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How the United States Lost the Naval War
of 2015
by James Kraska
James Kraska is a guest investigator at the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution and the former Oceans Policy Adviser for the Director of Strategic Plans & Policy,
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The views presented are those of the author and do not reflect the official
position of the Department of Defense. He may be reached at james.kraska@gmail.com.
Abstract: Years of strategic missteps in oceans policy, naval strategy and a force
structure in decline set the stage for U.S. defeat at sea in 2015. After decades
of double-digit budget increases, the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) was
operating some of the most impressive systems in the world, including a
medium-range ballistic missile that could hit a moving aircraft carrier and
a super-quiet diesel electric submarine that was stealthier than U.S. nuclear
submarines. Coupling this new asymmetric naval force to visionary maritime
strategy and oceans policy, China ensured that all elements of national power
promoted its goal of dominating the East China Sea. The United States, in
contrast, had a declining naval force structured around 10 aircraft carriers
spread thinly throughout the globe. With a maritime strategy focused on lowerorder
partnerships,and anational oceans policy thatdevaluedstrategic interests
in freedom of navigation, the stage was set for defeat at sea. This article recounts
howChina destroyed the USS George Washington in the East China Sea in 2015.
The political fallout from the disaster ended 75 years of U.S. dominance in the
Pacific Ocean and cemented China’s position as the Asian hegemon.
By 2015, U.S. command of the global commons could no longer be
taken for granted. The oceans and the airspace above them had been
the exclusive domain of the U.S. Navy and the nation’s edifice of
military power for seventy-five years. During the age of U.S. supremacy, the
Navy used the oceans as the world’s largest maneuver space to outflank its
enemies. Maritime mobility on the surface of the ocean, in the air and under
the water was the cornerstone of U.S. military power.1 The United States was
able to utilize its maritime dominance to envelop and topple rogue regimes, as
1 Barry Posen, ‘‘Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony,’’
International Security Summer 2003, pp. 5-46.

it demonstrated in Grenada and Panama, and use the maritime commons to
ferry huge ground armies to the other side of the world and sustain them
indefinitely, as it did in Vietnam and twice in Iraq. The unique capability to
project decisive power rapidly in any corner of the world gave the United
States deterrent power and unrivalled military influence.
All that changed in 2015, when the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
USS George Washington, forward-deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, sunk to the
bottom of the East China Sea. More than 4,000 sailors and airmen died and the
Navy lost eighty aircraft. A ship that would take seven years and $ 9 billion to
replace slipped into the waves. The incident upset not just the balance of naval
power in Asia, but ushered in a new epoch of international order in which
Beijing emerged to displace the United States.
Red Sky in Morning—Sailor’s Warning
The warning signs—the series of political, diplomatic and strategic
missteps—had been unfolding for more than two decades. Globalization,
developments in the international law of the sea, and the revolution in military
affairs aided the emergence of China and other new naval powers. Globalization
was a democratizing force among navies. The wealth effect of expanding
trade and rising economies combined with the spread of doctrine, training and
operational art, serving as a force multiplier. The result of globalization was a
vastly improved Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in terms of its force
structure and warfighting skills. The proliferation of advanced weapons
technology helped nations that historically had never exercised naval power
to make generational leaps in precision-guided munitions. Already, a number
of regional states had developed or acquired sophisticated anti-ship cruise
missiles and super-quiet diesel electric submarines armed with sensitive wakehoming
torpedoes.
A collection of unfriendly coastal states had invested heavily in
asymmetric anti-access technologies and strategies to counter the power of
U.S. naval forces. In 1991, Iraq used a mixture of crude pre-World War I
contact navalmines and sophisticatedmagnetic and acoustic influencemines
launched from small rubber boats. The country deployed over 1,100 mines in
the first Gulf War, but most of them were either inoperable or improperly
positioned. Yet Baghdad still reaped success in using mines to secure its
seaside flank off Kuwait City. The USS Tripoli struck a moored contact mine,
which ripped a 16  20 foot cavern below the waterline; hours later, and
despite proceeding with deliberate caution to avoidmines, the USS Princeton
struck a mine that cracked her superstructure and caused severe deck
buckling.2 The Persian Gulf is a relatively small, semi-enclosed body ofwater,
and in narrow seas mines are an effective anti-access weapon. The Pacific

After decades
of double-digit budget increases, the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) was
operating some of the most impressive systems in the world, including a
medium-range ballistic missile that could hit a moving aircraft carrier and
a super-quiet diesel electric submarine that was stealthier than U.S. nuclear
submarines. Coupling this new asymmetric naval force to visionary maritime
strategy and oceans policy, China ensured that all elements of national power
promoted its goal of dominating the East China Sea

I feel like the idea of the US losing any naval war in any future near enough to be predicted at all is really far-fetched. I'm not an expert, but it seems like even over and above our general military dominance, the US really puts a MASSIVE amount more into a combat navy than anyone else. Isn't our naval budget something like "larger than every other country put together and then some?"

I've read articles that a carrier group can't be effectively made immune to nuclear attack from the air, ground-based missiles, or sea (torpedoes) but I'm not sure what CAN, and then we have tons more nukes than anyone else, so attacking a carrier group like that seems strategically a bit...short-sighted.

What exactly does the author want the US Navy to build though? Presumably not more carriers?

Its really just silly how so much focus goes into MY GOD CHINA MIGHT BEAT ONE AIRCRAFT CARRIER! This is 9% of our entire naval carrier strength and 1/50th our fighter force. Life will be much more concerning when China can field multiple carrier battle groups, backed up by modern nuclear subs, then it having an anti ship ballistic missile that costs a fortune per shot. Its going to be further off then 2015 for assets like that to be in service in numbers and fully operational. Personally I kind of worry more about the few US auxiliaries crossing the wide open Pacific being blown away by an anti ship ballistic missile then the carrier decks, operating with protective escorts.

The impression I usually get from essays like these is of an author furiously masturbating over swarms of small "cheap" boats.

I suppose any succesful missile attack against carrier battle group would have to be a saturation attack involving multiple missiles to overcome the missile defence. Maybe a close distance sneak attack may also work if missile is launched against carrier while it transits busy shipping channel from nearby cargo ship so close that it takes only seconds to reach carrier. However would a single missile be enough to sink a carrier?

What if the ASBM is not only intended for use against US? How would say an Indian carrier or surface action group fare?

What if the ASBM is not only intended for use against US? How would say an Indian carrier or surface action group fare?

So the weapons overall value against India is fairly limited. It only really makes sense against the USN in the western Pacific, and in my mind the idea that it would deliver some kind of EMP warhead makes the most sense. Its surely hard to make an effective non nuclear EMP; but if you could deliver such a device directly onto the carriers flight deck it would certainly help.

How far away could it be effective?

Aren't military electronic hardened against such attacks?