

I am asking; was the difference in the engine weight 5 tons? If not, where did the 5 tons go? When the Soviets built the T-50, they got the same engine as the Germans, about the same armament (smaller caliber, greater rate of fire), more armor... and it still weighed less than the very first modifications of Pz-III. This is what Suvorov's talking about.

And what was BT-1 (or simply BT), then? The page you are giving does seem to view "Christie" as synonymous to BT without any numbers.

The BT-1 designation did not formally exist in the USSR, IIRC. Simply BT, yeah. The Christie M.1931 displayed the exact same characteristics as stated for in U.S. sources, actually.

Several sources insist that it was the "tractors" brought from America which had such a designation. In any event, judging from the date, they seem to be the model tested.

BTW, the words that the speed is "no more that 70 kph" can easily mean the testers expected more.

The tens of thousands of people working on the other side in May don't look like a ruse either. So what, the Germans intended to defend then?

How? If they "work", but are not allocated concrete for permanent fortifications, that is a ruse. No permanent defence line; just field defences.

Reports about building materials being delivered are also present.

The RL figures don't quite match either schedule (Suvorov mentions that some FR's were assigned secondary priority of building later). Especially considering said plan supposedly includes the restoration and reinforcing of the Stalin Line.

The USSR had a tendency of overestimating terms (see: the Plan of building battleships in 1937). But even those optimistic terms were not aimed for 1941.

But where is the work on the Stalin Line? At all?

BTW, the proper Soviet use for the FR's, as seen on the Stalin Line before 1939 (and on the Far East later) is to merely use them as a skeleton for the field defense of an entire division if not a corps. So, the reliance on fixed defense can be argued. Doesn't look like a bad approach to me.

It's a bad approach because it is considered adequate before forces concentrate. War has shown this false.

How is using fixed defenses AND field defenses worse than using only field defenses?

The German effort as par Halder himself was based on field defence, not on large-scale permanent concrete fortification. Omeganian failed to show any German documents proving any serious fixed defence construction effort in the East 1940-1941 at all.

He mentions fixed defenses in East Prussia, albeit with somewhat thinner walls. But then, the Molotov line also was short on 3 meter walls.

4) Omeganian has shown no proof whatsoever that the Christie M1931 (index-less BT) or the BT-2 had a speed of 100 kph as Rezun stipulates.

Heigl's Taschenbuch der Tanks from 1935 (translated to Russian) states:

Omeganian has shown no documental proof whatsoever for Rezun's claim that Hitler was a Soviet agent.

And I find no such claim made by Suvorov. All I see is a description of the revolution attempt in Germany, with Suvorov stating that it looks like Hitler could have been a part of it, but he has no data.

7) Omeganian failed to support Rezun's assertion that in 1939 the Germans had no tanks superior to the Soviet counterparts. In reality, the latter models of the 15-20 tonners were coming out; and even the models with armour comparable to the T-26 - early Pz.III and IV models - had a more powerful engine and armament, obviously (the 37-mm KwK or the 75-mm KwK in case of Pz.IV).

The armor penetration figures seem to be higher for the 45 mm. And the 75 mm, like I said, is a snub nosed gun not meant for tank combat. The Soviet analogue to that was T-28.

http://www.panzerworld.net/armourpenetration.html

Omeganian has failed to prove Rezun's thesis that wheeled tanks are (a) "agressive weapon" (b) designed to combat on wheels and on-road (c) only respected in the USSR (d) unusable on Soviet territory. Instead he fully agreed that the wheeled tanks were employed and developed by many nations, deployed for reasons of track conservation on-march, and fully abandoned by the time track resource rose high. Combat on roads was prohibited by the manual, contrary to Rezun's statements. Tanks were used for 630 km long marches without problem in Mongolia and ZabVO where scant few modern roads were present. Likewise without much problem (except for motorhour exhaustion) the BT marched during the June 1941 counterstrikes like e.g. the 6th MC counterstrike. In fact, Omeganian has all but conceded on all the above points.

I'm not sure whether it's still used by Suvorov 20 years later. At least, "Rout" simply states it to be a tank best for roads and for deep operations.

# Konev left his district

Suvorov gives a list a list of generals who either:

1) Went from their districts to the west

2) Were on their way to the west

3) were preparing to go.

Your point is that... in one case, Suvorov got the category wrong? How does it affect his point about the generals moving?

# Stalin line being a "good defence line" which was "properly manned" or "properly armed", as he claimed (and as did Rezun)

So it wasn't. Still, why abandon it instead of upgrading?

[K. A. Pital]

Suvorov gave a figure of 17 out of 80 bunkers completed on the banks of San on the German side. Looks comparable.

Comparable to what? Did the Germans plan 5000+ bunkers and build 800? Embarassing, Omeganian. I've asked time and again to provide evidence of large-scale construction of fixed defences based on German documents. Such "arguments" look like a joke. Don't blame me. Instead go ahead and prove there was a plan to construct fixed defences en masse, not field defences.

Tyulenev viewed the Finnish defenses as the most fitting for the modern times. With a 78 km depth. After all, the Soviets had no choice back then but to consider it exemplary defense.

The line which had like, what - 5 modern fortifications (the Miljoonalinnake). Concrete anti-tank blocks were meant to stop Renault FT-17 tanks; hardly a modern project. The line used 14 520 cubic meters of concrete. In fact, its fortifications were inferior to the most modern ones; so the Soviet command "extolled" the Mannerheim line only because of their own exceptionally bad luck when trying to break through it. And I could go into more detail, if you like, albeit I'm really short on time these days.

Of course, after the invasion

No - I asked to prove that all old FRs were abandoned before the invasion, a claim you made. With documents. You failed once again - instead of an answer I get meaningless blabbering. Sorry.

Re armed? it had over 300 bunkers. A mere dozen old guns brought there could easily mean a deception attempt.

Yeah, except only a handful of the 300+ bunkers were artillery - 7 finished according to Soviet documents. 340 were machine-gun bunkers. Another failure to produce an argument.

Which means that the need for upgrades was serious, and the attitude was lousy even earlier than Suvorov initially stated. And the amount of work needed doesn't look that large compared, for example, to the Volga-Don Canal.

There were unfinished bunkers captured by the Germans on the old border line. Which means the work was still ongoing. The mass rearmament of the FRs deemed still worthy for combat was slated for September 1941, actually. I see no reasons that would indicate otherwise. As for amount of work not being large, well - Volga-Don actually used lots of heavy construction machinery which was ample during late Stalinism. On the other hand, 1939-1941 was still the middle of the third five-year plan, when many projects were done by hand, often with terrific loss of life. I judge the level of advancement of Soviet industry by the numbers of dead at canal construction. Not a fair gauge, but a good gauge when going into all the minutiae statistics is too much of a hassle.

And Voroshilov stated that people for the new FR's will be needed in 1941, not 1943.

Because parts of the new FRs were ready in 1941. In fact, unfinished lines were often manned. Even the Mannerheim line was unfishined in 1939 and yet, obviously manned. Pay attention. After all, I'm trying to be decent to your arguments, do mine not deserve the same treatment?

Whether well trained or not, we are talking about resources being spent. In a socialistic country, that means a purpose.

No. Planned economies often waste resources... in black holes. One negative part of a command economy. In any case, that was obviously a necessary spending for a nation that desired to become a modern industrial economy (re: Stalin's 1931 speech to "run the 100 years in 10 years").

You think they were ignorant of their ally's progress? ...Doesn't seem to be the case on the December conference.

Yes, because they were. Otherwise they wouldn't plan for "defence with unmobilized and unconcentrated forces".

What do you mean "otherwise, they wouldn't". If they expected the Germans to have the initiative and attack first, then, yes, such an approach looks ridiculous. But if it's the USSR which concentrates and attacks first, the Germans (reacting directly to Soviet forces concentrating) are unlikely to prepare and launch a full scale attack before the Soviets are ready. A more likely scenario is hastily prepared attacks attempting to disrupt the gathering of the forces - of the exact type the covering plans expected.[/quote]
I'm sorry, but that's just speculation. I'm all for speculation. But this is a history forum, is it not? When something does not have solid documental proof, it's for all extents and purposes speculation.

Besides, if your forces are "unmobilized and unconcentrated", then most certainly the defense can't be expected to have reserves, which the Soviets state to be necessary.

How so? The Soviet forces had reserves. But they were unconcentrated. Once again you fail to provide evidence.

There are reports about materials brought. Cement, iron, armored caps from the Maginot Line, 2-3 daily trains of gravel to a single station... Where are your documents to contradict?

No, where are German documents proving that concrete is being brought? I'm only asking to treat my arguments head-on and produce the documents. You say there are reports - give me a few, why?

In other words; some people are saying that modern defense is dead. Nonsense. However, in order to be viable in modern times, the defense requires modifications - more depth, more reserves. Now, how can a defense which is not manned have reserves? How can it use its full potential? I don't think Timoshenko ignores the issue of the German element of surprise - it's simply taken for granted.

How can a defence "give time for concentration" if forces are already concentrated? A contradiction in terms. Pay attention.

Finland was hardly an operation where speed was an issue.

Really? The USSR didn't plan to swiftly win? I'm sorry, but I've given an example. You failed to counter it with anything meaningful. Besides, the USSR did plan to win swiftly in Finland.

Pavlov states that in the fast advancing mechcorps, minor repairs which can be done by the crew are to be performed, but anything serious is simply solved by pulling the machine off the road. The slower units will come and see to it.

That's pretty reasonable, but I doubt Pavlov considered an exceptionally high level of breakdowns and huge numbers of machines being kicked out of service when confronting the German forces. The tanks were often engaged in battles with German forces - the results of said battles were not good for the Soviet tanks. And you can bet part of this ad-hoc thinking about supply was instrumental in this failure. Later on the USSR was more... sparing, when it came to operating armor, I'd say.

If the enemy is expected to have the initiative - yes. But where's the evidence that was the expected scenario?

The scenario centers around a sudden attack by the Germans. You may be right here, the Soviet command did not expect the enemy to gain the initiative, because they were still thinking in terms of long pre-hostilities, etc. Inertia is very hard to shake off. But this exact case is a case where they proposed a plan to defend against a German attack. The attacker is the one who has the initiative, this is pretty much a given.

Well, Suvorov says where to find it.

Except I'm not flying to Aberdeen any time soon. We could always ask Shep, though.

"Enough skill"? *laughs* If Soviet pilots in the RKKA VVS had 30-180 hours on the average, I fear to think how many these "pilots" had.

Enough to follow the leader. Suvorov says they were meant for work in large groups, and in conditions of limited opposition. The need for evasive skills wouldn't have been large.

Except why would they have such a misguided view of opposition? Remember, most of Soviet VVS died in the air - not on the ground. It is quite reckless to assume the enemy would not be able to raise any assets into the air. On the other hand, the quality superiority of the Luftwaffe, both in terms of superior technology and superior pilots, translated into an astonishing air victory.

A better and simpler explanation, though, is that the USSR's leadership understood the nation is still weak and under-industrialized, and might end up with a long war or wars in the East and West. And protracted wars, as we all know, tend to quickly destroy the corps of pilots. This is where the reservists come in - they have basic flying skills and can be put into battle under a permanent mobilization theory. The fact that Stalin and the Soviet leadership prepared a MASSIVE plan of evacuation of all European Soviet industry indicated that they, in fact, admitted at least in theory that there might be a military catastrophe or a long war that would require shielding industries from strategic bombing (it is their, or should I say, our great luck the concept never really caught on with the German air command!).

He refers to a quote about the plane being designed with the possibility of very large numbers in mind.

Okay, no documents. Hope we cleared this out. Now, as for "being designed with the possibility" - that's pretty much an obvious requirement for military tech in an underdeveloped nation. It should be easy to make en masse. The real orders, however, were made according to the capabilities of the industry at the time, and they hardly exceeded a few thousand. We have a possibility of anything. No proof the craft was ever going to see such a large production run, not at all.

If the approximately 5.5 meter length of the tank passes in less than seven shots, conclusions can be drawn. Of course, since a filming speed can be adjusted, I cannot insist on that part.

Indeed. If we knew the FPS of the film and could see the reel, we COULD measure the speed by seconds. However, that's not the case, alas.

What are the arguments for the claim it couldn't be abandoned then?

What is the proof it should've been abandoned, though? The USSR was known for it's ad hoc approach to stuff. Today this, tomorrow that. And speculation is not history - ergo...

So... *shrugs* Perhaps then France and Britain should have starved the Weimar Republic and mass-murdered it's population? You know, because... they're future Nazis all right?

I don't think I'm the only one to say they really overdid it with the Treaty of Versailles.

So why is the USSR to blame for trading with the opressed Weimar Republic and technical cooperation with the nation?

I'm not sure how the Soviet aid to the Weimar Republic equals same aid to Nazi Germany.

Germany was a favorable country for starting a war.

Germany was an infavourable country - in 192x-1933 it was an industrial cripple. There were no guarantees whatsoever it could even rise from the Depression. The Depression was at an all-time high and Germany was exceptionally hard hit. In 1933, there were no objective reasons to think it would get better, more powerful or whatever.

The cutoff in cooperation post-1933 pretty much proves my point.

How? Judging from World War II, what the Soviets did by then was quite sufficient. What reason did the Soviets would have had to continue the cooperation? Time to play the other side.

Which side? The USSR was cooperating with top industrial powers. In the 20s, there was an idea that a pariah state like Germany would be excellent for tech transfer to the USSR (Junkers concessions were exceptionally important for the Soviet Airforce and air industry in general, etc.) By 1933, Germany became Nazi and that was it. On the other hand, the US was a democracy, a top industrial and it's new leaders JUST AT THIS TIME recognized the USSR diplomatically. Obviously, considering Stalins' own comments that Western democracies are better than Fascists and Nazis, the USSR chose to continue industrial development, using tech transfer from the USA, not from Germany.

The USSR only restored it's industrial potential in the early 1950s (and that combined with the German reparations, anyhow).

Would the cost of the skyscrapers built after the war in Moscow have been insufficient to at least get started?

Obviously yes. A few buildings in Moscow did not and could not comprise a large share of Soviet GDP. They were but promilles, I think. I could investigate it further, obviously, by looking at the late-Stalinist skyscraper construction costs in roubles and maybe manhours and the then-Soviet GDP and total manhours. *shrugs* But it should be obvious to people with an understanding of economics, even cursory.

Just like when the building started.

Exactly my point.

He provides examples from 1993. Since the book was sent into printing in 1994, and published in 1995 (probably with some last moment modifications), "long" would be an incorrect word. Besides, are you certain the historical science moved on? The 2008 book The Stalin and Molotov Lines, for example, still uses Zhukov's false description of the January games.

Even some new books often fail to notice new documents, true. But, by and large, science HAS moved on.

Such things are never guaranteed. But what is the guarantee that they would have become hostile to the point Stalin couldn't have at least bought the necessary goods (if the shortage would have been severe enough without the losses of 1941)? What could the attack change? Besides, Suvorov also mentions some blackmailing material, and that is generally worth more than some pieces of paper.

Once again, documental proof of anything Rezun mentions is necessary. Speculation is not history.

Iron railings were being scrapped due to metal shortages.

And yet, the shortages were never even near the food collapse in the First World war. Metal shortages occured from the simple fact that Britain was undergoing a massive total mobilization of war industries which was necessary to actively participate in the war and win it. The U-boats were pathetically inefficient compared to the overall volume of British-American naval traffic and became completely inefficient by 1943-45, despite their number and technical sophistication only increasing and getting better and better.

It's not unprecended, such orders were issued in the Civil War (hmm, why not mention Tukhachevsky?)

Yeah, on one side, a man who used chemical weapons to suppress revolts, on the other, a man who nuked his army. Also, civil wars and ordinary warfare are often played by different rules.

Please, do without the drama. Americans nuked their army (or, should I even say Navy and Army?) too. It was the order of the day - nuclear weapons were untested and yeah, soldiers became guinea pigs. Such were the days. As for civil war and non-civil war, actually there's scant few differences in case of the RCW. In the Russian Civil War, all parties had a claim of statehood and a formal army with uniforms and insignia, in addition to partisans. Same goes for World War II.

It wasn't just illegal - it scared the army away from the battle-lines. Malenkov overturned it. And taking hostages is a war crime. On this scale - an unheard of war crime.

The order was never put into effect, so "overturning" is wrong. Besides, if the order never saw execution, it is not a war crime commited.

Including his pointless battering in 1942?

Including - overall. Because other commanders also managed to lose people en masse, duh. Especially in larger battles, e.g. standoffs at Leningrad when Zhukov was already away from there.

Not knowing where enemy forces are when your forces lack aviation and modern means of intelligence is a common occurence.

For five weeks? Even cavalry could have scouted throughout Poland if organized properly. Which wasn't done.

Cavalry can scout in case there is no active enemy hindrance. If there is, cavalry is pretty much of limited use for scouting. Just like aviation is when there's heavy flak, you know.

On the other hand, Tukhachevsky developed a theory of mechanized operations in the USSR,

Arguable. It is often stated to be Triandaffilov. Halder states the idea was proposed by Buddeniy. Zhukov in his memoirs, when talking about the first experimental regiment, talks about Voroshilov, Shaposhnikov and Triandaffilov, not Tukhachevsky.

"Often stated" - by whom? Halder is not an authority here. Neither is Zhukov. And obviously not memoirs. On the other hand, we have Tukhachevsky's theoretical works, which are documents proving he did develop his own theory. Where are Budenny's publications to the effect? Triandafillov's? Voroshilov's? Shaposhnikov's? Do show. It is not something arguable. It is a fact Tukhachevsky developed a theory of mechanized operations, because he published works on it. On the other hand, if there are works by others proposing the same or similar concept in detail, that'd prove your point.

Well, he stated that an amphibious tank is always superior to an ordinary one, he proposed completely unrealistic plans for the size of the Soviet army, in 1935, he gave some completely ridiculous estimate of the German military strength, he wanted to rebuild tractors and trucks into tanks (without replacing the engines)... I'll say he had some problems.

In the late-1920s his views on warfare were similar to those of many commanders of the day. He had many progressive ideas and many strange ideas which seem strange in retrospect. In the late 1920s, the tank-tractor ideas, supermobilization ideas, land cruiser ideas and lots and lots of other crap was quite common in military theorizing.

BTW, Suvorov claims he never met a Tukhachevsky supporter who read Tukhachevsky's works.

I'm not a supporter of Tukhachevsky, but I read his works. I could be more specific, if you want.

0.94 kg/sq.cm. ground pressure.

Did it seriously impact their real performance?

"Roads and wheels" are not mentioned in the corresponding chapter of The Last Republic. He talks about operations in the deep rear; away from the enemy army. So long as a breach is made for you, the deployment of the army doesn't change that much.

Moving on wheels and on-road during combat is prohibited, only on march. Being in enemy rear is being in active combat, because the rear is not an empty territory; it is filled with sparsely placed enemy units. A unit mostly engages in march when it moves through own territory. Which the BTs perfectly did in Mongolia and elsewhere, and during military exercises in the European part of Russia.

The covering plans simply don't take the deployment into account.

How so? They do. They say deployment will happen at time so-and-so. It is an estimate.

And they only had 300 of them. The Soviets had 30 T-26 for each of the mediums, and 500-600 T-28; their own medium tank (mostly with armament similar to Pz IV, being rearmed with a better one).

The T-28 was vastly inferior to the Pz IV, being an old, obsolete multi-turret tank design.

I am asking; was the difference in the engine weight 5 tons? If not, where did the 5 tons go? When the Soviets built the T-50, they got the same engine as the Germans, about the same armament (smaller caliber, greater rate of fire), more armor... and it still weighed less than the very first modifications of Pz-III. This is what Suvorov's talking about.

And what does the T-50 has to do with the T-26 and German tanks? We were discussing the former and latter. The T-26 is a spectacularly bad piece of engineering, and by 1941 it was hardly capable of dealing with newer German machines. And it comprised the majority of Soviet tank forces.

Several sources insist that it was the "tractors" brought from America which had such a designation. In any event, judging from the date, they seem to be the model tested. BTW, the words that the speed is "no more that 70 kph" can easily mean the testers expected more.

They might have, but the models failed to get this speed. And speeds for the BT tanks are, in fact, taken from the documents on said models.

Reports about building materials being delivered are also present.

Please, show a few German reports? Which materials? What is the volume?

But where is the work on the Stalin Line? At all?

There are reports to reinforce the Letichev UR, KAUR before the onset of the war.

How is using fixed defenses AND field defenses worse than using only field defenses?

Not a bad idea; the bad idea is the false belief that fixed defenses can operate without a mobilized army and will hold off the enemy long enough for you to mobilize.

He mentions fixed defenses in East Prussia, albeit with somewhat thinner walls. But then, the Molotov line also was short on 3 meter walls.

ML bunkers were, however, the most modern and powerful the USSR constructed at the time.

Heigl's Taschenbuch der Tanks from 1935 (translated to Russian) states:

That's not proof. Any documents for the BT which prove this speed - test reports, manuals?

All I see is a description of the revolution attempt in Germany, with Suvorov stating that it looks like Hitler could have been a part of it, but he has no data.

Heh. Speculation, then. And speculation is not history.

The armor penetration figures seem to be higher for the 45 mm.

How so? Proof?

I'm not sure whether it's still used by Suvorov 20 years later. At least, "Rout" simply states it to be a tank best for roads and for deep operations.

Good then.

Suvorov gives a list a list of generals who either:
1) Went from their districts to the west
2) Were on their way to the west
3) were preparing to go.
Your point is that... in one case, Suvorov got the category wrong? How does it affect his point about the generals moving?

Not in that one case; in many cases. Alas, no time to get into detail now - be sure to requote this, I'll give a list.

So it wasn't. Still, why abandon it instead of upgrading?

Parts of SL which were deemed relevant and necessary were upgraded, in fact, or slated for upgrade. Parts which weren't, however, were left to degrade and rot away. KAUR is an example of the former, while, say Pskovsko-Ostrovskiy UR is an example of the latter. Like I said, there are documents and memoirs about work on the Stalin line before the war.

[Ritterin Sophia]

Can I ask a favor of you guys? Would it be at all possible to append a general translation of the Cyrillic texts for those of who don't speak Russian? It's not big deal if you can't, it's just online translators aren't very accurate and it makes the conversation easier to follow.

[Thanas]

About the strategic bombing - there were a few design studies being done, but the main reason AFAIK the Germans never utilized it was that they did not have the industrial capacity. Rearmament - even under the 4-years plan - was far from being the smooth and well-oiled machine propaganda claimed it to be. There was a lot of stuff that had to be relearned, and strategic bombing was just out of the question considering the problems the Germans had with building aircraft engines. Fighters and tactical bomberrs had a much more immediate and more efficient application.

At least that is what my admittedly limited knowledge tells me, feel free to correct me if I am wrong.

[K. A. Pital]

About the strategic bombing - there were a few design studies being done, but the main reason AFAIK the Germans never utilized it was that they did not have the industrial capacity. Rearmament - even under the 4-years plan - was far from being the smooth and well-oiled machine propaganda claimed it to be. There was a lot of stuff that had to be relearned, and strategic bombing was just out of the question considering the problems the Germans had with building aircraft engines. Fighters and tactical bomberrs had a much more immediate and more efficient application.

At least that is what my admittedly limited knowledge tells me, feel free to correct me if I am wrong.

No, you're right, but German aversion to bombing the right things spread over even to the tactical assets they had. They often chose badly, leaving essential targets, such as factories, functional and running until the Soviet government evacuated them. Fair enough, the Germans may have never thought the USSR had a ready plan of evacuation of industry from Europe.

Can I ask a favor of you guys? Would it be at all possible to append a general translation of the Cyrillic texts for those of who don't speak Russian? It's not big deal if you can't, it's just online translators aren't very accurate and it makes the conversation easier to follow.

I'll see what I can do. I used to translate texts before, but lately I'm kinda short on free time.

[Thanas]

No, you're right, but German aversion to bombing the right things spread over even to the tactical assets they had. They often chose badly, leaving essential targets, such as factories, functional and running until the Soviet government evacuated them. Fair enough, the Germans may have never thought the USSR had a ready plan of evacuation of industry from Europe.

Given the logistic constraints the Germans had and the rapid territorial gains (as well as the experience of using captured production facilities in the past) I am not sure wether using tactical bombers to bomb factories would be an effiicient use of the time, especially considering the needs for bombing and air support in all those battles.

[Sea Skimmer]

The Luftwaffe could not meet the basic demands of Army support; which were considerable. The Germans never had very much heavy artillery or even medium corps artillery in the war in field forces, and most of it was tied down in coastal defense and anti invasion roles. They depended a great deal on air power for mobile fire support, and had to repeatedly strip the Mediterranean of all serious air power to help stabilize bad situations on the Eastern Front as it was. This is a huge factor in why Malta never fell. A large scale campaign against Russian factories was not physically possible in 1941-42, nor after. I believe the heaviest raid the Luftwaffe ever managed to launch on Moscow was only 147 aircraft, hardly enough to make an impact on anything. The Germans had to win fast enough to capture the factories and win the entire campaign in six months to a year, or else they would certainly loose the entire war. So bombing factories wouldn't make any sense even if the bomber assets were available. Everything had to go into defeating the Russian field army as quickly as possible. That failed anyway, so Germany lost.

Keep in mind the peak combat strength of the Luftwaffe wasn't that much more then half the aircraft the allies deployed during Operation Overlord alone, and most bombers were on the light side.

[K. A. Pital]

The Germans had to win fast enough to capture the factories and win the entire campaign in six months to a year, or else they would certainly loose the entire war. So bombing factories wouldn't make any sense even if the bomber assets were available. Everything had to go into defeating the Russian field army as quickly as possible. That failed anyway, so Germany lost.

They did to try bomb GAZ automobile plant, IIRC, among other targets, half-assedly of course, but they did plan for industrial decimation (the most idiotic part, of course, being the destruction of industries already captured instead of using them for the Reich).