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I still wonder, though, about whether that might have changed once American shipping in Allied waters was safely out of the line of fire. We obviously care if our own freighters are getting torpedoed; how much would we care if it was just Norwegian and Dutch ships and the like?

Deathstalker wrote:To add the WWI discussion, England was living on borrowed time itself as far as starvation. Britain was losing merchant ships hand over fist to U boats, and if I recall, no one knew how bad it was and by the time they realized they were out of merchant ships, it would be to late. Another year of war, without US ships to help convoys, may have Britain reach a starvation point before the Germans. And the Germans could always buy or bully a continental power for food and have it delivered by rail.

The basic presumption is that unrestricted submarine warfare and US entry on the CP side are mutually exclusive. The OA (original assumption) was that the US joined the CP because the Brits were killing Americans smuggling goods to the CP. That's a very unlikely OA I admit but if that truly was the situation, an unrestricted submarine campaign would throw the US to the entente.

On a more basic level, the U-boat threat to the UK was not causing it to "live on borrowed time". It caused a crisis certainly but British countermeasures, most notably the introduction of convoying and the construction of specialized ASW escorts brought the situation under control. In fact, by 1918, the RN actually had greater operational expertise in ASW - and better equipment - than it did in 1939 (yes, the loss of expertise was that great). For example, in 1918, British ASW ships were using towed arrays and had SOSUS-like underwater sensors. The unrestricted U-boat campaign failed.

Reparations

Are out. The US wouldn't pay them and the Entente had no means of forcing them to do so. I believe the "Sorry about that" peace treaty is the most likely result. Basically everybody agrees to pretend the US declaration of war in 1917 never happened and everything that stemmed from it was a delusion caused by swilling too much cognac at a diplomatic reception. It's the simplest way out for everybody.

With the cost of sustaining another two years of war without the support of the United States, Stuart? I don't think so; the size of the lost generation will be much larger, and the industry of the country strained to the breaking point.

Agreed, no argument there either. However, a lot of assets in the UK did actually exist. (Lloyd George refused to deploy them to France, officially to prevent Haig launching more offensives, actually as part of his personal vendetta against Haig. So, there is capital that can be run down to push Germany out of the war. A competent allied strategic looking at the situation will see the CP are now split into two sections with the Atlantic between them. Germany is dying on the ropes and nothing can save it short of a miracle. So, the grand strategy would be to knock Germany out of the war quickly before America can properly mobilize and then either strike a deal with the United States or fight the war there. preferably the former. Note that this is a neat reversal of the actual strategic situation that existed at the start of 1918 on both geographical and political/operational terms. The big difference is that Germany was dying then. It took everything they had to trhow their 1918 offensives in 9including troops from Russia) and, hyperbole apart, they really didn't get very far. So, I would expect that with American-supplied munitions and manpower replaced by drawing down stocks in the UK, the rest of 1918 would follow much along the same lines. The truth of the German collapse is that it was largely the British Army 'ere what done the deadly deed (cockney phrasing deliberate). The French did much but the US was more or less along for the ride (something acerbically noted by British field commanders).

Germany might hold on a bit longer in the hope of an American rescue but there won't be much in it and any delay will simply make matters worse for them. Best case, they collapse on OTL schedule and get the Versailles treaty less the Wilsonian nonsense of League of Nations and so on. Worst case, they anger the Entente so much they get a much worse peace deal, essentially the four-states solution I described.

That would leave the United States out on a limb. It's going to be 1920 at least before their forces are capable of tackling the Entente. Looking at historical ship commissioning rates, the US will add to its fleet Mississippi in early 1918, Idaho in mid-1918, New Mexico in mid-1919, Tennessee in mid-1920, California in mid-1921, Maryland in mid-1921, Colorado in early 1923 and West Virginia in late 1923. Washington would have been completed in late 1924. Even being very generous, that means the US battleline would have been increased by eight battleships by 1924 six years after the defeat of Germany. Assuming the Royal Navy finished the four Hoods in by the end of that time period (Hood was completed in early 1920 so I don;t think that's unreasonable), the balance becomes 22 US battleships versus 31 British battleships and 13 battlecruisers (plus the three Courageous class ships which defy sane classification).

So, where do we go from there? Well, the next major US building program was the six South Dakota class battleships that were expected to enter the fleet between 1925 and 1927. They were followed by the six Lexington class battlecruisers that were expected to joint the fleet between 1927 and 1929 (probably two per year in 1927, 1928 and 1929). These were a serious priority for the US Navy. In that period, the British would have built the four G3s (at least). technically they are battlecruisers but they were really fast battleships.

So, by 1930, the balance would be 28 US battleships and 6 battlecruisers vs 35 British battleships and 13 battlecruisers. On this trendline it would be the mid-1930s before the US battleline was capable of matching the British - and even then it would be running at a speed deficit. In fact, I'd guess that a lot of older ships, expecially the 12-inch ships, would have gone by then. This would be 16 years after Germany went bye-bye and I honestly can't see the US continuing with a phony war for nebulous causes for that long. I think that, around 1920, there would have been the "sorry about that" peace treaty and everybody would have packed up and gone home.

The Europe that was left would make an interesting history tale though. A largely peaceful Europe with Germany split up between four seperate states with "German nationalism" discredited by the crushing defeat in 1918. No WW2 in the offing for reasons we discussed earlier. That would be a really interesting situation, a big charge from the familiar "who won WW2" to the new "no WW2". That's really alternate.

Would any of this affect what happens in Russia, or would any effect on that situation be minimal? Certainly the historical intervention didn't help the Whites enough to win, but would the Reds win any faster? If so, would that matter?

Stuart, those ships were repeatedly delayed by the war due to demands from other shipping, and we certainly had the capability of accelerating production. Don't you think using the historical construction table is pretty much useless in light of the circumstances of America having to defend against a large enemy battlefleet ? The Marylands for instance would almost certainly all be laid down in early 1917 and the SoDaks would follow as soon as the shipyard space was freed for them.

Scottish Ninja wrote:Would any of this affect what happens in Russia, or would any effect on that situation be minimal? Certainly the historical intervention didn't help the Whites enough to win, but would the Reds win any faster? If so, would that matter?

If the war with Germany is prolonged into 1919, it could give the whites a better end result. Frankly Russia is a fairly large question marked because it could also like the Ukrainian Hetmanate, which was a conservative anti-communist government, stabilize into a semi-functional country.

The Europe that was left would make an interesting history tale though. A largely peaceful Europe with Germany split up between four seperate states with "German nationalism" discredited by the crushing defeat in 1918. No WW2 in the offing for reasons we discussed earlier. That would be a really interesting situation, a big charge from the familiar "who won WW2" to the new "no WW2". That's really alternate.

Not quite, if Germany got split up the power vacuum in Central Europe would be very destabilizing for either the Soviets or the Western Allies, of which why after WWII such notions weren't seriously considered. Also the great reduction in economic capacity as a result would be undesirable as well. If Germany were to be truncated it would need to look more like the current territorial boundaries in order to be stable for the rest of Europe.

montypython wrote:

The Europe that was left would make an interesting history tale though. A largely peaceful Europe with Germany split up between four seperate states with "German nationalism" discredited by the crushing defeat in 1918. No WW2 in the offing for reasons we discussed earlier. That would be a really interesting situation, a big charge from the familiar "who won WW2" to the new "no WW2". That's really alternate.

Not quite, if Germany got split up the power vacuum in Central Europe would be very destabilizing for either the Soviets or the Western Allies, of which why after WWII such notions weren't seriously considered. Also the great reduction in economic capacity as a result would be undesirable as well. If Germany were to be truncated it would need to look more like the current territorial boundaries in order to be stable for the rest of Europe.

The detachment of Hanover, Saxony, and Bavaria would leave a compact and still very powerful Prussian state.

The Duchess of Zeon wrote:Stuart, those ships were repeatedly delayed by the war due to demands from other shipping, and we certainly had the capability of accelerating production. Don't you think using the historical construction table is pretty much useless in light of the circumstances of America having to defend against a large enemy battlefleet ? The Marylands for instance would almost certainly all be laid down in early 1917 and the SoDaks would follow as soon as the shipyard space was freed for them.

Let's have a look at building times (from authorization to completion)

Utah class - 1908 program - three years
Arkansas class - 1909 program - three years
Texas class - 1910 program - four years
Oklahoma class - 1911 program - five years
Pennsylvania class - 1912/13 program - four years
New Mexico class - 1914 program - four years
California class - 1915 program - five years
Colorado class - 1916 program - six years

So, the Colorado class were definately delayed by about a year. The Californias may have been delayed by a few months but its not clear. However, the pattern is distinctly related to the size of the ships. So I think we can assume that five years is about right for the South Dakotas. They were authorized in 1917 and actually laid down in 1919. In the revised timeline, authorization in 1917 still means the keel gets laid a year later - the time between is making bits for them. The earliest the US Navy is likely to see the South Dakotas is 1923/24 with construction continuing to 26/27. (Dates taken from JFS 1924)

That's not enough to really make a difference. It's important to remember that the US warship industry in the teens and twenties was still being built up while the mass production techniques that made WW2 production rates possible were still a decade in the future. So, there are bottlenecks in such areas as turbine production, gun casting and armor production etc. So, I'd say a year or so advance over my original figues would be reasonable but not much more than that.

That's not going to make a realistic difference. I still think that once Germany gets flushed down the pan, the US (which would have entered the war on very shaky legal ground and without popular consensus) would just want out while the Entente are too exhausted to want to continue so the "Sorry about that" treaty is the best hope for everybody. Incidently, its easy to see that treaty containing provisions very similar to Washington. Oh, I can see some nice little terms in there for saving face all around but I honestly think that the "sorry about that" treaty would just be a diplomatic way of saying "oops". The US entry into WW1 would be more or less a footnote (which, truth be told, it is in OTL).

montypython wrote: Not quite, if Germany got split up the power vacuum in Central Europe would be very destabilizing for either the Soviets or the Western Allies

Why? The idea that Stalin wanted to invade Western Europe is pretty much of a myth unless he did so as a pre-emptive strike against a powerful Germany. With Germany neutered, no German attack to pre-empt and thus no Soviet invasion. See our thread on whether Hitler was a bulwark against communism (consensus is that thesis cannot be defended).

of which why after WWII such notions weren't seriously considered.

Got news for you. Germany was split up post-WW2. It didn't reassemble until 1990. "Preventing German reunification" was a clause in the French and British socialist party consitututions until the late 1990s. the lesson that German needed to be split up came directly from the failure to do so in 1919.

Also the great reduction in economic capacity as a result would be undesirable as well.

Why? Less competition for British and French industrial goods.

If Germany were to be truncated it would need to look more like the current territorial boundaries in order to be stable for the rest of Europe.

I don't see that at all. Europe did OK with Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria and Westphalia for several centuries. No reson why they can't continue to do so. Remember, the unified German Empire was less than fifty years old in 1919. Easy to write it off as an experiment that failed.

This environment would be a nice set-up for a novel positioned around say 1980 in which Europe has been at peace since 1919, there are the four independent German states as part of the EU, and WW2 was something fought out between Japan and the US in the Pacific that nobody really cares about.

Stuart wrote:

montypython wrote: Not quite, if Germany got split up the power vacuum in Central Europe would be very destabilizing for either the Soviets or the Western Allies

Why? The idea that Stalin wanted to invade Western Europe is pretty much of a myth unless he did so as a pre-emptive strike against a powerful Germany. With Germany neutered, no German attack to pre-empt and thus no Soviet invasion. See our thread on whether Hitler was a bulwark against communism (consensus is that thesis cannot be defended).

It has less to do with Stalin and more to deal with the point that more divided Central Europe is the easier for Communist influence to move, the Bavarian Socialist Republic being one example. Also, Germany counterbalances both France and Russia, without which the influence of one or the other grows which makes the balance of power in Europe less stable and less favorable to the British.

of which why after WWII such notions weren't seriously considered.

Got news for you. Germany was split up post-WW2. It didn't reassemble until 1990. "Preventing German reunification" was a clause in the French and British socialist party consitututions until the late 1990s. the lesson that German needed to be split up came directly from the failure to do so in 1919.

Of which both German states were effective proxies of their big brothers, which changes the internal dynamics. If keeping them split was desired to begin with the Western Allies would never bother to combine their occupation zones to begin with.

Why? Less competition for British and French industrial goods.

Also less consumption of foreign imports and less available capital for the French and British to exploit either.

In any case, ignoring socioeconomic factors, conditions and interactions for the sake of mere political-military scenarios ends up producing erroneous conclusions as detrimental as McNamara-era DoD assessments.

montypython wrote: It has less to do with Stalin and more to deal with the point that more divided Central Europe is the easier for Communist influence to move, the Bavarian Socialist Republic being one example. Also, Germany counterbalances both France and Russia, without which the influence of one or the other grows which makes the balance of power in Europe less stable and less favorable to the British.

It also provides more room for genuine democratic influences to grow. The east European states in the 1920s and 1930s didn't do so badly. Carving Germany up into four similar states is unlikely to make any great difference. I agree it is quite likely that the new states (in East Europe and carved-up Germany) will be a patchwork of different systems and belief ranging from right to left but I have no problem with that.

Of which both German states were effective proxies of their big brothers, which changes the internal dynamics. If keeping them split was desired to begin with the Western Allies would never bother to combine their occupation zones to begin with.

Actually, they didn't intend to, at least not so quickly. That was forced on them by the developing situation in Eastern Europe. As it was both the Democratic Republic of Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany developed into perfectly viable states. Thus, there is no reason to presume that the projected Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria and Hannover (or whatever) would not have done the same.

Also less consumption of foreign imports and less available capital for the French and British to exploit either.

Why? The population doesn't change nor does the area it occupies. It's merely split into four small entities rather than one large one. If anything that might well increase foreign imports into those countries.

In any case, ignoring socioeconomic factors, conditions and interactions for the sake of mere political-military scenarios ends up producing erroneous conclusions as detrimental as McNamara-era DoD assessments.

Smile when you say that stranger. Nobody is ignoring socioeconomic factors, conditions and interactions. We're discussing exactly that. And, in the world of 1919 following a worse German defeat than was experienced in OTL, it's entirely plausible that hacking Germany up (or, more accurately, returning Germany to) the status of smaller independent states would be smiled upon by its inhabitants. Say again, in 1919, the German Empire was less than fifty years old and a high percentage of Germans could remember the days when Bavaria was a real country. Those people would be running the new situation. It;s verye asy to see them turning around and saying "those damned Prussians caused this with their damned stupid ideas of empire. To hell with them, we're better off without them.

Stuart wrote:It also provides more room for genuine democratic influences to grow. The east European states in the 1920s and 1930s didn't do so badly. Carving Germany up into four similar states is unlikely to make any great difference. I agree it is quite likely that the new states (in East Europe and carved-up Germany) will be a patchwork of different systems and belief ranging from right to left but I have no problem with that.

I thought the only Eastern European state that managed to sustain a democracy into the 1930s was Czechoslovakia.

Teebs wrote: I thought the only Eastern European state that managed to sustain a democracy into the 1930s was Czechoslovakia.

Democracy isn't the only functional form of government though and a lot of the world drifted away from it in the 1930s. What's more important is the style of the government and its basic policies. I don't see any real problems with having a melange of small states that have differing systems, especially if they are too small to seriously threaten each other. Certainly I don't think the possibility that some might have a communist government for a longer or shorter period is anything to get too greatly concerned about. On the other hand eliminating a powerful Germany with a Nazi government is a good thing from any perspective.

Stuart, I think you are ignoring German Nationalism here. It was very, very strong. There is no way the populace will tolerate a splitup of Germany unless there is a complete occupation.

Furthermore, what are your sources for the gains of Brest Litowsk and their impact on the German resource situation?

Thanas wrote:Stuart, I think you are ignoring German Nationalism here. It was very, very strong. There is no way the populace will tolerate a splitup of Germany unless there is a complete occupation.

Was it actually so strong in 1919 following a massive military defeat, huge casualties, crippling losses etc. And, independent German states only fifty years in the past. How would, for example, German nationalism stack up against Bavarian nationalism or Saxon nationalism under those circumstances. A friend of mine whose grandfather served in the WW1 German Army noted serious anti-Prussian feeling in his Bavarian regiment

Furthermore, what are your sources for the gains of Brest Litowsk and their impact on the German resource situation?

I don't think that's me is it?

Stuart wrote:

Thanas wrote:Stuart, I think you are ignoring German Nationalism here. It was very, very strong. There is no way the populace will tolerate a splitup of Germany unless there is a complete occupation.

Was it actually so strong in 1919 following a massive military defeat, huge casualties, crippling losses etc. And, independent German states only fifty years in the past. How would, for example, German nationalism stack up against Bavarian nationalism or Saxon nationalism under those circumstances. A friend of mine whose grandfather served in the WW1 German Army noted serious anti-Prussian feeling in his Bavarian regiment

That is Prussian vs Bavarian, which is probably the most extreme you'll get. However, note that even in areas where Prussian loyalty was quite low (the Saar and Rhine regions), when given a choice, people overwhelmingly voted to remain part of Germany.

Even Austria, which had the most anti-prussian complex ever of all German states, wanted to join.

Furthermore, what are your sources for the gains of Brest Litowsk and their impact on the German resource situation?

I don't think that's me is it?

Well, weren't you of the opinion that Brest-Litowsk and the gains from the Ukraine would not allow Germany to survive past 1919? If not, I apologize.

One other option of course would be to strip Germany of all non-German territories and then allow the union of the Republic of German Austria and the core German territories (basically modern Germany with a small German-majority part of Silesia, and the port of Stettin as well as what would have become the Kaliningrad Oblast), while the Republic of German Austria was more or less Austria and the Sudetenland. And then completely abolish Prussia and split it into its component provinces so that Bavaria and Austria dominated the federal union. It wouldn 't happen, but it would create a very different political situation within Germany, particularly if a new liberal constitution based in the 1848 principles was written, under equal federation of the states instead of Prussian dominance.

Thanas wrote: That is Prussian vs Bavarian, which is probably the most extreme you'll get. However, note that even in areas where Prussian loyalty was quite low (the Saar and Rhine regions), when given a choice, people overwhelmingly voted to remain part of Germany. Even Austria, which had the most anti-prussian complex ever of all German states, wanted to join.

Not if I ran the elections they wouldn't . Many are the interesting tales I could tell of how to fiddle elections based on the best Philippine and Thai tutors (like the Philippine village where President Arroyo received 1,926 votes, while her main rival, Enrique Poe, had 3,460 votes, giving Arroyo a majority of 5,523 votes).

Well, weren't you of the opinion that Brest-Litowsk and the gains from the Ukraine would not allow Germany to survive past 1919? If not, I apologize.

I think that's Marina.

The Duchess of Zeon wrote:One other option of course would be to strip Germany of all non-German territories and then allow the union of the Republic of German Austria and the core German territories (basically modern Germany with a small German-majority part of Silesia, and the port of Stettin as well as what would have become the Kaliningrad Oblast), while the Republic of German Austria was more or less Austria and the Sudetenland. And then completely abolish Prussia and split it into its component provinces so that Bavaria and Austria dominated the federal union. It wouldn 't happen, but it would create a very different political situation within Germany, particularly if a new liberal constitution based in the 1848 principles was written, under equal federation of the states instead of Prussian dominance.

Won't work. Bavaria and Austria cannot dominate northern Germany, they simply do not have the resources or the population. Instead of a unified Prussia you would get a major voting block of Northern States , which would be in effect the North German Coalition 2.0, so the results would be the same. What it will do, however, is completely shatter the power of the left. Only with SPD-controlled Prussia was the Prussian gentry controlled. Remember that Prussia was the vital roadblock Hitler had to demolish before getting control of Germany. Without such a strong left and pro-democratic state (yes, it is hard to imagine Prussia as the bulwark of democracy, but for anyone who doubts it I suggest they read Christopher Clark's new Prussia book), you'll get a much more militaristic, much more revanchist Germany.

Basically, without the SPD-held Prussia (post 1920 it was a model of republicanism and democracy) and the enormous political power it wielded, the Weimar Republic would have collapsed much, much sooner.

Especially considering that in your scenario they have got plenty of stuff to get angry about, even more stuff than in the OTL.

Stuart wrote:Not if I ran the elections they wouldn't .

Which, without a complete and costly occupation, you would not.

Many are the interesting tales I could tell of how to fiddle elections based on the best Philippine and Thai tutors (like the Philippine village where President Arroyo received 1,926 votes, while her main rival, Enrique Poe, had 3,460 votes, giving Arroyo a majority of 5,523 votes).

You ran into a few problems like German election laws. Having done a study of them, I have to say they are very, very hard to manipulate.

Thanas wrote:
You ran into a few problems like German election laws. Having done a study of them, I have to say they are very, very hard to manipulate.

Presumably the elections would be done under whatever rules the occupiers had, not German ones.

Lonestar wrote:

Thanas wrote:
You ran into a few problems like German election laws. Having done a study of them, I have to say they are very, very hard to manipulate.

Presumably the elections would be done under whatever rules the occupiers had, not German ones.

Which is why I said in my post it would need a complete occupation.

Stuart wrote: Now, this leads us to Canada. It's a very obvious target. Only, we run into the small US Army in 1917 and the fact that the Canadians have been mobilized for three years. I'd suggest that its a very good probability the infant US army would get soundly spanked.

The main railway passing most of Canada's food east in 1917 actually goes through Minnesota. Need to find that map again, but most of Canada's agriculture is west of that point, and only one single rail line lies entirely outside of the United States in 1917. It's not much better now, even.

What about the French Army? From what I understand it was near revolt/collapse in 1918, which was mostly staved off by putting warm bodies from the British Empire and the US in the line. The Americans were a logistics drain to equip and green as hell, but they were fresh troops in a meat grinder war.

Imperial Overlord wrote:What about the French Army? From what I understand it was near revolt/collapse in 1918, which was mostly staved off by putting warm bodies from the British Empire and the US in the line. The Americans were a logistics drain to equip and green as hell, but they were fresh troops in a meat grinder war.

Yeah...no. The French Army's big morale crisis was the mutinies in the wake of the Nivelle Offensive in May-July 1917; there was a slump in 1918 during the German offensives, but this happened for a variety of reasons and didn't result in dysfunction. The basic problem was that the French were simply running out of men - they'd had consistent manpower shortfalls through 1917 and the start of 1918, a process not helped by the casualties inflicted during the Spring Offensives. Units didn't get rested/rotated sufficiently and there was a perception amongst line units that victory was unattainable and the Americans were a false hope. But the victory during the Second Battle of the Marne - when the French Tenth Army, supported by American, British and Italian units, evicted the Germans from the Marne salient, taking 29,000 prisoners in the process - restored morale and started the long chain of Allied counteroffensives that became the 100 days.

At the time senior British leaders complained the French weren't doing their share - but in hindsight this doesn't really seem to be true, if you compare the casualties taken and prisoners and guns captured between July 15 and November 11 the French and British achievements are roughly equal.

Though how they'd react to an American declaration of war, in which case there are no American reinforcements, ever... that could be different. Especially since they'd face a supply shortage from the lack of American-made goods that they were using at the front.