No missile shield in Eastern Europe

[Big Orange]

This could be seen as trying to pull back on one of Bush's more ambitious/belligerent foreign policies and cut back on the military spending that is straining a crippled US economy without seeing any adverse affects on the rest of the military (missile defence shields are as expensive as they are dormant).

[Axis Kast]

Missile defense proponents, of course, go much further, stating that missile defense provides a reliable (and some insist the only) way to counter emerging missile threats.

I'll leave it to functional testing to decide whether missile defense, as implemented by any administration, is going to be reliable. Cost, too, needs to come into it. However, missile defense is one alternative amongst a number of essentially unappealing options, including preventive attack (which may entail still larger costs), passive absorption, "classic" deterrence, and negotiation/appeasement.

The fundamental problem with this argument is that missile defense will never live up to these expectations. Let me say that again: Missile defense will never make a shred of difference when it comes to its primary mission--protecting a country from the threat of a nuclear missile attack. That isn't to say that advanced sensors and interceptors someday won't be able to deal with sophisticated missiles and decoys. They probably will. But again, this won't overcome the fundamental challenge of keeping a nation safe against a nuclear threat, because it would take only a small probability of success to make such a threat credible while missile defense would need to offer absolute certainty of protection to truly be effective.

Missile defense is more or less useful under different circumstances. Podvig's strawman - "It'll never work with 100% effectiveness, and therefore must be worthless" - is either very clever or very foolish.
First, a threat may have different degrees of credibility, and can be viewed from both sides of the fence. The presence of a missile defense system imposes higher premiums on the attack even when the defender tends to take a pessimist's view and plans to treat the probability of penetration as 100%.
Second, missile defense may be a cost-effective answer to missiles fired by accident or by "rogue" forces who do not believe they are subject to any retaliation, and therefore aren't susceptible to Waltzian logic of mutual assured destruction.

So when all of the uncertainties in missile and warhead performance are added up, the chance of success probably wouldn't be higher than a few percent (which, by the way, is considered a highly potent threat worthy of a multibillion dollar investment in missile defense). Missile defense eventually might be able to reduce that chance, maybe even considerably, but it will never reduce it to zero. In other words, the defending side would still face a threat that isn't much less credible than it was without missile defense.

So... missile defense reduces the chance of penetration considerably... but doesn't make the threat significantly less credible? Podvig is clearly playing without a full bag of marbles.

[Vympel]

Do the Russians not have shorter-ranged ballistic missiles that they might reasonably want to shoot over Poland in a war? I could have sworn they did, but I could be wrong.

No. The Russians have the Tochka-U, which is a strictly battlefield weapon, and the Iskander-M, which is a 400km SRBM. They don't have MRBMs (just like the US doesn't) due to the INF Treaty. I've expected the Russians to pull out of that and start building them again - maybe a modernised version of the SS-20, which was the last generation of Soviet MRBMs that INF banned, IIRC.

[Sea Skimmer]

No. The Russians have the Tochka-U, which is a strictly battlefield weapon, and the Iskander-M, which is a 400km SRBM. They don't have MRBMs (just like the US doesn't) due to the INF Treaty. I've expected the Russians to pull out of that and start building them again - maybe a modernised version of the SS-20, which was the last generation of Soviet MRBMs that INF banned, IIRC.

SS-20 is an IRBM. The Soviets had several different follow on IRBM projects for it, at least one of which did reach the test firing stage, and which unlike SS-20 had provisions for conventional warheads. INF killed them all, but they still might be the basis for a new weapon. I don’t see that happening though, it makes way more sense to scale up Tochka.

[MKSheppard]

Vympel, please don't post such garbage from Povdig again.

That isn't to say that advanced sensors and interceptors someday won't be able to deal with sophisticated missiles and decoys.

They already are. As previously mentioned in another thread on SDN; what differentates a decoy from a real warhead?

The materials and coatings applied to the real warhead to allow it to survive it's plunge through earth's atmosphere. Thus, they have distinctive IR and radar signatures compared to inflatable balloons; even if both the warhead and decoy are the exact same shape and dimensioned the same.

If the decoys aren't inflatable balloons; well you just wasted a lot of precious weight and volume on the warhead bus for nothing.

[MKSheppard]

Seabased BMD? It's nothing but a chimaera -- a myth.

Right now, we have just SM-3 installed on a couple cruisers and destroyers -- the plan is to eventually expand the modernizations of the AEGIS system enabling it to perform in the BMD mode to all the AEGIS ships in the fleet.

These modernizations are pretty expensive, as they also add some pretty powerful capabilities to the SPY-1 itself via new components, etc.

Even with this; the Navy can only handle theater level defense unless they're in a perfect location to intercept a strategic missile shortly after launch (say, from a cruiser based off the coast of Iran).

The kinematics of the SM-3 missile inherently limit Navy Sea-Based; it's just too small, it has to be in order to fit into existing VLS cells of the Navy's fleet.

So the Navy in order to perform Strategic ABM, as opposed to Tactical ABM; must station cruisers very close to the areas that are to be guarded. Because you need three ships to maintain one on station at any one time; even a simple barriage line of four ships along a coastline would require 12 ships, which is a not trivial fraction of the Navy's AEGIS fleet.

By contrast, GBI (and the cancelled KEI) are not limited by this constraint, and can be much, much, much larger; and more energetic; allowing a huge increase in area covered, and longer ranged intercepts, ie. how a single site in Alaska can defend virtually all of CONUS.

The Navy isn't going to obtain the same capability as land based ABM unless it invests in a totally new class of cruiser with VLS cells sized to carry GBI/KEI class missiles. And then they'd have to "Marinize" the GBI for duty on cruisers, or develop their own GBI-sized missile.

This is going to take far far longer than it would to dig more silos and deploy more GBIs.

[K. A. Pital]

Seabased BMD? It's nothing but a chimaera -- a myth.

Right now, we have just SM-3 installed on a couple cruisers and destroyers -- the plan is to eventually expand the modernizations of the AEGIS system enabling it to perform in the BMD mode to all the AEGIS ships in the fleet.

These modernizations are pretty expensive, as they also add some pretty powerful capabilities to the SPY-1 itself via new components, etc.

You just refuted your own words. You're making all missile cruisers BMD-capable (which would be a total breach of the late ABM treaty were it still in effect, by the way, since space or sea based ABM was banned). SM-3 is a perfectly capable weapon for dealing with a freak attack. Naturally, such an attack would not come without prior tensions between America/NATO and "rogue" state "X".

This is going to take far far longer than it would to dig more silos and deploy more GBIs.

Aren't silo deployed interceptors like teh GBI or the Moscow ABM system Azov missiles very expensive and high-performance exoatmospheric missiles that rival, cost-wise, the production of ICBMs themselves? (I heard that the actual cost of the Azov missile was reported to be far higher than the ICBM, despite it requiring a silo for launch all the same)

However, missile defense is one alternative amongst a number of essentially unappealing options, including preventive attack (which may entail still larger costs), passive absorption, "classic" deterrence, and negotiation/appeasement.

Classic deterrence and preventive attack seemed to work pretty well so far. If those options are so unappealing, why do the politicians and generals both routinely choose them for the Xth decade since the first ABM attempts were laid back in deployment? Perhaps it's not as cost effective as those options, or not as politically viable.

[MKSheppard]

You just refuted your own words.

How so? Seabased sounds "sexy" and and appears to be the solution to the problem of basing rights. But it's when you look at it more closely; it falls apart.

If they had gone with Sea Based BMD for protection of CONUS; it would have required a not insignificant fraction of the US Navy's fleet permanently moored off both coasts of the US providing ABM protection.

By contrast, land based BMD with GBI needs only a few battalions of soldiers to man and run it at Fort Greely.

But that's what you get when you compare the two systems:

SM-3: 3,000~ lb missile/booster that must fit into existing VLS cells on US Navy Warships (22” diameter, 257” length maximum allowable missile dimensions).

GBI: 28,000 lb missile that is deployed in it's own purpose built silo. It's not for nothing that when you compare area ABM missile sizes; all the operational systems trend to 20,000+ lb missiles (the Soviet/Russian ABM, the SPARTAN component of SAFEGUARD).

You're making all missile cruisers BMD-capable (which would be a total breach of the late ABM treaty were it still in effect, by the way, since space or sea based ABM was banned). SM-3 is a perfectly capable weapon for dealing with a freak attack.

Only if the cruiser is in the right position at the right time. SM-3 is just limited in it's kinematic abilities; because like I said before, it's got to be weight and size limited to fit into VLS cells.

Aren't silo deployed interceptors like teh GBI or the Moscow ABM system Azov missiles very expensive and high-performance exoatmospheric missiles that rival, cost-wise, the production of ICBMs themselves?

While GBI is supposedly $70 million a missile, and SM-3 supposedly $10-15 million; it leaves out the fact that the majority of costs in any ABM system are C3I; and with GBI; you just need one site to protect a continental landmass -- thus you only need one C3I Complex. Meanwhile, with SM-3; you need a lot more sites to cover the same area -- and the cost of running a Burke or Tico isn't inconsequential.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

What exactly is the difference between the C3I of an ICBM system and an ABM system? Isn't the ABM system a bit more demanding than the ICBM in terms of C3I since the former needs a sophisticated array of radars and cross country data links?

[MKSheppard]

What exactly is the difference between the C3I of an ICBM system and an ABM system? Isn't the ABM system a bit more demanding than the ICBM in terms of C3I since the former needs a sophisticated array of radars and cross country data links?

C3I of an ICBM system must survive a nuclear attack, because ICBMs can't be recalled. This is not cheap.

In an ABM system, the C3I system doesn't really need to survive a nuclear attack. Once the missiles fly, it's done it's job.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

In an ABM system, the C3I system doesn't really need to survive a nuclear attack. Once the missiles fly, it's done it's job.

Doesn't the C3I system need to.. survive the duration of an attack at the least which will entail multiple launches to deal with multiple ICBMs?

[K. A. Pital]

In an ABM system, the C3I system doesn't really need to survive a nuclear attack.

Space tracking facilities which is what ABM command points are, aren't cheap either, Shep.

[TimothyC]

Wee - Super mega Ultra Post!

You just refuted your own words. You're making all missile cruisers BMD-capable (which would be a total breach of the late ABM treaty were it still in effect, by the way, since space or sea based ABM was banned). SM-3 is a perfectly capable weapon for dealing with a freak attack. Naturally, such an attack would not come without prior tensions between America/NATO and "rogue" state "X".

No it isn't (for the US)because keeping one Tico or Burke on station requires a total of three ships. That eats into the 77 AEGIS ships that we have very quickly.

This is going to take far far longer than it would to dig more silos and deploy more GBIs.

Aren't silo deployed interceptors like teh GBI or the Moscow ABM system Azov missiles very expensive and high-performance exoatmospheric missiles that rival, cost-wise, the production of ICBMs themselves? (I heard that the actual cost of the Azov missile was reported to be far higher than the ICBM, despite it requiring a silo for launch all the same)

SM-3s cost about 10 million USD a pop, THAAD, about 8, and the figure I saw a while back for GBI's Kill Vehicle put it about 20, so the missile probably wouldn't be more than 100 or so. The whole system costs less than and ICBM system.

Classic deterrence and preventive attack seemed to work pretty well so far.

Then I want you to call for the elimination of the Moscow system.

If those options are so unappealing, why do the politicians and generals both routinely choose them for the Xth decade since the first ABM attempts were laid back in deployment? Perhaps it's not as cost effective as those options, or not as politically viable.

Because Politician can be stupid spinless morons who (in the US) need to be reminded of their oath:

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

This could be seen as trying to pull back on one of Bush's more ambitious/belligerent foreign policies and cut back on the military spending that is straining a crippled US economy without seeing any adverse affects on the rest of the military (missile defence shields are as expensive as they are dormant).

Missile Defense costs less than other things that Zero is up to.

I'll quote Stuart to bring the point home:

BMD costs around USD9 to 10 billion per year. That's out of a USD532 billion defense budget. So, BMD costs us less than 2 percent of all defense expenditures. Also, we're over the peak now, the RDTE is pretty much completed on the near-generation systems and most of the real money is in production. So, we can add a lot of extra missiles for relatively little cost. We laos have a line of coutries ready to pay money for BMD systems and its quite likely we'll actually end up making money on the production side of the program.

Ooor ... maybe it will provide a better outcome for the United States to be able to work with Russia and use a missile shield as a bargaining tool to extract concessions from Russia in negotiation, rather than declaring unilaterally that we will build our shield? You know, rational people (and countries) respond to tit-for-tat, and appreciate not being trodden all over.

As others have said Putin has refused to allow the Iran and the GBI site in Eastern Europe to be coupled. As for nations not being trodden all over, this comes out 70 years to the day after The USSR invaded Poland. That shows that Obama is either telling eastern Europe that we don't care what happens to them, or the worse option - He, and his administration are even more incompetant then the Bush Administration ever was.

PS- "Appease" is a loaded word; you shouldn't use it unless you're absolutely certain that Putin will be as impossible to negotiate with as Hitler.

I trust Putin to be a rational player, and squeeze the US for every concession he thinks he can get.

PPS- Why is it important for America to assert strong geopolitical influence in eastern Europe? Maybe having a better negotiation position with Russia is worth the price?

Is it worth backing out on an ally? Is it worth saying (by our actions) to other Allies that we might back out on them too?

Wait help me out here.

Is someone really referring to the President as 'Zero' in HPCA-hilarity and expecting to be taken seriously? This is the first I've seen of it here.

Let me turn that around for you:

Wait help me out here.

Is someone really referring to the President as 'Shrub' in SDN-hilarity and expecting to be taken seriously? This is the first I've seen of it here.

I'll keep calling Zero Zero because he's a hindrance on the Furthering of American Foreign Policy.

[Vympel]

Vympel, please don't post such garbage from Povdig again.

Povdig's an expert in his own right, his opinions on its uselessness (as he sees it - i.e. safeguarding a nation from attack, as opposed to all the "extract a higher premium" argument) are quite legitimate to post. Further, that he's not enamoured of ballistic missile defense is hardly a controversial position in the field.

They already are.

Who says? Do the kill vehicles currently deployed have any ability to differentiate? Have they ever been tested to do this?

As others have said Putin has refused to allow the Iran and the GBI site in Eastern Europe to be coupled. As for nations not being trodden all over, this comes out 70 years to the day after The USSR invaded Poland. That shows that Obama is either telling eastern Europe that we don't care what happens to them, or the worse option - He, and his administration are even more incompetant then the Bush Administration ever was.

So missile defences in Poland vs Iran have something to do with defending Poland against Russia, now? Forgive me if I find the fake symbolism laughable.

Also, your pompous recitation of the oath of office is just hilarious - apparently you think there's something in that oath that obliges the executive branch to spare no expense in whatever weapon system you have a hard-on for, as opposed to being very general? Or are you asserting that America was somehow not defended against nuclear attack for some 60+ years?

I'll keep calling Zero Zero because he's a hindrance on the Furthering of American Foreign Policy.

And The Furthering of American Foreign Policy ( ) is defined as .... what?

[MKSheppard]

Povdig's an expert in his own right

Yet he parrots tired old tropes instead of doing any fucking critical thinking at all.

Who says?

Simple fucking logic. We already have IR/EO optical heads on our kill vehicles; and an inflatible decoy will have a different IR spectra than a actual re-entry vehicle. Never mind that nuclear armed RVs have a quite unique IR signature -- here's a fucking hint -- Plutonium is warm to the touch, it generates it's own heat. Over the years that a missile would sit waiting to be fired, the plutonium would hot soak the RV over time; and when you're looking at something with a supercooled IR head, you can see quite minute differences.

Not to mention that when you rapidly inflate something, it cools down from gas expansion -- ever feel those compressed cans of air after spraying them around for a bit? Imagine the temperature of a inflatable ballon after it's been blown up in a second or two.

[Vympel]

Simple fucking logic. We already have IR/EO optical heads on our kill vehicles; and an inflatible decoy will have a different IR spectra than a actual re-entry vehicle. Never mind that nuclear armed RVs have a quite unique IR signature -- here's a fucking hint -- Plutonium is warm to the touch, it generates it's own heat. Over the years that a missile would sit waiting to be fired, the plutonium would hot soak the RV over time; and when you're looking at something with a supercooled IR head, you can see quite minute differences.

Not to mention that when you rapidly inflate something, it cools down from gas expansion -- ever feel those compressed cans of air after spraying them around for a bit? Imagine the temperature of a inflatable ballon after it's been blown up in a second or two.

That's not an answer to the question. I asked whether they had the ability to differentiate, not whether there was something to differentiate. The mere presence of IR/EO heads on the kill vehicles doesn't prove that capability, and I take it from your lack of response that this has never been tested? In other words, Povdig's statement is not a gross falsehood, but the only thing a reasonable person can say - it's unknown whether they can currently deal with 'sophisticated missiles and decoys'.

It's not about Russia, AEGIS based defense was always a better solution, and Obering's less than forthright

[PeZook]

Is it worth backing out on an ally? Is it worth saying (by our actions) to other Allies that we might back out on them too?

You know, now that Americans decided to give us an actual, armed battery of Patriots, your point is kinda strange.

Obama is doing some maneuvering: he shelved GBI, then announced America will try to build a new system incorporating more NATO members ; He appeased Russia, and then suddendly Poland is getting an actual SAM battery with actual missiles.

His administration is better at this than you give them credit for.

[MKSheppard]

What I love is Arms Control Wonk has no idea how ships are actually deployed. If you wanted 10 AEGIS shooters on station, you would need 30 AEGIS ships minimum, because for each station, you would need:

1 ship undergoing post deployement refit and repairs
1 ship undergoing pre-deployment shakedown and trials
1 ship actually on station.

Obering added a fourth ship to the above rule of thumb for deployed ships -- I wonder about that.

[Vympel]

Obama is doing some maneuvering: he shelved GBI, then announced America will try to build a new system incorporating more NATO members ; He appeased Russia, and then suddendly Poland is getting an actual SAM battery with actual missiles.

Why is America obliged to give Poland anything? Are they buying it? Who cares about Patriot, anyway? It's not like it's some sort of credible defence against a Russian attack, that's what all of NATO is for.

[MKSheppard]

Obama is doing some maneuvering: he shelved GBI, then announced America will try to build a new system incorporating more NATO members

I've concluded that shifting the emphasis onto SM-3 is a carefully calculated move by Obama -- he could have gone for Land-Based THAAD, which is actually operational, with about the same range as SM-3; but with the added bonus of engaging in-atmosphere targets (SM-3 is exoatmospheric). Land Based THAAD has already been deployed operationally -- in Hawaii -- so building several extra firing batteries and deploying them shouldn't be hard to add into the FY11 or FY12 budget.

But Obama didn't do that. Instead, he hung the future of ABM onto a notational "land based" SM-3; and no doubt when the notational land based SM-3 encounters difficulties in development as they convert it from a ship based system to a land based system (here's a hint, on a ship C3I is pretty easy since the sensors and weapons are very close to each other; on land, your C3I is much messier); Obama will have all the excuses he needs to cancel it, leaving NATO with no real theater defenses.

And Pezook, there's already a ABM system incoporating NATO Members. It's called MEADS, and is presently under development, and will incoporate the Patriot PAC-3 Block II missile, with a more powerful motor allowing greater ranges. The problem is, it has a relatively short protective range; about 40-50 km, enough to protect a city; but meaning you have to wallpaper a country with it for effective protection.

[PeZook]

Why is America obliged to give Poland anything? Are they buying it? Who cares about Patriot, anyway? It's not like it's some sort of credible defence against a Russian attack, that's what all of NATO is for.

You missed my point. The point is that despite backing off from the deal, we're still getting the battery anyway. In light of this, it's kind of hard to claim Obama is "backing out on US allies", since the US doesn't get anything in return for that battery save for brownie points.

[MKSheppard]

That's not an answer to the question. I asked whether they had the ability to differentiate, not whether there was something to differentiate.

This is the imagery from the IIR Seeker head on the AIM-9X Sidewinder. Note the detail. Somehow, I'd like to think the IIR seeker head on the EKV is a bit more advanced than that of a mere air to air missile which shoots down fighters.

That's the biggest problem with the ABM debate, it's always been about one side; the anti-ABMers outright lying or making up information from bullshit, while the pro-ABM side is inherently limited in how much they can respond to outright lies; because the information they have is classified -- like for example, I've only been able to get rough details on the experiments we carried out in 1988 under SDIO's aegis; the Delta-181 Thrusted Vector Experiment, which involved placing decoys into orbit and then training every kind of sensor we had (IR, radar, ladar, UV, etc) at them from an accompanying sensor vehicle.

[Vympel]

This is the imagery from the IIR Seeker head on the AIM-9X Sidewinder. Note the detail. Somehow, I'd like to think the IIR seeker head on the EKV is a bit more advanced than that of a mere air to air missile which shoots down fighters.

And yet, they have so far not tested whether the seeker can ignore decoys (whether balloons or not), have they?. You are not reading what Povdig is saying properly. The meaning of this is clear:-

That isn't to say that advanced sensors and interceptors someday won't be able to deal with sophisticated missiles and decoys. They probably will. But again, this won't overcome the fundamental challenge

His focus has fuck all to do with sensors and decoys whatsoever- i.e. technical minutae. He doesn't give a shit about that.

It will be interesting to see this missile defence review that was supposed to be revealed, because it was supposed to be very critical of the entire Eastern Europe thing.

[MKSheppard]

And yet, they have so far not tested whether the seeker can ignore decoys (whether balloons or not), have they?

They actually had a test planned for that and carried it out. Guess what? The fucking decoys hung up and didn't deploy properly.

[MKSheppard]

His focus has fuck all to do with sensors and decoys whatsoever- i.e. technical minutae. He doesn't give a shit about that.

So I see he's a subhuman moron who doesn't understand the fact that we operate on a look-shoot-shoot-look system, ensuring kills even if an interceptor fails to malfunction. One of the "failed" ABM tests was because the interceptor hung up in it's silo -- which completely ruined the test.

In a true operational environment, the operators would have been expecting two missiles to be launched, and when only one went up; they'd go "aw damn it, a hung missile -- time to call the EOD guys to clear it".

Additionally he can't even comprehend the concept of virtual attrition -- which is kind of funny, considering how the Soviet Air and Missile defense system reduced the number of cities the British nuclear deterrent could destroy from 200 in the late 50s with the V-Bomber force, to just one city (moscow) with Polaris Chevaline.