CC wrote:Or we could go with common sense and Occam's razor and note that it is much more likely that the lack of a Soviet ABM system meant there was no reason to accept the decrease in range with the higher weight of the penaids and so they didn't deploy it past the one instance. I think that's rather more logical than your "It was completely ineffective against a non-existent system" explanation.
The ABM-1 GALOSH system is not "non existent".
If you had read any of the Polaris to Trident book (which I did); you would have known that the designers of PX-1 had to make educated guesses on what frequencies and such that the threat radars and such would operate -- it was when the Soviets actually lit off their battle management radars for the first time; that the engineers realized that everything was completely wrong; they had spent $$$$$$ on expensive in-flight tests -- everything, from the chaff to decoys had been designed around a totally different threat than what actually materialized.
By the time that PX-2 was ready to deal with the actual GALOSH threat; nuclear ABMs had moved from relatively small, slow 20 kiloton tipped NIKE systems to fast, long ranged 5 megaton SPARTANS, and you would have reduced the range of your missiles for nothing.
A-35 is described by OKB Fakel (in the book quoted in that thread) as a Mach 4 missile with a range of 300 kilometers. Now, perhaps it is just me, but how do you translate that to being capable of making an ascent phase intercept several thousand kilometers away?
The warheads don't debuss from the RV immediately after boost phase. If they did that; they'd be horribly inaccurate.
page 73 wrote:In all, sixteen test flights were carried out (including a few of Impala), mainly in the Pacific 'against' the Army's Safeguard radar at Kwajalein, with results that were considered successful.
I've always wondered what exactly was tested against the Safeguard radar. I could try getting the classified appendix of Bell Lab's ABM Monograph declassified; or any results from that test series.
page 74 wrote:In fact, your own source directly supports my argument that they did work and that it was not further deployed due to lack of operational need.
Did you get to the lovely part about the severe PX-1 reliability problems, like batteries running dead? Oh, and how are your decoys going to work
when they're too small to be seen by the long wave radars that the Soviets selected? Same thing for the chaff.
They're cut to the wrong frequency and are ineffective.
And fixing these problems isn't simple. You can't simply replace the chaff with longer or shorter ones cut to the new frequency, or introduce bigger decoys; because you will have to do very expensive, full up tests of the PX-1 (Mod) system, to make sure it works reliabily. At which point it's just cheaper and faster to go straight to PX-2.
Yes and there had been absolutely no hardening of Polaris prior to Topsy. It is quite possible that the Topsy program eliminated the problem of multiple kills.
Now you're being crazy. Each additional pound of weight added to a ballistic missile reduces it's range significantly; so they're still susceptible to multi-kills. Just not as easy as a non hardened system to get multi kills on.
You mean Marina's contention of widespread nuclear tipped versions? Yes.
However, the fact remains that the Soviets deployed a very large number of SAM complexes which had a marginal RV enagement capability; this was enough to throw some uncertainity into the targeteering side of the business.
Back when Stuart was working in the
light-blue-touchpaper-and-retire-to-a-safe-distance business, the widespread proliferation of SAM systems in the USSR (SA-5 and SA-10); capable of having a decent kill capability on very high altitude, very fast, manouvering aircraft (and by extension a capability against ballistic targets) caused quite a bit of concern, and thinking over what to do about it.
It effectively meant that Stuart and his colleagues could no longer pick a missile from their chinese menu of options, whip out a pie cutter, do some calculations and mark off "Karovgrad" from their list of targets. They now had to do a more in-depth probability analysis on the p(k) of the target than simply looking at missile reliability (60-70% is a good round figure for modern ICBMs); it meant they had to factor in the chance of the incoming RV being intercepted by a SA-5 or SA-10. So more warheads on top of the extra one thrown that way to deal with a missile malfunction had to be thrown at poor "Karovgrad"; which meant that less targets overall could be hit, when this was multiplied by the other regions in the Soviet Union which had SA-5/SA-10 complexes nearby.