Alternative Soviet stratagies on the Eastern Front?

[Vehrec]

So, in a discussion of lesser known parts of the second world war, a friend of mine asserted that Stalin had killed millions of his countrymen for no reason other than to expand the postwar soviet sphere of influence. Leaving aside the fact that this is why wars are fought, he proposed that the soviet union would have been better off holding the line against the Germans and not throwing their warm bodies into the meatgrinder, until the war was over.

So, how bad really were the Soviet casualty figures during the offensives, as opposed to when they were on the defensive, how imperative was it to remove the Nazis from the territory they now held, and just what other strategies might the Soviet union have used, had they not been as interested in expanding their postwar influence (a rather silly stipulation in my opinion, but my friend has no real stomach for realpolitic.)?

[The Big I]

According to the information I have the *soviets lost(KIA or MIA) by year:

1941: 2,993,803
1942: 2,993,536
1943: 1,997,127
1944: 1,412,335
1945: 631,633

IMO if the Soviets just concentrated on heading straight for Germany without trying to "liberate" the rest of Eastern Europe they would have had higher casualities because it would have allowed the Germans to concentrate their army on the main axis of attack the Soviets were using making it a much bloodier attack.


* When Titans clashe by David M . Glantz and Jonathan House p292 Table A.

[K. A. Pital]

The Big I is right. Ignoring Nazi satellites would've been idiotic since those nations were brimming with German soldiers, effectively serving as a part of the Nazi reich. That's utterly stupid and would undermine the whole war against Germany.

Losses of the last year of the war were small compared to those when the USSR regained it's proper territory.

[spaceviking]

The "liberated" territories were also an important source of new conscripts, Russia manpower was not limitless.

[K. A. Pital]

The "liberated" territories were also an important source of new conscripts, Russia manpower was not limitless.

Romanians, Finns and others started fighting the Nazis when they switched side, too. So it was an important addition in the last days of the war. How can you ignore Axis satellites anyway? They were actively participating in the war with their units and forces (e.g. Romanians, Hungarians); they sent Hitler natural resources and military hardware.

It's pathetically idiotic - World War II wasn't just a war between Russia and Germany. There was a ton of smaller powers on Germany's side which actively fought Russia. Why should the USSR have "ignored" them is totally beyond me.

[PeZook]

And the moral argument doesn't hold water, either: the Soviet advance prevented the total and utter annihilation of Poland, for example. Yeah, Poland fell under Soviet sphere of influence, communism, Stalinist dictatorship repressions yadda yadda yadda, but they didn't try to murder everyone. Not to mention captured Soviet territories where the SS rampaged unchecked.

So...holding the line and/or ignoring Nazi satellites would've been both strategically unwise and morally reprehensible, since the Nazis would've continued their merry little extermination plan to its conclusion. The millions of dead soldiers prevented a humanitarian catastrophe of even greater proportions than historically.

[Vehrec]

The Big I is right. Ignoring Nazi satellites would've been idiotic since those nations were brimming with German soldiers, effectively serving as a part of the Nazi reich. That's utterly stupid and would undermine the whole war against Germany.

Losses of the last year of the war were small compared to those when the USSR regained it's proper territory.

Yeah, this is pretty much what I thought. Letting the Nazi's keep what they had taken and just digging in WW1 style until the Americans won the war for them would have been even more idiotic I suppose.

[Thanas]

Yeah, this is pretty much what I thought. Letting the Nazi's keep what they had taken and just digging in WW1 style until the Americans won the war for them would have been even more idiotic I suppose.

It would. For one, if Germany is free to move forces around at will, it is not a given the Allies will be able to defeat Germany on the western front. Even more problematic is that this will allow the Germans to use the higher mobility of the forces to achieve local superiority and thus make offensives like the 1942 advance that culminated in the battle of Stalingrad.

[Stuart]

So, in a discussion of lesser known parts of the second world war, a friend of mine asserted that Stalin had killed millions of his countrymen for no reason other than to expand the postwar soviet sphere of influence. Leaving aside the fact that this is why wars are fought, he proposed that the soviet union would have been better off holding the line against the Germans and not throwing their warm bodies into the meatgrinder, until the war was over.

Nobody has ever won a war by defending themselves. That's a very general rule and it has exceptions but by and large it hold much truth within it. Another way of saying the same things is that wars are won by Departments of War and lost by Departments of Defense. The suggested "strategy" (it isn't actually a strategy, more an excuse not to have a strategy) leaves all the initiative in the German's hands and that is a very dangerous place to leave it. Also, it fails to achieve the true objective of WW2 in EuroRussia which was to engage, pin down and destroy the German Army. That essential objective was achieved by the Russian Army and no amount of protests from the other allies will change that cold, hard fact.

In WW2 it is striking that all the really massive losses were caused by encirclements. Using Ericsson's Road To Berlin as a source, it's apparent that the real destruction of the German Army took place when their front caved in and their infantry couldn't retreat faster than a T-34 could advance (boy were tank-riders a tactical innovation that paid off big). Therefore, had the Russian Army just sat in its defenses and fought of German attacks, the destruction of the German Army would not have taken place.

So, how bad really were the Soviet casualty figures during the offensives, as opposed to when they were on the defensive, how imperative was it to remove the Nazis from the territory they now held, and just what other strategies might the Soviet union have used, had they not been as interested in expanding their postwar influence (a rather silly stipulation in my opinion, but my friend has no real stomach for realpolitic.)?

Assuming the Russians were prepared to sit on their backsides and wait to be rescued (which seems very unRussian to me), the Germans could have held their front line with significantly fewer forces. As they consolidated that line, they could have built enough fortifications to allow further consolidation and pulled more troops out. These would have then constituted a strategic reserve that would have made major differences to the fighting in Western Europe. In effect, the burden of destroying the German Army would have fallen on the Anglo-American forces and they would have incurred the casualties necessary for that task. That could easily equate to a million or so U.S. dead and that sort of death toll would have chilling post-war effects. In fact, it brings us back to the concept of a massive nuclear strike aimed at Germany.

The other problem is that, even if the German Army is defeated by the Anglo-American forces in Western Europe (or its air power equivalent, a massive nuclear blow that destroys Germany), these leave the German forces in Russia untouched. So, Russia has to be liberated anyway, only this time it has to be done using pre-prepared assaults on heavily-defended defensive regions. That will be even more costly than the great offensives that destroyed the German Army were and would last much longer.

[Elfdart]

Another thing to keep in mind is that Stalin would have been a cretin if he had decided to dig in and let the other allies do most of the fighting:

1) He didn't trust FDR or Churchill.
2) There was no guarantee that the other allies would make up the difference.
3) It gives Hitler freedom to move men and equipment however he wanted to.

The idea is ridiculous. Even rope-a-dope strategy entails going on the offensive.

[Zinegata]

Much of Germany's oil supply also came from the Axis Satellite states (especially Romania). Taking these resources away from the German war machine made sound strategic sense, especially with the other major supply of oil (synthetic oil) being bombed regularly by the Americans.

[TC27]

I dunno - avoid some of the stupid stand and fight orders in '41 could have being replaced by trading space for time and keeping more forces intact - though perhaps the sacrifices kept German forces busy West of Moscow until Winter kicked in (especially enticing Hitler to go for encirclement in the Ukraine instead of an early attack on Moscow).

Operationally I dont think the Soviets got much wrong from Stalingrad onwards - even in Kharkov 43'....theres plenty to cricise regarding tactics ETC but thats a different question

The other problem is that, even if the German Army is defeated by the Anglo-American forces in Western Europe

Moot point anyway as there's no way the Western Allies would have beaten the Germans on the ground (even if the mythical Stephen Ambrose super GI's had existed) if the critical mass had not being otherwise engaged on the Eastern front.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Having a sensible retreat policy in 1941 inspired by Barclay de Tolly's willingness to abandon everything to preserve the army until Napoleon was weak enough to be brought to battle, which largely succeeded even though he was overruled (which led to Borodino), would certainly have saved very large numbers of Soviet troops from encirclement and capture without materially altering the depth of the German offensives; however, it's important to note that even in the Kiev encirclement the Soviet troops fought extremely hard and bought precious time for the Union, the same is true at Odessa and of course Sebastopol held out an absurdly long period of time. What I'm saying is that those trips will have to be committed later to deal with the Germans who were not lost in their historic defeats; there will have to be battles to bring the German offensives to a halt, and they will have to be won.

[TC27]

Having a sensible retreat policy in 1941 inspired by Barclay de Tolly's willingness to abandon everything to preserve the army until Napoleon was weak enough to be brought to battle, which largely succeeded even though he was overruled (which led to Borodino), would certainly have saved very large numbers of Soviet troops from encirclement and capture without materially altering the depth of the German offensives; however, it's important to note that even in the Kiev encirclement the Soviet troops fought extremely hard and bought precious time for the Union, the same is true at Odessa and of course Sebastopol held out an absurdly long period of time. What I'm saying is that those trips will have to be committed later to deal with the Germans who were not lost in their historic defeats; there will have to be battles to bring the German offensives to a halt, and they will have to be won.

As I said the Kiev encirclement probaly saved Moscow in '41 (in so far as Hitler wasnt able to resist doing it) though at the cost of hundreds of thousands of men and alot of equipment....the scale of the losses on the Eastern front are simply staggering and the Russian altitude towards human life is quite alien to a Westerner.

nb - I think on balance Bordino can probaly be seen as a Russian victory though standing there was a mistake - if Napoleon had being anywhere near his A game that day he could have bagged the main Russian fields army.

[Iosef Cross]

So, in a discussion of lesser known parts of the second world war, a friend of mine asserted that Stalin had killed millions of his countrymen for no reason other than to expand the postwar soviet sphere of influence. Leaving aside the fact that this is why wars are fought, he proposed that the soviet union would have been better off holding the line against the Germans and not throwing their warm bodies into the meatgrinder, until the war was over.

While I am not exactly a fan of Stalin's regime, I think that destroying the Nazi empire was the correct route of action, considering the interests of the state. In the long run they were a threat to the USSR and even if they stopped attacking in the present, they would attack in the future.

So, how bad really were the Soviet casualty figures during the offensives, as opposed to when they were on the defensive, how imperative was it to remove the Nazis from the territory they now held, and just what other strategies might the Soviet union have used, had they not been as interested in expanding their postwar influence (a rather silly stipulation in my opinion, but my friend has no real stomach for realpolitic.)?

Well, if they didn't want to expand their postwar influence, they would have to stop advancing by mid 1944 and propose peace terms to Germany. That way they could get rid of the responsibility of becoming a superpower after the war. They could cut about 4-5 million casualties, from their 29 million number.

However, if they stopped putting pressure on the Wehrmacht in the east, the Germans would easily be able to reallocate 150 divisions to fight the western allies. That would multiply the size of the forces available to the Germans in the western front by around 3 times, with the probable consequence of the survival of the Nazi held western european empire, and the continued thread to world peace and the lives of dozens of millions of people.

[PeZook]

Add up the eventual mass nuking of Nazi Germany and genocide plans continuing undisturbed, and the whole thing could've been much, much worse than historically.

[K. A. Pital]

They could cut about 4-5 million casualties

Only ~2 million of the 26-27 odd. If it made that much difference, the question wouldn't be so clear cut.

[Iosef Cross]

They could cut about 4-5 million casualties

Only ~2 million of the 26-27 odd. If it made that much difference, the question wouldn't be so clear cut.

I mean 4-5 million casualties in terms of death, wounded or killed. The Red Army lost 29 million men death, wounded or killed. They also lost 26.6 million deaths, civilian and military. Of course, since the bulk of their civilian losses were in 1941-1942-1943, to stop their 1944-45 advances wouldn't decrease significantly their proportion of killed, but would mostly reduce the number of military wounded.

Of course, I agree that in 1944-45, they shouldn't stop advancing.

[Stuart]

Add up the eventual mass nuking of Nazi Germany and genocide plans continuing undisturbed, and the whole thing could've been much, much worse than historically.

This is the key consideration; if the Germans do any better than historically, it ends up much, much worse for them. The decision to substitute Japan for Germany as the prime nuclear target was taken sometime between August and October 1944 (I've spent years looking for the written memo that changed priority and I've never found it. I'm beginning to believe there never was a written decision). So, if the Soviets had simply dug in and waited, they'd have been a lot further east when teh hammer fell and that puts them in a much weaker position postwar. Stalin was thinking as much postwar as during-war and that is, in my opinion, makes him the most effective of the allied WW2 leaders.

[Medic]

Add up the eventual mass nuking of Nazi Germany and genocide plans continuing undisturbed, and the whole thing could've been much, much worse than historically.

This is the key consideration; if the Germans do any better than historically, it ends up much, much worse for them. The decision to substitute Japan for Germany as the prime nuclear target was taken sometime between August and October 1944 (I've spent years looking for the written memo that changed priority and I've never found it. I'm beginning to believe there never was a written decision). So, if the Soviets had simply dug in and waited, they'd have been a lot further east when teh hammer fell and that puts them in a much weaker position postwar. Stalin was thinking as much postwar as during-war and that is, in my opinion, makes him the most effective of the allied WW2 leaders.

Heh, funny you mention that; plenty of American leaders were, just not at the level of POTUS, his cabinet or Congress. No lesser than the war chiefs in the Army Air Force's absolutely viewed the war against Japan as having an importance long into their own future, or so I read in Max Hastings' Retribution. Knowing how quickly it took for them to become an independent branch after the war and then become the near sole guarantor of American national security in SAC's heyday, I'd say they were quite right in persecuting the bombing campaign to the extent they did, up to and including Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Not like they had any choice though. They were chained to industrial decisions years before, AWPD-42, and Germany was at the plans fruition, clearly circling the drain. So B-29's descended (luckily) upon Japan, not Germany.