StarDestroyer.Net BBS

The plan to destroy Soviet industry on the ground makes sense. The Nazis intended to murder and deport the local populations; so no one will be left alive to run those captured communist factories. Destroying them removes the need to guard them against a resurgent eastern Russia, or import French slave workers to run them. Germanic colonist populations were intended to be primarily agrarian as far as I can tell; and they’d be spread very thin. Primarily Russia would be a source of raw material. The machinery of the destroyed industry would have been hauled back to the slaveworks of the Reich for conversion into battleships to fight America.

Comparable to what?

The line which had like, what - 5 modern fortifications (the Miljoonalinnake). Concrete anti-tank blocks were meant to stop Renault FT-17 tanks; hardly a modern project. The line used 14 520 cubic meters of concrete. In fact, its fortifications were inferior to the most modern ones; so the Soviet command "extolled" the Mannerheim line only because of their own exceptionally bad luck when trying to break through it. And I could go into more detail, if you like, albeit I'm really short on time these days.

Yeah, except only a handful of the 300+ bunkers were artillery - 7 finished according to Soviet documents. 340 were machine-gun bunkers. Another failure to produce an argument.

There were unfinished bunkers captured by the Germans on the old border line. Which means the work was still ongoing.

The mass rearmament of the FRs deemed still worthy for combat was slated for September 1941, actually. I see no reasons that would indicate otherwise.

Volga-Don actually used lots of heavy construction machinery which was ample during late Stalinism. On the other hand, 1939-1941 was still the middle of the third five-year plan, when many projects were done by hand, often with terrific loss of life. I judge the level of advancement of Soviet industry by the numbers of dead at canal construction. Not a fair gauge, but a good gauge when going into all the minutiae statistics is too much of a hassle.

No. Planned economies often waste resources... in black holes. One negative part of a command economy. In any case, that was obviously a necessary spending for a nation that desired to become a modern industrial economy (re: Stalin's 1931 speech to "run the 100 years in 10 years").

I'm sorry, but that's just speculation.

But this is a history forum, is it not? When something does not have solid documental proof, it's for all extents and purposes speculation.

How so? The Soviet forces had reserves. But they were unconcentrated. Once again you fail to provide evidence.

You say there are reports - give me a few, why?

December 27th

По данным агентуры, немцы строят бетонированные укрепления по реке Сан, от Перемышля на запад, протяжением в 140 километров. Такие же укрепления по реке Сан строятся от Перемышля до Ярослава. Вокруг Ярослава устанавливаются цементные противотанковые надолбы.

Около города Кросне строится большой форт. По специально проложенной от станции Кросне жел. дорожной ветке прибывают составы с цементом и другими материалами для строительства этого форта.

January 14th

В пограничной полосе, против участка 93-го погранотряда, немцами продолжается усиленное строительство военных укреплений...

В 30 км севере-восточнее г.Варшавы, в районе железнодорожной линии Варшава – Миньск – Мазовецки, строится пункт противовоздушной обороны.

Кроме этого, там же сооружаются железобетонные укрепления от наземного противника.

February 14th

В шести километрах от г.Клайпеды, справа от шоссейной дороги, ведущей на Байор, закончена постройка железобетонных укреплений.

Также закончена постройка железобетонных укреплений около местечка Занкрук, где уже установлена тяжелая, полевая и зенитная артиллерия.

В селе Журавицы, около кладбища, в первой половине января 1941 года, построен подземный склад боеприпасов, обнесенный проволочным заграждением. В этом же пункте продолжается строительство новых укреплений.

На полях около гор.Санок роются окопы и устанавливаются проволочные заграждения.

На ст.Эйтекун, напротив выходного семафора в сторону ст.Эбенроде, в середине декабря 1940 года начато строительство укреплений. Фронт земляных работ раскинут в юго-западном направлении, протяжением около километра. В ночное время место работ освещается прожекторами.

27 декабря 1940 г. с этой станции в Сувалки отправлен военно-строительный поезд в составе 27 платформ, 13 крытых и 10 классных вагонов. В \658\ классных вагонах помещались солдаты, на платформах были погружены машины, бревна, повозки и груз, закрытый брезентом. Поезд следовал в Сувалки на строительство укреплений.

February 27th

Каких-либо конкретных признаков готовящейся против нас близкой агрессии в моем распоряжении нет, но известно лихорадочное дорожное строительство, оборонительных укреплений и содержание большого количества войск в бывшей Польше.

...

По данным, требующим проверки, в районе Клайпеды, на расстоянии 7 10 километров от советско-германской границы, строится линия укреплений. Железобетонные ДОТ, площадью 30 – 50 кв.метров располагаются на расстоянии 500 метров одна от другой и вооружаются тяжелыми орудиями и пулеметами.

Линия укреплений проходит вокруг г.Клайпеды и вдоль шоссейных дорог Прекуле – Тильзит и Пилькаллен – Кенигсберг.

Каждая из ДОТ обнесена проволочными заграждениями и-охраняется часовыми в форме артиллеристов.

На побережье Балтийского моря от Клайпеды до Паланги устанавливаются батареи тяжелых орудий.

В районе ст.Лауксзарген, на расстоянии 500 метров от границы установлена линия проволочных заграждений. На расстоянии 500 – 600 метров от этой линии установлена вторая линия заграждений.

На ст.Тересполь строится бомбоубежище, на перекрытие которого израсходовано 1400 рельсов. Рельсовое перекрытие покрыто слоем бетона.
На ст.Журавица 10 февраля доставлено три вагона железных столбов четырехугольной формы толщиною 20 см, длиною 3 метра. Предполагается, что эти столбы будут использованы для устройства противотанковых заграждений.

March 11th

Сразу же после выхода в 1939 г. на линию новой границы с СССР германское командование приступило к расширению своих восточно-прусских укреплений, к модернизации и усовершенствованию бывших польских укреплений на территории Генерал-Губернаторства.

По приграничной полосе В.Пруссии.

К 1 марта 1941 г. имелись сведения о следующем количестве законченных строительством ДОТ:

в районе Клайпеда 6 ДОТ

-"- Тильзит 3 "

-"- Пилкаллен 25 "

-"- Сталлюпенен 8

на участке Пшеросль – Рачки 18 "

-"- Лык-Просткен 13 " \758\

Всего же на участке Клайпеда – Рачки, занимающем по фронту около 300 км, отмечено законченных или находящихся в последней стадии строительства 103 ДОТ, в действительности же их, видимо, больше.

На территории Генерал-Губернаторства.

На территории Генерал-Губернаторства к 1 марта 1941 г. отмечено следующее количество оконченных или находящихся в последней стадии строительства ДОТ (железобетонных и дерево-земляных):

в районе Остроленка – до 60

-"- Варшавы – до 140

-"- Демблин (участок Рыни, Куруа) – 83

-"- Аннополь – 7
Итого: ок. 290 ДОТ.

April 9th

Вместе с переброской войск и боеприпасов отмечено также усиленное строительство укреплений, аэродромов и дорог.

В феврале начато строительство линии укреплений Варшава - Модлин, на которой заняты главным образом евреи.

Также развернулось строительство укреплений по линии р.Буг.

В районе железнодорожной линии от ст. Рембертов в направлении г. Седлец отрываются окопы и сооружаются военные укрепления и проволочные заграждения.

April 10th

В юго-западном направлении от г. Рачки над рекой Довстуи на протяжении 2 км проходит линия железобетонных подземных укреплений, которые в настоящее время якобы используются под склады боеприпасов и военного имущества.

На границе Восточной Пруссии с Сувалкским уездом в районе деревень Филиппово и Баколажево, построены цементные и железобетонные подземные укрепления.

От д.Носажево в сторону г.Прасныша на протяжении 18 км вдоль шоссейной дороги Млава - Прасныш строится оборонительная линия шириной 10 \59\ 12 км. На территории этого строительства проведена узкоколейная железная дорога, используемая для подвозки строительных материалов. В этом же районе построено большое количество деревянных бараков, в которых в настоящее время находится свыше 5000 германских солдат. Большая часть этих солдат работает на данном строительстве. Вблизи бараков установлены дальнобойные орудия. Все жители деревень, расположенных в районе этого строительства, отселены.

В одном километре от д.Збуйна, в сосновом лесу, по обе стороны шоссейной дороги, идущей в сторону г. Мышинец, построено 45 -50 цементированных огневых точек длиной 15 - 16 м, шириной 10 м и глубиной 7 м. Каждая с боков и сверху имеет амбразуры и замаскирована дерном и специально посаженными деревьями.

Линия укрепления на подступах к Варшаве проходит от р.Нарев до р. Висла через Струга, фольварк Зенка, ст. Милосна, к истоку р. Свидер. В районе линии укреплений в настоящее время продолжают строиться бетонные артиллерийские точки, пулеметные гнезда, противотанковые заграждения, завалы, подготавливаются для минирования поля.

В казармах крепости Модлин, что в 60 км северо-западнее Варшавы, в трехэтажных зданиях может разместиться дивизия военного времени.

Форты преимущественно современные, замаскированные от наблюдения с воздуха. Вооружение фортов состоит из тяжелых, легких, противотанковых и зенитных орудий и тяжелых пулеметов. В подвалах казарм и фортах находятся большие склады продовольствия и боеприпасов.


April 16th

Одновременно с концентрацией немецких войск немецким командованием производится ускоренное строительство железобетонных укреплений и шоссейных дорог.

В район г.Лиско подвезено много готовых железобетонных гнезд, по слухам, якобы с линии Мажино, с целью установления их вблизи советской границы. В окрестностях г. Санок производится трассировка пулеметных и артиллерийских гнезд, места расположения которых отмечены небольшими столбиками с номерами.

Не исключена возможность, что на местах отмеченных столбиками, будут установлены подвезенные готовые железобетонные гнезда.

April 21st

В те же районы, куда прибывали войска, доставлялось большое количество боеприпасов, горючего и искусственных противотанковых препятствий.

В апреле усилились работы по строительству укрепления. Строительство долговременных огневых точек отмечено в Сувапкском уезде в районах Шабляки - Подгурнж - Козьол, и установка противотанковых металлических крестовин в районе Ширвиндта Клайпедской области.

April 29th

23.4.41 г. отмечено в районе Вабицы - Куньковицы - Русска "ВЕС" работы оборонительного характера по берегу реки Сан. С этой целью в ночь на \128\ 23.4.41 г. подвозили стройматериалы на 10 автомашинах. В этом же районе установлено проволочное заграждение в 3 кола - колья железные. Ширина забора 100 метров, высота 1 метр. 24.4.41 г. в районе м. Жиглуд-Гломча продолжаются работы оборонного характера.

В последних числах марта на ст. Старый-Загуж прибыли металлические купола для строительства оборонительных сооружений в погранполосе. Купола якобы доставлены из линии Мажино. На 24.4.41 г. в районе Гнышев, Загроды и Мунина производятся работы оборонительного характера. В указанном районе работает батальон пехотинцев. Немецкими властями спешно ремонтируется и расширяется шоссе Ясло - Сапов. На данном шоссе работает местное население.

May 5th

Подтверждаются сведения о создании на границе с СССР укрепленной линии и отдельных укрепленных районов. Все работы проводились под руководством известного строителя "линии Зигфрида" - инженера ТОДТ силами немецких рабочих и солдат. Для подсобных, главным образом земляных работ, было мобилизовано 35 000 евреев. В частности, из района города Родома выселены все жители окрестных 250 деревень. Здесь создан ряд укрепленных районов. Город Седлец превращен также в укрепленный пункт.

May 10th

На ст. Тересполь ежедневно прибывают по 2 - 3 состава гравия, предназначенного для сооружения укреплений около имения Лобачев, в полутора километрах от Тересполя.

С 1 апреля на границе открыто работают саперы, к местам работы подвозится лес-кругляк.

May 15th

Одновременно с концентрацией немецких войск у границы с СССР отмечается усиленное строительство аэродромов и укреплений.

В Ярославе закончено строительство большого аэродрома, на который прибыли самолеты.

В лесу близ Ярослава быстрыми темпами строятся бетонированные укрепления.

Немецкими властями форсируется строительство оборонительных сооружений. Особенно интенсивные работы по укреплению границы проводятся в районе м.Белз и Заставье.

Во дворе ст. Журавица-Южная строится бетонированное укрепление. (Данные зак.агента "ВЛАДИМИРСКОГО" от 24.4.41 г.).

На станциях Перемышль, Журавицы и Ярослав отмечается строительство разных укреплений. Днем работы не производятся.

В конце апреля на ст.Перемышль в течение 10 суток стоял пассажирский поезд из 10 мягких и одного вагона-ресторана. Поезд охранялся усиленным военным конвоем. В этом поезде якобы приезжали губернатор и какой-то генерал (их фамилии не установлены), которые производили осмотр вновь возведенных укреплений.

May 24th

По результатам опроса отдельных переселенцев, прибывших из Германии в порядке репатриации, строительство укреплений на границе с ЛССР началось с 1939 года и особенно активизируется за последнее время. \254\

Укрепления возводятся по всей линии границы, но мы располагаем только частичными данными по отдельным населенным пунктам.

На территории Мемельского уезда.

1. Строительные работы по сооружению укреплений производятся по берегу Балтийского моря, севернее города Мемель в пунктах: Ферстрей, Мелраге, Зандкруг, Сидершнеце и в воротах к Мемелю.

Расположение огневых точек - шахматный тип. Точки между собой связаны подземными ходами. Глубина - 5 метров, высота над землей около 2 метров, а толщина стен - 1 метр и более. Поверхность укрепления замаскирована под берег. В гнездах отмечено наличие орудий калибра 32 м/м и по 2 пулемета.

По неточным данным, в этом районе под землей имеется помещение для войск, склады боеприпасов и аммуниции. Количество гнезд не выявлено.

В пересеченной местности, вблизи этой линии укреплений, выстроены ДОТы, противотанковые надолбы и проволочные препятствия. На работе по строительству этих укреплений были заняты немцы, а лица других национальностей, якобы, не привлекались.

2. Укрепленные точки также имеются вблизи населенных пунктов: Таурлаукен, Слинчай, Акяй, Дивинчи и Плекен. Около каждого населенного пункта по 3 - 4 железобетонных точки на расстоянии 50 - 100 метров друг от друга. Поверх железобетона проложена резина толщиной 64 см.

Огневые точки в группах соединены железобетонными трубами под землей, где в полусогнутом состоянии свободно проходит человек.

Аналогичного характера укрепления возводятся в 3 км от города Мемеля в сторону Прекуле, возле имения Гесейфе, а также возле местечка Гирули.

3. В 7 км от г. Мемеля, в сторону г.Кретинга - ЛССР, построена ДОТ, замаскированная сверху хворостом под местность. Там же несколько бараков человек на 200.

Подобные ДОТы отмечены возле деревень: Сленден, Фимортен, Наудварен и имения Суркунай. По рассказам местных жителей, эти укрепления строили полтора года.

В район деревни Лелиай, по шоссейной дороге от Мемеля на Прекуле, подвозится большое количество лесоматериала и камня для строительства огневых точек. Проведена уже закладка фундамента для установки тяжелых орудий.

Имеются частичные данные об активном строительстве укреплений в Сувалкском и других уездах, так например:

1. С весны 1940 года начато строительство в районах населенных пунктов: Вижайны, Филиппово, Новинки (Сувалкский уезд), и линия строительства тянется на Августовские леса.

В данное время наблюдается усиленный подвоз стройматериалов - цемента, камня, леса.

Такие же работы проводятся за местечком Краснополь, возле озера Вигри, а по линии Пшеросль - Филиппов - Бакалжево - Рачки - строятся ДОТы по западным берегам озер и реки Роспуда. На строительстве заняты саперные части. Перед ДОТами строятся противотанковые заграждения и тянется проволока.

При въезде в мест. Рачки, со стороны Сувалок, с правой стороны моста 3 ДОТа, а с левой - 4 ДОТа. Строительство продолжается.

К югу от города Сувалок, на расстоянии 8 - 9 км, по дороге СувалкиАвгустов, в лесу, строятся огневые точки и проводится дополнительное шоссе. Эти работы продолжаются около года. \255\

2. На территории Тильзит-Рагнитского уезда укрепленные точки отмечены в лесах Екштаркен - за городом Пагеген. Первоначально работали военнопленные французы (видимо, только на земляных работах), а в настоящее время на работах заняты немцы-саперы.

June 2nd

Продолжаются работы по устройству оборонительных сооружений вблизи границы, главным образом в ночное время.

June 6th

По дороге Просткен - Остроколен с правой стороны построены три огневые точки.

На протяжении 1940 года и до сего времени по всему берегу р.Нарев строятся укрепления разных видов, ежедневно со ст.Остроленка на автомашинах и подводах к местам строительства подвозится цемент, железо, доски и др. строительные материалы.

В 600 метрах от границы в направлении ст.Плятеров в 1 км от ж.д. полотна вправо производится строительство ДОТ.

June 12th

Источник "Ковалевский", будучи на железнодорожной станции Журавица, путем личного наблюдения установил, что вдоль линии границы по всей возвышенности роются окопы. За станцией Журавица... на расстоянии одного километра сооружаются бетонные укрепления.

December 27th

According to the agents' reports, the Germans are building concrete fortifications along the San river, from Peremyshl to the west, extending 140 km. Similar fortifications are being built along San from Peremyshl to Jarosław. Concrete anti-tank obstacles are being constructed around Jarosław.

Near the city of Krosno a large fort is being built. Along a separately constructed from the Krosno railroad branch, trains with concrete and other materials are arriving for the building of said fort.

January 14th

Near the border, opposite the territory of the 93rd border unit, the Germans continue increased building of military fortifications.

30 km south east of Warsaw, in the area of the railroad line Warsaw-Mińsk Mazowiecki, an ADF point is being built.

Also, reinforced concrete fortifications against land forces are being built at the same place.

February 14th

6 km from Klaipeda, to the right of the road leading to Bajor, the building of reinforced concrete fortifications was complete.

Likewise was completed the building of reinforced concrete fortifications near the Zankruk borough, where heavy, field and AA artillery has already been placed.

In the Juravitsy town, near the graveyard, in the first half of January 1941, was built an underground ammunition depot, surrounded with barbed wire. in the same place, the building of new fortification continues.

on the Eytekun station, opposite the exit semaphore signal post in the direction of the Ebenrode station, fortification building has started in mid-December 1940. The front of the earthwork stretches about a kilometer in the south-western direction. At nighttime, the work site is lighted by projectors.

On December 27th 1940, from that station into Suwalki, a military construction train was sent, composed of 27 platforms, 13 covered and 10 passenger cars. The passenger cars contained soldiers, the platforms were loaded with machines, logs, carts and tarp covered cargo. The train went into Suwalki for building fortifications.

February 27th

There are no concrete signs of a close aggression being prepared against us, but we know about feverish road and fortification building, as well as a large amount of forces being stationed in former Poland.

...

According to data requiring verification, near Klaipeda, 7-10 km from the Soviet-German border, a forification line is being built. Reinforced concrete pillboxes, 30-50 sq. m. area are positioned 500 meter apart and are being armed with heavy artillery and machine guns.

Fortification line is passing arround Klaipeda and along the roads Priekule - Tilsit and Pillkallen - Königsberg

Each pillbox is surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by sentries in artillery uniform.

On the coast of the Baltic Sea, from Klaipeda to Palanga, heavy artillery batteries are being placed.

Near the Laukszargen station, 500 meter from the border a barbed wire obstacle line has been placed. 500-600 meter away from it there is a second line.

On the Terespol station a shelter is being built, for the cover of which 1400 rails have been used. The rails are covered with a layer of concrete.

On February 10th, the Juravitsa station received 3 train cars of iron poles 20 cm thick, 3 meter long. Presumably, they will be used to construct anti-tank obstacles.

[b]March 11th

Immediately upon reaching the new border with the USSR, the German command started the expansion of its East-Prussian fortifications, modernization and improvement of former Polish fortifications on the General Government territory.

On the border of East Prussia.

As of March 1st 1941, data was present on the following number of complete pillboxes:

Near Klaipeda 6

Tilsit 3

Pillkallen 25

Stallupönen 8

Przerośl - Raczki sector 18

Lyk - Prostken 13

Overall, on the sector Klaipeda - Raczki, stretching 300 km, 103 pillboxes were reported complete or nearly complete, in reality the number is probably higher.


On the General Government territory.

On the General Government territory, as of March 1st 1941 the following number of pillboxes was reported complete or nearly complete (both reinforced concrete and wood-earth):

Near Ostrolenka - up to 60.

Warsaw - up to 140

Demblin (or Deblin?) (sector Ryni-Kurua) - 83

Annopol - 7

Overall, around 290 pillboxes.

April 9th

Along with the transfer of forces and ammunition, an increased building of fortifications, airfields and roads has been noted.

In February, a building started of a fortification line Warsaw - Modlin, using mainly Jews for work.

Likewise, fortification building along the Bug river has started.

In the vicinity of the railroad from Rembertov station towards the City of Siedlec, trenches are being dug, and military fortifications along with barbed wire obstacles are being constructed.

April 10th

In the southwestern direction from Raczki above the river Dovstui (Rospuda?) for 2 km passes a line of underground reinforced concrete fortifications, which are currently supposedly used as a depots for ammunition and military equipment.

On the border of East Prussia and the Suwalki district, near the villages of Philippovo and Bakolajevo, cement and reinforced concrete underground fortifications have been built.

From the village of Nosarzewo towards Przasnysz, over 18 km along the high road Mława-Przasnysz a defensive line is being built 10-12 km wide. On the territory of said construction, a narrow-gauge railway was built, used for delivering building materials. In the same area a large number of wooden barracks has been constructed, which currently house over 5000 German soldiers. Most of the soldiers work at said construction. Long range artillery has been placed near the barracks. All the inhabitants of the nearby villages have been evacuated.

One km from Zbójna, in a pine forest, to both sides of the road leading to Myszyniec, 45-50 cemented firing positions were built 15-16 meter long, 10 meter wide and 7 meter deep. Each one has gun ports to the sides and above, and is concealed with turf and planted trees.

The fortification line on the approaches to Warsaw passes from the Narev river to the Vistula river through Struga, Zenka farm, Miłosna station, to the source of the Świder river. In the fortification line currently they continue building concrete artillery positions, machine gun nests, anti tank obstacles, blockages, fields are being prepared for mining.

In the barracks of the Modlin Fortress, 60 km north-west of Warsaw, in three floor buildings, a wartime division could be stationed.

The forts are mainly modern, concealed from aerial observation. The forts' armament consists of heavy, light, AT and AA guns, as well as heavy machine guns. in the basements of the barracks and the forts there are large amounts of rations and ammunition.

April 16th

Along with concentrating forces, the German command also carries out accelerated building of reinforced concrete fortifications and highroads.

To the vicinity of Lesko, many reinforced concrete nests have been delivered, rumored to be from the Maginot line, in order to put them near the Soviet border. In the vicinity of Sanok routing of machine gun and artillery nests is carried out, with the locations marked with small numbered posts.

It is a possibility, that the places marked with the posts are where the nests will be placed.

April 21st

Into the same areas where the forces are arriving, large amounts of ammunition, fuel and artificial anti tank obstacles are being delivered.

In April, fortification building work has increased. Building of permanent firing positions has been noted in the Suwalki district in the areas Szablaki - Podgurnzh - Kozioł, and installation of anti tank metal crosspieces in the vicinity of Schirwindt, Klaipeda region.

April 29th

23.4.41 have been noted in the vicinity of Vabitsy - Kunkovitsy - Russka VES (?) defensive works on the banks of the San river. For this purpose, in the night before 23/4/41, building materials were delivered on 10 cars. in the same area, a barbed wire obstacle was constructed 3 stakes (deep?) - iron stakes. The fence is 100 meter wide and 1 meter high. 24/4/41 in the Zhiglud - Glomcha area, defensive activity continues.

In the last days of March, the Stary Zagórz station received metal domes for building defensive structures near the border. The domes are reportedly from the Maginot line. As of 24/4/41 in the vicinity of Gnyshev, Zagroda and Munina defensive works are conducted. An infantry batallion is working in the designated area. The German authorities are rapidly repairing and expanding the road Jasło - Sapow. The local population is working on the road.

May 5th

There are confirmations about the reports, that on the border with the USSR, a fortified line is being created, as well separate fortified regions.All the works were conducted under the supervision of the famous Siegfried Line builder - a Todt engineer , with the manpower of German workers and soldiers. For auxiliary, mainly ground works, 35 000 Jews were mobilized. Particularly, from the vicinity of Radom, all the inhabitants of 250 nearby villages were evacuated. A group of fortified regions was created there. Siedlec has likewise been turned into a fortified area.

May 10th

The Terespol station receives 2-3 trains of gravel daily, meant for constructing fortifications near the Lobachev estate, 1.5 km from Terespol.

Since April the 1st, sappers are working on the border openly, round timber is being delivered to the working locations.

May 15th

Along with the concentration of the German forces near the Soviet border, increased building of airfields and fortifications has been noted.

In Jarosław, construction of a large airfield has been completed, to which planes have arrived.

In the forest near Jarosław, concrete fortifications are being constructed rapidly.

German authorities are speeding up construction of defensive structures, especially intensive works on border fortification are being conducted in the area Bełz and Zastave bridge.

In the yard of the station Żurawica-Uuzhnaya, a concrete fortification is building is being built. (A report by the agent "Vladimirsky", 24/4/41)

On the stations of Przemyśl, Zurawica and Jarosław, construction of various fortifications has been noted. No works are conducted during daytime.

In the end of April, on the station of Перемышль, a passenger train of 10 upholstered carriages and a restaurant car was standing for 10 days. A reinforced military convoy was guarding the train. A governor and a general (last names undetermined) have reportedly arrived, for inspecting the freshly constructed fortifications.

May 24th

According to the questioning of migrants, who arrived from Germany as repatriates, the building of fortifications on the border with LSSR has started in 1939, and has significantly increased lately.

Fortifications are constructed along the entire border, but we only posses partial data on individual places.

On the territory of Memel district.

1. Fortifications are being constructed on the coast of the baltic sea, north of Memel in the locations; Ferstrey, Melnragė, Sandkrug, Sidersheze, and the gates to Memel.

Firing positions' order - in staggered rows. The positions are connected with underground passages. Depth - 5 m, Height above ground - 2 m, wall thickness - 1 m and above. The surface of the fortifications is disguised as part of the coast. The nests were noted to contain 2 machine guns each and 32 mm guns.

According to low accuracy data, in this area underground there is a place to house forces, ammunition and equipment depots. The number of nests is unknown.

In rough terrain, near this fortification line, pillboxes, Anti tank obstacles and wire obstacles have been built. Germans were deployed on the construction of said fortifications, while other nationalities, reportedly, were not.

2. Fortified positions are likewise present near the places: Taurlakhen, Slinchay, Akiay, Divinchi and Pleken. Near each place there are 3-4 reinforced concrete positions 50-100 m apart. Above the concrete there is rubber, 64 cm thick.

The positions within the groups are connected underground by reinforced concrete tubes, through which a half bent man can easily pass.

Similar fortifications are being constructed 3 km from Memel in the direction of Priekule, near the Geseife estate, as well as the Giruli borough.

3. 7 km from Memel, in the direction of Kretinga - LSSR, a pillbox has been built, disguised with brushwood as part of the terrain. There are also a few barracks there, for about 200 people.

Similar pillboxes have been sighted near the villages: Slenden, Fimorten, Naudvaren and the Surkunai estate. The locals say the fortifications were built over the course of a year and a half.

Into the vicinity of the Leliai village, on the highway from Memel to Priekule, a large amount of timber and stone is being delivered for firing positions' construction. The foundation was already laid for placing heavy artillery.

Partial data is present about active fortification building in Suwalki and other districts such as:

Since spring 1940, building has started near Wiżajny, Filipów, Nowinki (Suwalki district), with the construction line stretching toward Augustów Forest.

Currently, an increased delivery of building materials was noted - cement, rock, timber.

Similar works are conducted behind Krasnopol, near the Wigry Lake, and on the Przerośl - Filipów - Bakałarzewo - Raczki line - pillboxes are built on the western banks of the lakes and Rospuda river. Sapper units are the ones working. In front of the pillboxes, anti tank obstacles are being built and wire stretches.

At the entrance to Raczki from the side of Suwalki, there are 3 pillboxes to the right side of the bridge, and 4 to the left. The construction continues.

To the south of the Suwalki city, 8-9 km away, on the Suwalki/Augustów road, in the forest, firing positions are being built and additional highroads are being laid. This work continues for about a year.

Om the territory of the Tilsit-Ragnit district fortified positions are noted in the forests behind Pogegen. At first, French POWs worked (earthworks only, it seems), now German sappers are the ones working.

June 2nd

Works are continuing on organizing defensive structures near the border, mainly at night time.

June 6th

On the road Prostki - Ostrykół to the right, three firing positions have been built.

Throughout 1940 and until now, all along the bank of Narev, fortifications of different types are being built. Every day from the Ostrołęka station, on cars and carts, cement, iron, boards and other building materials are being brought.

600 meter from the border, in the direction of the Platerów station, 1 km from the railroad to the right, pillboxes are being constructed.

June 12th

The source "Kovalevsky", while being at Żurawica railroad station, determined through personal observation, that along the border, all over the elevated terrain, trenches are being dug. Behind the Żurawica station... 1 km away, concrete fortifications are being constructed.

How can a defence "give time for concentration" if forces are already concentrated? A contradiction in terms. Pay attention.

Really? The USSR didn't plan to swiftly win? I'm sorry, but I've given an example. You failed to counter it with anything meaningful. Besides, the USSR did plan to win swiftly in Finland.


That's pretty reasonable, but I doubt Pavlov considered an exceptionally high level of breakdowns and huge numbers of machines being kicked out of service when confronting the German forces. The tanks were often engaged in battles with German forces - the results of said battles were not good for the Soviet tanks.

The scenario centers around a sudden attack by the Germans. You may be right here, the Soviet command did not expect the enemy to gain the initiative, because they were still thinking in terms of long pre-hostilities, etc.

Inertia is very hard to shake off.

But this exact case is a case where they proposed a plan to defend against a German attack.

The fact that Stalin and the Soviet leadership prepared a MASSIVE plan of evacuation of all European Soviet industry indicated that they, in fact, admitted at least in theory that there might be a military catastrophe or a long war that would require shielding industries from strategic bombing (it is their, or should I say, our great luck the concept never really caught on with the German air command!).

What is the proof it should've been abandoned, though? The USSR was known for it's ad hoc approach to stuff. Today this, tomorrow that.

And speculation is not history - ergo...

So why is the USSR to blame for trading with the opressed Weimar Republic and technical cooperation with the nation?

Germany was an infavourable country - in 192x-1933 it was an industrial cripple. There were no guarantees whatsoever it could even rise from the Depression. The Depression was at an all-time high and Germany was exceptionally hard hit. In 1933, there were no objective reasons to think it would get better, more powerful or whatever.

Which side? The USSR was cooperating with top industrial powers. In the 20s, there was an idea that a pariah state like Germany would be excellent for tech transfer to the USSR (Junkers concessions were exceptionally important for the Soviet Airforce and air industry in general, etc.) By 1933, Germany became Nazi and that was it. On the other hand, the US was a democracy, a top industrial and it's new leaders JUST AT THIS TIME recognized the USSR diplomatically. Obviously, considering Stalins' own comments that Western democracies are better than Fascists and Nazis, the USSR chose to continue industrial development, using tech transfer from the USA, not from Germany.

Obviously yes. A few buildings in Moscow did not and could not comprise a large share of Soviet GDP. They were but promilles, I think. I could investigate it further, obviously, by looking at the late-Stalinist skyscraper construction costs in roubles and maybe manhours and the then-Soviet GDP and total manhours. *shrugs* But it should be obvious to people with an understanding of economics, even cursory.

Exactly my point.

Even some new books often fail to notice new documents, true. But, by and large, science HAS moved on.

Once again, documental proof of anything Rezun mentions is necessary. Speculation is not history.

And yet, the shortages were never even near the food collapse in the First World war. Metal shortages occured from the simple fact that Britain was undergoing a massive total mobilization of war industries which was necessary to actively participate in the war and win it. The U-boats were pathetically inefficient compared to the overall volume of British-American naval traffic and became completely inefficient by 1943-45, despite their number and technical sophistication only increasing and getting better and better.

Please, do without the drama. Americans nuked their army (or, should I even say Navy and Army?) too.

Besides, if the order never saw execution, it is not a war crime commited.

Including - overall. Because other commanders also managed to lose people en masse, duh. Especially in larger battles, e.g. standoffs at Leningrad when Zhukov was already away from there.

Cavalry can scout in case there is no active enemy hindrance. If there is, cavalry is pretty much of limited use for scouting. Just like aviation is when there's heavy flak, you know.

It is a fact Tukhachevsky developed a theory of mechanized operations, because he published works on it.

In the late-1920s his views on warfare were similar to those of many commanders of the day. He had many progressive ideas and many strange ideas which seem strange in retrospect. In the late 1920s, the tank-tractor ideas, supermobilization ideas, land cruiser ideas and lots and lots of other crap was quite common in military theorizing.

I'm not a supporter of Tukhachevsky, but I read his works. I could be more specific, if you want.

Did it seriously impact their real performance?

Moving on wheels and on-road during combat is prohibited, only on march.

The T-28 was vastly inferior to the Pz IV, being an old, obsolete multi-turret tank design.

And what does the T-50 has to do with the T-26 and German tanks?

We were discussing the former and latter. The T-26 is a spectacularly bad piece of engineering, and by 1941 it was hardly capable of dealing with newer German machines.

They might have, but the models failed to get this speed.

There are reports to reinforce the Letichev UR, KAUR before the onset of the war.

Not a bad idea; the bad idea is the false belief that fixed defenses can operate without a mobilized army and will hold off the enemy long enough for you to mobilize.

ML bunkers were, however, the most modern and powerful the USSR constructed at the time.

That's not proof.

Heh. Speculation, then. And speculation is not history.

How so? Proof?

Not in that one case; in many cases. Alas, no time to get into detail now - be sure to requote this, I'll give a list.

Parts of SL which were deemed relevant and necessary were upgraded, in fact, or slated for upgrade. Parts which weren't, however, were left to degrade and rot away. KAUR is an example of the former

1) Can we take for granted that barring an aggressive Germany or other power in Western/Central Europe, Stalin would have unleashed his wrath upon all of Europe in a war of conquest at some point in the 1940's?

2) If we take the above for granted, could an alliance of Central and Western European powers have stopped such a conquest (barring US involvement)?

3) Can we thank Nazi Germany for preventing such a conquest due to their aggressive war mobilizing the enemies of Germany into an uneasy alliance?

4) If on VE day Stalin had simply attacked the Western allies (yes, I know how ridiculous the question is from a practical standpoint when you consider the massive casualties the Russians took in defeating the Germans) and tried to drive them off the continent, would he have had the manpower and industrial power to do so barring the US use of an atomic weapon or even with one?

In fact, Stalin's Soviet industrialization in the 1930s started with greater value-added for civilan sectors than for the military prior to ~1935, when European nations started raising their armament prospects.

I hate to butt in on a thread which had its topic fairly well covered already, but in the interest of accuracy, I need to point out the 1920-1921 war was hardly clear-cut with regards to who started the mess. I wouldn't call it "defence against Soviet invasion", since both sides were really damn eager to fight, just looking for an excuse. Things were so bad in 1919 that border patrols sometimes attacked each other with little provocation.

The USSR constantly modernized it's army, but to be fair, it was an industrializing nation still.

No. Stalin´s basic idea was that the people of every nation would eventually rise up and overthrow their capitalist opressors, more or less violently.

And a nation expecting to attack usually doesnt spend lots of time and resources setting something like the Stalin-line up.

After the division of Poland, Stalin thought the line was really waaaay too far behind the new frontline with Germany and commanded that the weapons and crews from the line was to be moved up to set up a new line...

These were garrison troops however and the only way for them to attack would be to stand still and try to shoot into Germany, or push their guns by hand, they didnt even have horses assigned for movement.

And so, he decided to remove them nearly a year before he started to build the new line...

Zhukov says that the decision to relocate weapons from the already-conserved parts of Stalin Line (conservation decision came in autumn 1939) to the Molotov Line came in early 1941 (during the Feb-March conference, to be precise). Zhukov is lying?

Well, it says there was a decision to remove a part of the armaments from secondary positions. Doesn't quite seem to match reality.

That's what the public was told, but how much Stalin actually believed it can happen spontaneously - well, could be argued.

Translation; Germans never built the Siegfried Line.

And so, he decided to remove them nearly a year before he started to build the new line...

albeit most of them were obsolete guns from 1877-1895

However, where is the relocation in early 1939? Mind shedding some light on this?

It cant exist because the new line, even the idea of one, wasnt created until after the split of Poland.

Mind elaborating?



Well, the absence of immediate conquest plans in the 1920s can hardly be questioned, so I don't see how a concentration on defense at the time can prove anything.

Tenshinai some stuff is just painfully wrong with your post but I don't have time to spell it all out. You have a very strange view of the West Wall to say the least; here's a hint, if it was not a priority then how to it consume more steel then the German Panzer force in the run up to WW2?

Do you understand the difference between highstrength armourgrade steel and normal construction steel?

The vast majority of steel delivered to building the line was the latter while it was meant to be the former, and with the latter the bunkers were simply not capable of withstanding heavy weapons, which sort of defeats most of its purpose, except to make the French more hesitant to attack

(and when France did start its planned offensive, German troops were so effective in harrassing the attack that their numbers and quality were greatly overestimated, and coupled with the overestimation of the Westwall, it was considered too much before being fully mobilised and prepared for a massive offensive, and so they retreated back to their own lines)...

Add to that the fact that to fully finish the Westwall, far more than twice as much steel would have been needed. And again, the vast majority of it should have been armourgrade steel to really make the line worthwhile.

In short, the Westwall was a lot of hype, a papertiger with enough real bite and armour to make it look far more than it was.

So, i guess you dont know enough to know that your "hint" was irrelevant.
Shall i assume your "painfully wrong" is equally irrelevant or do you actually have any points to make?

As the Siegfried line was built during the middle of WWI i assume you refer to the Westwall. Either way, the Germans built it close to the border, except it was never truly prioritised, quality armour plates were never installed in most parts, manning levels were never close to adequate, weapons and ammunition stores were mever sufficient, non-garrison troops supporting it was nonexistant...

In short, the Westwall was most of all a 4th rate "extra" where the only part even remotely close to being finished were the tank obstacles.

Meanwhile, USSR started building the Stalin line in the 1920s, as an intricate chain of wellbuilt defensive positions, far enough from the border to allow for reaction time (meaning that it was meant to be able to defend against surprise attacks ), fully manned, with lots of weapons and supplies in storage, with a large part of the army based to be able to support the line, airfields placed to enable aircover along the full line...

Also, the basic part of the line was that it was NOT built like the Maginot line nor the Westwall, it wasnt built to be impenetrable, rather it was meant to force an attacker to move where the defenders were waiting for them, behind the line, so the line required cooperation between garrisons and regular troops, but with that it was also quite capable of stopping just about any attack for a long while, or even completely.

The Westwall OTOH was built more to slow down an enemy while not supported by regular troops.

Because Germany needed to be able to have those elsewhere, like Poland or later moving through Belgium into France.

That the Westwall was also never completed, or even halfway so, because mobile troops were prioritised, while in USSR, the Stalin line was, up until 1939, continually improved, should tell another part of what i was referring to.

Do note that that does not automatically equate to "bad guns". For example one of the Soviet 76mm gun that was truly common was of pre-WWI heritage, and the Germans used lots of captured guns of the type in WWI as well(usually after mounting it on a lighter carriage to allow it to be moved more easily by infantry), and they were still highly useful in WWII.

Certain sources claim the mothballing started in 1939 already.

All going slightly okay. In reality that would have led to a military coup deposing Hitler the moment the German army smashed into the Czech fortifications along the boarder.

It was Munich that screwed the Czechs royal, because they had that defensive frontier stripped from them, leaving the heartland of Bohemia open to easy invasion by Germany.

In terms of percentage. Not absolute terms, of course, but I hardly think every single bunker was built on the banks of San.

I'm talking about the fact they praised its depth. They said a defense line should be deep, and away from the border. So... where is their own depth?

For these 340 - only a dozen machine guns.

Are you sure these weren't the bunkers standing incomplete since 1939?

Strange schedule. Did they expect the Germans to attack in September? Or did they expect they won't be able to mobilize until September?

Belomorkanal wasn't that small either. And there is the one Suvorov mentions being dug for the Pinsk flotilla - 127 km. Not meant for very large ships, but still.

Over a hundred thousand pilots trained, with only a few thousand people in the civilian service. How does that make Russia a "modern industrial economy"?

What defense?

Nah, logic.

Like the Soviets planning the Winter War? Where are the plans of that invasion?

And the unconcentrated reserves can provide the described organized battle order?

Here are quotes (from bdsa.ru). The ones from after Barbarossa was approved. Sorry if mistakes were made during translation (there are some locations mentioned which I couldn't find on the net as they are spelled).

By giving time to concentrate for a more effective defense, as well as other types of action. I see no contradiction. After all, there is never too much defense.

Both arguments are based on the assumption that the real life operation was identical to the plans, without the need to make significant adjustments... any evidence of that?

Documents which show examples of such thinking?

Seems to me it was shaken off quite well by December 1940.

It should've been abandoned because taking the parade was Stalin's duty. All you are saying is that there would have been no problem doing that.

Unfortunately, gaps are too common to avoid speculation.

Not for trading, for training its generals.

A gamble, you say? Not unusual for the Komintern.

Exactly. Allies of Germany when convenient, allies of the USA when convenient... proves absolutely nothing.

We are not talking about the GDP, we are talking about building a single large skyscraper.

So... what changed that the project was abandoned?

Suvorov can still find enough to criticize. You have a problem with the examples he gives - well, details?

Western indifference to Soviet attacks on other countries, however, is a fact. Without the Germans capturing/destroying half the Soviet industry and conquering territory, neutrality of the West would have been quite acceptable for Stalin.

And how does all this prove Britain would have had a negative reaction?

In close proximity to their own cities?

So what? Was it legal to issue?

Zhukov was the one with the worst defeats.

Then why did he advance? Nothing can change the fact that this is idiocy.

What are the works saying, exactly? Are they giving actual figures? Are the figures valid (mathematics wasn't his strong suite)? He had a lot of demagoguery (and technobabble obsession), but little actual theory.

So, he went along with completely idiotic ideas (or started them)... And you don't doubt his ability? Besides, we're not talking about the twenties. He wrote the article in 1932, and conversion experiments were conducted even later.

How about the one where he said that in 1935 that Germany was building 9 battleships... at the time when only two were ordered, and it's unclear whether they were battleships or battlecruisers?

The problems with Russian terrain are well known.

What is this obsession of yours with roads and wheels?

A disadvantage in mobility, but the armor and armament were similar. With a 100% numerical advantage, I wouldn't hurry to dismiss them.

You were the one who started the talk about Suvorov arguing the relative inefficiency of the German tanks - and that's exactly his point. He argues that without mentioning T-26 - any type fitting the description works.

The Germans had enough of the older machines for it to deal with. And I believe we are discussing 1939, too.

And Pz-I couldn't keep up with infantry on Russian roads. Doesn't tell much about the maximum speed under other conditions.

I ask about actual work done, not paper.

Is there evidence of such a false belief?

So what? In 1941, German tanks had 30mm armor. It was better that in 1939. It was the best they had. But it doesn't mean it was adequate.

Why is that?

Speculation is for filling gaps. With a conspiracy, you often have too much of these.

Figures for Soviet guns are at the bottom of the table.

Итак, под прикрытием Сообщения ТАСС военные командиры высших рангов во главе армий, и один даже во главе штаба фронта, тайно перебрасываются к германским границам, бросив на произвол судьбы (и НКВД) ВСЕ внутренние военные округа

We saw a witness stating it was neglected. What does it matter that some piece of paper states it shouldn't have been?

В августе 1940 г. было сформировано Управление, получившее наименование 22 Укрепленного района, который объединил крепостные пулеметные батальоны.

После советско-финской войны командование Ленинградского военного округа приняло ряд серьезных мер к укреплению в инженерном отношении рубежа и повышению боеготовности частей. Силами частей Укрепленного района, инженерных частей округа, а в начале войны и жителей города, были построены боевые соружения, которыми заполнены промежутки между батальонными узлами и ротными опорными пунктами и значительно усилена противотанковая оборона, особенно на дорожных направлениях. Всего было построено артиллерийских железобетонных сооружений - 15, пулеметных и артиллерийских сооружений деревянно-земляных и сваренных из корабельной брони - 114.

Весной [1941 г.] в части был призван приписной состав, как рядовой, так и командный, и с ним организована усиленная подготовка.

Well, there is this. Admittedly, it does show that the situation didn't grow bad until much later, at least to the north - since, apparently, it had to be fortified "to free up forces for the main grouping in the south". Makes an impression of numerous revisions to the plans.

Осенью 1939 года УРы оказались далеко от границы. Предстояло решить, как использовать их в дальнейшем. Начальник Главного военно-инженерного управления Красной Армии предложил использовать их в качестве «второй укрепленной полосы» и в связи с этим сохранить их оборудование и вооружение. Но поздней осенью 1939 года был отдан приказ о консервации укрепленных районов...

Затем, в феврале 1940 года, было принято решение: УРы на старой границе не консервировать, а содержать в боевой готовности до возведения УРов по новой границе. Весной 1940 года численность кадрового состава войск укреплённых районов была установлена в 75 тысяч человек.

А проверка, произведённая комиссией Генштаба РККА в конце декабря 1940 года, показала, что пулемётные батальоны УРов Западного особого военного округа по установленному штату мирного времени рядовым и младшим начальствующим (то есть сержантским) составом были укомплектованы полностью. Четыре белорусских укрепрайона - Полоцкий, Минский, Мозырский и Слуцкий - имели тогда в сумме 876 долговременных сооружений (в подавляющем большинстве - пулемётных), из них только 145 сооружений Слуцкого УРа - без вооружения.

Так, «Мобилизационный план № 23», составленный в феврале 1941 года Геншабом РККА, предусматривал увеличение количества управлений укреплённых районов (включая Дальний Восток) до 44-х, а численность личного состава развёрнутых по военному времени войск УРов предполагалось довести до 248,4 (по другим данным - 239,6) тысячи человек. Затем, весной 1941 года последовало распоряжение о формировании управлений комендантов укрепрайонов даже для находящихся в консервации - в целях осуществления ими мероприятий, направленных на «использование указанных укрепрайонов в военное время».

I question the very fact of large bunkers being built in significant numbers, because the reports come from Soviet intelligence, not from internal German documentation. I hope you understand why. If someone's intelligence claims something, only internal documents can confirm it. Needless to say that even in our super-duper advanced age stuff like Yellocake forgeries is enough to start a war. You'd need to convince me with internal documentation, and any historian with a high standard of evidence would behave the same. Higher standards - not "laxer standards".

Especially in the light of a complete contradiction coming from Halder with the "only field defenses" statement.

[

Mannerheim line - average distance 20-40 km away from the border, i.e. predpol'ie or forward field was 30 km average. Depth of fortifications - initially planned 2-3 km, later 6-7 km (that was the depth of Summajarvi fortified region which the RKKA broke through). Stalin line - fortification depth 1-2 km (Minsk, Volynsk, Mozyr fortified regions), sometimes 2-5 km. Forward field - 10-15 km average (examples Minsk, Mogilev-Podolsk, Novgorod-Volynsk FRs, etc.). Molotov line - lower depth 4-5 km, higher depth 5-16 km, forward field - 5-15 km. Maginot line didn't have a much greater forward field likewise - 4-16 km.

I think if we're talking about the Kamenets-Podolsky and Karelsky fortified regions, the construction continued in 1940 and even in 1941, IIRC.

I presume the latter. I think the USSR realistically estimated their abilities to mobilize and re-arm forces, and September 1941 was a good target date. If, as you say, it doesn't matter when and how you mobilize if you're the one who makes the mobilization decision, it is quite natural that the USSR simply thought it could perhaps begin any combat operations in Sep 1941 with a favorable disposition.

BMK and Moscow-Volga required tens of thousands of dead, incidentally. And using prisoners on military construction might not have had a good effect. Don't know why, but Stalinist bureaucracy preferred to direct convict labour to industrial transport projects as opposed to purely military ones.

The GVF (civilian air fleet) said they require 33 thousand pilots already during the first Five-Year Plan (i.e. by 1933!). I'm sure the requirements for the GVF only grew.

Logic of the above-discussed events tell me that logic points to the USSR being unprepared and its leadership looking for a more convenient timeframe to adequately prepare its forces for war.

There's a directive from 1939 which demands of the Soviet Navy to destroy navies of the Baltics and Finland

and there are documents (now declassified) how Soviet army should prepare provocations to declare a war on Finland. Are you unaware?

Um... of course. The "unconcentrated reserves", i.e. the 2nd echelon, was quite potent as it was in both units and manpower.

So the USSR was making super-defensive war plans? Doesn't chime in well with the "best defense is offensive" motto and "beat the enemy on his own land".

You said speed didn't matter in the war in Finland. I countered it with the fact that the USSR planned to win fast. Goalpost shifting much?

By relying on fixed defense

Of course. The whole concept (and it was quoted many times from the conference records in this very thread, no need to requote) revolves around unmobilized forces meeting the attacker relying on fixed defences and hold him off while the rest mobilize, concentrate and deploy. Clearly not a sound idea.

In 1939, 1940 and early 1941 the Military Comission of the SNK composed drafts of evacuation plans. In May 1941, the Soviet leadership felt that the border regions were already threatened enough so that the evacuation plan orders even slipped into military directives:
6. На случай вынужденного отхода разработать, согласно особых указаний, план эвакуации фабрик, заводов, банков и других хозяйственных предприятий, правительственных учреждений, складов, военного и государственного имущества, военнообязанных, средств транспорта и др.

And no problem doing anything else. The USSR's leadership never had problems with changing or upholding traditions for reasons that are not related to conspirology.

History aims to fill them with documents and facts, not to speculate.

Speculation is the field of conspiracy theorists. History aims to work with documents, existing evidence and facts. If there are no facts, you can speculate endlessly and the speculation wouldn't be worth much more than any other speculation. The scientific method is to find facts, not invent them.

Why? Weimar was a friendly democracy.

Almost nobody could predict the evolution of Weimar in the 20s.

In this case the cost of that skyscraper wouldn't be enough to "get started". End of answer.

Slow demise of Stalinist architecture.

I have a problem with speculation instead of facts and documents, misquotes and the like.

Western indifference to German attacks on other countries is also a fact. They chose to stick up for Poland, however. Too much expansion.

Legality doesn't matter; it was immoral. War crimes often are legalized. The key is that Zhukov's order was immoral. In any case, it never came to execution of the order.

That evens out with the greatest victories, duh.

RKKA wasn't a stellar Army in the Civil War too, and most of Tukh's research was done in the post-war era.

http://militera.lib.ru/science/tuhachevsky/index.html

In his treatise on air and motor mechanization, Tukh. correctly predicted a lot of stuff.

Most notably the jet revolution, one of the most important things in military aviation in general and in strategic bombing as well.

He notes that airpower became so advanced that air assaults and bombing campaigns will become military operations of their own, often more important than joint action with ground forces (in 1943-1944 vindicated by the Allied bombing campaign in Germany).

Everyone produces good and bad ideas. It is unfair to select just one bad idea and trump it all over.

The USSR had a habit of Nazi scares.

In 1936, the Soviets learned of Hitler's "70000 pilots" order and started trumping the 150000 pilots figure as an answer.

Didn't seriously impact the speed of German advance.

Not mine, Rezun's. He said the instructions/textbooks say BTs have to primarily use wheels. That was shown to be wrong (explicitly prohibited!), that's all.

Being de-concentrated means they'd fail to do a difference, like most of Soviet stuff. KV and T-34s at least could make a difference even in smaller numbers due to quality superiority, but the older models - in a situation of dispersal they were doomed.

I said Germans built good models as well, and most of their tanks were better than the Soviet most numerous tank (the T-26).

Internal documents about shipments are much more reliable than foreign intelligence. See above.

Um... but the question wasn't about adequate. The question was whether the Molotov line defences were superior to the Stalin line, not whether they were adequate. They were superior, that's all.

Only technical documentation of the relevant nation on exploitation of their own hardware or technical documentation on the exploitation of trophy hardware would be relevant.

The Three's gun (37-mm KwK 35/36 L/45) could utilize Pzgr.40, giving it a huge edge over the Soviet 45-mm.

As for the moving generals, Rezun simply says:


That's an obvious wrong. Not only Konev didn't leave, but Siberian, Arkhangelsk, etc. command was still remaining in their places, as far as I remember.

Who said the Karelian fortified region was neglected? Why should his claims be considered seriously? Nobody did. Neglecting parts of the Stalin line was more than natural - the line was deeper than a hundred kilometers away from the border, it was older and often obsolete (compared to the Molotov line, which was, as you said, inadequate too, but at least it was more modern and had better fortifications on the average). However, parts which were still relevant - e.g. the Karelian Fortified Region - were upgraded and improved:

Note that these measures were carried out between the Winter War and the Great Patriotic War. Why would you do that, if you determine the date and place of attack?

It sure does:

And so, in February 1940 the old FRs were deemed to have to be kept operational until new ones were completed. In December 1940 fortified FRs of ZapOVO were fully complect with commanders. That's good caution, if you ask me. And the Spring 1941 order to form commands - even of fortified regions on conservation - to "conduct measures for use of listed fortified regions in wartime" is clearly a pre-war caution as well, and one which presumes a rather unfortunate turn of events for the USSR - if the enemy never reaches the conserved fortifications, that is unnecessary. That all mixes well with the idea of the USSR being uncertain and threatened, even if bombastic in propaganda, and it doesn't mix with the idea of an overconfident USSR.

Well, there is page 170 here (available as a preview). The numbers seem reasonably consistent with the other sources (although the intel seems to have severely underestimated the number of field fortifications). Unfortunately, I do not have the source the book refers to.

Let’s see… The Soviet intel says that the Germans built fortifications since they got to Poland, and Halder makes mention of fortifications in the East at the beginning of 1940. Halder says that at a certain date around the end of 1940, a decision was made to only build new concrete fortifications in Eastern Prussia. … and in spring 1941, East Prussia is all concrete, while the rest of the border also has field fortifications… Where’s the contradiction?

Colonel Krebs returned from Moscow where he was acting in Kestring's position. He was courted with great consideration. Russia will do everything to avoid war. We can expect any concessions except for territorial claims.
The Russian officer corps is extremely bad (makes a pitiful impression), much worse than in 1933. Russia will need 20 years to restore the level of their officer cadre [the impression of Krebs]. Re-armament is underway. New fighter. New long-range bomber. However, flight training and capabilities are lacking. Long-range bombers seem to be concentrated along the Western border. Train lines with materials for construction of fortifications are being sent to the border. Other than that no large concentrations of forces [during the railway trip] were noticed.

General Vladimirskiy claims that for at least two of the regions, the distance to border was 1-3 km, sometimes zero.

BTW, is there reliable data about the Stalin line, second building stage (Kamenets-Podolsky), or the Far East fortifications? They would be a more adequate comparison.

Compared to which building stage? Were they superior to the 8 FR’s being built in 1939?

Kamenets-Podolsky was retained as a proving ground.

And until then?

I said that the volume of work stated by the NKVD to be necessary for getting the Stalin Line combat ready was quite possible to provide. So, why wasn’t it provided?

Suvorov gives the number of all the personnel in the civilian air fleet as 3927, including stewardesses.

Well, if the enemy attacks first, you don’t exactly get to choose the timeframe.

And from November 1940, too. And, you know, when at the very first day, an order is given to the fleet to sink all enemy ships including the Red Cross, it probably means some work was done beforehand.

Must have missed them. In what way are they better than the May 1941 plan?

They talk about order required from the beginning. Also, if these reserves are capable of providing the things necessary for defense, what’s bad about relying on them?

Just because defense is not expected as the main type of action, doesn’t mean it should be a bad defense. In what ways was the German defense under Yelnya lacking?

Zhukov’s report, when talking about offense gives as a standard a 60-70% mobilized defense of an opponent. Which includes all the components needed. Presumably, the Red Army is supposed to do better. In summer 1941, that hardly seems to have been the case. And where is that talk about fixed defenses? Reserves, maneuver and counterattacks seem to be the main tools. Tyulenev states explicitely that “The foundation of the modern defensive operation is artillery, tanks, aircraft.”

In 1939, 1940 and early 1941 the Military Comission of the SNK composed drafts of evacuation plans. In May 1941, the Soviet leadership felt that the border regions were already threatened enough so that the evacuation plan orders even slipped into military directives:
6. На случай вынужденного отхода разработать, согласно особых указаний, план эвакуации фабрик, заводов, банков и других хозяйственных предприятий, правительственных учреждений, складов, военного и государственного имущества, военнообязанных, средств транспорта и др.

Let’s see… You can’t just evacuate a factory. It must be evacuated somewhere. This somewhere must be decided upon, and then the plans must be coordinated with the administration there - In other words, such a plan must be developed at a level above a district. Yet here, the district is to develop the plan alone, no location is specified, nor any words about coordination. Looks like a decoy.

Maybe. And some will say that one fact’s a coincidence, three’s a pattern. In any event, it’s curious how many people tend to stick to criticizing this (quite unimportant) point.

The scientific method is to extrapolate. The theory of evolution, for example, has plenty of gaps which are filled with extrapolation, there is plenty of speculation… hasn’t lost to creationists yet.

BTW, concerning scientific method. Do all the researchers have access to all the wartime archives already?

For the USSR? That’s a contradiction in terms.

Yeah, almost. Perhaps the Soviets, with their intel, believed it more likely than others. (sigh) Of course, that can never go beyond speculation.

Figures, please.

And the construction of the MGU campus?

Also, at what point did they start complaining about his 1945 advancement in Asia? At what point did they actually take action?

Maybe. But it seems suspicious that he didn’t consider the possible negative effects. And there is his criticism of Stalin’s original (much milder) orders after the war. BTW, about being legalized… this is actually one order which couldn’t be, you know.

What victories? Leningrad?

I look at his works, and I see very little research. It’s all mottoes.

I don’t see any signs of these being his ideas. Where are the calculations? Triandafillov, in his book, makes calculations, shows how much force and ammo is needed to conduct a mobile operation, draws conclusions… we see thought. Admittedly, he hardly mentions tanks yet – because, as he states, tanks of the type required for deep operations are yet to be made in adequate quantity. Tukhachevsky doesn’t have that. Merely mottoes and political propaganda.

He supported a lot of new ideas. Recoilless guns, remotely controlled tanks, universal artillery systems, aircraft diesels, gyroplanes…

Yes, Douhet’s doctrine. Was nothing new at the time.

Then, why is Tukhachevsky the one always praised for warning of the German threat?

Mind giving some details about that order? Never heard of it.

Из доклада помощника японского военного атташе в Москве капитана Коотани в декабре 1937 года: «...Наибольшего нашего внимания требует та работа по популяризации и обучению авиации, которая проводится Осоавиахимом. На съезде Советов в ноябре прошлого года начальник штаба ВВС Хринин заявил: «Германия заявляет, что имеет 70 тысяч летчиков. Если так, то мы должны иметь 100 тысяч». Это было встречено бурными аплодисментами, и на следующий день со стороны рабочих одного ленинградского завода последовал призыв: «100 тысяч мало, подготовим 150 тысяч человек». Это перешло на практические рельсы, и в последнее время Россия готовит 150 тысяч летчиков.

Will he also go into the whole question of training pilots to see whether it is not possible to turn out a greater number of pilots? We have had Herr Hitler's statement that he has 70,000 pilots and the statement of Signor Mussolini that he has from 20,000 to 30,000 pilots, and I do not feel that we are training sufficient pilots in this country. There are in the towns many young men who ride motor-cycles and so on, and I believe they would be only too pleased to be trained to fly if they had the chance.

We're currently discussing vehicle speed, not strategic advancement.

I don’t remember him saying that in his latest books.

We are talking about 1939. What circumstances could demand concentration at the time? It’s not like Hitler could attack the USSR then.

The tanks they had were Pz 1-4 and two models of Czechoslovakian tanks. Out of these, only Pz 3-4 can be called better than T-26 (or not… well, whatever). But… they weren’t “most” of the German tank forces even in June 1941, not to mention 1939.

More reliable or not, they don’t tell what we want to know – how much was being actually done.

We’re not talking about secret data here.

You quote Suvorov saying the generals were being relocated, and your argument is… that the relocation was still incomplete?

Because it’s a secondary direction, where large scale Soviet offense wasn’t a guarantee (or was scheduled for a different time). Although in summer 1941, the Soviets did attack first in that area, you know.

Or it’s a result of the cadre shifts.

Could you quote, since Amazon isn't really keen on showing me the contents.

In some cases (e.g. river bank, favorable landscape features, etc.) the distance can indeed be very small - considering the circumstances. The Vladimir-Volynskiy UR certainly was one of the lower-depth ones. Reports mention the UR being 5-6 km deep which is well within the lower limits specified. Distance to the border, however, is not the entire depth of the UR. I guess that's where the confusion comes from.

Of course there is. 1938's Kamenets-Podolsky UR, for example, 3-5 km deep. Sebezhsky UR - 2-5 km. Slutsky UR - 3-5 km. Shepetovsky UR - 4-5 km. Starokonstantinovsky UR - 5 km. Ostropolsky 3-5 km. Izyaslavsky UR - 2-5 km. Please refer to this table. As for the Far East, Grodekovsky and Ust-Sungariysky UR seem to have a depth of 1-3 km both. By the way, the data on the new fortifications is also present in the table. You're very much welcome.

From the data that we have on hand it seems the USSR was busy with rearmament and construction of fortifications.

I mentioned that using convict labour for military construction was less acceptable than using convict labour for infrastructure projects.

In the North? I guess it hardly makes sense to expect such a gigantic number of GVF planes operating in the North.

Seems bullshit to me given the number of GVF airplanes (2575). Maybe that's just the pilots and stewardesses? Oh, okay, found it. That's just the "летно-подъемный состав", in other words just the permanent crew members. Which means that all the technicians and engineers, who may also act as test pilots, and all the airfield personnel servicing the planes, is a lot more massive. The total GVF staff was 42685 people, of them 21371 working in airplane operation and maintenance. I suppose my point's well proven - those who finished education but weren't good enough to be part of the permanent crew went on to fill secondary working positions in the GVF system. Which is quite normal. The GVF schools also continued to train pilots to replenish the cadres, since for an 40 000 men strong organization you'd have a certain turnover each year.

On the 28th of November the USSR denounced the non-agression pact with Finland. On the 29th it was already issuing orders to destroy the Finnish forces. On the 30th it attacked. However, there's more than that. On the 1st of October, for example, the Karelian NKVD started mandatory Finnish courses for their counter-intelligence forces. While not a clear sign of war, it is a sign of severe tensions. It is certain that the possibility of attack formed slowly during October. During November that possibility turned into strong resolve.

The documents are all there.

If they are unconcentrated, it is rather hard to rely on them.

It wasn't lacking per se, however, that was not deep defence which relied on fixed long-term fortifications. That was field defence, and one which was not pre-planned but was forced on the Germans by the situation - the failure of their attack.

All of that was present, but concentration and manning of FRs was certainly a weak point. The line directly above the one you quote says "Win time to concentrate forces"

However, the outdated stuff is pouring out from every sentence of that report. For example "In this case [defense planning in peacetime] when planning a defensive operation organizing the relocation or retreat to a pre-determined defensive line is not necessary". That same report by Tyulenev. What a load of crap.

In 1939, 1940 and early 1941 the Military Comission of the SNK composed drafts of evacuation plans. In May 1941, the Soviet leadership felt that the border regions were already threatened enough so that the evacuation plan orders even slipped into military directives:


It says "according to special instructions" which are the key element given at above district level.

The fact is that the Military Comission of the SNK composed drafts of evacuation plans at a national level. So the drafts were there. Moreover, after events of December 1940 the plan for creation of "reserve production plants" was put in action and more than 2900 so-called "twin plants" were created in the East far away from from the border regions. Your explanation?

When your entire theory is based on tangential points and baseless extrapolations with garbage use of numbers, I'd say every bit of criticism is warranted.

The theory of evolution is falsifiable.

Certainly not all, but there's plenty of material to work with (see above) which suggests that if there ain't a massive of documents related to an event, it is quite likely that there won't be one.

The construction of Palace of the Soviets was expected to cost 25 million rubles yearly. The Soviet GDP ca. 1937 was 136 billion rubles, in 1941 around 219 billion rubles. You can do the dividing yourself. For comparison, the entire 5-year construction of the TSIK house was 30 million rubles.

What of it? There was also another building in Zaryadie which was cancelled together with Palace of the Soviets. I guess there was some dastardly conspiracy there as well.

At no point of course, since there was a prior agreement which explicitly demanded the USSR attack the Japanese Empire. Which prior common agreement with the USSR any of the Western powers made? Oh right there was one about defending Czechoslovakia, but France and Britain shat on it.

That's wrong. Such measures have been legalized beforehand during the Civil War. As extreme-situation circumstances, of course, but nonetheless.

Berlin. And Leningrad, which didn't fell, also counts.

Even in the December 1940 conference the generals were constantly saying "how great Stalin teaches us" instead of actually basing their points on facts. You can't be much worse than that.

Not really. The correct evaluation of extreme importance of strategic bombing, for example, is given by T. in that very work. He also correctly mentions that more durable planes will be required to win in aerial battles and down enemy bombers. That all he mentions before 1938. Or his paragraph about modern ships being unprepared for aerial assault. This proved a real insight further along, in the 40s. I think "New problems of war" is quite prophetic in some aspects. Though not in all statements of course.

Remotely controlled tanks, sure. As for gyroplanes - they get only a short mention in his works as potentially progressive technologies. The bomber importance takes a whole paragraph.

Not much about rockets there either, not in the treatise above at least.

Of course it was new. Douhet's doctrine was well ahead of the strategic planning in the early 30s.

Unsure, not that I know anything about it.

Oh, but there's more. Now from Britain:

Commons debates on 25 May 1938
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debate/?i ... 25a.1327.3

The speed of vehicle is not important - the speed of advance is limited by the speed of the slowest moving combat element.

I don't remember any latest books from Rezun. We're in 2012.

I am talking about the fact that positioning of forces means more than their equipment at times. Quite often so.

Pz. Kpfw III and IV were superior to most of the Soviet park, not just T-26. And sure, they weren't most of the German park.

They actually do, but if you don't like what you read, I guess that's not my problem.

No, the fact that the general specifically mentioned (the one which was "in charge of the Front HQ") wasn't in fact relocated to the German border. Wasn't abandoning the internal districts. Wasn't moved. At all.