The Battle of France -- Source Conflicts

[Flameblade]

This seems like the best place to ask for this, so here goes.

I'm involved in a debate with some acquaintances over the Battle of France, specifically the relative numbers, equipment and training of the Allies compares to the Axis. Our sources seem to be in dispute, and I don't know where else to find out which author is more accurate on the subject matter.

My opponent is referencing (among others):

Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia ISBN 0-87475-520-4
History of the Twentieth Century, A, Vol I: Volume One: 1900 - 1933 ISBN-10: 0688100643 (as well as the other books in this series)

Meanwhile, I am referencing (among others):

Citino, Robert Michael. The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1999. ISBN 1555877141.
Citino, Robert Michael. The German Way in War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich, University of Kansa Press. 2005. ISBN 978-0700661624-4
Frieser, Karl-Heinz. Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940, Operationen des Zweiten Weltkrieges. München: R. Oldenbourg. 1995. ISBN 3486561243.
Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Blitzkrieg Legend. Naval Institute Press. 2005. ISBN 978-1-59114-294-2

His sources seem to claim that the Germans substantially outnumbered the Allies, and had all-around superior training and equipment, and that as such, the Fall of France was completely inevitable.

My sources seem to indicate that the Allies slightly outnumbered the Germans, and had superior training and equipment, except for radios and airplanes, and that the Fall of France hinged on the luck of Guderian's losses from his armoured divisions hitting on a superior ratio of infantry to armour for effective combined arms operations, and chancing across an opening in the lines during a shift in the French forces.

Comments on either the suppositions or the veracity of our sources are welcome.

[That NOS Guy]

Shooting purely from the hip, as I have none of my usual library in front of me, you are in fact correct. Keep in mind how incredibly godawful lucky the Germans were in the campaign as well. For example, the British were nearly successful at Arras despite the near total lack of infantry support.

[CaptHawkeye]

I tend to think of the Battle of France as more the result of Allied incompetence than German skill early in the war. A lot of people would still use that as an excuse for Wehrmacht wank regardless but here's the thing.

By 1940 the Nazis had been in power for 7 years. Almost as soon as they took power in 1933, they transformed the many public and social programs of the Wiemar Republic into weapons production, strategic planning, and military research. Including many programs the Wiemar Republic *itself* had been subtly working on. The Nazis made a very minor effort to continue the economic reforms of the Wiemar Republic, but a combination of violent preoccupation with their own long term goals and colossal mismanagement meant that many of these programs produced nothing. Remember how the Nazis work after all, professional positions are awarded based on party loyalty, not competence. The one group that was immune to this was the Wehrmacht, particularly the Heer. Which contributed to the formation of Hitler's private army the Waffen SS.

So the result was that in the time between 1933 and Poland, the Nazis had literally been doing nothing but obsessing about the next war. Programs started by the Wiemar Republic to rebuild Germany quietly and peacefully were re-purposed into big fucking guns to kill many people with. The Nazis spent 6 years doing this before Poland. With everything the Nazis gave up to make their military big and bad, i'd honestly be surprised if they didn't get as far as they did.

At least before their economic and political structure finally collapsed under its own lethargic weight, with inevitably led to the military engine starting to sputter, and progressively fail by the mid 40s. The Nazis traded long term security for a short shot of steroids into the military and heavy industry. We can all pretty cleanly see how that worked.

Now to be fair, everyone was working on weapons and research programs during the 20s and 30s. The difference is many of these countries had the economic space to afford this. Germany did not and had no reason to. Unless you're a disgruntled veteran and racist with extreme delusions of grandeur. Additionally, working towards the next war was really not on the mind of many leaders at the time. So military R&D for most of the world's nations was very much an afterthought. This contributed to what seemed like a total lack of preparedness for WW2 on the part of the Allies.

[Zinegata]

I don't have either of the books; but as a guide to resolving this issue one needs to remember that historians often have different points of reference. Are they counting every warm German body in uniform, or just the men involved in the Western offensive? Are they counting every German soldier in the West, or just the guys north of the Maginot line?

And judging from the fact that your opponent is referencing an Illustrated Encyclopedia and a general history for 1900 - 1933... I wouldn't put much veracity on the claims of your opponent's sources. It looks very much like someone just getting some general figures and making sweeping conclusions about them; as opposed to a very focused study of the Battle of France like some of your sources are.

All in all, I'd say that you're right on this one. Both sides have generally equal numbers and training/equipment; albeit the Germans had superior doctrine in certain areas. I would however, note that training does not result in good morale; and I've seen it mentioned quite often that the French Army of 1940 was suffering from severe morale issues. This could have been a major factor that resulted in the defeat of the French Army - but admittedly hard data is difficult to come by as morale isn't the easiest thing to measure

[MKSheppard]

Now to be fair, everyone was working on weapons and research programs during the 20s and 30s.

I'd like to add a point that Stuart pointed out a while ago, either here on HPCA.

Germany had a huge advantage in that she timed her equipment cycle (the point where you go from paper designs to actual designs in the hands of troops), just right for the early part of WWII; in that she ended up with decent weaponry for the early part of WWII (1939-1942).

Italy is a good example of what happens when you botch the equipment cycle.

Italy's equipment would have been great...if we had fought WWII in 1935-37.

[Stark]

Is that really true? Sure, other groups were a year (or two) away from finishing their 'way better than panzer 2' programs, but I'm not sure this was some piece of brilliant timing and not just a happy coincidence. Didn't they not 'plan' on starting a proper war until the mid forties?

And I'm not sure its relevant to the Battle of France outside planes and small arms anyway.

[Zinegata]

Switching to bigger tanks is indeed a fairly big deal if you don't have the industrial base for it - as it requires a wholesale overhaul of your logistics network too (i.e. need bigger tank trailers for trucks and trains).

However, I'd have to agree that the Germans got lucky. At the start of the war they were still using mostly 30s era designs (Panzer 35t; Panzer 38t; Panzer II), and had just started producing more modern designs (Panzer III, Panzer IV) in 1939.

And even those "modern" designs had issues. The MK III couldn't mount a gun bigger than the short 75mm (unless turned into a Stug assault gun). The Mk IV was originally an infantry support tank, but her designers had included provisions for a bigger gun "just in case" (which it did in fact need).

[Thanas]

I tend to think of the Battle of France as more the result of Allied incompetence than German skill early in the war.

That misses the point - every great victory depends on the inncompetence of the losers.

[Simon_Jester]

Switching to bigger tanks is indeed a fairly big deal if you don't have the industrial base for it - as it requires a wholesale overhaul of your logistics network too (i.e. need bigger tank trailers for trucks and trains).

However, I'd have to agree that the Germans got lucky. At the start of the war they were still using mostly 30s era designs (Panzer 35t; Panzer 38t; Panzer II), and had just started producing more modern designs (Panzer III, Panzer IV) in 1939.

Almost by definition, an army fighting in 1939 will be equipped with "30s era" designs. Isn't the question whether the design is good or bad by '30s standards, then?

I think the point here is that while you can keep developing new weapons continuously, you have to commit to mass-producing something sooner or later, and once you start setting up assembly lines for that, you don't get to change your mind in a hurry. The Germans decided to start mass-producing tanks in the late 1930s, which to a large extent locked them into late 1930s tank designs. That what they had the factories, the tooling, the parts and trained workers for. So they just kept turning out Panzer I through IV, and trying to repurpose the I-IV chassis to fill new needs, throughout the war, because... that's what they had.

They tried to develop new models in 1941-42, but under the stress of wartime conditions, they never really managed to replace their existing production with the Mark V and VI. The ones that appeared in 1943-45 did quite well individually and made a mark on the war at the tactical level, but couldn't replace the numbers of I-IV designs Germany had committed to mass-producing in the first place.

Whereas the US, to pick an extreme contrast, had virtually no production facilities to build masses of its 1930s tank designs, and practically started tank production from scratch in 1940 with designs of 1940. That locked them into a 1940-41 design that incorporated the lessons of the Battle of France (mobility is important, tanks in position to exploit a breakthrough are decisive), but not the lessons of Barbarossa (the best antitank weapon is often another tank, so tanks need to be heavily armed to tackle their peers). Like the Germans, once the US had laid foundations and cut metal for its tank production lines, it was too late to go back, redesign from scratch, and put the new vehicle into mass production. So instead of a host of new tanks materializing in 1944-45, we got a host of Stuart and Sherman variants.

However, just as the Panzer IV had enough upgrade potential to evolve from a 1939 design to a viable 1943-44 frontline tank, the Sherman had enough potential to stay viable until 1945... within limits.


Also, I think it was in other areas that the Germans had a marked advantage- not so much tanks themselves as in communications, aircraft, and... well, doctrine isn't hardware and doesn't have the same development cycle, but I think there's a similar pattern in that it comes in waves of innovation, followed by waves of implementation. The Germans were at the peak of the wave in 1940, but were having trouble keeping up in 1943 with things like motorization of the infantry and air defense.

[Agent Sorchus]

Actually Simon the greatest anti-tank weapon is infantry, followed by field guns and aircraft. Infantry were quite easy to overrun tanks with, especially the heaviest armored tanks, any tank in a city or an immobilized tank. And it is easier (economically) to upgrade a nations field guns to be capable in killing a tank than it is to upgrade a tank to carry the same gun. And field guns were a lot harder to spot by aircraft or other recon assets. Aircraft had it easier since armoring the top of a tank is harder and adds a weight penalty fast for what protection you get such that tanks will always lose the battle for economy.

What a tank does well is providing a hard point for support of infantry and for demolishing hard points with their guns. They can't be used as a defensive weapon any better than if you demount their gun and put it in a pill box. The biggest advantage the tank had was that it was able to converge and give local superiority in a location that allows an attack or counter attack to work.

Barbarosa is different only because the Russian tanks were basically the most advanced tanks of the period when the war started. Shooting things that have no chance makes them good anti-tank weapons, since they have the mobility that other forms of anti tank weapons lack (and in the case of airplanes the endurance). But even there the war changed quickly enough that tanks became a second rate weapon in fighting other tanks. Of note the Russians sent overseas their plans for taking out Ferdinand TDs and they basically said that while you can easily destroy a ferdinand with a flanking tank it was easier to overrun them with infantry or ambush them with field guns in a triangle that draws the Ferdi into the middle where the two guns it isn't pointed at takes it apart.

The real lesson of Barbarosa is never attack Russia without being ready to fight in the winter.

[CJvR]

My sources seem to indicate that the Allies slightly outnumbered the Germans, and had superior training and equipment, except for radios and airplanes...

Well It might depend on if the Belgian and Dutch armies are included in the total. The armies were almost identical in size and the German advantage in the air was marginal but they had two critical weapons that the Allied lacked - dive bombers and transports. It was the tactical doctrine and the daring operation plan of the German army that was decisive in 1940. It should be noted that in the post DQ phase of the invasion the French had developed nasty defence in depth against the Panzers and that the Allied tanks were generally superior to the German panzers. Also the Allies deployed 28 motorized/armored divisions against 17 German ones so they should have had superior strategic mobility but the German foot infantry managed to keep them busy while the Panzers dashed through to the sea.

[CaptHawkeye]

Actually Simon the greatest anti-tank weapon is infantry, followed by field guns and aircraft.

No, statistically the leading cause of death for tanks throughout the entire war was AP shot fired from anti tank guns, unless you're lumping in AT weapons *with* infantry. Depending on the period of the war we're talking about here, field guns or other tanks came next. Infantry were very low on the food chain until relevant anti tank weapons showed up like the Panzerfaust. Even then, infantry were not the leading cause of death for armor. Airplanes barely even register on a percentage of tank kills throughout the entire war. I don't have exact figures but i'd wager less than 5%. The effect of airplanes on tanks during the war has been wholly overblown.

Infantry were quite easy to overrun tanks with, especially the heaviest armored tanks, any tank in a city or an immobilized tank.

Bullshit. This is a blanket statement that's flat out impossible. Unless you really think a guy walking is going to outrun an armored vehicle. It's true many tanks historically were overrun by infantry, because those tanks had suffered engine or transmission failure and had been abandoned there by their unit. This was not a regular event though.

And it is easier (economically) to upgrade a nations field guns to be capable in killing a tank than it is to upgrade a tank to carry the same gun.

No it's not. Why do you think the caliber of high velocity guns steadily increased during the war? Field guns are indeed very economic...so long as we're talking about a gun in the 30-50mm range. Once you get to around 75mm and on the gun starts to get so heavy it needs a specialized transport to move it around. The Flak 36 itself cost roughly as much as a light tank. Once you throw in a tractor needed to tow it around plus setup time you might as well just build a fucking tank.

And field guns were a lot harder to spot by aircraft or other recon assets. Aircraft had it easier since armoring the top of a tank is harder and adds a weight penalty fast for what protection you get such that tanks will always lose the battle for economy.

Horseshit. Tanks didn't lose the battle for economy, they *won* it. Why do you think we replaced field guns with ATGMs?

Top armor of most tanks is indeed thin, too thin to stop a shell or an anti tank weapon fired from, say, a rooftop. But most airplanes during the war were armed with with weapons 20mm or less which won't do shit to the top armor of most tanks. You also have to remember that planes attack at an angle. Attacking straight down is very, very impractical. So the weakness of thin top armor is really overblown.

What a tank does well is providing a hard point for support of infantry and for demolishing hard points with their guns. They can't be used as a defensive weapon any better than if you demount their gun and put it in a pill box. The biggest advantage the tank had was that it was able to converge and give local superiority in a location that allows an attack or counter attack to work.

This is such a simplistic blanket statement.

Barbarosa is different only because the Russian tanks were basically the most advanced tanks of the period when the war started.

Shooting things that have no chance makes them good anti-tank weapons, since they have the mobility that other forms of anti tank weapons lack (and in the case of airplanes the endurance). But even there the war changed quickly enough that tanks became a second rate weapon in fighting other tanks.

So anti tank guns are everywhere today and most tanks still use low velocity guns right? Complete other way around. Tanks became the primary means for which to fight *other* tanks. Look at literally every tank designed from 1945 to today and tell me you really think tanks are a "second rate" means to fight other tanks.

Of note the Russians sent overseas their plans for taking out Ferdinand TDs and they basically said that while you can easily destroy a ferdinand with a flanking tank it was easier to overrun them with infantry or ambush them with field guns in a triangle that draws the Ferdi into the middle where the two guns it isn't pointed at takes it apart.

Which had a lot more to do with the fact that the Ferdinand was a piece of shit, and everyone except Hitler knew it. It wasn't even armed with a fucking machine gun.

The real lesson of Barbarosa is never attack Russia without being ready to fight in the winter.

Where did you learn all this from? High school?

[Stark]

That misses the point - every great victory depends on the inncompetence of the losers.

Yeah, its like saying 'you only won because I fucked up'. That's what war is about.

[MKSheppard]

And Simon nails it. Bravo.

There's also an addenum here. You *can* start to replace specific pieces of equipment if you have the industrial capacity in that specific sector of industry to balance off the decrease in production as you shift to a new model with the need to keep existing units at strength.

Germany/USA/Britain/USSR were all able to manage this to varying extents, while nations with extremely poor industrial capacity such as Japan or Italy just could not manage this.

[Gunhead]

I'd have to go digging through my books, but I've held the position that the Germans did have several advantages going for them operationally and the poor showing of the French army on the operational level was what made the campaign in France such a huge success for the Germans. I'm not prone to German wank, but I'm also not buying the idea the Germans won JUST because the French sucked unless it can be backed up with some solid evidence.

-Gunhead

[Sea Skimmer]

No, statistically the leading cause of death for tanks throughout the entire war was AP shot fired from anti tank guns, unless you're lumping in AT weapons *with* infantry. Depending on the period of the war we're talking about here, field guns or other tanks came next. Infantry were very low on the food chain until relevant anti tank weapons showed up like the Panzerfaust. Even then, infantry were not the leading cause of death for armor. Airplanes barely even register on a percentage of tank kills throughout the entire war. I don't have exact figures but i'd wager less than 5%. The effect of airplanes on tanks during the war has been wholly overblown.

Statistically everyone but the UK issued anti tank guns to the infantry. The British gave them to the Royal Artillery, but from 1942 onward they crept into the infantry in every greater numbers until it was about a 2:1 ratio in favor of the artillery. The US also had some of its AT guns in the absurdly stupid Tank Destroyer Command which was its own service branch. Some nations fielded both infantry and artillery operated anti tank guns, such as the French gave the main 25mm anti tank gun to the infantry, while a divisional artillery regiment was to have a small (eight) 47mm anti tank guns to defend the rest of the artillery but this was not typical. The Soviets ultimately began using all field artillery and most medium artillery as anti tank weapons, but the balance of the war heavily favors the infantry as the anti tank gun operators. In German hands things could get complicated because the famous 88mm flak guns were owned by the Luftwaffe but often ended up in infantry hands. Infantry with anti tank weapons and counter mobility obstacles were incredibly hard to defeat with an armored attack, then and now, because no matter how much firepower you have its very hard to locate them as targets until they've already done a fair bit of shooting at you.

Bullshit. This is a blanket statement that's flat out impossible. Unless you really think a guy walking is going to outrun an armored vehicle. It's true many tanks historically were overrun by infantry, because those tanks had suffered engine or transmission failure and had been abandoned there by their unit. This was not a regular event though.

Infantry not in a prepared position are easy to overrun; but yeah too sweeping of a statement.

No it's not. Why do you think the caliber of high velocity guns steadily increased during the war? Field guns are indeed very economic...so long as we're talking about a gun in the 30-50mm range. Once you get to around 75mm and on the gun starts to get so heavy it needs a specialized transport to move it around. The Flak 36 itself cost roughly as much as a light tank. Once you throw in a tractor needed to tow it around plus setup time you might as well just build a fucking tank.

The Flak 36 also weighed about as much as a light tank at 5 metric tons, but was undoubtedly a far more effective anti tank assets then anything of comparable mass. Meanwhile the smallest tanks to actually mount a comparable gun are in the 45 short ton range. No, those are not the same cost as a towed anti tank gun, they are much more expensive and easier for the enemy to knock out of action on the attack because they are much larger targets if they get stuck in a defensive position instead of employing mobility.

Horseshit. Tanks didn't lose the battle for economy, they *won* it. Why do you think we replaced field guns with ATGMs?

Why do you think tank fleets around the world are dropping like crazy in numbers? Economical they are not. Anti tank missiles are a vastly more economical means of destroying tanks, since they are not only much smaller and much cheaper, the heavier ones also have much greater effective ranges. He is also completely correct that anti tank guns were far harder to spot from the air, and once spotted for that matter an artillery piece in a hole was damn hard to knock out. Today the best anti tank weapons are missile firing helicopters or artillery firing smart submunitions. The tank is hamstrung by the limited range of its direct fire gun.

Top armor of most tanks is indeed thin, too thin to stop a shell or an anti tank weapon fired from, say, a rooftop. But most airplanes during the war were armed with with weapons 20mm or less which won't do shit to the top armor of most tanks. You also have to remember that planes attack at an angle. Attacking straight down is very, very impractical. So the weakness of thin top armor is really overblown.

Given a proper anti tank weapon aircraft were very very deadly against tanks. Rockets and bombs didn't work well, but weapons like the German 37mm and Russian 23mm guns racked up endless tank kills and put any vehicle in the war at risk. The performance of the guns is considerably enhanced by the velocity of the aircraft adding to the velocity of cannon. Aircraft also simply exercised an enormous constraining influence on armor operations by easily tracking tank movements and constantly attacking the lines of communication. The US Army made a great sport of destroying specific German tanks with air spotted indirect fire artillery as well.

This is such a simplistic blanket statement.

As opposed to your non statement? The ability of tanks to concentrate and disperse rapidly is indeed the great advantage they have. They concentrate at the decisive point, and move before the enemy, theoretically, can mass his own forces against them, particularly artillery. However modern improvements have undermined this advantage and so they've undermined the place of truly massed tanks in warfare as they enjoyed for about sixty years of the 20th century.

:

So anti tank guns are everywhere today and most tanks still use low velocity guns right? Complete other way around. Tanks became the primary means for which to fight *other* tanks. Look at literally every tank designed from 1945 to today and tell me you really think tanks are a "second rate" means to fight other tanks.

You are confusing design with actual use and combat. Of course everyone began designing tanks to fight other tanks, this doesn't change the fact that other weapons are in fact more economical means of doing so, particularly in defensive operations for which tanks are often poorly suited because they are too obvious and better held back for a counter attack. The tank is at its best when it is NOT fighting enemy tanks. Its best when its exploiting its agility and firepower to destroy everything else and rapidly tear up the enemy rear. Air power in the gulf war destroyed half the Iraqi tank fleet before the ground war even started. That makes Coalition tanks, the best in the world at the time, second rate out of hand because they didn't destroy the other half alone. 144 US A-10s alone destroyed over a thousand Iraqi tanks. The Germans were so damn successful in WW2 because they realized early in the war that the best tactics directly integrated tanks and anti tank weapons, using the tanks to defend anti tank guns which were aggressively pushed forward, then massacred enemy tanks when they moved to engage the more obvious German tanks.

Which had a lot more to do with the fact that the Ferdinand was a piece of shit, and everyone except Hitler knew it. It wasn't even armed with a fucking machine gun.

Neither were US tank destroyers before the M18 for that matter or a number of Russian assault guns, but the Ferdinand did prove incredibly deadly on the defensive. The Germans using them in the first wave of the norther half of the offensive at Kursk just never made a lick of sense. Very poor tactics will lead to the defeat of even the best designs.

[Sea Skimmer]

My sources seem to indicate that the Allies slightly outnumbered the Germans, and had superior training and equipment, except for radios and airplanes, and that the Fall of France hinged on the luck of Guderian's losses from his armoured divisions hitting on a superior ratio of infantry to armour for effective combined arms operations, and chancing across an opening in the lines during a shift in the French forces.

Comments on either the suppositions or the veracity of our sources are welcome.

Raw manpower was nearly equal, though the rapid collapse of the Dutch quickly slanted things against the allies.

The Allies on the balance had more firepower, mainly in the form of considerably greater artillery firepower in both number of tubes and caliber. The Germans had plainly superior infantry weapons, tactics and organization. On the topic of tanks, allied tanks ended to have heavier armor and heavier guns, as well as superior numbers, however many allied tanks had only two man crews, all of the heavy French designs had only two man turrets, and organization was bad and largely non existent above the battalion level. The Dutch and Belgian tanks were too scattered to even register, and the vast majority of French tanks were spread around in single battalions attached to infantry divisions with no training or command structure for anything but a direct infantry support role. This was a problem, because while the Germans mostly had weak Panzer II tanks, they mixed them in with the more effective types to balance out the effectiveness in large units. The lighter tanks acted as reconnaissance assets (explode and you found the enemy) and helped suppress infantry and defend anti tank weapons even if they were totally useless against allied tanks themselves.

The same was not done with French tanks. Instead the French had specific tanks for specific roles, and so for example the three French light mechanized divisions had large numbers of the relatively good S35 tanks, while you had endless infantry divisions with nothing battalions of crappy light tanks spread across the entire front. Such battalions were naturally defeated in detail; though when something approaching equivalent battles took place like Battle of Gembloux they could be quite effective. That battle is worth looking up, some good stuff exists on the web for it now, as it shows what the allies could do when planning had not completely screwed them. Though in the end the French units had to retreat anyway as the battle washed around them. Even then the Germans lost about 50% of the airborne troops and troop carrier aircraft.

Many allied troops were well trained at a specific job, but combined arms training was inferior, almost completely lacking for the British (this is why they would do so badly in the Desert War), while the Dutch and Belgians lacked any serious armored forces at all and had only feeble air power. That kind of ruled out proper combind arms out of hand, and they also had generally poor training and very heavy reliance on reservists. The Dutch also just kind of collapsed from within because the German air assault was such an unprecedented and unexpected event and paralyzed them beyond its true strength.

Importantly allied training did not include large scale use of armor in anything but a few French light mechanized (light meant mobile, not lightly equipped) and recently formed armored divisions which were in any case significantly smaller then Panzer divisions and lacking in enough infantry or artillery to be truly comparable. The best allied divisions were the three French light mechanized divisions, only two of which had been fully trained, but these were grouped in a cavalry corps on the extreme left allied flank charged with advancing all the way into Holland…. so they basically spent the entire campaign advancing and then retreating. Moving that one corps to the allied center could actually change the whole battle, because it’s the only unit the allies had that remotely matched one of the three German Panzer corps. However its speed and firepower was seen as the best allied chance to prevent a Dutch collapse from a conventional invasion.

The French army meanwhile had very well designed infantry divisions but lacked the weapons to fully equip them, anti tank guns in particular were in short supply along with anti aircraft weapons which barely existed. The divisions covering the Ardennes had neither but still held up the Germans for several days. Moral was questionable in some units, and leadership often poor. Motivation was not what it should have been, and not helped by the battle plan which was basically (run from this ditch to another unknown ditch of inferior Belgian make). However the French solider was no coward and its doubtful that these factors were really all that important. Certainly the scale of French losses were not small, over 200,000 killed in action.

The German won because they had a much better plan, and held a major reserve. German forces were massed at the decisive point with all types of arms including large scale use of air power for battlefield support (though not so much close air support as is often supposed), and success was heavily reinforced. The allies were meanwhile dispersed as possible, willingly gave up the advantage of prepared positions in favor of an advance into Belgium (which had failed to do really serious work on its promised fortification belt) and had no strategic reserves; and really not even any serious reserves at all at any level. In short, allied combat power was squandered, and the economy of force measures required where simply not exercised.

The ridiculous failure of the French high command counted for far more then any German advantage in organization or weapons like having a radio receiver, but not transmitter, on every tank. The allies could have had a strong chance of stopping a German offensive in far as simple raw numbers of counts of equipment go, but not with anything like the plan they actually carried out. As it was the Germans could have been worse prepared and still have probably won a massive victory anyway. However it is also worth considering that the German High Command itself through the entire Ardennes attack was pushing forward to rapidly, and ordered Rommel to stop his division several times, orders which he ignored. It would have taken a long German delay though to change the basic situation.

Edit: This is worth looking at on Gembloux to give a feel for how combat really went when German and French units met on similar terms; but take it with a grain of salt since it was written on the pro French side of writing.
http://www.tarrif.net/wwii/pdf/DL%20-%2 ... mbloux.pdf

[CaptHawkeye]

That misses the point - every great victory depends on the inncompetence of the losers.

Yeah, its like saying 'you only won because I fucked up'. That's what war is about.

A better way to say it would be along of the lines of "The Allies really weren't prepared for war because they hadn't spent the last half a decade obsessing over a new one." Don't get me wrong the Allies lost and that's that.

[Zinegata]

Almost by definition, an army fighting in 1939 will be equipped with "30s era" designs. Isn't the question whether the design is good or bad by '30s standards, then?

I may have worded it poorly; but what I meant to say is that the majority of the German tank fleet in 1939 were still tanks like the 35t, 38t, and the Panzer II - which couldn't really be upgraded to fight 40s era tanks like the T-34. So if their tank development was just a little late and they were forced to just focus on making these existing designs... they could could have been stuck fighting 1940-42 with conversions of 35t and 38t tanks (Hetzer power!).

By contrast, the new designs (Mk III and MK IV) which proved viable for the early 40s period had just begun production; and even then they lucked out that the designers had included provisions for a bigger gun "just in case". If the Mk IV designers had stuck to the brief and produced an infantry support tank that could ONLY take the short 75mm, then the German army would be screwed. Instead, they made the tank a little bigger with future upgrades in mind, and that little fact ended up making the Mk IV the most-produced German tank in spite of its initial intent.

[Sea Skimmer]

You know I think really, it’s worth it to put things in more stark terms then I at least have been using. The allies lost because they never planned to win, very literally. At best they planned to avoid defeat, and had no plans for a bold counter stroke to restore the territory the Germans gained or push back into German soil. The allied goal was to stabilize the lines, and await the completion of rearmament two years into the future. The Germans planned to win decisively and put all effort towards that goal; by nature this meant allied planning was completely reactive to this and meanwhile the Germans also simply made decisions faster and more effectively then Gamelin. Gamelin meanwhile was haunted like the rest of France by her 'victories' of 1914 which he had personally overseen, which saw the French army more then decimated.

[CaptHawkeye]

Yeah the attitude in the West particularly in France was just so cynical and worn out. It didn't matter that they had "won" World War 1. Nobody in France saw it that way.

[Skgoa]

Zinegata: wyh do you persist in writing "Mk III"? "P III" is less keystrokes and less absolutely incorrect.

[Zinegata]

Zinegata: wyh do you persist in writing "Mk III"? "P III" is less keystrokes and less absolutely incorrect.

I'm referring to German tanks anyway (so possible confusion vs similar-era British tanks is minimal), and I like saying Mk III

[Sea Skimmer]

Well, utter hoards of allied period documents call them by Mk numbers.

[Rekkon]

On the subjet of WWII airpower vs. tanks.