A specific kind of stalemate?

[Davey]

I got a quick question: Imagine an allegiance system between an odd-numbered (of three or more) group of factions in a state of political deadlock with each other with relatively equal power, the key thing here being that all of the factions are mutually intimidated by each other, but unwilling to go to war because a war would weaken the involved factions and allow them both to be conquered by a third (which would result in a no-win scenario for both the warring factions), so all the involved members simultaneously watch each others' backs, waiting for someone else to make the first move or show some kind of weakness.

Now, is there such a term, or a two-word phrase (like "hydraulic empire" etc) to describe this kind of specific stalemate? I need to find the right term to describe an RPG world. Thanks.

[Sriad]

...Mexican Standoff?

[Davey]

...Mexican Standoff?

That sums it up perfectly, thank you very much!

I can't believe I missed that. Stupid, forgetful ol' me...

[General Zod]

Also known as a Cold War.

[Masami von Weizegger]

There's no generally used term for such an instance (as far as I am aware) but "multipartite/multilateral deadlock/stalemate/standoff" would be a fairly accurate phrase, I think.

[Skgoa]

Isn't this a Nash Equilibrium, too?

[Masami von Weizegger]

Isn't this a Nash Equilibrium, too?

Ah, yes. It could certainly be construed that way, if the parties involved have sufficiently competent intelligence on their enemies that reveals that maintaining the balance is the best course of action.

That is to say, if the status quo in this RPG world is motivated by a lack of intelligence and knowledge of the other faction's tendencies and strategies and is merely an attempt to avoid taking the worst action, then (I believe, it's been a while since I've waded in this sort of thing) it would not be a true Nash Equilibrium.

[Skgoa]

A Nash Equilibrium is defined as a state were a player changing his own strategy is only advantagous, if the other player(s) change(s) his/their strategy, too. Its not contingent on knowledge of the internal state of the other player(s).
E.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma: betraying your accomplice potentially maximizes your reward and not betraying him while he betrays you minimizes your reward. Since the two suspects can't coordinate, they can't choose to not betray each other.
The situation the OP described is very similar. Unless either all sides agree to simultaniously declare war on each other or an alliance of sufficient power is formed, going to war is not a reward maximizing strategy for any single faction.

[PeZook]

Forming an alliance is not a guarantee for victory either: it is advantageous for the allies to betray each other so that they can conquer the two other states weakened by war, is it not? If there are states A, B and C of roughly equal power, A & B make an alliance, then if B betrays A and doesn't go to war with C, then B will become to next superpower once the dust settles.

So the only "solution" per se is if everyone declares war on everyone else.

[Davey]

Hmm. I'm reading about the Nash Equilibrium, and it definitely would apply in this scenario because there's no advantage to changing course even if everyone else knew about it, although details on that particular thing are still up in the air at this point. Indeed though, all these terms are really helping to paint a pretty good picture of the different factions, and the "Game Theory" articles look like they might make for some pretty interesting reading on the situation, much better than just 'it's a stalemate.'

Forming an alliance is not a guarantee for victory either: it is advantageous for the allies to betray each other so that they can conquer the two other states weakened by war, is it not? If there are states A, B and C of roughly equal power, A & B make an alliance, then if B betrays A and doesn't go to war with C, then B will become to next superpower once the dust settles.

So the only "solution" per se is if everyone declares war on everyone else.

The sort of arrangement, yeah, that's sort of it exactly. A and B can'd declare war on each other, because C would decimate them both, and so forth.

The help is appreciated.

[Davey]

doublepost

[Skgoa]

Forming an alliance is not a guarantee for victory either: it is advantageous for the allies to betray each other so that they can conquer the two other states weakened by war, is it not? If there are states A, B and C of roughly equal power, A & B make an alliance, then if B betrays A and doesn't go to war with C, then B will become to next superpower once the dust settles.

And in this case A and C will have to agree to a cease fire immediately and we are back at square one. But I only meant those as examples for how more than one side has to change it's strategy for a change in strategy to be advantagous.