The Founding Fathers get new comrades (RAR!)

[K. A. Pital]

And what use to them is that if they have to give up their wealth and much vaunted independence?

I highly doubt the XX century Russians would try "conquer all of American landmass straightaway". That's idiotic. Invite workers to increase labour pool and secure their city, factories and the ship first. Only then do something. In fact, they'd most likely support the American anticolonial war, secure a supply base and then think what to do next.

Do they?

Quite. Even small munitions industry from the XX century requires extenisive pre-production facilities for XX century tech.

How much knowledge are 5,000 Russians from the early 20th century going to have?

Much more than XVII century people trying to do anything to them.

Then they have the problem of actually being develop that technology which has no base to build upon.

Yes. Outside of their city.

The Russians are going to have to impose their rule at the point of a gun

Why would they even want to engage in something as dangerous as war before securing their survival first? That doesn't follow.

[TheDarkling]

I highly doubt the XX century Russians would try "conquer all of American landmass straightaway". That's idiotic. Invite workers to increase labour pool and secure their city, factories and the ship first. Only then do something. In fact, they'd most likely support the American anticolonial war, secure a supply base and then think what to do next.

That war pretty much ends the first time the Russians demonstrate their weaponry to the British.

However the Russians don't need to conquer all of the US straight away, they are landing in the second biggest English speaking city in the world filled with rich men, loyalists and Quakers (amongst other religious persuasions).

Given the rank and file can speak English it isn't going to take long for it to leak out what the Russians and really all about and just about every American will have reason to dislike them.

In any case just because they decide to take over Philidelphia first isn't going to win them any prizes, imagine aliens landed in New York tomorrow and confined themselves to just the conquest of the city at first.

They still aren't going to win much PR and will rightfully be seen as a threat.

Quite. Even small munitions industry from the XX century requires extenisive pre-production facilities for XX century tech.

Well I suppose it depends on exactly what they get, I was thinking they just get the end process not necessary the tech plant require to build up factories (i.e. they can create a barrel from steel but they don't have a steel plant).

In which case they just need a lot of workers(although they need a way to feed them, probably by stealing land and forcing people to work it), although it would still take time to switch it over to others uses.

Much more than XVII century people trying to do anything to them.

That isn't really an answer.

Do they have somebody versed in the production of steel, an expert on dyes, a textile worker, somebody who knows the workings of electricity, an engineer etc.

A bunch of peasants/soldiers/sailors form the early 20th century aren't necessarily going to know how to build anything.

Why would they even want to engage in something as dangerous as war before securing their survival first? That doesn't follow.

You already have them conquering Philidelphia, that is conquest.

They will need food and they have no money, unless they are going to start flogging their weapons then they are going to have to steal food and eventually land and people to work it.

Securing their immediate survival doing these things is imposing their control through warfare, even if the war only last an afternoon.

They could possibly ask for land n exchange for services but they would have to get government agreement and I very much doubt the government is going to give them Philidelphia , in fact just about every state is likely to veto having them on their territory.

[K. A. Pital]

That war pretty much ends the first time the Russians demonstrate their weaponry to the British.

Indeed, but they will expect a compensation of sorts from Americans for the assistance, I believe.

Given the rank and file can speak English it isn't going to take long for it to leak out what the Russians and really all about and just about every American will have reason to dislike them.

Why is that, actually? A city made entirely of revolutionaries with no prior history of government? Why would they "dislike" them?

In any case just because they decide to take over Philidelphia first isn't going to win them any prizes

Why would they want to take Philadelphia? They have a city without excessive people,advanced manufacturing. They only need to create a supply of food, which they can trade for weapons or other advanced stuff like communications, lights, electricity.

Do they have somebody versed in the production of steel, an expert on dyes, a textile worker, somebody who knows the workings of electricity, an engineer etc.

A bunch of peasants/soldiers/sailors form the early 20th century aren't necessarily going to know how to build anything.

If they would have a balanced composition, obviously they do. Little is known about the composition of the 5000 city, but Aurora at the very least has electric engineers, gun specialists, mechanics. How do you think it can be otherwise?

You already have them conquering Philidelphia, that is conquest.

WHY? they have their own city with much more advanced technology!

unless they are going to start flogging their weapons then they are going to have to steal food and eventually land and people to work it.

Why steal if you can exchange it for some advanced technology? Do you think after demonstrating, say, portable radios or steam machines they won't get a lot of clients eager to buy this?

I think our disagreement runs over Phialdelphia. But nowhere doesthe OP specify they capture it, and Ihave never said they will!

[Turin]

But that (according to Lenin) depends on having a large proletarian cadre.

Proletarians were needed to seize cities, while peasant revolts against landmasters helped secure victory in the rural areas of the civil war.

Physical/military victory, but the peasants were still pretty backwards and when collectivization of land occurred, they weren't so wild about it IIRC.

But Lenin is not in an industrial society, and he doesn't have a cadre base across the country. He won't be pushing for some huge revolution straightaway, most likely, Lenin would probably start with creating a high-tech commune with his small city. Assuming that composition of Bolsheviks includes ship and weapon engineers, and workers, I'm sure at least some common peasantry will flock to "humans from the future with super-technology preaching a new age of man".

You know, there's a thought. Effectively Lenin is in an opportunity for something like the February revolution -- ally with the colonials ["Mensheviks"] to throw off their imperial oppressor. "October" can come later, after the Russians have helped to industrialize the colonies and create a proletarian class who serve as the cadre.

Also, why would Lenin want to alienate Americans, knowing that he has only 5570 men? Sure, advanced weapons, but a Zulu-like scenario is possible on land.

Which some people didn't seem to think was the case when I brought up the southerners rising up when their slaves were freed. But I get what you're saying here.

...I doubt the Northerners are going to be enthusiastic about the communists either given the foundation of New England revolutionary fervour was Sam Adam's "government is evil" libertarian ideology, a communist government is going to reach into the daily lives of the people in a way that would probably cause Adams to spontaneously combust...

By the time you have a post-revolutionary government in place where this is an issue, it's all over. During the revolution and immediately thereafter, you had centralized planning of the revolutionary effort, but local control of industry through the soviets (worker's councils). Between 1917 and 1924(?) or so, there really was nascent a "worker's state" in Russia.

[K. A. Pital]

Physical/military victory, but the peasants were still pretty backwards and when collectivization of land occurred, they weren't so wild about it IIRC.

In the 30s, yes. In 1918-1922, collectivization was a temporary measure to ensure state control of bread so that the forces can be supplied. Peasants also served as a cadre base for military operations in the Civil War, since Decree on Land was pretty much precious to them and they have already seized lots of land that formerly belonged to the land barons.

Between 1917 and 1924(?) or so, there really was nascent a "worker's state" in Russia.

1917-1924, some of it continued to 1929. Also, before collectivization, peasants were allowed literally to seize land and form their own communes. A revolution essentially encourages worker commitees to seize plants from their owners - capitalist, peasants to seize land from it's owners - land-rentier, and control them in a democratic fashion (by an elected worker commitee on a factory or the same in a landbase).

[Turin]

Physical/military victory, but the peasants were still pretty backwards and when collectivization of land occurred, they weren't so wild about it IIRC.

In the 30s, yes. In 1918-1922, collectivization was a temporary measure to ensure state control of bread so that the forces can be supplied. Peasants also served as a cadre base for military operations in the Civil War, since Decree on Land was pretty much precious to them and they have already seized lots of land that formerly belonged to the land barons.

I would say it was because of the little detail that the peasantry still made up 90% of the population -- there wasn't any way of getting around using the peasants as the main recruiting pool for the revolutionary military. But I'm talking about political cadre. Until collectivization turns them into a sort of rural proletarian, peasants have a fundamentally different relationship to their means of production than industrial proletarian.

Between 1917 and 1924(?) or so, there really was nascent a "worker's state" in Russia.

1917-1924, some of it continued to 1929. Also, before collectivization, peasants were allowed literally to seize land and form their own communes. A revolution essentially encourages worker commitees to seize plants from their owners - capitalist, peasants to seize land from it's owners - land-rentier, and control them in a democratic fashion (by an elected worker commitee on a factory or the same in a landbase).

Maybe my history of the era is a little rusty, but I didn't think that the soviet really took off as a concept in the rural regions, and that largely peasants seized land from their landowners and then broke it up into family plots and the like.

Just so that we're not getting too off-topic, I'll concede that I think a February-style revolution is possible in this scenario. But the post-colonial period is going to have to see a lot of industrial growth before they're ready for October.

[Zor]

I should have stated this in the OP, but they do have plenty of books on engineering and mechanics as of the Russian Revolution as well as a few people well educated in mechanics and no shortage of trained and experianced Machinists, mechanics and factory workers. As well as a small foundery on the same tech levels of those in Russia during the great war capable of fufilling their metal needs.

Zor

[K. A. Pital]

But I'm talking about political cadre. Until collectivization turns them into a sort of rural proletarian, peasants have a fundamentally different relationship to their means of production than industrial proletarian.

If they already seized the land, yes. If land belongs to the landowner, there's little difference. What is the difference between a commune of workers running a factory and a commune of peasants culturing a land piece?

Maybe my history of the era is a little rusty, but I didn't think that the soviet really took off as a concept in the rural regions, and that largely peasants seized land from their landowners and then broke it up into family plots and the like.

Soviets arose from industrial centers, but later spread to the rural territory, so it was like, the reverse. Essentially Peasant Soviets seized lands from rentiers, and it passed into the control of the Soviet, becoming "national property" but de-facto controlled by the local Soviet authority - a municipality of sorts.

[Turin]

But I'm talking about political cadre. Until collectivization turns them into a sort of rural proletarian, peasants have a fundamentally different relationship to their means of production than industrial proletarian.

If they already seized the land, yes. If land belongs to the landowner, there's little difference. What is the difference between a commune of workers running a factory and a commune of peasants culturing a land piece?

Because the peasants don't need the commune to cultivate the land. The peasantry has an inherently petit-bourgeois relationship to their means of production due to the fact that peasants can just grow their own crops and tell everyone else to fuck off. Which is exactly why emergency collectivization was required in the first place IIRC. Industrial proletarians don't have that option -- they must operate collectively (whether under the control of the owner or their own workers' councils).

Maybe my history of the era is a little rusty, but I didn't think that the soviet really took off as a concept in the rural regions, and that largely peasants seized land from their landowners and then broke it up into family plots and the like.

Soviets arose from industrial centers, but later spread to the rural territory, so it was like, the reverse. Essentially Peasant Soviets seized lands from rentiers, and it passed into the control of the Soviet, becoming "national property" but de-facto controlled by the local Soviet authority - a municipality of sorts.

If there was defacto control by the Soviet, why was collectivization required?

[DrMckay]

Give about two hundred of those Mosin-Nagants to Kentucky woodsmen and trappers; and watch the British Officer become an "Endangered Species"

[Pelranius]

Preferably a monkeyed down Mosin Nagant rifles. Don't want some one else to start hunting your people in the woods if things get rough.

[K. A. Pital]

If there was defacto control by the Soviet, why was collectivization required?

The infamous scissor crisis resulted in middleman traders of grain (NEP men) receiving surpluses from the peasants which, as well as communes and land commitees, were allowed to sell surplus. Peasants were self-employed and while nominally the land was "owned" by the Soviets, the produce was owned by the peasant.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Econom ... y#Policies

[Turin]

If there was defacto control by the Soviet, why was collectivization required?

The infamous scissor crisis resulted in middleman traders of grain (NEP men) receiving surpluses from the peasants which, as well as communes and land commitees, were allowed to sell surplus. Peasants were self-employed and while nominally the land was "owned" by the Soviets, the produce was owned by the peasant.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Econom ... y#Policies

Um... it's entirely possible I'm using the term "de facto" wrong here (although I don't think so), but what you've described here isn't de facto control by the Soviet. It's just as I described -- the peasant has a petit bourgeois relationship to his means of production. (I was pretty sure I was remembering this problem correctly, but now that you've mentioned the NEP, it's all coming back.)

Tying this back to the OP, you can end up with a similar situation in the Colonies. In the South, you have a large landed class who the peasants (and slaves) can seize the land from, but it will take quite a bit of doing before you're going to convince them they should collectivize. Which is going to be a problem in the long term for Lenin, and the longer the peasants hold that land, the less likely they're going to want to ever give it up.

[K. A. Pital]

Which is going to be a problem in the long term for Lenin, and the longer the peasants hold that land, the less likely they're going to want to ever give it up.

Why would he want to run a collectivization program similar to the real in the USSR? Facts point to the following: when agricultural production fell during the Civil War, Lenin proposed a long-term NEP period, with administrative controls hampering the influence of NEP men (actually the scissor crisis was resolved without destroying the NEP, but Stalin still used it as argument of the NEP's crisis in 1928, when "scissors" were already overcome), industrialization in 1800s in the US has not yet reached even the level of XX century Russia so where is the proletarian for whom this collectivization is run? Finally, in the very long term, they can run a successful collectivization program like Hungary, which would not impact livestocks and grain production. In fact, producing grain to feed people will be important proably for a longer time than Lenin himself is alive, and Lenin saw no alternative but to let communes give peasants grain production from land for free use to boost up agriculture.

Since the earliest Soviet laws only prohibited hired labour, a situation where municipalities own the land, but peasants own the produce from their land areas is very much possible. Collectivization has no clear goal and will anyway not be possible for a rather long period of time, due to extremely low mechanization and the lack of proletarians who are to be supplied by the peasants' collective agriculture is making any steps towards that meaningless.

[Turin]

Since the earliest Soviet laws only prohibited hired labour, a situation where municipalities own the land, but peasants own the produce from their land areas is very much possible. Collectivization has no clear goal and will anyway not be possible for a rather long period of time, due to extremely low mechanization and the lack of proletarians who are to be supplied by the peasants' collective agriculture is making any steps towards that meaningless.

I think we're talking past each other. Everything you're saying here is true. My original argument was that the lack of a large proletariat means a lack of revolutionary political cadre. The peasantry isn't capable of acting as this cadre because of exactly the sort of thing we're discussing above -- they are still effectively petit bourgeois.

I'm not arguing that Lenin & the Bolsheviks can't become a major influence on the development of the colonies, I'm arguing that moving towards a worker's state will ultimately fail for almost precisely the same reasons it failed in Russia -- a critical mass of proletariat doesn't exist. In Russia, Lenin and Trotsky could hope for the international spread of the revolution (into Germany, for example, until that failed). In the 1800's, there's no hope of that.

(Note that I'm assuming for purposes of this discussion that Lenin's theories of revolution are actually correct; in the long run a worker's state is doomed to failure anyway.)

[Glocksman]

Preferably a monkeyed down Mosin Nagant rifles. Don't want some one else to start hunting your people in the woods if things get rough.

How in the hell would you monkey down a M-N to begin with?
I have two (an M-38 and an M-44) of them, and they're as simple a bolt action rifle as it gets.
The only way I could see to make 'monkey models' would be to block off the 5 round magazine and make it a single shot rifle.

[Pelranius]

Preferably a monkeyed down Mosin Nagant rifles. Don't want some one else to start hunting your people in the woods if things get rough.

How in the hell would you monkey down a M-N to begin with?
I have two (an M-38 and an M-44) of them, and they're as simple a bolt action rifle as it gets.
The only way I could see to make 'monkey models' would be to block off the 5 round magazine and make it a single shot rifle.

Well, you could mess with the range of the rifle if possible, and the general quality controls for the stuff you're shipping out to the frontier areas.

[K. A. Pital]

I'm arguing that moving towards a worker's state will ultimately fail for almost precisely the same reasons it failed in Russia

My take is that a worker's state will be created on a local base by Lenin. Given the vast technological superiority, he has no fear now that a local Soviet state, even limited to several provinces, may be crushed by world "capitalist" powers. Why would a small, but excessively technologically superior worker's state ever fail? The Ricardo Paradox with a 200-year disparity will not be offset significantly by any possible inefficiencies of a command economy. It will propel the Soviet Republic of America faster and faster with more advanced technologies while the rest of the world, through the workings of the Ricardo paradox, will remain inferior to it, depending on resource trade with the Bolsheviks for the know-how.

In Russia, Lenin and Trotsky could hope for the international spread of the revolution (into Germany, for example, until that failed). In the 1800's, there's no hope of that.

They can significantly alter world politics by forging political alliances and acting as high-tech rulers of said alliances. Then proceeding to slowly industrialize those lands, creating a large worker mass, then install socialism.

Note that I'm assuming for purposes of this discussion that Lenin's theories of revolution are actually correct; in the long run a worker's state is doomed to failure anyway.

Not with a 200-year tech disparity. Ricardo's Paradox will not cease to work until know-how investments cease to be territorial and specialist-bounded. Other countries will always be in the "developing" niche now, while Bolsheviks will grow more and more high-tech.

And a reclusion into a semi-closed community (inner immigration and annexion, but no outer immigration and no major tech leaks a-la Jackson Wenick) will lead to an indefinete technological superiority for the Bolsheviks with even greater certainity than the Ricardian paradox itself.

The mass of wealth and advancement from having XX century tech two centuries earlier will mean the Soviet lands will be seen as nothing but "paradise" by everyone else, which can easily lead, given enough time, to a world triumph of Soviet model, or the entier world falling into Soviet influence sphere.

Would that Pax Sovietica arise, or not, or desintegrate in the future is not an immediate concern - for many hundreds of years, the worker state will not fail in any way due to it's massive head start. Basically it's the Russian revolution reverse, you get the most advanced means of production while the rest of the world are underdeveloped. Can easily turn them into semicolonies if you want

[Turin]

I'm arguing that moving towards a worker's state will ultimately fail for almost precisely the same reasons it failed in Russia

My take is that a worker's state will be created on a local base by Lenin. Given the vast technological superiority, he has no fear now that a local Soviet state, even limited to several provinces, may be crushed by world "capitalist" powers.

I agree, assuming that the Bolsheviks get their initial worker's city-state up and running without any problems (i.e., they need agriculture and they need to avoid the aforementioned Zulu situation before they have it, and they need to avoid disease outbreaks, etc). This mini worker's state should be sustainable for some time.

Why would a small, but excessively technologically superior worker's state ever fail? The Ricardo Paradox with a 200-year disparity will not be offset significantly by any possible inefficiencies of a command economy. It will propel the Soviet Republic of America faster and faster with more advanced technologies while the rest of the world, through the workings of the Ricardo paradox, will remain inferior to it, depending on resource trade with the Bolsheviks for the know-how.

I'm sorry, I'm not familiar with the term "Ricardo paradox." I know who David Ricardo was and have a vague familiarity with him with respect to Labor Theory of Value, but that's not helping me.

In any event, I think it's probably not important, because the rest of your post seems to assume that I'm talking about an external threat to the worker's state, which I'm not.

In Russia, Lenin and Trotsky could hope for the international spread of the revolution (into Germany, for example, until that failed). In the 1800's, there's no hope of that.

They can significantly alter world politics by forging political alliances and acting as high-tech rulers of said alliances. Then proceeding to slowly industrialize those lands, creating a large worker mass, then install socialism.

That's an extremely long-term project, you'd have to admit. It's not like the rest of the world is going to industrialize overnight. And that gives time for the worker's state to be brought down through internal problems (see below).

And a reclusion into a semi-closed community (inner immigration and annexion, but no outer immigration and no major tech leaks a-la Jackson Wenick) will lead to an indefinete technological superiority for the Bolsheviks with even greater certainity than the Ricardian paradox itself.

The mass of wealth and advancement from having XX century tech two centuries earlier will mean the Soviet lands will be seen as nothing but "paradise" by everyone else, which can easily lead, given enough time, to a world triumph of Soviet model, or the entier world falling into Soviet influence sphere.

This assumes that the reason the Soviet model isn't sustainable in the long term is because of external pressures. That certainly was the case in Russia, I think you'd agree. But I would argue that "uneven consciousness" (i.e. human nature) is going to inevitably create internal rifts in the worker's state, no matter what the external situation is like. In this particular case, the internal rift is the vast disparity between the 5000 Russian proletarians and the over a million Colonial peasants. Those peasants are, as I've arguing, effectively petit bourgeois after the initial land-grab. Getting them to voluntarily give that up is an unsurmountable problem. Forcibly collectivizing them quite obviously leads to massive divisions which will result in Stalinist-style "state capitalism."

I suppose you can say that this particular state can persist for a very long time if it has a massive technological lead. But it isn't a worker's state anymore.

[K. A. Pital]

I'm sorry, I'm not familiar with the term "Ricardo paradox."

That's the freetrade paradox in other terms. The simplest model is countries A & B both produce grain and industrial machinery. But A has invested more heavily in industrial machinery, thus it's cheaper and better to make it in A, whereas B has better lands and it's cheaper to produce grain. If B shifts all of it's manpower to grain production, and A - to machine production, in the immediate perspective they gain a mutual value through freetrade. In the long-term period, A is going to invest into machines more and more heavily, getting more surplus from better and better machines, and thus become a prosperous industrialized economy, whereas B will remain an agrarian shithole. When A is industrialized enough to run a green revolution, B is fucked. That is only a small example but it works the same with any investment nto natural resource versus investment into technological progress. It also explains why technological and financial disparity persists and grows between countries.

That's an extremely long-term project, you'd have to admit.

Yes, indeed. But what alternatives do they have? Create "worker's states" in agrarian countries which don't even have enough conscious workers?

Getting them to voluntarily give that up is an unsurmountable problem.

But why force them to "give that up" at all? As I said, collectivization in such a situation is even less clear a goal than in the USSR. In the USSR, it's advocates were able to point at least to some reasons (workers goods' becoming super-expensive regarding expanded agriculture, need to supply the cities and forcibly extort grain for exports). Those reasons are totally abscent in the 1800s.

[Turin]

I'm sorry, I'm not familiar with the term "Ricardo paradox."

That's the freetrade paradox in other terms. The simplest model is countries A & B both produce grain and industrial machinery... It also explains why technological and financial disparity persists and grows between countries.

Thank you. Ok, that makes plenty of sense to me, and obviously applies to this situation. But my argument is of course that internal issues are the problem.

That's an extremely long-term project, you'd have to admit.

Yes, indeed. But what alternatives do they have? Create "worker's states" in agrarian countries which don't even have enough conscious workers?

Obviously not. Indeed, spreading internationally by first helping other nations to industrialize is the best solution for the Bolsheviks in this scenario. But just because it's the best solution doesn't mean it will be enough to overcome the internal difficulties. It occurs to me that it also puts them in a situation where their "allies" may overcome the Ricardo paradox discussed above -- those allies can potentially close the technology gap if they're being "uplifted" by the Bolsheviks.

Getting them to voluntarily give that up is an unsurmountable problem.

But why force them to "give that up" at all? As I said, collectivization in such a situation is even less clear a goal than in the USSR. In the USSR, it's advocates were able to point at least to some reasons (workers goods' becoming super-expensive regarding expanded agriculture, need to supply the cities and forcibly extort grain for exports). Those reasons are totally abscent in the 1800s.

You're undergoing massive industrialization. You're going to be shifting large numbers of people with uneven consciousness to proletarian/urban roles, and will need to supply these people. The people who are creating that supply are not Bolsheviks -- they're peasant farmers with a Calvinist background. Demand for industrial goods will at first far outstrip supply, which means that these peasant farmers aren't seeing the benefit of sending all their grain to the cities. You running into almost exactly the same situation as Russia.

[K. A. Pital]

It occurs to me that it also puts them in a situation where their "allies" may overcome the Ricardo paradox discussed above -- those allies can potentially close the technology gap if they're being "uplifted" by the Bolsheviks.

That is possible, but in a long-term perspective, and it doesn't necessarily bring the original Soviet state to failure, merely creates several possible technological competitors. The industrialization of the world will run faster than in real life, but with the initial point of landing of the advanced technology as a very major center of innovation.

Demand for industrial goods will at first far outstrip supply, which means that these peasant farmers aren't seeing the benefit of sending all their grain to the cities. You running into almost exactly the same situation as Russia.

Yet, scissor crisis was resolved without resorting to the kind of rough and extreme collectivization that Stalin ran. Everything depends on the speed of industrialization, actually, cost-cutting in industrialization and trade controls are more effective for balancing industry-agriculture indexes than grain requisitions. More than that, in reality the USSR had to balance several needs: extreme modernization of industry in the course of several years from a dominantly agrarian economy, maintaining a large and powerful army, and boost or at least maintain agricultural produce.

Do we have such a problem posed at the time? Army: the excessive superiority of XX century arms makes attack on either Bolsheviks or their potential allies a military suicide. No need to feed a large army and build it up since excessive tech superiority frees manpower. Industrialization: once again, there is no need to run it at extreme speeds since little external pressure can be applied to the Soviet state or it's allies. Agricultural produce - with XX century tech, a colossal boost will arise even with the existing farmers, which will create an abundance of grain for the period (it will outpace the Agricultural Revolution of the late 1700-1800 in Britain by such a great factor that I doubt producing grain could be a problem).

The problems in Russia came from extreme speed of industrialization with a backwards agricultural production system, which isn't a necessity for this otherworld. Though it's clear that such problems will arise in several places sooner or later, it doesn't mean they will plague the Soviet state so much that it would fall.

[Turin]

Do we have such a problem posed at the time? Army: the excessive superiority of XX century arms makes attack on either Bolsheviks or their potential allies a military suicide. No need to feed a large army and build it up since excessive tech superiority frees manpower. Industrialization: once again, there is no need to run it at extreme speeds since little external pressure can be applied to the Soviet state or it's allies. Agricultural produce - with XX century tech, a colossal boost will arise even with the existing farmers, which will create an abundance of grain for the period (it will outpace the Agricultural Revolution of the late 1700-1800 in Britain by such a great factor that I doubt producing grain could be a problem).

The problems in Russia came from extreme speed of industrialization with a backwards agricultural production system, which isn't a necessity for this otherworld. Though it's clear that such problems will arise in several places sooner or later, it doesn't mean they will plague the Soviet state so much that it would fall.

Hold on a second. You're saying the Bolshevik's don't need to excessively industrialize, and then in the next breath saying that there will be a colossal boost in agricultural production. I think you're seriously underestimating the time and energy it will take to get industrial production up to a point where we have a "colossal boost" in agricultural production.

They'll also need far more rapid industrialization than you're talking about here because they can't have the Aurora everywhere at once, and a mere 5000 troops, no matter how well equipped, can't be spread across the entire colonial coast -- and they can't immediately intimidate the British into backing off, if only because it takes forever for the British lines of communication to catch up (theirs as well, I might add). They can use their well-equipped troops as a kind of shock force, but they need to start stamping out more guns, more parts, and more industrial agriculture equipment if they want to win. Which means a rapid expansion of that initially available industrial base. Which brings us back to the same problem as Russia: a need for extreme industrialization combined with backwards agricultural base.

[K. A. Pital]

Which means a rapid expansion of that initially available industrial base. Which brings us back to the same problem as Russia: a need for extreme industrialization combined with backwards agricultural base.

Ah, now I understand what you mean. In the shortest term, yes, they will need to supply their growing industrial center(s) with food. The limits to their growth will be put by the actual surplus of the peasants, which cannot be raised through any industrialization in the immediate term - even if they stamp some a/c tools during a year, the effects will be only in the next year.

At first they would probably just supply their own city, which has a small population and therefore can exist even on a small food surplus. Besides, as they are deposited close to a big city (Philadelphia) they will have less problems drawing some of the surplus to ther industrial needs. It's hard to even think that the industrial base can be expanded any more rapidly than several years, since the manpower for production of industrial goods and, especially, teaching to use industrial machinery is very small at first.

But, what are the American colonists for? After all, they won that war on their own wihout any superweapons, so I don't think they'll expect the soviets to show up in any place on the Coast with their shock troops, only in the most important places.

"Rapid" expansion of industrial base will not be more rapid than the end of American-British war, methinks, since even the communication lines which take forever are not as bad as the need to introduce radically advanced technology into industrial centers, not to mention the need to have those industrial centers at your command to do it.

[Turin]

I think we're mostly agreeing on the issues they face, but we're getting different results. It just seems to me like you're giving the Bolshevik's an awful lot of "projects" for the first couple years: ally with the colonists, assist the colonists with the war vs Britain, begin to industrialize the local agriculture, start producing more machine tools to expand industrialization locally, and set up infrastructure to obtain the natural resources (such as coal) to support their industry.

If any of these goes wrong or falls short, they can find themselves in a situation where they're coming into conflict with the colonists, which won't go well for them in terms of setting up a successful communist state. I won't argue at all that the Bolsheviks can become successful players on the regional (and eventually world) stage; their technology gap is too great. But without being able to throw some hard numbers at this, I'm just skeptical that the Bolsheviks can pull off their ultimate goals.