Omeganian wrote:In terms of percentage. Not absolute terms, of course, but I hardly think every single bunker was built on the banks of San.
I question the
very fact of large bunkers being built in significant numbers, because the reports come from Soviet intelligence, not from
internal German documentation. I hope you understand why. If someone's intelligence claims something, only internal documents can confirm it. Needless to say that even in our super-duper advanced age stuff like Yellocake forgeries is enough to start a war. You'd need to convince me with internal documentation, and any historian with a high standard of evidence would behave the same.
Higher standards - not "laxer standards". Especially in the light of a complete contradiction coming from Halder with the "
only field defenses" statement.
Omeganian wrote:I'm talking about the fact they praised its depth. They said a defense line should be deep, and away from the border. So... where is their own depth?
Mannerheim line - average distance 20-40 km away from the border, i.e. predpol'ie or forward field was 30 km average. Depth of fortifications - initially planned 2-3 km, later 6-7 km (that was the depth of Summajarvi fortified region which the RKKA broke through). Stalin line - fortification depth 1-2 km (Minsk, Volynsk, Mozyr fortified regions), sometimes 2-5 km. Forward field - 10-15 km average (examples Minsk, Mogilev-Podolsk, Novgorod-Volynsk FRs, etc.). Molotov line - lower depth 4-5 km, higher depth 5-16 km, forward field - 5-15 km. Maginot line didn't have a much greater forward field likewise - 4-16 km.
Omeganian wrote:For these 340 - only a dozen machine guns.
Rearmament means replacing worn-out equipment. If there be any equipment which is still in workable shape, that's not replaced. Not sure what you're trying to prove. Shipping a few dozen new machine guns to 340 MG nests is a reasonable rate of replacement in peacetime.
Omeganian wrote:Are you sure these weren't the bunkers standing incomplete since 1939?
I think if we're talking about the Kamenets-Podolsky and Karelsky fortified regions, the construction continued in 1940 and even in 1941, IIRC.
Omeganian wrote:Strange schedule. Did they expect the Germans to attack in September? Or did they expect they won't be able to mobilize until September?
I presume the latter. I think the USSR realistically estimated their abilities to mobilize and re-arm forces, and September 1941 was a good target date. If, as you say, it doesn't matter when and how you mobilize if you're the one who makes the mobilization decision, it is quite natural that the USSR simply thought it could perhaps begin any combat operations in Sep 1941 with a favourable disposition.
Omeganian wrote:Belomorkanal wasn't that small either. And there is the one Suvorov mentions being dug for the Pinsk flotilla - 127 km. Not meant for very large ships, but still.
BMK and Moscow-Volga required tens of thousands of dead, incidentally. And using prisoners on military construction might not have had a good effect. Don't know why, but Stalinist bureaucracy preferred to direct convict labour to industrial transport projects as opposed to purely military ones.
Omeganian wrote:Over a hundred thousand pilots trained, with only a few thousand people in the civilian service. How does that make Russia a "modern industrial economy"?
The GVF (civilian air fleet) said they require
33 thousand pilots already during the first Five-Year Plan (i.e. by 1933!). I'm sure the requirements for the GVF only grew.
Omeganian wrote:What defense?
Which is to be done in case of a sudden enemy attack, "relying on fortified regions". *shrugs* The one discussed, you know.
Omeganian wrote:Nah, logic.
Logic of the above-discussed events tell me that logic points to the USSR being unprepared and its leadership looking for a more convenient timeframe to adequately prepare its forces for war.
Omeganian wrote:Like the Soviets planning the Winter War? Where are the plans of that invasion?
There's a directive from 1939 which demands of the Soviet Navy to destroy navies of the Baltics and Finland, and there are documents (now declassified) how Soviet army should prepare provocations to declare a war on Finland. Are you unaware?
Omeganian wrote:And the unconcentrated reserves can provide the described organized battle order?
Um... of course. The "unconcentrated reserves", i.e. the 2nd echelon, was quite potent as it was in both units and manpower.
Omeganian wrote:Here are quotes (from bdsa.ru). The ones from after Barbarossa was approved. Sorry if mistakes were made during translation (there are some locations mentioned which I couldn't find on the net as they are spelled).
Uh... see the very beginning of my post.
Omeganian wrote:By giving time to concentrate for a more effective defense, as well as other types of action. I see no contradiction. After all, there is never too much defense.
So the USSR was making super-defensive war plans? Doesn't chime in well with the "best defense is offensive" motto and "beat the enemy on his own land".
Omeganian wrote:Both arguments are based on the assumption that the real life operation was identical to the plans, without the need to make significant adjustments... any evidence of that?
You said speed didn't matter in the war in Finland. I countered it with the fact that the USSR planned to win fast. Goalpost shifting much?
Omeganian wrote:Documents which show examples of such thinking?
I'll post them below.
Omeganian wrote:Seems to me it was shaken off quite well by December 1940.
By relying on fixed defense
In 1939, 1940 and early 1941 the Military Comission of the SNK composed drafts of evacuation plans. In May 1941, the Soviet leadership felt that the border regions were already threatened enough so that the evacuation plan orders even slipped into military directives:
6. На случай вынужденного отхода разработать, согласно особых указаний, план эвакуации фабрик, заводов, банков и других хозяйственных предприятий, правительственных учреждений, складов, военного и государственного имущества, военнообязанных, средств транспорта и др.
Omeganian wrote:It should've been abandoned because taking the parade was Stalin's duty. All you are saying is that there would have been no problem doing that.
And no problem doing anything else. The USSR's leadership never had problems with changing or upholding traditions for reasons that are not related to conspirology.
Omeganian wrote:Unfortunately, gaps are too common to avoid speculation.
History aims to fill them with documents and facts, not to speculate.
Omeganian wrote:Not for trading, for training its generals.
Why? Weimar was a friendly democracy.
Omeganian wrote:A gamble, you say? Not unusual for the Komintern.
Almost nobody could predict the evolution of Weimar in the 20s.
Omeganian wrote:Exactly. Allies of Germany when convenient, allies of the USA when convenient... proves absolutely nothing.
Just like, um... every other power? Poland was also an ally of Germany while convenient with the Pilsudski-Hitler agreement, and it also grabbed a piece of Czechoslovakia with the help of Germany. What does it prove? Nothing. Britain and France gambled with Germany turning East in 1938, what does this prove? Nothing.
Omeganian wrote:We are not talking about the GDP, we are talking about building a single large skyscraper.
In this case the cost of that skyscraper wouldn't be enough to "get started". End of answer.
Omeganian wrote:So... what changed that the project was abandoned?
Slow demise of Stalinist architecture.
Omeganian wrote:Suvorov can still find enough to criticize. You have a problem with the examples he gives - well, details?
I have a problem with speculation instead of facts and documents, misquotes and the like. Legitimate research is only welcome.
Omeganian wrote:Western indifference to Soviet attacks on other countries, however, is a fact. Without the Germans capturing/destroying half the Soviet industry and conquering territory, neutrality of the West would have been quite acceptable for Stalin.
Western indifference to German attacks on other countries is also a fact. They chose to stick up for Poland, however. Too much expansion.
Omeganian wrote:And how does all this prove Britain would have had a negative reaction?
See above.
Omeganian wrote:In close proximity to their own cities?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_radi ... t_research
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Castle_Bravo
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Plumbbob
Omeganian wrote:So what? Was it legal to issue?
Legality doesn't matter; it was immoral. War crimes often are legalized. The key is that Zhukov's order was immoral. In any case, it never came to execution of the order.
Omeganian wrote:Zhukov was the one with the worst defeats.
That evens out with the greatest victories, duh.
Omeganian wrote:Then why did he advance? Nothing can change the fact that this is idiocy.
RKKA wasn't a stellar Army in the Civil War too, and most of Tukh's research was done in the post-war era.
Omeganian wrote:What are the works saying, exactly? Are they giving actual figures? Are the figures valid (mathematics wasn't his strong suite)? He had a lot of demagoguery (and technobabble obsession), but little actual theory.
http://militera.lib.ru/science/tuhachevsky/index.html
In his treatise on air and motor mechanization, Tukh. correctly predicted a lot of stuff. Most notably the jet revolution, one of the most important things in military aviation in general and in strategic bombing as well. He notes that airpower became so advanced that air assaults and bombing campaigns will become military operations of their own, often more important than joint action with ground forces (in 1943-1944 vindicated by the Allied bombing campaign in Germany). And many other wise things.
Omeganian wrote:So, he went along with completely idiotic ideas (or started them)... And you don't doubt his ability? Besides, we're not talking about the twenties. He wrote the article in 1932, and conversion experiments were conducted even later.
Everyone produces good and bad ideas. It is unfair to select just one bad idea and trump it all over. By that logic, Joseph Stalin would be the master of bad ideas, he had more than a few of them.
Omeganian wrote:How about the one where he said that in 1935 that Germany was building 9 battleships... at the time when only two were ordered, and it's unclear whether they were battleships or battlecruisers?
The USSR had a habit of Nazi scares. In 1936, the Soviets learned of Hitler's "70000 pilots" order and started trumping the 150000 pilots figure as an answer.
Omeganian wrote:The problems with Russian terrain are well known.
Didn't seriously impact the speed of German advance.
Omeganian wrote:What is this obsession of yours with roads and wheels?
Not mine, Rezun's. He said the instructions/textbooks say BTs have to primarily use wheels. That was shown to be wrong (explicitly prohibited!), that's all.
Omeganian wrote:A disadvantage in mobility, but the armor and armament were similar. With a 100% numerical advantage, I wouldn't hurry to dismiss them.
Being de-concentrated means they'd fail to do a difference, like most of Soviet stuff. KV and T-34s at least could make a difference even in smaller numbers due to quality superiority, but the older models - in a situation of dispersal they were doomed.
Omeganian wrote:You were the one who started the talk about Suvorov arguing the relative inefficiency of the German tanks - and that's exactly his point. He argues that without mentioning T-26 - any type fitting the description works.
I said Germans built good models as well, and most of their tanks were better than the Soviet
most numerous tank (the T-26). Numerous matters, because with dispersal, this tank was the mainstay of the forces.
Omeganian wrote:The Germans had enough of the older machines for it to deal with. And I believe we are discussing 1939, too.
See above - my point clarified.
Omeganian wrote:And Pz-I couldn't keep up with infantry on Russian roads. Doesn't tell much about the maximum speed under other conditions.
Once again, we're quibbling about minor details. Technical top speed is irrelevant.
Omeganian wrote:I ask about actual work done, not paper.
Internal documents about shipments are much more reliable than foreign intelligence. See above.
Omeganian wrote:Is there evidence of such a false belief?
Of course. The
whole concept (and it was quoted many times from the conference records in this very thread, no need to requote) revolves around unmobilized forces meeting the attacker relying on fixed defences and hold him off while the rest mobilize, concentrate and deploy. Clearly not a sound idea.
Omeganian wrote:So what? In 1941, German tanks had 30mm armor. It was better that in 1939. It was the best they had. But it doesn't mean it was adequate.
Um... but the question wasn't about adequate. The question was whether the Molotov line defences were superior to the Stalin line, not whether they were adequate. They were superior, that's all. Now I understand you're not Rezun, so you might not hold that point as relevant (especially as you agreed that the situation on the Stalin line was critical long before) - but Rezun does make a point out of it.
Omeganian wrote:Why is that?
Only technical documentation of the relevant nation on exploitation of their own hardware or technical documentation on the exploitation of trophy hardware would be relevant. If you'd list a German tech doc from 1941-1942 after they captured Soviet trophy tanks that would give the characteristics, that would be a good and valid source. Access and ability to test and run the equipment matters. Soviet reports on the characteristics of M1 Abrams aren't the same as those characteristics, and vice-versa.
Omeganian wrote:Speculation is for filling gaps. With a conspiracy, you often have too much of these.
Speculation is the field of conspiracy theorists. History aims to work with documents, existing evidence and facts. If there are no facts, you can speculate endlessly and the speculation wouldn't be worth much more than any other speculation. The scientific method is to find facts, not invent them.
Omeganian wrote:Figures for Soviet guns are at the bottom of the table.
The Three's gun (37-mm KwK 35/36 L/45) could utilize Pzgr.40, giving it a huge edge over the Soviet 45-mm. With ordinary munitions, it was slightly worse, sure. As for the moving generals, Rezun simply says:
Итак, под прикрытием Сообщения ТАСС военные командиры высших рангов во главе армий, и один даже во главе штаба фронта, тайно перебрасываются к германским границам, бросив на произвол судьбы (и НКВД) ВСЕ внутренние военные округа
That's an obvious wrong. Not only Konev didn't leave, but Siberian, Arkhangelsk, etc. command was still remaining in their places, as far as I remember.
Omeganian wrote:We saw a witness stating it was neglected. What does it matter that some piece of paper states it shouldn't have been?
Who said the Karelian fortified region was neglected? Why should his claims be considered seriously? Nobody did. Neglecting parts of the Stalin line was more than natural - the line was deeper than a hundred kilometers away from the border, it was older and often obsolete (compared to the Molotov line, which was, as you said, inadequate too, but at least it was more modern and had better fortifications on the average). However, parts which were still relevant - e.g. the Karelian Fortified Region - were upgraded and improved:
В августе 1940 г. было сформировано Управление, получившее наименование 22 Укрепленного района, который объединил крепостные пулеметные батальоны.
После советско-финской войны командование Ленинградского военного округа приняло ряд серьезных мер к укреплению в инженерном отношении рубежа и повышению боеготовности частей. Силами частей Укрепленного района, инженерных частей округа, а в начале войны и жителей города, были построены боевые соружения, которыми заполнены промежутки между батальонными узлами и ротными опорными пунктами и значительно усилена противотанковая оборона, особенно на дорожных направлениях. Всего было построено артиллерийских железобетонных сооружений - 15, пулеметных и артиллерийских сооружений деревянно-земляных и сваренных из корабельной брони - 114.
Весной [1941 г.] в части был призван приписной состав, как рядовой, так и командный, и с ним организована усиленная подготовка.
Note that these measures were carried out between the Winter War and the Great Patriotic War.
Why would you do that, if you determine the date and place of attack? The only reasonable threat to the USSR at large from the Finnish direction was German troops attacking through Finland with the support of the Finnish army; Finland on its own was hardly capable of executing a grand attack. The Soviet leadership was aptly preparing what they saw as reasonable defenses - the inadequacy of both defenses themselves new and old alike, and also inadequacy of the very concept of relying on a fixed defense line aside - I can't see what's wrong with my point here.
Omeganian wrote:Well, there is this. Admittedly, it does show that the situation didn't grow bad until much later, at least to the north - since, apparently, it had to be fortified "to free up forces for the main grouping in the south". Makes an impression of numerous revisions to the plans.
It sure does:
Осенью 1939 года УРы оказались далеко от границы. Предстояло решить, как использовать их в дальнейшем. Начальник Главного военно-инженерного управления Красной Армии предложил использовать их в качестве «второй укрепленной полосы» и в связи с этим сохранить их оборудование и вооружение. Но поздней осенью 1939 года был отдан приказ о консервации укрепленных районов...
Затем, в феврале 1940 года, было принято решение: УРы на старой границе не консервировать, а содержать в боевой готовности до возведения УРов по новой границе. Весной 1940 года численность кадрового состава войск укреплённых районов была установлена в 75 тысяч человек.
А проверка, произведённая комиссией Генштаба РККА в конце декабря 1940 года, показала, что пулемётные батальоны УРов Западного особого военного округа по установленному штату мирного времени рядовым и младшим начальствующим (то есть сержантским) составом были укомплектованы полностью. Четыре белорусских укрепрайона - Полоцкий, Минский, Мозырский и Слуцкий - имели тогда в сумме 876 долговременных сооружений (в подавляющем большинстве - пулемётных), из них только 145 сооружений Слуцкого УРа - без вооружения.
Так, «Мобилизационный план № 23», составленный в феврале 1941 года Геншабом РККА, предусматривал увеличение количества управлений укреплённых районов (включая Дальний Восток) до 44-х, а численность личного состава развёрнутых по военному времени войск УРов предполагалось довести до 248,4 (по другим данным - 239,6) тысячи человек. Затем, весной 1941 года последовало распоряжение о формировании управлений комендантов укрепрайонов даже для находящихся в консервации - в целях осуществления ими мероприятий, направленных на «использование указанных укрепрайонов в военное время».
And so, in February 1940 the old FRs were deemed to have to be kept operational until new ones were completed. In December 1940 fortified FRs of ZapOVO were fully complect with commanders. That's good caution, if you ask me. And the Spring 1941 order to form commands - even of fortified regions on
conservation - to "conduct measures for use of listed fortified regions in wartime" is clearly a pre-war caution as well, and one which presumes a rather unfortunate turn of events for the USSR - if the enemy never reaches the conserved fortifications, that is unnecessary. That all mixes well with the idea of the USSR being uncertain and threatened, even if bombastic in propaganda, and it doesn't mix with the idea of an overconfident USSR.