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Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-08-26 07:52am
by MKSheppard
First up, the ever lovable Soviet Union, from
Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden 1940-1945
And here is the Resource output normalized with 1940 production levels as 1.0

Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-01 05:00am
by Thanas
Very impressive.
The soviets really must have loved their artillery. Still, the number of combat aircraft and armored vehicles is astoundingly high. Is there a further breakdown of those, to see what classes/types they produced?
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-02 04:33am
by PeZook
It's interesting to see how production shifted from civilian and semi-civilian items (like shoes) to ridiculously high military output.
It probably corresponds closely to stuff that came in lend-lease shipments.
Also, it's kind of scary how much food production fell during the war: nearly 50% across the board, sometimes more.
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-02 04:45am
by Fingolfin_Noldor
Well, the Germans took over a good swath of the arable land in the Ukraine etc.
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-02 04:51am
by Thanas
I was wondering why fishing remained at such a high level - maybe Stas can answer this?
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-02 04:58am
by PeZook
Tea also slumped after Barbarossa, but quickly got back up to 18-20 thousand tonnes. It's clearly an important strategic product...after all, the staff and combat units often run on it

Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-02 08:14am
by MKSheppard
Thanas wrote:I was wondering why fishing remained at such a high level - maybe Stas can answer this?
Remember, that the Soviet Union retained control over the black sea (or at least could contest it) well into the war, and had access to the Pacific via Vladviostock -- which led to an amusing turn of events -- Ships loaded with lend lease sailed right through Japanese waters to land at Vladviostock, to unload guns to kill nazis -- a nominal japanese ally.

Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-02 09:22am
by Thanas
Yes, but I would imagine the loss of the fishing in the baltic sea and the significant loss of the black sea territory would have had more of an impact. Likewise with fishing from Murmansk (u-boats, bombers).
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-05 04:57am
by Sea Skimmer
You could say they liked artillery. The Vistula-Oder Offensive was supported by 32,000 guns, mortars and multiple rocket launchers. This figure does not include 6,000 more barrels of 57mm or heavier mounted on the tanks and assault guns of the armored forces. The Nazis only had about 5,000 artillery pieces and tank/assault gun cannon in opposition. However while the Soviets threw together artillery barrages totally without comparison in any other war, they had relatively little ammunition on average. The US Army fired far more rounds per day on average from maybe 1/10th as many gun tubes.
In the fishing, its worth considering that a large portion of Soviet fish would have come from the Caspian Sea, which would have never been directly disrupted either. Since the Soviets had a major food shortage overall it is likely fishing was intensified in the far east and Caspian Sea during the war.
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-05 05:15am
by Thanas
Sea Skimmer wrote:In the fishing, its worth considering that a large portion of Soviet fish would have come from the Caspian Sea, which would have never been directly disrupted either. Since the Soviets had a major food shortage overall it is likely fishing was intensified in the far east and Caspian Sea during the war.
That makes a lot of sense, I had completely forgotten about the Caspian sea.
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-08 08:26am
by Marcus Aurelius
Thanas wrote:Yes, but I would imagine the loss of the fishing in the baltic sea and the significant loss of the black sea territory would have had more of an impact. Likewise with fishing from Murmansk (u-boats, bombers).
The figures might not have the Baltic countries included (annexed in 1940) and even if they are, I doubt the Germans had enough resources after 1942 to hunt fishing boats on the Barents Sea, which would have made fishing from Murmansk at least partially feasible from 1943 on. Then there was the White Sea, which was never under German control or surveillance. Caspian Sea was already mentioned, but the Aral Sea was also very good for fishing before the ill-conceived Soviet irrigation projects that nearly dried it.
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-08 09:04am
by PeZook
The northern U-Boat screen was notoriously underequipped, and the harsh weather made it an especially difficult area for uboat operations, while Condor pilots had trouble attacking large merchant vessels effectively - their only major success was PQ17, and that was only because the convoy scattered out of fear about a capital ship sortie. PQ18 was kind of a success too, but when PQ17 was totally annihilated, PQ18 managed to reach Murmansk. Otherwise, the theater was much less dangerous than the Atlantic.
I doubt the germans actually had any capability to hunt fishing boats when basing out of Norway.
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-08 11:35am
by K. A. Pital
Fishing was intensified everywhere in the remaining Soviet-controlled regions on the order of several times, that's the explanation. Since 1934, the Soviet fishermen operated under restrictions (meant to prevent population depletion and protect wildlife), which were lifted immediately since the onset of the war and fishing volume increased greatly. Even Murmansk kept fishing during the war despite naval action, bringing over 500 000 tons of fish during the whole 1941-1945 period.
Re: Industrio-Military Production of World War II
Posted: 2009-09-08 07:40pm
by Sea Skimmer
PeZook wrote:The northern U-Boat screen was notoriously underequipped, and the harsh weather made it an especially difficult area for uboat operations, while Condor pilots had trouble attacking large merchant vessels effectively - their only major success was PQ17, and that was only because the convoy scattered out of fear about a capital ship sortie. PQ18 was kind of a success too, but when PQ17 was totally annihilated, PQ18 managed to reach Murmansk. Otherwise, the theater was much less dangerous than the Atlantic.
Condors didn't fly missions like that and had gotten entirely out of making direct attacks by 1942. The anti shipping and recon work in Northern Norway was done with the He115 seaplane while it lasted, along with Ju88 and He111 torpedo bombers. It had a major concentration of Do217s for a time as well; probably the only place Germany ever massed that aircraft.
The main problem for the Germans was that it wasn’t that long into the Russian convoy runs that escort carriers appeared throughout the Atlantic theater. The very first one sent to Russia was actually torpedoed and sunk a U-boat on the trip, but subsequent ones survived and did well. Even a handful of Swordfish and Sea Hurricanes made life very hard for U-boat and bomber alike. The Luftwaffe was not able to spare any fighters for escort duties, even though a handful could have done the job.
I doubt the germans actually had any capability to hunt fishing boats when basing out of Norway.
The did; somewhat. They made surface raids with destroyers, and once or twice pocket battleships as far as the Kara Sea (that’s the water body between Novaya Zemlya and Siberia). Such offensive sorties did often not occur because of fuel shortages, but they did sink a number of Russian vessels and laid the most northern naval minefields in history. The Russian northern fleet had only a few old destroyers and little naval air power, so it was unable to oppose these actions. By the time it was reinforced, the German surface fleet had largely gone home or been sunk.