The problem is the heat sink most certainly can take that.Mad wrote:Sure, you'd need around 17,000 GT released over the course of a second in order for the shields of an Acclamator to start to take notice. But what if it was 17 GT released in 0.001 seconds? You've passed the heat dissipation rate at that point. Sure, it'll be fine again a fraction of a second later, but the idea is that time is certainly a factor when dealing with wattage.Batman wrote:The very fact that they could take down the shields of a Victory means that the torpedoes have to be high-gigaton. A lousy Acclamator has 7E22 W worth of shielding. That's 16,746 GT per second. Even allowing that that's overall and sustained and that the X-Wings took down only one shield facing, that would require thousands of MT-range torpedoes.
There are several components to a shield system that can be taken advantage of. There's the shield itself and whatever its made of [1]. There are the shield projectors which maintain the shield and presumably move the energy aboard to dedicated heat sinks [2]. There's the shield generator which provides the power and mechanism to maintain the shield effect, implemented by the projectors [3]. There is the dedicated heat sinks themselves [4]. And lastly there is the heat dissipation mechanisms [5].
The shield may be made of exotic force fields or a bubble of exotic matter, or some combination (I think Mike prefers an explanation involving a bubble of exotic, superconducting matter). Anyway, there are shield-disrupting torpedoes that disrupt whatever it is that makes up the shield, presumably without overwhelming the power and energy management constraints - these include the T-33 torpedoes carried by New Republic K-Wing tactical bombers and perhaps the torpedoes mounted aboard Loronar Torpedo Spheres. These attack the shield from angle No. 1.
Energy beams and torpedo impacts don't just vanish, so their energy is not totally absorbed and reradiated by dedicated neutrino radiating systems. The shield itself is superconductive and reemits absorbed energy at probably a given wattage. This is probably not very important since the heat dissipation wattage of the shield itself probably is less than the dedicated systems.
There are the shield projectors, which presumably can only manage directing a certain wattage max to the heat sinks and radiators without damage. Presumably in most cases - like ship-to-ship combat across an entire broadside this wattage exceeds that of the radiators' heat dissipation rate, or the latter would not be of much meaning. However, this probably applies the whole network as a whole, or at least large arcs, not small sections. A single projector covering a particular shield arc probably can manage only a significantly lower wattage, and probably much less energy content than the dedicated heat sink. Overwhelming portions of the projector grid over a small arc of a ship with concentrated high-wattage (but not necessarily high-energy) firepower may be a sound strategy. However EGtW&T suggests burned-out projectors are routine in pitched battle and experienced crews can repair and replace damaged components back to full function in minutes. This is how you can hit the shield system from angle No. 2.
I don't know if you can hit the shield from No. 3; nothing intuitive comes to mind.
As for No. 4 and 5, this is how capital ships brute-force through most opponents' shields. You attack with sufficient wattage to exceed the heat dissipation rate of the radiators, forcing the heat sinks to store the energy. These attacks must be both very high energy and very high wattage, because they must both overwhelm the ships' ability to reradiate the absorbed firepower into space, and to overwhelm the ship's ability to store and contain the energy of your attacks. A capship attacking with overhwhelming force will fill the heat sinks to capacity, in which case the projector grid probably shuts down being simply unable to absorb more energy, and the shield dissipates, allowing unimpeded shots to hit the hull until the heat sink radiates significant amounts of energy away so it has the capacity to absorb more.
I think No. 2 and No. 1 are the best angles and models for explaining hard-to-explain examples of starfighter and torpedo efficiacy against large warships. In particular No. 2 seems to intuitively match the damage patterns caused in most of the incidents. The No. 1 examples too provide probably small windows of opportunity; Loronar Torpedo Spheres provide areas of weakness in planetary shields that are measured in small fractions of a second. Its presumably a simple and quick fix to reangle and reinforce disrupted shield arcs.
I think Mad's theory makes the most sense in relation to No. 2. Of course, Rogue Squadron makes it easy but extrinsically Stackpole's a shitty author and intrinsically, just because Rogue Squadron can do it doesn't mean its easy or broadly applicable. Think about it; in order to take advantage of No. 2 a full squadron of fighters must attack an armed warship from along what is nearly a single vector, must all fly relatively an equal distance from the ship, and all fire simultaneously, at close enough range where it is unlikely they'll be stopped by point defenses, with sufficiently powerful torpedoes, to even have a hope of success. This is extremely dangerous! Anti-starfighter defenses need only be directed against a single arc against ships flying in formation, placing them at extremely high risk.
Presumably being able to form up and fire torpedoes in synchronicity and bug out quickly enough for it to not be suicide against a competent crew and while being reliably effective enough to be worth the fired torpedoes is the kind of starfighter circus acrobatics that can only be expected and relied upon from an ultra-ace squadron like the Rogues, or comparable experience and talent. Also, I can't think of a single incident where Rogue Squadron was posted on a mission to take out a capital ship in such a way. Each time the tactics were last-ditch efforts to salvage a shitty situation they unexpectedly ran into. The fact they're not assigned to do it means that Command cannot possibly rely on such tactics working enough to justify the risk.