Stuart wrote:
I don't think that the basic premises of the 2002 Defence Review can be faulted. NZ is a long way from anywhere, it hasn't got anything that people want and it's too small to support armed forces large enough to make it an important ally unless resources are concentrated on something that makes it a valuable ally With the Navy reduced to patrolling and policing home waters and the Air Force restricted to the same tasks plus carrying things, that left funding available to be concentrated on the Army. The questionable presumption was that a dramatic increase in defense funding could not be made available. That was a dubious proposition in 2002 although it is probably correct today. In that sense, 2002 was a wasted opportunity, although I doubt even a major increase in funds would have justified saving the Skyhawks.
The 2002 review was a political document, that is to say it was a political Fait accomplii that had everything to do with Labour's view of the world, and makes sense if you accept their world view as fact. Funding would not change and that is what led to what happened (bear in mind the 1991 cuts). You need to look at what was going on behind closed doors, although the Green party even admitted it before the review was done, they were openly boasting that they had killed of the strike arm.
In NZ, reviews are seldom independent, they are a formalized statement of the governments idealogical view or a statement of political expediency.
There is a Yes Prime Minister episode about this.
Now I will grant you that NZ has not got anything any one would want, it has always been thus, but defense planning, historically, has never been about what others want so much as what NZ wants, that is to say, trade, which is a our foreign policy.
When they said they could not increase funding it was because Labour had other uses for the money, the Ballet was one of them as was the NZ Symphony Orchestra, I shit you not. Follow the money.
You have to look at who is saying what, and why. In this case the Labour party was, and still is, animated by views which date to the student political left of the 60's and 70's. Indeed, Clark, Goff and most of the MP's that defined the Labour defence ideal are of that political generation; anti-american and isolationist.
That really reflects what I said about the New Zealand Armed Forces trying to be smaller versions of major forces instead of making fundamental priority decisions. That artillery fire control system is a good example. For armies that have a lot of artillery and a lot of troops to support with that artillery, those systems are a godsend. They allow targets to be switched very quickly, guns to be massed on target and then dispersed to provide general support, then massed again. They also allow ammunition supplies to be matched to requirements etc etc. But, for an army with a handful of guns and a handful of troops to support, those facilities just are not needed. It's like somebody getting dressed up in full Hell's Angels regalia and then going out to ride a bicycle.
No, that artillery 'computer' was an ancient POS, the job of which could have been done for the price of said calculators, and that was the problem, the money was not spent properly. Thats not simply my opinion either, btw, but that of the artillery officers who where there at the time and a number of subsequent reviews.. Why spend millions on one old system when the same job can be done for a lot less by another? What could the saving have gone to?
As I said, the great strength of the New Zealand Armed Forces was and is superb personnel. That's why concentrating on the Army makes so much sense. It leverages assets and applies force multipliers to advantages rather than just carrying on in the same old way.
Well, when we can recruit and retain them at any rate, but thats another issue.
The same 'old way' was a result of budget cuts and inefficient use of existing funds. The same 'old way' was always for Air strike/Navy to be for local use at a given threat level, nothing more and was doable at a given funding level, around 2% GDP, double what we have now. Army was always supposed to be a high quality job for expeditions, but it never quite worked out that way. Once funding dropped below that magic level, something had to give, so one must ask why did funding drop? Look at politics for the answer.
I know the history of the ANZACs very well. Basically the New Zealand Government saw the opportunity of getting a couple of new frigates cheap by piggy-backing the 8-ship Australian program. In isolation that wasn't a bad idea. What it did mean was that the decisions were made in Australia. Saying the NZG chose ANZAC for political reasons isn't entirely accurate.
I did say mainly
They chose to piggy-back the Australian program for economic reasons and the Australians made the selection of MEKO-200 for largely political reasons. The NZG was stuck with it. They did wave their hand and say they didn't like MEKO-200 but they were pretty bluntly told that they were buying two ships out of ten so would they please shut up and take what they were given. And they did.
In the 80's, Navy wanted six, Labour was happy for two, with options for two, expectations where that at least three would be purchased. Final decision/fight 1998/99.
Now, serious questions can be asked about whether buying those MEKO-200s at all was a good idea although it should be noted that the last experience of buying used-British wasn't too thrilling. Leanders were good ships but were expensive to crew and run. Essentially they'd reached the point where age meant maintaining them was reaching the levels of buying a new ship (for a British-built ship, that's around 20 years. For Dutch-built ships, it's closer to 30).
As it happens, a lot of that was because of Labour unions and Muldoon era local politics, rationality had nothing to do with it.
Navy wanted Dutch ships new built.
The big debate was really about the third frigate for which an option was held (and allowed to lapse). One can argue that either way; my own feeling is that the frigates were of such limited value that probably letting the third ship lapse was the right decision.
I well remember this one, you must remember that its was political, not for any other reason. As to value for money, well the bang for buck on the ANZAC class is pretty limited, weight/space issues which were apparent in the mid/late 80's.
This is really where things have changed dramatically since 1945 and I don't think the implications of those changes were fully understood until the late 1980s and for New Zealand until a decade after that.
No, I don't think that true, NZ has only ever been able to field small forces, so what we did send must be of high quality, 1st Division (ww1) is a case in point. NZDF knew full well what was going on, because its a situation we have always had to live with, being small. Problem was NZDF couldn't win the political fight, or spend money efficiently plus lack of strategic vision.
In 1945, another light infantry brigade was an OK contribution. It had its uses even if it was poorly equipped. By the late 1980s it was simply in the way. It absorbed transport lift that could be better used to support modern formations. In 1945, offering an infantry brigade was something substantial and concessions could be gained in exchange for it. By 1990, a poorly equipped infantry brigade was a liability and concessions had to be offered to gain its acceptance. It took the New Zealand Army a decade to understand the implications of that. What this meant was that the force had to be equipped to a standard that, once again, made it an asset not a liability and it had to be provided with the lift that allowed it to deploy independently.
Ok, the correct, staff, time line for you, post 45.
Division; untill mid to late 50's
Light Brigade, 60's-89
Light Brigade/Battalion 90-95ish depending on who you talk to.
2000 onwards: no one now seriously thinks a battalion group is doable outside of a Timor repeat, the gear and people just are not there.
The above assumptions were based on getting the gear, and a lift.
Its worthy of note that when Lange asked for a a 'mini invasion' of Fiji in 87, CDF told him to get stuffed, no one thought a toe hold could be established there, especially if the Fijians were wired on Fiji bitter. SAS were considered for a hostage job when an Air NZ plane was taken over in Fiji, even that wasn't considered doable, good thing the cabin staff belted the miscreant with a bottle of whiskey to save the day. NZDF knew damn well their limitations, what they never realized was their inability to spend money efficiently to remedy some of their shortcomings was one of the issues, or the fact that service chiefs/CDF could not see past the strategic horizons of their last command, so they could not, therefore, play the political game or even know what they needed.
(snip)
The P-3K2 is Harpoon-capable; for-but-not-with. The presumption (a correct one) is that Harpoons could be obtained very easily if they were needed
Well, unless you think that was included in the stated upgrade, I doubt it. The last LTDP to the Labour government stated that that was a capability that was to be looked at, cost unknown, in the next few years, nothing more. There has been no change to that since National got into government. The P3 upgrade was specifically for data management, sensor, communications and navigation systems, there was nothing in the upgrade program for harpoon and if there were, it would,as a matter of course, been made public in the budget/LTDP, advice to incoming government, as matter of course.
I hope not. Utter waste of money. There are much, much higher priorities than buying a handful of fast jets (small numbers mean very high per capita operating expenses)
This is something that a number of us have been concerned about, including a former commander 1 NZSAS, that we now lack the ability to train our forces in the use of close air support, defence against air attack etc. While we realize that the active strike arm is long gone, the trainers could be used for simulation, and that is the intent. The trainers are also brought and paid for. They also represent the ability to bring back a proper strike arm if needed. Of course, if they do get sold, which is probable, it then becomes irrelevant.
What I think you are not seeing is what happened to the defense budget in 1991, which is the
financial reason for the loss of the air strike arm, the money was there, if 45% of the budget had not vanished for no apparent reason when Ruth Richardson was finance minister.
The C-130 problems have a long way to go before they reach Australian SH-2 levels. That being said, a lot of the problems are due to the age of the aircraft and buying new ones would have been a better investment. One obvious choice is to go to the C-130J, the other plan mooted is the C-27/C-17 mix. That's expensive but with Protector out of the way, the money is available - especially since the US procurement of the C-17 is ending and Boeing is desperate for all the orders it can get to keep the line open.
They could have gone for J model Herc's, but, once again, it was political, Labour never wants to spend money on defence unless it has to; upgrade was seen as a cheaper alternative (and hopefully shift the replacement burden to National, maybe)
As for new transport planes, well you are quite wrong about new spending,the money is not available; Finance Minister Bill English has publically stated there will be no increase in spending, not with government borrowing at 240 million a week to keep things as they are. Protector has nothing to do with it, thats brought and paid for, and departments have been told their budgets will not change, money for new projects must be found from existing budgets, new funds will not be made available.
Now what things are like in five years, I don't know, but if the C17 line is still open, then its an option, but one I would not want to fight past the combination of Labour/Green/Maori parties on a C17 buy given that National has historically not been able to argue the case for any defense spending that is not supported by Labour.
They are; about half the fleet is in long-term storage and are up for sale. The "other variants" are needed and the Army is looking for swapsies. There is also talk of a switch to Strykers funded by sale of most of the existing LAVs
They are not for sale, nothing more than talk/kite flying, I have correspondence from the Minister to show this. That was Wayne Mapp pandering to those who subscribe to certain 'Sparkie' ideas about wheeled vehicles, nothing more, and its not an army view as far as I know.
You don't have to - I know them.
Yeah, gets like that doesnt it?
Much worse than that. The problems with Canterbury were systemic, not isolated. Basically nobody knew what questions to ask and nobody had the gumption to ask which questions to ask (bad New Zealand trait here that keeps biting the NZDF in the ass - they will not go to other people for help when they are stuck. Australians have a lesser version of the same syndrome). Essentially, Canterbury is a militarized version of the commercial ferry Ben-My-Chree. She was a relatively short fat ship optimized for short-haul ferry duties in the relatively calm and placid waters of the Irish Sea. Nobody ever thought to ask wht that made a suitable basis for a long-duration military surveillance and transport mission in the wild waters of the South Pacific. In passing it's fun watching the crew go apeshit when they lose lateral control of an LCVP hanging from a crane. I haven't had so much of a laugh since I watched a crew with a wrecking ball discover they'd knocked down the wrong building. Nobody from the people doing the program oversight flew over to the UK and watched the Ben-My-Chree at work. Then there was the whole thing about accepting an OPC design that the Australian Navy had thrown out the window. But I digress. . . . .
You are soooo right about this. What NZDF often forgets is that there is so much we did not inherit from the Brits with respect to institutional knowledge/strategic insight, and they are simply to proud to ask about now (same is true for the politicians, but for different reasons). They should know better, the last time they had any real experience with amphibious shipping was in 1942/43 and before that, 1915 at Gallipoli.
What was frustrating also was that a group of people, 15 minutes walk away from NZDF HQ, at the ferry terminals, could have told them a some of it, but navy didn't want to know, they thought they knew best. Incidentally, Navy wanted a proper battalion landing ship originally, LPD iirc, but Labour said no.
The third frigate was actually the third MEKO-200 and that option lapsed in November 2003 so I doubt if it was really on.
Yeah, political/budgetary
Anyway, MEKO-200 isn't really that hot. They're OK now since they are existing assets and they make a useful heavy mob to back up the OPVs.
If they get the upgrades, essm, AUSPAR, etc..a very big 'if'.
If we could turn the clock back, it would have made more sense to buy (say) four or six French Floreal class frigates than two or three MEKO-200s. Floreal is a grossly under-rated design, primarily because people keep thinking of it as a frigate when its actually an OPV. If we had a clean-slate option today, buying a quartet of Absalom class frigate-transports would make a lot of sense. The problem is neither option is really open
Yep, couldn't agree more. What the NZ frigate replacement will be will be interesting, I wonder what the Brit T26 will be like, or will that be a cock up ?(I just hope Aussie yards have their shite sorted, which was another complaint of the ANZAC class, pork barrel job with inexperienced builders)
Exactly. That's a problem that affects nearly everybody these days. The shortage of people pretty much defines which options are accessible.
True, and not a problem that I can solve.
I think the 2002 Defense Review actually did a pretty good job of balancing things; the execution may have been flawed in some respects but even there, the NZG did a whole lot better than some countries I can think of (accusing stare: British government goes bright red and shuffles its feet).
Well if one takes it in isolation, from a certain political viewpoint, it does, but then I don't share that view
A lot of the problems are due to inexperience. New Zealand simply hasn't managed large, modern defense programs before and they tripped over their own feet. The real criticism is that they wouldn't hire in help from people who had done such things before.
You will not be surprised to learn that you are not the only one saying that, its something said internally in NZDF, but too often the people who are saying it are not in a position to do anything about it, guess who are in the position to do something, and don't, and why?