WMD proliferation... Pros/cons?

[HMS Sophia]

I was doing my Security studies exam today (complete barrel of laughs), and one of the questions that came up was this:

Is the proliferation of WMD's necessarily a threat to international security?

Now, too me this sounded ridiculous. I did attempt an answer, and the only positive side was increased security through MAD (mutually assured destruction). Even that had some serious negatives, such as the possibility of non-state actors getting their grubby hands on them.
So my question is this. Is there anything positive about the spread of WMD's? At all?

Sorry if this is in the wrong place by the way.

P.S: Not just nuclear WMD's, but biological, chemical and radiological as well.

[Straha]

I can post more later, but let's just say there's a lot to say here.

Certainly fighting Proliferation is, more often than not, bad. Horrendously atrociously bad.

Kenneth Waltz and Christopher Layne have both published a number of articles about the benefits of Proliferation. I'd recommend looking them up. It stops wars, ensures greater international stability, and helps to undo a lot of the mental framework that surrounds western views of weapons control.

[Dave]

Stuart Slade (who goes by Stuart on this forum) has written a few essays on this topic.

The Nuclear Game - An Essay on Nuclear Policy Making is a short essay on why nuclear proliferation can be a good thing, especially for unstable and hostile (but not religious fundamentalist*) nations.

Basically, his argument is that as soon as a nation has nuclear weapons, they have the ability to instantaneously wipe cities or countries off the face of the earth. This is a great power, and forces other nations to take them seriously. This also forces the newfound nuclear power to realize that other nuclear-tipped countries have the same power over them, and that each side is now forced to respect the other. In effect, nuclear weapons are the great equalizer, provided all nations have them. This forces belligerents to tread very cautiously and fight cold wars and/or relatively small or low-intensity wars, to avoid pissing people off enough to want to hit the 'nuke' button. The result of wielding ultimate destructive power is, ironically, less destructive war.

*the reason religious fundamentalist nations are excluded from this is because members of these nations (or more importantly, their leaders) could believe that they are divinely protected from mutually assured destruction, and so it appears to be one-way destruction in their favor. While in actuality they and their entire nation will be destroyed, the illusion that they are protected from MAD could mean they believe full nuclear exchanges would go in their favor.

[HMS Sophia]

Well that sounds reasonable enough
Does the same apply too chemical and biological weapons?
And what about the risks of rogue states, mildly insane leaders, and terrorists getting hold of them? Is proliferation still advisable?

Thank you, and I think I may have screwed up my exam

[Eternal_Freedom]

*the reason religious fundamentalist nations are excluded from this is because members of these nations (or more importantly, their leaders) could believe that they are divinely protected from mutually assured destruction, and so it appears to be one-way destruction in their favor. While in actuality they and their entire nation will be destroyed, the illusion that they are protected from MAD could mean they believe full nuclear exchanges would go in their favor.

This is I think what scares people about proliferation. Yes, if all nations had WMDs and if all the leadres of said nations understood the concepts and consequences of MAD, then it wouldn't be a bad thing. But if you have some religious fundamentalist/radical/moron who is willing to "martyr" himself and his nation for his cause, you have a big problem. If they think they'll be sitting pretty in Paradise there is no need to fear MAD.

[Simon_Jester]

*the reason religious fundamentalist nations are excluded from this is because members of these nations (or more importantly, their leaders) could believe that they are divinely protected from mutually assured destruction, and so it appears to be one-way destruction in their favor. While in actuality they and their entire nation will be destroyed, the illusion that they are protected from MAD could mean they believe full nuclear exchanges would go in their favor.

I have to point out, though, that there is no evidence for this being a relevant concern. There aren't a lot of cases in history of heads of government being detached enough from reality to seriously believe that divine intervention will save them in a war against overwhelming forces, not when the option of not provoking the war was available.

We should not make the mistake of assuming without proof that systems like the Iranian theocracy select for delusional insanity on the part of the people with fingers on nuclear buttons. Not when we know that other systems, like the Soviet and American ones, didn't.

Well that sounds reasonable enough
Does the same apply too chemical and biological weapons?
And what about the risks of rogue states, mildly insane leaders, and terrorists getting hold of them? Is proliferation still advisable?

Thank you, and I think I may have screwed up my exam

Chemical weapons are, bluntly, not that dangerous, because most of the possible delivery systems for them are closely similar to the ones needed to deliver conventional weapons. They add another level of fear and difficulty to an already fearful and difficult battle, and any sane army would rather not have to worry about them, but they don't change the whole strategic character of a war the way nukes do.

Biological weapons tend to run towards the opposite extreme: many of them are so potent, and so capable of spreading beyond the target to infect people outside the war zone, that the arguments against them are much stronger. A fifty-kiloton nuke will destroy whatever you drop it on, but it's not much of a threat to the country next door to the target. A smallpox epidemic is another matter entirely.

As for whether proliferation is advisable, that has to be decided on a country-by-country basis. Some countries are very good risks when it comes to proliferation: China and India are good examples, as both those nations became less belligerent and less prone to fight bloody conventional wars after their nuclear deterrent was well established. Others are bad risks: Pakistan today causes much more alarm than they would without a nuclear deterrent, because of the danger that an unstable government might lose control of the nuclear arsenal.

[Kyler]

It is important to remember which WMD's you are talking about.

Nuclear proliferation definitely has it benefits and its technology is much easier to control and monitor than Chemical & Biological weapons. Since nuclear weapons can be developed in a number of different sizes and yields they are excellent deterrent weapons. Your enemy has to worry about strategic and tactical weapons and many different methods of delivery. That can includes ICBM's, SLBM's, cruise missiles, artillery shells, torpedoes, and even suit case weapons. The threat of mutual assured destruction so far proved that the proliferation of nuclear weapons to be a effective deterrent. That is why Russia & the United States while shrinking their overall strategic nuclear forces and are modernizing them to be as effective or more effective for at least the next 20 to 30 years.

Chemical weapons are difficult to deploy and properly use. Production can prove difficult depending on the components, materials, and quality of production. That can lead to severe limitations in their operational life and field use. Since most modern nerve agents require very particular chemicals to produce a quality weapon. The shipment of these chemicals can pretty easily monitored on a international level if a nation wants to produce large strategic and tactical stockpiles of nerve agents. The difficulty of producing of nerve agents can be negated by focusing on more common chemical gases like Mustard & Phosgene. Both while not nearly as effective as nerve agents they can be easily produced and developed into a mass causality weapon when striking against a civil population. Though mustard & phosgene would be extremely difficult to deploy on a strategic levels unless your enemy was with close range because the large number of delivery systems required to make an effective deterrent.

Biological weapons prove the greatest proliferation risk since so much R&D, production, and deployment can be hidden. Though for a country unable to produce nuclear or chemical weapons it may prove the only option since the knowledge and technology to develop these weapons are considerably less expensive and basic training is more readily available since it is used for modern medicine. No modern biological weapons has ever been used in combat so there effects are unknown either on the battlefield or on a civilian population. The Soviet Union under Biopreparat did do extensive testings and deployed Anthrax & Smallpox as strategic weapons plus having a very effective production capability to quickly replenish any used weapons. Anthrax is a more ideal biological weapon for a military commander since it extremely deadly but is not spreadable from human to human. It would pose less of risk than using Smallpox since it is highly contagious and deadly. The use of Smallpox or another similar biological agents would most likely lead to a global epidemic. Causing mass death & causalities for attacked nation but mostly like eventually the attacking nation as well. Weaponized bacteria & viruses are extremely difficult to treat especially on massive scale so medical facilities would be quickly over run with cases. Biological weapons while the cheapest and arguably the most effective weapon also poses some of the greatest risks since accidents have been known to happen or the risk of causing a global epidemic.

[HMS Sophia]

Damn Forum ate my post.
So it seems to me that proliferation can be a good thing but only in very specific circumstances. (a mix of area, scope, and stability)

I have to point out, though, that there is no evidence for this being a relevant concern. There aren't a lot of cases in history of heads of government being detached enough from reality to seriously believe that divine intervention will save them in a war against overwhelming forces, not when the option of not provoking the war was available.

We should not make the mistake of assuming without proof that systems like the Iranian theocracy select for delusional insanity on the part of the people with fingers on nuclear buttons. Not when we know that other systems, like the Soviet and American ones, didn't.

While there are not that many who would rely on divine intervention, I'm sure there are some leaders out there who would simply damn the consequences and treat a WMD as a very big conventional weapon, without the somewhat fearful respect that western nations such as the US do.
Surely this also becomes more plausible with non-nuclear WMD's, as they are not as... blatantly destructive as a nuke.

As for which WMD, the essay question referred to all four types. I just kind of lumped them together and hoped for the best (I didn't have time to go into any great detail.)

[Shroom Man 777]

We should not make the mistake of assuming without proof that systems like the Iranian theocracy select for delusional insanity on the part of the people with fingers on nuclear buttons. Not when we know that other systems, like the Soviet and American ones, didn't.

We should also note that the Iranian theocracy hasn't waged an aggressive war, nor is it the delusionaly insane terroristic nation to have launched an illegal invasion based on an elaborate international deception over fictitious imaginary 'WMDs'. So I think certain other nations are just as guilty, if not more so, of making major military decisions based on figments of their imagination and wishful thinking.

I vote for Iran developing nuclear power and ballistic missile defense. That is, defense by ballistic missiles that explode with nuclear power.

[Straha]

While there are not that many who would rely on divine intervention, I'm sure there are some leaders out there who would simply damn the consequences and treat a WMD as a very big conventional weapon, without the somewhat fearful respect that western nations such as the US do.

Ahem, ahem. Look up Wohlstetter and Kahn. The United States has long had a MASSIVE current of strategic thought dedicated to the fact that a Nuclear Weapon is nothing more than a very very big conventional weapon. It's been ascribed to by a number of top authorities inside the US government at one point or another, and still rattles around today (with, for instance, the recent Bunker Buster program.) Historically speaking, actually, the United States doesn't have much respect for Nuclear Weapons, it just cares very much that other countries probably shouldn't get them because it might hurt U.S. hegemony.

If anything, I would argue, religious nations have a much better history with regards to treating nuclear weapons with awe and respect than secular nations. If anyone claims otherwise I'd Pepsi Challenge them. Name me three countries that are A. religious fundamentalists and B. would blow up the world with nukes given the chance.


EDIT: Fixed a typo with Kahn's name.

[HMS Sophia]

Ahem, ahem. Look up Wohlstetter and Khan. The United States has long had a MASSIVE current of strategic thought dedicated to the fact that a Nuclear Weapon is nothing more than a very very big conventional weapon.

At no point did I say which leader, of which nation. I did not disqualify the US at any time.
I'm pretty sure I remember McCarthy(sic) wanting to drop nukes on advancing NK or Chinese units during the Korean conflict (my memory is not so good at 5am), so yes, absolutely the US would view them as conventional weapons, at least up until the era of MAD (IMO). But then surely there came a change when it was recognised how threatening they were (when someone else pointed them at you)?

I don't see your point on Wohlstetter? From *very* limited link clicking he appears to have been a proponent of non-proliferation, BMD, and argued against MAD as well
Can you link me too this Khan fellow. There are a lot of khans (this is purely me not recognising the name not me not believing the reference )

As for your challenge:
Israel? perhaps? A long shot but you never know
Pakistan? Though I have limited knowledge on that situation
However, I'm not basing these on the fact that they are religious nations, but more on their geopolitical situations, i.e. Israel being surrounded by threats, and Pakistan... well, just them and India, from what I have read.
The only other ones I can think of aren't particularly religious

[Straha]

Ahem, ahem. Look up Wohlstetter and Khan. The United States has long had a MASSIVE current of strategic thought dedicated to the fact that a Nuclear Weapon is nothing more than a very very big conventional weapon.

At no point did I say which leader, of which nation. I did not disqualify the US at any time.

You claimed that the United States (and western nations as a whole) has a fearful respect of nuclear weapons, as opposed to other nations. Wohlstetter and Kahn are both god fathers of a wide strain of American thought which directly undercuts your (rather silly and problematic) statement.

But then surely there came a change when it was recognised how threatening they were (when someone else pointed them at you)?

I'd love to see some solid evidence for that. Yes the public mindset did shift, eventually, but it wasn't due to weapons being pointed back at the United States, but the halls of Washington never really embraced the same thought process.

I don't see your point on Wohlstetter? From *very* limited link clicking he appears to have been a proponent of non-proliferation, BMD, and argued against MAD as well

And argued a number of times in favor of a first strike and using nuclear weapons in a tactical manner. None of the points you make anyway undercut the fact that Wohlstetter didn't totally differentiate Nuclear Weapons from Conventional Weapons. Somebody (I believe Warnke) once said "Wohlstetter is trying to teach us how to fight wars with nuclear weapons".

Can you link me too this Khan fellow. There are a lot of khans (this is purely me not recognising the name not me not believing the reference )

That's because I screwed up and mistyped it, it's Kahn. Search for On Thermonuclear War. Transaction Publishing recently reprinted it, and I highly recommend it.

As for your challenge:
Israel? perhaps? A long shot but you never know
Pakistan? Though I have limited knowledge on that situation
However, I'm not basing these on the fact that they are religious nations, but more on their geopolitical situations, i.e. Israel being surrounded by threats, and Pakistan... well, just them and India, from what I have read.
The only other ones I can think of aren't particularly religious

Try again when you can put more thought into it.

EDIT: Fixed a quote tag.

[HMS Sophia]

barnest2 wrote:
Quote:
Ahem, ahem. Look up Wohlstetter and Khan. The United States has long had a MASSIVE current of strategic thought dedicated to the fact that a Nuclear Weapon is nothing more than a very very big conventional weapon.

At no point did I say which leader, of which nation. I did not disqualify the US at any time.

You claimed that the United States (and western nations as a whole) has a fearful respect of nuclear weapons, as opposed to other nations. Wohlstetter and Kahn are both god fathers of a wide strain of American thought which directly undercuts your (rather silly and problematic) statement.

Yes that response was a bit silly. Sorry this subject is relatively new too me. Beyond one lecture, one seminar, some own research and an exam, that's all I know. But it was meant to be a tongue in cheek statement (hence the smiley).
I didn't meant too say that just western nations had this respect for them, but those who currently maintain an arsenal of them. But I concede the point, it's not something I know enough about.

I'd love to see some solid evidence for that. Yes the public mindset did shift, eventually, but it wasn't due to weapons being pointed back at the United States, but the halls of Washington never really embraced the same thought process.

I mainly meant the shift in thinking of them as battlefield weapons, and instead thinking of them as an unusable deterrent. I don't mean that there were no plans too use them in Washington halls (not in the halls... you know what I mean), but that it was recognised that nuclear weapons were never going to be thrown around the battlefield on any reasonable scale. I understand that during the Cold War there were always kept on alert, or similar, but wasn't it recognised in political circles that it was unlikely WWIII would happen without some major external catalyst to push the balance.
And it was recognised by the involved governments that such weapons had to be restricted (SALT and START), does this not show a healthy level of, if not respect, then understanding that these weapons were not too be considered the norm?
What was the cause of the shift in public mindset, if not the threat of nuclear weapons, in regards to such weapons?

And argued a number of times in favor of a first strike and using nuclear weapons in a tactical manner. None of the points you make anyway undercut the fact that Wohlstetter didn't totally differentiate Nuclear Weapons from Conventional Weapons.

I wasn't trying to undercut the man's ideas, I was simply confused as too the point. As I said, all I knew of him was from flicking through a couple of pages. So thank you, I now understand the point.
However, from what little I have read, it was only until the early to mid 60's that he argued for tactical nuclear weaponry and the use thereof. After that it appears he moved onto non-proliferation, and ballistic missile defence, as well as other areas.

That's because I screwed up and mistyped it, it's Kahn. Search for On Thermonuclear War. Transaction Publishing recently reprinted it, and I highly recommend it.

Thank you, that actually looks remarkably interesting. I'll pick it up if I have the time to read it (and the money for it).

As for the challenge... yeah, that was slightly ridiculous.
If anything I've said above is wrong, please do just say :p As I say, I'm learning.

[adam_grif]

I find it hard to make the logical leap from "Religious fundamentalist" to "is willing to commit global genocide and the only thing stopping them from doing it is the fear of retaliation". You could make pretty much exactly the same argument for a fundamentalist government openly attacking the Russians or Americans right now, because their god will protect their armies, save them from nuclear attacks and guide their shells or what have you. It strikes me as just as absurd as the idea that a religious theocracy would not fund medicine or hospitals because they think God will protect them from illness and so on.

I can't think of any religion that espouses killing on a grand scale, even Islam has to be twisted pretty far to justify the kinds of holy wars the crazies are trying to get going in the middle east.

[Lord of the Abyss]

I find it hard to make the logical leap from "Religious fundamentalist" to "is willing to commit global genocide and the only thing stopping them from doing it is the fear of retaliation".

Well, you have the Christian fundamentalists in America who not only don't fear retribution but actively want it, since they think they'll be Raptured before the bombs hit. Jerry Falwell tried to convince Reagan that Russia and China were the Biblical Gog and Magog and that Reagan should launch a nuclear first strike in order to bring on the end of the world and the Rapture of the chosen into Heaven.

[adam_grif]

There are always crazies, the question is whether it's plausible that enough crazies of the right sort will be the ones with the keys and have the balls to go through with it. I don't think it's very plausible, personally.

[HMS Sophia]

Why not? Are 'the crazies' not normally charismatic individuals who draw followers?... which sounds suspiciously like a US president, no?

I do not see how it is so implausible for someone like this to get into power?

[Shroom Man 777]

Why not? Are 'the crazies' not normally charismatic individuals who draw followers?... which sounds suspiciously like a US president, no?

I do not see how it is so implausible for someone like this to get into power?

Well, to be fair, he was also a Hollywood actor. I don't think it's fair to call people who are old and have mental diseases associated with old age "crazies", even though they start mixing up 1980s movies with reality, go on about aliens, and make slips of the tongue that might trigger war with the Soviets, man.

[HMS Sophia]

Well, to be fair, he was also a Hollywood actor. I don't think it's fair to call people who are old and have mental diseases associated with old age "crazies", even though they start mixing up 1980s movies with reality, go on about aliens, and make slips of the tongue that might trigger war with the Soviets, man.

Ha I didn't even mean for it too be a reference too.... Reagan? but now you mention it...
I just meant that most presidents are quite charismatic and gather some... interesting followers... (I think I mostly mean Republicans, but I may be wrong)

[Shroom Man 777]

I thought you were referring to Brak Saddam Zerobamasamabinladenaramamcnamara. Or BALLS! as we call him on the hill. (Which was why I countered it with some smarm, a Smart Munition Anti Radiation Missile launched from an orbiting XBOX-70 VALKYLIE MINOGUE traveling at Mach 5, piloted by Speed Racer, and with Spritle and Chim Chim at the trunk weapons control)

But yeah, the 20th century did have the greatest, and worst, example of a malfunctioning democracy that did elect a highly charismatic man into power, who then led his loyal populace into a very destructive conflict. Hitler.

[Simon_Jester]

I find it hard to make the logical leap from "Religious fundamentalist" to "is willing to commit global genocide and the only thing stopping them from doing it is the fear of retaliation".

Well, you have the Christian fundamentalists in America who not only don't fear retribution but actively want it, since they think they'll be Raptured before the bombs hit. Jerry Falwell tried to convince Reagan that Russia and China were the Biblical Gog and Magog and that Reagan should launch a nuclear first strike in order to bring on the end of the world and the Rapture of the chosen into Heaven.

And you will note that Falwell failed: he was that crazy; the people who ran the country weren't.

We shouldn't assume that "theocracy" means "rule by Jerry Falwell." There's a lot of internal politics that goes on behind the scenes in places like Tehran or the Vatican, and you won't get far in those circles if you're a frothing maniac incapable of rationally evaluating the strength of an enemy.

Ahem, ahem. Look up Wohlstetter and Kahn. The United States has long had a MASSIVE current of strategic thought dedicated to the fact that a Nuclear Weapon is nothing more than a very very big conventional weapon...

Well, in a strict sense it kind of... is. I mean, nuclear weapons have concrete, measurable effects; their capabilities are definable rather than being unimaginable demons that ravage the landscape at their own will.

My reading of Kahn (admittedly, I'm only familiar with On Thermonuclear War, not with other material he published later or earlier) is that the things he comes out most in favor of boil down to self-honest assessment of nuclear doctrine, not any particular version of that doctrine.

He mentions a lot of problems with a wide variety of nuclear doctrines, including problems with the use of nuclear weapons in small scale limited wars, such as "how do you keep the war limited?". And problems with what we now call "mutually assured destruction," such "having nervous fingers on the launch buttons for twenty thousand ICBMs sounds like a really good argument for arms control."

What distinguishes Kahn is that he looks at the numbers associated with nuclear warfare, and then says "very well, to make a rational decision we must look at the numbers." Looking at the numbers, it seems to me that his rational conclusion is "You know, we should really look into a strategic arms reduction treaty with the Russians; this is getting out of hand." But people only remember him for saying "well, if we don't have arms control, we're going to have to do this, this, and this, because without arms control the war will happen sooner or later, and we'll need to make preparations just to have any chance of eventually recovering."

Likewise, people don't remember him for saying "the idea of nuclear war as unsurvivable-by-definition is bad because [blah blah blah]*" They remember him saying "nuclear war is survivable in principle," and assume that means "nuclear war isn't so bad! Let's have a nuclear war!"

*[blah blah blah] includes things like:

-Because if we assume the war is mutual suicide for both parties, regardless of what happens, it removes the pressure to have a deterrent that actually works under adverse conditions. Who cares whether the buttons are connected to the missiles if the world comes to an end by definition the moment the first missile flies, and no consequences past that first spasm of destruction matter? The problem then being that an enemy who figures out that your buttons are not connected to your missiles is liable to stop taking your deterrent seriously- at which point war becomes more likely, not less, the difference being that the war is going to go much worse for you than it will for him.

-Because if the war takes on an unexpected form, such as a limited strike against our own deterrent capability, it leaves us without a plan for what to do on day two- even such a simple and sensible plan as "surrender."

-Because refusing to consider the question of what happens, on the assumption that it's too terrible to think about, means that all questions of nuclear policy are settled by the political equivalent of random-walk: we get whichever weapon the generals promote the hardest, whichever policies the politicians can sell the best, and no coherent strategy that gives us a reliable ability to tell people "this is our policy, this is what we are and are not willing to fight over."

Honestly, I can see his reasons for being concerned about all these things.

[Bottlestein]

Have you guys read Nie Rongzhen or K. Sundarji on Nuclear Deterrence, as opposed to Nuclear Warfighting?

It goes a long way to describe, IMO, China and India's nuclear thinking. Plus, it seems as though Pakistan's nukes (maintained and supplied by China) can be explained well through their lenses.

[Simon_Jester]

Ahem, ahem. Look up Wohlstetter and Kahn. The United States has long had a MASSIVE current of strategic thought dedicated to the fact that a Nuclear Weapon is nothing more than a very very big conventional weapon...

You claimed that the United States (and western nations as a whole) has a fearful respect of nuclear weapons, as opposed to other nations. Wohlstetter and Kahn are both god fathers of a wide strain of American thought which directly undercuts your (rather silly and problematic) statement...

And argued a number of times in favor of a first strike and using nuclear weapons in a tactical manner. None of the points you make anyway undercut the fact that Wohlstetter didn't totally differentiate Nuclear Weapons from Conventional Weapons. Somebody (I believe Warnke) once said "Wohlstetter is trying to teach us how to fight wars with nuclear weapons"...

That's because I screwed up and mistyped it, it's Kahn. Search for On Thermonuclear War. Transaction Publishing recently reprinted it, and I highly recommend it.

An interesting and relevant passage from On Thermonuclear War, one which would seem to contradict the implication that Kahn was part of the school of thought you describe... while also confirming the existence of that school.

Starting on Page 540, underlining added by me:

...This consideration brings us naturally to our second topic: Would it be better to spend money on a Limited War Capability to the exclusion of a Credible First Strike Capability?

2. Limited war capability.
I am very much attracted by this alternative; certainly, I definitely favor spending some money on a limited war capability. I am more extreme than some proponents of limited war, however, in that I favor having a high-explosive (HE) capability, even though it threatens to be expensive. The controversy between HE and nuclear weapons is peripheral to the Central War* question being discussed here, but some points of contact between the two topics will be discussed briefly.

One of the advantages of limiting small wars to HE is that a violation of the rule is so clear-cut, so unambiguous. There is a genuine distinction between nuclear and chemical explosions. The fact that very low-yield nuclear weapons could be developed which would render this distinction fuzzy and vague does not change this. Even though such devices seem to be very useful from the narrow military point of view, the breaking of the precedent would seem to me to be of much more significance than the advantages to be gained. Thus the main reason for developing such small weapons is probably to blot out the distinction. But no dividing line other than nuclear-nonnuclear is anywhere near as well defined. It is this that makes it so important that it not be eliminated.

The limiting line must not only be very well defined, it must seem reasonable. Most important of all, the line must seem "acceptable," separating "tolerable" from "intolerable." Most of the world (apparently including Russia) seems to consider the use of nuclear weapons a drastic measure. The only people who do not are some of the professional students of war- in the services and out- who have been trying to talk each other into accepting the idea of using nuclear weapons routinely. I myself have had some contact with their proselytizing program. Their story seems to go like this:

A says to B sometime in 1953 (when the Korean War is safely over), "A nuclear weapon is just a weapon like any other- only larger." B says, "I agree." Neither really believed this in 1953. But such conversations have been going on repeatedly in the years that have followed, until both participants are beginning to believe it (but not quite). However, except for our two participants and people who accept government pronouncements at face value, almost everyone, I feel sure, agrees that the use of nuclear weapons is a very eventful act. Because nuclear weapons are unambiguous and also eventful, it is possible to draw a line at this point. One can also argue that it would be very useful for the United States to draw a line here.

*"Central War" here refers to the idea of a war directly between US and Soviet forces over some issue critical to both, such as the fate of Western Europe. "Limited War" refers to something more constrained, involving nuclear powers but over an issue small enough that both sides would prefer to keep the idea of a major exchange of strategic weapons off the table. -Simon_Jester

Kahn continues at some length as to why we would not be doing ourselves any favors by promoting the use of 'tactical' nuclear weapons in small scale wars. His main argument is that this would encourage massive proliferation of nuclear weapons, since everyone who wanted any chance of defending against American attack would need them. Moreover, he argues that the US is poorly prepared to fight a war in which 'tactical' nuclear weapons are available on both sides, for a number of reasons.

[HMS Sophia]

Okay, I'm completely out of this debate pretty much. People here know a lot more than I do (no shame in that )

However:

Moreover, he argues that the US is poorly prepared to fight a war in which 'tactical' nuclear weapons are available on both sides, for a number of reasons.

Why is this? I mean I understand tactical nukes ruining anyone's day, but why specifically a) the US, and b) when they are on both sides?

[Simon_Jester]

Well, think about it.

(1)
In 1960, as today, the US fought most of its wars far overseas, relying on a global network of WWII-vintage base locations to support its operations.

(2)
Then as now, US forces tended to use a lot of supplies- bombs, artillery shells, fuel, bullets, and so on- supplied by America's relatively powerful economy.

(3)
Then as now, the American people would not be likely to respond well to open use of terror tactics: we had (and have) a certain amount of tolerance for 'collateral damage,' but "surrender now or we kill a thousand civilians every day until you surrender" isn't something we like to think of our military saying.

(4)
Then as now, Americans were averse to taking very high casualties as a percentage of the forces deployed: losing half an infantry division in one battle would be a tremendous disaster from our point of view, and a war in which we took such losses would soon become incredibly unpopular.

Taking lots of casualties in a hurry makes the American people unhappy: either they get angry and want to escalate, or they question the purpose of the war and want to pull out.

Now, imagine a war fought with 'tactical' nuclear weapons on both sides- bombs in the low kiloton range, with a radius of destruction of no more than a few miles. Assume a variety of delivery systems, from short range missiles to smuggling the thing in a truck. And assume that both sides are perfectly willing to use those nukes: us because it's our doctrine to use them, and the enemy because they need nuclear firepower to even the odds against us.

---

You still with me? OK, let's consider the consequences of such a war.

(1)
For one, the best targets for tactical nukes are usually in the enemy's rear area- supply lines, command centers, things like that. Dropping one twenty-kiloton bomb in open country will catch some of the enemy's soldiers and weapons, but it won't break the back of his army. Dropping the same bomb on the ports, railroads, or Ho Chi Minh trails that supply his forces, now that can break an army. Likewise dropping the same bomb on an air defense headquarters, which opens up the rest of the area to air attack.

Imagine you're North Vietnam in 1965. The US is pushing more forces into South Vietnam, and pretty soon they're going to get into all-up offensive against you. Their doctrine says that they will use kiloton-range nukes against you wherever they see a good target; you know damn well you can't stand up against that.

Assume that you have somehow obtained tactical nukes of your own- say, because the US policy of using nuclear weapons in small wars has scared enough countries around the world to make nuclear proliferation a big deal, such that there are people actively selling small nuclear weapons to countries that want them for self defense.

So now we're looking at nuclear war between the US and the North Vietnamese. But think about it- who is hurt more by this, the US or the Vietnamese? Sure, the US has a more powerful air force and can deliver its bombs more efficiently... but on the other hand, the Vietnamese know that the entire American war effort depends on a few bases in Japan and the Philippines, on control of the South Vietnamese capital in Saigon, and so on.

Because the US has to fight a war at a great distance, relying on large, long-established military bases, it is proportionately more vulnerable to the loss of those bases. Moreover, losing bases can mean a general loss of US influence in the area: if a few major US military bases in the Philippines were destroyed by nuclear weapons smuggled inside or near the base perimeter, the entire American posture in the Pacific would be affected.

In this respect, the US's nature as a 'global' power, one that normally fights far from home with expeditionary forces supplied through large bases, makes it more vulnerable to the use of tactical nukes in a small war. With the entire American war effort depending on a few small, concentrated targets, we'd be in trouble in a war where the enemy stood a chance of destroying those targets. If the enemy has tactical nukes, they can do that.

So in this way, the US is better off fighting a conventional war against a non-nuclear opponent than a war in which both sides use tactical nuclear weapons.

(2)
This is related to (1). American forces, then as now, relied on a very heavy supply train. Disruption of the supply train (by a nuclear attack, or by the need to spread out our logistics so one nuke can't ruin everything) disrupts our forces badly. Against an enemy that uses a lighter supply train, this is a disadvantage when both sides are prepared to use nuclear weapons against their enemy's logistics.

(3)
One of the most obvious tactics in any nuclear war, even one fought with "small" nuclear weapons, is blackmail. "Do this or we will destroy one of your cities." It's a powerful argument, and any realistic nuclear power can use it if their rules of engagement let them use nukes at all in the war they're fighting.

But imagine you're an American in 1965 and you find out that we ended the Vietnam War by threatening to kill five million North Vietnamese citizens with a nuclear strike on their cities. That would probably strike you as disproportionate- sure, you don't want communists running all of Vietnam, but is it really worth killing five million people all in one blow to keep that from happening? Actually, it would strike you as much more than disproportionate. It would tell you that your current president, who threatened to make the nuclear attack, is willing to be the largest mass murderer since Adolf Hitler.

How will that make you feel. Do you want to support a government willing to do that? Probably not.

So the US government would have to be very restrained in making such threats during a 'small' nuclear war fought over small objectives like "who gets to run Vietnam?" But on the other hand, the enemy might not be so restrained. Perhaps they're a revolutionary government, and are desperate or violent enough to take greater risks. Perhaps they don't care what their people think. Perhaps their people are so strongly anticolonial that they don't mind if their government threatens to kill a few million people in another country to get the foreigners out.

So once again, if both sides feel free to use even small nuclear weapons, and both sides have them available, the US finds itself at a disadvantage. The US is a democracy, and is playing for small stakes in such a limited war (NOT one fought over huge issues, we're talking about small wars, remember?). Whereas its opponent is likely not a democracy and may be playing for large stakes, such as "uniting the country under their own rule." They can run greater risks when it comes to nuclear blackmail.

Sure, the US can threaten massive retaliation (turn whole country into glass), but that has its own problems, more on that later.

(4)
Finally, any nuclear wars will involve a LOT of localized destruction. Every time the enemy lands even one nuke on target, the odds are good that many of our troops will die as a result. So in a war where both sides have nukes, we can expect that both sides will take a lot of casualties, relative to the forces they send. We can reduce our casualties by sending only small numbers of troops and keeping them dispersed, but even then, there will be specific places (like our army bases) where many troops gather... and many troops will be killed in the event of a nuclear attack.

That produces very large casualty figures in a hurry- not just a few at a time, like the Iraq War, but thousands of people being killed at once. Once again, that will raise powerful questions in the US about our willingness to remain in the war. Is it really worth it, the voters will ask. And they'll have a point.

Again, the enemy may be more able to absorb casualties and damage than the US is, because they are fighting for larger stakes. This places the US at a disadvantage when both sides have the power to inflict massive damage in a hurry.

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If you're still with me, you've probably thought:

"Well, if the small-nuke war is going against the US, they can just break out the BIG nukes and threaten to blow up the whole country, right?"

And the answer is "No, probably not." There are a lot of reasons why that can backfire. For one, it results in massive civilian death, which causes problems at home. For another, it means escalating the war out of all proportion to what it was being fought over. If we're throwing around megaton-range bombs, the other large nuclear powers are likely to start getting itchy trigger fingers, for fear they might be next.

For another, we wind up as very unpopular allies. If you ally with the US against a rival in this situation, you can expect the following:
1) The rival will know that the US likes to use tactical nukes in small wars, and will thus move heaven and earth to get its hands on at least a few nukes to defend itself.
2) These nukes will be used against key US bases and field formations... many of which are in your country.
3) If the US thinks it is failing, it will probably devastate your rival with giant megaton bombs. Then it will leave... and you will be left with the fallout, the refugees, the economically crippled territory to deal with.
4) To make matters worse, the US might apply this 'we have to destroy the country in order to save it' mindset to your own nation in the future!

Suddenly, the US does not look like such a friendly ally anymore. You might be better off staying neutral. Or allying with the Soviets and becoming one of the states that they protect against US nuclear attack with their nuclear arsenal.

And nations around the world will be making the same calculation: US use of megaton bombs in Vietnam might provoke, say, Sweden or Italy to change sides in the Cold War, knowing that they're better off as a Soviet satellite than as a country the US fights over.

In these ways, the use or the threat to use overwhelming nuclear force against a small country over small issues can backfire horribly for the country making the threat.