StarDestroyer.Net BBS

Well, the pertinent point is that by 1947 at the latest the Royal Navy will have commissioned 13 modern fleet carriers--Ark Royal, 4 Illustriouses, 4 Implacables, 4 Audaciouses, as well as 4 Unicorn class support carriers (one per every four fleet carriers in service); having started with Courageous, Glorious, and Furious; and still having around Eagle, Hermes, and Argus for ancillary duties. At the same time 18 modern battleships will have been put into service.

Against this building effort the Japanese will have completed seven battleships at most--all of them Yamato-class, but still barely more than a third of the Royal Navy's numbers. Five is much more likely. The Japanese were never actually planning a new battlecruiser until the US was found to be planning one to counter the one they thought Japan was building--heh--so that's that. In carriers the Japanese would be better off, with Taiho the prototype to a series of very powerful and effective armoured-deck carrier designs based on her. But even the height of those Japanese plans envisioned only 8 ships of the Taiho series (Taiho, two improved ships, five yet further improved ships) and three Unryu-class. That's not enough of an advantage to be really decisive (especially since we have to include the two Joffre-class carriers of the MN as well, and possibly a third follow-on), and all of these plans are going to be affected even without the bombing campaign by the unrestricted submarine warfare of the RN and MN, which have better submarines than the US and collectively more than the US by a fair margin.

Correction: Only one ship of the Unryu class was planned, not three.

The South China sea isn't exactly an ideal place for a carrier war either, even the US was very reluctant to send Task Force 58 into it after the Philippines fell. Land based air power will come to heavily favor the French and British. Japanese carriers have zero hope operating under the umbrella of serious numbers of enemy land based aircraft. They just never had the radar or fighter direction skills or anti aircraft batteries to do it and this is all highly unlikely to change.

How do the new UK BBs stack up against the Yamatos? Because I can't see the KGV class having much hope.

Thanas wrote:How do the new UK BBs stack up against the Yamatos? Because I can't see the KGV class having much hope.

The problem is that you have-at best--seven Yamatos steaming into battle against 18 modern Royal Navy battleships by the time this is done. Now all these ships won't be done at the same time and over the course of the war it's likely that many on both sides will be lost, but the Royal Navy has more than two and a half battleships for each one sailing under the Rising Sun. In older battleships the odds are closer, but you have only two fast battleships in the IJN to make the odds better, and four battlecruisers; the British have three much better ones and a great host of functional older ships, which is again very painful -- Two Nelsons, five Queen Elizabeths, and possibly Royal Oak against four very marginal "turret farms" with weak armour and plenty of magazines.

Now, add in the Marine Nationale and the odds only get worse -- Three ships of the Richelieu class, Gascogne with the same armament but one turret aft, and four ships of the Alsace class with 9 x 15in guns in three triple turrets and improved armour, speed, secondaries. Also Strasbourg and Dunkerque, so we have eight more modern battleships and two more battlecruisers, as well as two to three fleet carriers and a training carrier, to reinforce the Royal Navy. Over the course of the war, from 1941 - 1947 say, the IJN will be ultimately facing 3-to-1 odds in battleships. Odds will be essentially even in carriers, but at least while fighting defensively land-based air around Singapore and southeast Asia generally will be much more important.

It is a big problem that the allied guns are ineffective against Yamatos armor outside about 15,000 yards, but then that's basically how Jutland was fought and the allied ships are not at all badly off in protection either. All the more so when considering the Japanese Type 91 diving shells performed so poorly in general, and that Yamato while the most thickly armored battleship, also had one of the smallest armored envelopes.

Meanwhile the Yamato class cannot move ammunition between between the rotating and fixed portion of the magazine in action, so they only have 60 rounds per gun to fight with in any given battle. Then the turrets must remain in a fixed position while the reserve ammo is moved into the rotating structure. Very bad when outnumbered (major flaw in a ship meant to fight superior numbers!), while the allies will have a serious radar advantage and most likely seek a night action. Yamato was meant to beat two US standard type battleships, not much reason to assume she'd be able to take on two much newer, and somewhat larger ships. Yamato is big, but she certainly wasn't better ton for ton then other nations ships.

What was probably hoped for with Yamato was that just one or two hits from the 18.1in shells (preferably below the waterline) would be enough to send most battleships packing. So if everything worked out right, Yamato would be able to get at least that number of hits on a target per 60 shells. Force enemy ships in the line to disengage, and maybe actually try to sink any of the ones that get separated or crippled. The Japanese were certainly helped by the fact that none of their enemies had a clue about the details of Yamato's design.

The whole class stank of blind optimism though.

Thanas wrote:How do the new UK BBs stack up against the Yamatos? Because I can't see the KGV class having much hope.

As pointed out above me the Yamato's would be outnumbered. So from what I've read elsewhere, even if a KGV, etc, couldn't sink a Yamato outright, there would be enough volume of fire to put the rangefinders, etc, out of action. Then it comes down to how much torpedoes do the British destroyers need to fire to put it under.

CaptHawkeye wrote:What was probably hoped for with Yamato was that just one or two hits from the 18.1in shells (preferably below the waterline) would be enough to send most battleships packing. So if everything worked out right, Yamato would be able to get at least that number of hits on a target per 60 shells. Force enemy ships in the line to disengage, and maybe actually try to sink any of the ones that get separated or crippled. The Japanese were certainly helped by the fact that none of their enemies had a clue about the details of Yamato's design.

The whole class stank of blind optimism though.

Getting 2 hits out of 60 shells is pretty optimistic if we use Jutland as a measure.

I don't think the Japanese could have seriously believed that only two hits, even only two successful diving strikes, would knock even USS Oklahoma out of action. That would be a very risky assumption.

Well i'm speculating to an extent but the limits of the design make me wonder if Yamato was more just meant to break an enemy line up and *then* pick off stragglers or cripples. At 27 knots she would be comfortably able to outrun the Standard Types in any condition. The 60 round limit becomes less of a problem if Yamato closes the distance to a US battle line rapidly.

Who knows though? I'd buy the ship being expected to get into shelling slugfests and little else. They were designed almost exclusively with the lessons of Jutland in mind. Though that makes the limit SS just pointed out a pretty ridiculous problem. The Japanese might well had been better off with 16in guns but sanity wasn't exactly prevailing in the military.

60 rpg, not total.

So that makes 180 shells per turret, and the Yamato had three triple turrets so...540 shells? Correct?


That makes things a bit better for the Super-Battleships. Though they are still outnumbered.

With 540 shells you're likely to score some hits, yes- the British hit rate at Jutland was about 3%, we can use that as a baseline, and fifteen 18" shell hits would probably do a pretty good job of hammering any battleship ever made.

Thanas wrote:How do the new UK BBs stack up against the Yamatos? Because I can't see the KGV class having much hope.

...how? Again, Yamato is resistant to fire - but then again, so what? One good hit on superstructure, not even directly at the top, and main targeting array is out of action. Yamato can't match Allied radar targeting with its main optics, good luck doing it with turret ones. Then, unless the Japanese score lucky hit in return, it's just matter of pumping enough shells into it so it can be torpedoed/bombed at allied leisure. Can't be too hard with 3:1 advantage, Yamato is not all invulnerable armour, and it's going to be slower than new Allied BBs so it can't even close the gap.

Just look at Bismarck, armour kept it afloat but in state allowing UK battleships to actually use torpedoes at that point.

Simon_Jester wrote:With 540 shells you're likely to score some hits, yes- the British hit rate at Jutland was about 3%, we can use that as a baseline, and fifteen 18" shell hits would probably do a pretty good job of hammering any battleship ever made.

At Jutland, both sides had used the exact same equipment. If one side will fire from beyond visual range, the other trying to match it blindly is going to have much worse results than 3%, IHMO.

Irbis wrote:Just look at Bismarck, armour kept it afloat but in state allowing UK battleships to actually use torpedoes at that point.

You mean the cruisers I think. Regardless I suspect that any big naval surface battle will involve lots of torpedoes.

Zinegata wrote:

Irbis wrote:Just look at Bismarck, armour kept it afloat but in state allowing UK battleships to actually use torpedoes at that point.

You mean the cruisers I think. Regardless I suspect that any big naval surface battle will involve lots of torpedoes.

HMS Rodney fired its torpedoes at Bismark. IIRC its the only battleship to have hit another with torps.

Ah. I was thinking of Dorcertshire when it comes to Bismarck getting torpedoed. My bad.

Irbis wrote:

Simon_Jester wrote:With 540 shells you're likely to score some hits, yes- the British hit rate at Jutland was about 3%, we can use that as a baseline, and fifteen 18" shell hits would probably do a pretty good job of hammering any battleship ever made.

At Jutland, both sides had used the exact same equipment. If one side will fire from beyond visual range, the other trying to match it blindly is going to have much worse results than 3%, IHMO.

I was talking more about the design logic- the idea makes sense; 60 rounds per gun would probably be enough for Yamato to put an enemy ship out of action at reasonable engagement ranges. For the definition of 'reasonable' used by her creators.

As to the range concern, that becomes more of an issue the longer the war drags out. Radar-guided gunnery was good but not perfect, and it had limitations of its own in those days. So "shooting from far beyond visible range..." I don't know how practical that would really be in a major battleship action.

Just a question, but how fast can Britain and France send its naval force to the East Indies and how long would they wait before doing so? It just strikes me that Britain and France wouldnt have as much confidence in their economic power as the USA and might send in units too early.


And Britain cant afford any major losses to the Japanese in terms of Carrier power. I also assume that if Britain goes forward into the conflict with more focus on Battleships and not Carrier operations, that the first battle or two would be strongly if not lopsidedly in Japan's favor.


My theory is that, for the quickest end to the war, that it would actually be beneficial for Britain and France to send in Battleship centric fleets with insufficient air support and get clobbered early on. That way, some of its Battleships to be laid down are changed to Carriers to lay down.


But if Britain and France wait until 1943 or later to go head on with the Japanese, I forsee a horrible slaughter happening.


What is the position of the US? Neutral and selling to both?

Dominarch's Hope wrote:Just a question, but how fast can Britain and France send its naval force to the East Indies and how long would they wait before doing so? It just strikes me that Britain and France wouldnt have as much confidence in their economic power as the USA and might send in units too early.

Based on the Singapore strategy, depends on where the fleet is stationed. If stationed at the Mediterran as expected, anywhere from 35-70 days. The French has a small naval force in IndoChina and a base, but any defence strategy was disrupted with the fall of the homeland.

If anything, based on extant communications from the French colonial office, their weakness forced them to make a much more realistic assumption of what the Japanese were capable of doing.

And Britain cant afford any major losses to the Japanese in terms of Carrier power. I also assume that if Britain goes forward into the conflict with more focus on Battleships and not Carrier operations, that the first battle or two would be strongly if not lopsidedly in Japan's favor.

Which war? The British strategy........ depending on which officer had won the faction war would had been to bomb Japan or "blockade" it. There was never an intention to win a decisive fleet battle, other than fleet actions needed to defend and secure the blockade of Japan.

How was this to be done? No idea, but the existing comments made by certain RAF officers highlighted how absurd the RAF strategy was.(Yeah, hold Hong Kong with a few squadrons of fighters and bomb Japan with squadrons of Bleinhems is a war winning strategy.)

They would kinda have to destroy Japan's Navy to enforce a blockade. A starvation blockade should have been the preferred strategy if the Atom Bombs hadnt worked. Atleast for about 9 months before Downfall.

Dominarch's Hope wrote:They would kinda have to destroy Japan's Navy to enforce a blockade. A starvation blockade should have been the preferred strategy if the Atom Bombs hadnt worked. Atleast for about 9 months before Downfall.

You have to ask a military historian about that, especially since I'm working off memories of essays that were compiled into a book presented from the Fall of Singapore anniversary as opposed to a research thesis.

I'm just saying that, you know, the Japanese could reach Pearl Harbor and feasibly come back in the same trip. Singapore and such is small potatoes to that.

Calling Singapore small potatoes is pretty much entirely what's wrong with your analysis.