Carrier Free Seas (RAR!)

[Simon_Jester]

If you have nuclear ABM, just add another stage to the goddamn missile and shoot the satellites down

Precisely my point. You could do it, but it's more cost-effective to swamp the satellites. Their point defense can only handle so much, especially if we start painting the kill vehicles' nose cones in ablatives. Or lobbing clouds of shrapnel on ballistic suborbital trajectories into their paths.

[Zanfib]

Part of the problem is that by the time it becomes conceivable to mount defensive lasers and (more likely) nuclear-tipped ABM weapons on a warship, you're looking at a huge... operational disadvantage in the development of carriers. Carrier doctrine and operations are very not-simple things; it takes many years of experience to get it right and it's a continuously developing art. If no one builds aircraft carriers at all, you won't see people going "Ah-HAH! We can build a Nimitz now!" and building a Nimitz now. They won't know how it should be laid out from practical experience, they won't know what to do with it from practical experience, and they won't know why it's desirable to have such a thing from practical experience.

They will know that somebody doesn't want them to have it.

[MrDakka]

[T]he Convair F2Y Sea Dart didn't; it only had the hydro-skis.

While it did not have wheels large enough to move around aboard a ship, it did (and does!) have wheels to beach itself:

I stand corrected. I'm assuming that those wheels are integrated into the hydro-skis?

[Sidewinder]

Part of the problem is that by the time it becomes conceivable to mount defensive lasers and (more likely) nuclear-tipped ABM weapons on a warship, you're looking at a huge... operational disadvantage in the development of carriers. Carrier doctrine and operations are very not-simple things; it takes many years of experience to get it right and it's a continuously developing art. If no one builds aircraft carriers at all, you won't see people going "Ah-HAH! We can build a Nimitz now!" and building a Nimitz now. They won't know how it should be laid out from practical experience, they won't know what to do with it from practical experience, and they won't know why it's desirable to have such a thing from practical experience.

They will know that somebody doesn't want them to have it.

Then the question becomes, "We know someone doesn't want us to have aircraft carriers, but do WE want aircraft carriers? Are they worth the time and money we must spend to get those things to work, not to mention the battleships and land-based aircraft we will NOT get because we must spend the necessary resources on aircraft carriers and carrier-borne aircraft instead?" (You cannot simply fly a land-based aircraft off an aircraft carrier- landing on an aircraft carrier has been described as a "controlled crash," due to the stress this places on the aircraft. For this reason, carrier-borne aircraft are significantly heavier than land-based aircraft, due to reinforcements their airframes and landing gear require.)

[Sea Skimmer]

In WW2 you could get a lot closer to flying a land plane off a carrier then you could in the heavier, faster flying catapult using jet age. Some carrier conversions like the Seafire basically just involved adding more strips of metal to the bottom of the fuselage to hold a tail hold. Since planes were only expected to last a few months in action, or less, it wasn't a big deal. High landing speeds and/or poor cockpit visibility put many conversions out of the question though.

[Simon_Jester]

Part of the problem is that by the time it becomes conceivable to mount defensive lasers and (more likely) nuclear-tipped ABM weapons on a warship, you're looking at a huge... operational disadvantage in the development of carriers. Carrier doctrine and operations are very not-simple things; it takes many years of experience to get it right and it's a continuously developing art. If no one builds aircraft carriers at all, you won't see people going "Ah-HAH! We can build a Nimitz now!" and building a Nimitz now. They won't know how it should be laid out from practical experience, they won't know what to do with it from practical experience, and they won't know why it's desirable to have such a thing from practical experience.

They will know that somebody doesn't want them to have it.

They'll know someone doesn't want them to have big ships with runways on.

They won't know how to use such a ship, how to design it without lots of trial and error, or what to use it for. These are important questions normal people ask before paying for expensive things.

[TimothyC]

[T]he Convair F2Y Sea Dart didn't; it only had the hydro-skis.

While it did not have wheels large enough to move around aboard a ship, it did (and does!) have wheels to beach itself:

I stand corrected. I'm assuming that those wheels are integrated into the hydro-skis?

Yep. There was a smaller wheel located on the tail as well.

[tim31]

HMS Pinafore's argument ignores the central premise of the RAR anyway; without a carrier fleet, Japan does not pull any shit on Pearl Harbour. As to when/whether America enters the war on either front without the sneak attack... I'm not touching that.

[HMS Conqueror]

Does it matter? No. Because naval strategies don't work like real-time-strategy games where two factions sit on opposite sides of a map and use abstract-miracle-industry to spawn units that get thrown at each other in big cauldron battles in the middle where both sides duke it out until one side takes 100% casualties.

Now, defeating Japan with the US being magically limited to no-carriers takes a lot longer and is more difficult, but as long as the Japanese are similarly restricted it's totally possible. The trick is that most of those island bases the US needs to seize don't have runways and basing facilities for large land-based air forces. And even if they do, they can be pounded into crater fields by attacks from the neighboring islands with heavy bombers. So individual islands can still be neutralized as far as the land-based air attack threat goes.

It's not. The restriction applies to both but that doesn't mean the effects balance. It gives a huge advantage to whoever controls the land bases at the start, which is Japan. The US is not capable of launching an amphibious campaign against Japan in those circumstances.

Do you know why US even bothered with the island hopping campaign rather than just landing in Tokyo immediately after Midway? It's because Japan airfields on barrier islands were powerful obstacles even when the USN had carriers.

It's fighting on the continental mainlands that's more difficult

It makes no difference to that, because you won't be using carrier planes there anyway. It makes not much difference in Europe for instance, and none on the Eastern Front. It makes it much harder for the allies to move in the Mediterranean, and Britain will probably lose Malta. It may also not be practical to invade Italy first. But the allies can still invade North Africa with overwhelming force either via Suez or via French West Africa, so in the end makes no difference.

As to when/whether America enters the war

When Japan invade the Philippines, which was at that time part of the US's colonial empire.

[Mr Bean]

It's not. The restriction applies to both but that doesn't mean the effects balance. It gives a huge advantage to whoever controls the land bases at the start, which is Japan. The US is not capable of launching an amphibious campaign against Japan in those circumstances.

Not true your forgetting the 1941 campaign
Burma, Singapore, Guam, Wake Island, Manila, Rabaul, Paulu, Java, Bali plus the other dozen islands they occupied to begin building airstrips where non existed.
At the start of the historic war there were over ten islands with British or American forces stationed close to Japan and a threat to Japanese shipping and ship movements, without suprise air raids each one of those is going to require shelling followed by land invasion and several of those islands would be much better set up to resist a ground campaign than a surprise air attack.

I suggest you zoom around on Google Earth and see the literal sixty seven islands in the Pacific capable of support an airfield between Hawaii and Japan.

[HMS Conqueror]

Burma was a total stall, it would have taken the allies years to grind through thousands of km of jungle and then reconquer the whole of China. They would not be in a position to force anything more than a conditional peace whereby Japan makes gains.

Now yes the allies didn't have nothing right at the start, but they didn't have much, the far Pacific not being vital to their interests, and the Japanese had the initiative as the attackers. The Japanese would have been able to seize a defence zone giving them an Empire with the resources they needed, and then effectively defend it.

[Mr Bean]

Burma was a total stall, it would have taken the allies years to grind through thousands of km of jungle and then reconquer the whole of China. They would not be in a position to force anything more than a conditional peace whereby Japan makes gains.

Now yes the allies didn't have nothing right at the start, but they didn't have much, the far Pacific not being vital to their interests, and the Japanese had the initiative as the attackers. The Japanese would have been able to seize a defence zone giving them an Empire with the resources they needed, and then effectively defend it.

You make points about how hopeless the American's would be attacking into land based airfields only to counter that with the point of how useless the American held land based airfields would be in stopping Japanese naval attacks. The point of the Burma attacks was not that it would take Burma but that it remove the American airfields there. That's why I did not mention China in that list because taking out our joint airfields there was impossible.

In 1941 America had the bombers to start bombing Tokyo and the airfields to do it from, they lost them in 1941 because of the surprise attack. Without Pearl Harbor to tie up the best Naval base in the world for six months the counter offensive from the instant the first shells landed. We had the B-24 with a max ferry range of 4,600 miles meaning we could have theoretically flown bombing missions from Midway to Japan if we had wished (Bomb loads at that range would be only 500 kilograms so not worth the trip) but from Guam we could have bombed any point inside Japan with a full 3600 kilogram load with fuel left over. California to Hawaii, Hawaii to Midway, Midway to Guam and inside of twenty six hours at high cruising speed plus pit stops at each airport. The B-36 Atomic fun bomber could simply fly missions from Hawaii if wished with a full load but more likely Guam again.

If we held onto Guam in 41 out strategic situation would be vastly simplified and the war a great deal shorter. For that matter if we had held the Philippians we would have had a great deal of an easier time attacking the Japanese mainland.

[HMS Conqueror]

The difference is that Japan was attacking unprepared positions that were not expecting an attack. In principle Singapore was a much stronger position than Iwo Jima, with more troops, more preparation, an airfield, etc. It was also more important strategically. But Singapore fell quickly and Iwo Jima did not. This was repeated throughout the Pacific. If the allies had stationed major air forces and garrisons on their Pacific islands in 1941, the Japanese offensive would have stalled almost immediately.

If the US's response is reduced to a limp strat bombing campaign (these usually failed to even stop the growth of war production) then there would have been a peace deal.

[Mr Bean]

The difference is that Japan was attacking unprepared positions that were not expecting an attack. In principle Singapore was a much stronger position than Iwo Jima, with more troops, more preparation, an airfield, etc. It was also more important strategically. But Singapore fell quickly and Iwo Jima did not. This was repeated throughout the Pacific. If the allies had stationed major air forces and garrisons on their Pacific islands in 1941, the Japanese offensive would have stalled almost immediately.

If the US's response is reduced to a limp strat bombing campaign (these usually failed to even stop the growth of war production) then there would have been a peace deal.

Again you show your ignorance of WWII history. The European bombing campaign was some what successful in reducing production and delaying parts mostly because of how widely the Germans could split up production and how hard it is to wreck machine tools to begin with. But the Japanese blockades and later bombing campaigns were widely successful in halting ship production and crippled aircraft engine production. By it's nature Japan did not have the room or rail networks to take one plant and split it into six new locations as the Germans could. And when one plant was bombed they could not simply clear out an unused or empty building and start fresh.

Japan has next to none of the natural resources it needs to build battleships and crusiers or aircraft engines for that matter. It had to import lots of things beyond just oil and because of that, controlling the Philippians and Guam means having sub bases in the back yard of Japan making the blockade far easier in our carrier free alt-history world.

[TimothyC]

The difference is that Japan was attacking unprepared positions that were not expecting an attack. In principle Singapore was a much stronger position than Iwo Jima, with more troops, more preparation, an airfield, etc. It was also more important strategically. But Singapore fell quickly and Iwo Jima did not. This was repeated throughout the Pacific. If the allies had stationed major air forces and garrisons on their Pacific islands in 1941, the Japanese offensive would have stalled almost immediately.

If the US's response is reduced to a limp strat bombing campaign (these usually failed to even stop the growth of war production) then there would have been a peace deal.

Why don't you read Miller's "War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897-1945." I'm only about a third of the way through it at the moment, but it's based on actual research into the various plans for a US war with Japan.

The downside is that you might learn just how wrong you are with many of your statements.

[HMS Conqueror]

Again you show your ignorance of WWII history. The European bombing campaign was some what successful in reducing production and delaying parts mostly because of how widely the Germans could split up production and how hard it is to wreck machine tools to begin with.

German war production rose every year until 1945, when they started losing large amounts of territory and population. Every source I have read agrees on this point.

But the Japanese blockades and later bombing campaigns were widely successful in halting ship production and crippled aircraft engine production. By it's nature Japan did not have the room or rail networks to take one plant and split it into six new locations as the Germans could. And when one plant was bombed they could not simply clear out an unused or empty building and start fresh.

Japan has next to none of the natural resources it needs to build battleships and crusiers or aircraft engines for that matter. It had to import lots of things beyond just oil and because of that, controlling the Philippians and Guam means having sub bases in the back yard of Japan making the blockade far easier in our carrier free alt-history world.

US can't just repeat the OTL campaigns regardless of not having air superiority over the Pacific or land troops near Japan or bases near Japan. Like in Europe, the strategic bombing came only after Japan had already been substantially defeated; sort of limp campaign that would be launched from half-way across the Pacific against intact defences without the threat of invasion will not cause a capitulation.

And US still loses Philippines and Guam to a surprise attack like Britain still loses Singapore. Carriers were not decisive in any of these actions.

[Sea Skimmer]

Yes, amazing, the US must change its plans, and make Macarthur southern pacific drive the primary offensive, precisely as he had wished in the first place, and with complete air superiority by 1943 just as occurred in real life because Japan had zero ability to sustain attritional air battles. Carriers were the best thing that happened to Japan, because they provided a system under which its elite pilots could have maximum effect. With land when you fight every single day and just keep pouring in more and more resources Japan is hopelessly screwed. I see you continue to refuse to acknowledge that such a campaign even existed. This means you are either a complete idiot or just trolling.

[HMS Conqueror]

The allies did not approach Japan from the South; those campaigns proceeded very slowly and most of south east asia was not retaken until Japan had already essentially lost, having no sea control of the area or supply lines to the mainland.

In this universe, it's only viable to fight Japan on land where the allies have a solid foothold already, not to island hop.

[Sea Skimmer]

You have obviously have no conception of the south west pacific campaign at all. It did go slow at times, mainly because it was starved of resources....

[Admiral Drason]

If the US pacific fleet is intact wouldn't that mean that the US Navy would have been able to come in and relieve the besieged forces in the Philippines? It seems to me that there would be no Pearl Harbor attack and that just means that as soon as the Japanese launch attacks on the colonies the Navy will steam out and swat them back much like what I assume was the original plan the USN had for the Pacific in case Japan did start anything.

[Purple]

Would the Japanese even attack the Philippines thou? Without aircraft carriers they know they have no hope of ever taking the fight to the American mainland or hitting American infrastructure or fleets in their docks. They might just decide to leave them alone and hit the other colonial empires instead.

[Sea Skimmer]

if they attack anyone in south asia, they must take the Philippines, otherwise US air power and submarines would be an endless threat to Japanese lines of communication and the US would be fully expected to declare war over the situation. Waiting would only give time for the US to heavily reinforce the islands, and since they were rather large and net exporters of food a real chance existed that a large US garrison on the islands could actually hold out for years. The US would never charge across the Pacific to save them, well before 1941 it had concluded that this plan would not work because the logistical assets to support the fleet simply didn't exist and wouldn't exist until the Two Ocean Navy plan was at least partly completed. War Plan Orange was absurdly optimistic even had the assets existed, it called for the first landings on Japanese held islands within 90 days which would have barely provided time to assemble and load the invasion transports and then actually steam the required distance. This was because War Plan Orange was based on the idea that we had to make a plan to beat Japan before the US public got bored of the war, rather then one in line with military realities.

[Esquire]

Sounds like the officers writing the plan might have been counting on its bloody failure - don't let those boys have died in vain, and suchlike.

[Sea Skimmer]

I think they just wanted some kind of plan to be on paper they could talk about to congress when they asked, and to give future planners some basis to work from. Around 1939 the US replaced the color coded war plans with the Rainbow plans, Rainbow 3 was basically a clone of War Plan Orange. However Rainbow 5 was more relevant to the actual war, because it assumed alliance with the British and French. In 1940 Rainbow 5 was expanded under a formal decision and talk with the British that war with Germany would come first, and this is when the Philippines were formally written off in secret. However as part of the Limited War Emergency (I love this term) which was declared in 1939, the US had already begin to rapidly expand efforts to build up the Philippines army so that it would simply be capable of holding the entire archipelago against any Japanese invasion with some 800,000 men in 50 divisions. Japan of course struck first before most of the army could be recruited, let alone trained and equipped, but this was generally a better way to spend money then expecting to rapidly fight across the entire Pacific. The main problem was most of the reserve weapons and equipment we might have sent were instead sent to the British after the Fall of France, or needed for our new divisions formed out of the peacetime draft that started at the same time. So everything had to be produced new, and that took serious time.

[Sky Captain]

Without carriers I think there would be much more effort to develop long range fighters, bombers and seaplanes. Battleships and cruisers would have more effective AA defense, maybe there would even be dedicated air defence ships with hundreds of AA guns. Surface to air missile maybe would be invented faster.
As far as Pacific war goes both sides would be limited without carriers and US would benefit from more numerous more advanced longer ranged aircraft. A war with Japan may drag on a bit longer, but once the atomic bomb and B36 is developed (which would happen faster since there is more pressing need for it) it would be game over for Japan because US could just nuke any place in Japan from Hawaii until Japan surrenders.