Putin to Europe: Screw You! Arms Buildup! Wooo!

[K. A. Pital]

Obviously, we have no real-world experience to go on in that area but we did a lot of conflict simulations back in the good old days and they all escalated very quickly

The basic missile parity by 70s and 80s allowed for that. If missiles become obsolete, the US gains a huge upper hand against everyone else, because strategic air forces in other countries are in a yet weaker stage of development than in the U.S. itself. The US has air bases everywhere in the world and shitloads of aircraft carriers. This ABM system would only strengthen it's possible dominance over world affairs. I don't think that this turn of events looks good. If a missile exchange is ran after a first strike of country B against country A, what are country A's options?

The US on the other hand already has the ability to use it's airforce agains a possible enemy ABM.

Which creates a disbalance in offensive-defensive capabilities.

[Stuart]

Wouldn't Russia have more to worry about America than China in terms of nuclear capability? America has a lot of nukes on Minutemen ICBMs and Ohio SSBNs, and also a defense pact with a lot of nations bordering Russia (NATO).

In an abstract sense probably but not in reality. The Russians are very familiar with how the United States makes war and it doesn't involve massive attacks on people. In fact, the U.S. style is to contain a situation and launch spoiling attacks that prevent the target from progressing with its plans (Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran and Iraq) while allowing its economic muscle and political developments to slowly strangle its enemy. Russia's been on the receiving end of that treatment and they can see it all too easily. China is much more of an unknown quantity.

Remember, weapons are just weapons, they're tools intended to do a specific job. What really matters is the intention of the person using the tools. Now, there's an old military maxim that one should plan on the enemy's capabilities, not on his intentions and that's a good rule at a tactical and operational level. However, at this level of strategic thought, intentions become part of capability (put another way, the ability of a country to form an intention to do something is as much a capability as actually doing it.)

In any case, in the final analysis, very often strategic objectives are determined by possibility. It is not economically possible for Russia to form a defense an American strategic onslaught (we'd love them to try, it would be a rerun of the 1980s) but it is economically possible for them to defend against a Chinese attack. So, the strategic objective becomes to defend against that which one can defend against.

[K. A. Pital]

Remember, weapons are just weapons, they're tools intended to do a specific job. What really matters is the intention of the person using the tools.

We in Russia think that intentions are nothing but a frail piece of paper on the wind. Today it's one thing and tomorrow it's another.

It is not economically possible for Russia to form a defense an American strategic onslaught

Yes. But we know that we don't need a defense, we basically need the ability to ruin anyone who dares. This, in itself, is a very important factor which sort of affects the ideas and actions of the possible adversary. You say that the US likes to lay and hide, ruining possible opponents financially, strangling them economically and technologically. That is well true, but I don't believe that doctrines are born without the consideration of existing strategic realities.

And Chinese nuclear attack on Russia will be countered by the same problem, China will be reduced to cinder before it says "AH". China's missile abilities (thankfully) are rather lacking as of now, and it's ABM abilities too.

We are not exactly looking forward to press against China, Europe and the US at the same time, but if missiles really become obsolete, Russia will use strategic airforces or whatever is left of them.

[Stuart]

If missiles become obsolete, the US gains a huge upper hand against everyone else, because strategic air forces in other countries are in a yet weaker stage of development than in the U.S. itself.

Exactly. And the problem here is? Seriously, you've just encapsulated in one neat argument why a missile defense screen is a valuable contributor to the US strategic posture.

The US has air bases everywhere in the world and shitloads of aircraft carriers.

Actually 11 (soon to drop to ten) but more or less yes. Personally, I'd prefer to have fewer forces abroad and better means of power projection from CONUS but that's me.

This ABM system would only strengthen it's possible dominance over world affairs. I don't think that this turn of events looks good.

It does when one's sitting in Washington - or more precisely, a five-sided building outside Washington. From our point of view, it looks very good. If we can eliminate the ICBM as a major threat, we've taken a big step towards securing the American homeland against attack which has always been the primary aim of US policy.

If a missile exchange is ran after a first strike of country B against country A, what are country A's options?

In the absence of an ABM system, only one - hit back with everything left in the arsenal. Country A shoots and goes down fighting. In the presence of an ABM system, it has the option of downing the attack and then can choose whether to fire on the country launching the attack and devastate it or (assuming that country depleted its arsenal in its original failed first strike) advice said country that it forks over the goodies on pain of being nuked (there is a third option, force it to fork over the goodies then nuke it anyway but that's bad business).

The US on the other hand already has the ability to use it's airforce agains a possible enemy ABM.

That's right although its likely that the country will also be defended by an enemy ADGE. However, if the bombers have got far enough inland to hammer the MDGE, why bother with it, why not just laydown on the primaries instead? Why pound on the shield when one can stab the shield-bearer in the heart? However, the point is that bombers are a much safer and stabilizing form of nuclear delivery system. They can be stopped, recalled, diverted to different targets (which is a force-economy by the way - one of the reasons why missile-delivered warheads are in such numbers is that ICBMs can't be retargeted in flight. If a target is missed or the missile aimed at it is shot down, a surplus missile from another target cannot be diverted to it'; a bomber can).

Which creates a disbalance in offensive-defensive capabilities.

If you mean, does it load the dice in our favor, then yes, of course it does. That's our job - just as Putin's efforts to load the dice in Russia's favor are his job. Its just we're a bit better at it.

[K. A. Pital]

If you mean, does it load the dice in our favor, then yes, of course it does.

We need you to elect Dick Cheney who will ressurect McNamara and make him SoD. Now.

Anyway, I don't think our engineers have said their respective last words. We'll just see how it goes. New Tu-160s is what we need for the interim though.

[Stuart]

We in Russia think that intentions are nothing but a frail piece of paper on the wind. Today it's one thing and tomorrow it's another.

On a tactical and operational level that's quite true. However, when one gets to a high strategic level, things change. Stalin had a name for it 'permanently operating factors'. It's observable that national characteristics and strategic formularies are quite constant. The objective may change, but the way that objective is approached does not. The United States is primarily an economic power; its military strength grows out of its economic power. Americans grow up thinking of situations in economic terms. As a result, the US is a past-master at the "economy of force" game. It commits just enough force to achieve its ends (which may not be - indeed seldom are - easily discernable) and no more.

So, as you say, American objectives may shift and change like a frail piece of paper on the wind (or as we say, like a fart in a thunderstorm) but the way it will achieve any given end is relatively constant,

Yes. But we know that we don't need a defense, we basically need the ability to ruin anyone who dares.

The point is, we don't want to be ruined. We just want to sit back and let time and money strangle our enemies. So if we can create a situation where we can't be ruined, we're ahead of the game.

This, in itself, is a very important factor which sort of affects the ideas and actions of the possible adversary. You say that the US likes to lay and hide, ruining possible opponents financially, strangling them economically and technologically. That is well true, but I don't believe that doctrines are born without the consideration of existing strategic realities.

And to Americans, the predominant strategic reality is that we have overwhelming economic power that eventually strangles our enemies. We don't hide, we just grin, bide our time and disrupt enemy plans with spoiling attacks when needed.

And Chinese nuclear attack on Russia will be countered by the same problem, China will be reduced to cinder before it says "AH". China's missile abilities (thankfully) are rather lacking as of now, and it's ABM abilities too.

Now, yes but they're working on both missile and laser-based ABM systems. They have a functional and effective ASAT. It'll be some years before they have a capable MDGE but its coming. When it does, the ICBMs in Russia will be obsolete.

We are not exactly looking forward to press against China, Europe and the US at the same time, but if missiles really become obsolete, Russia will use strategic airforces or whatever is left of them.

Well, wouldn't it make sense to start beefing them up now? As I've said, ABM isn't just an American scheme, a whole load of countries are in that game and if we don't develop it, somebody else will (and probably sell it to whoever needs it). Malaysia or Thailand may not be able to develop their own but the French will be happy to sell a system to them. As I've said all along, its not just a question of the US system; the end of the ICBM is a worldwide thing, driven by technology developments that put ABM into more and more hands. If we don't take that on board and act on it, one day we're going to have a set of strategic systems that are useless and nothing to replace them

[Stuart]

Anyway, I don't think our engineers have said their respective last words. We'll just see how it goes. New Tu-160s is what we need for the interim though.

I agree (from your point of view). Building up the Tu-160 force to deal with the USA while also developing the SLBM force for handling China. Scrap the ICBMs and the developing ABM systems are left without a reason for their existance.

[K. A. Pital]

Scrap the ICBMs

The silo based ICBMs are running out of age anyway, they are very sturdy but every weapon has a limit of age.

[Starglider]

As I've said all along, its not just a question of the US system; the end of the ICBM is a worldwide thing, driven by technology developments that put ABM into more and more hands.

Presumably it makes sense for the US to keep some ballistic missiles around just to force the enemy to spend money defending against them? But is this an argument for maintaining a minuteman force, or are SLBMs sufficient for that? I assume dispersed missile silos are only a warhead sponge if they're enough of a threat to merit trying to take them out before they launch - though if you can't rely on your ABM shield staying operational once the bombers have arrived I suppose it makes sense to kill the ICBMs (if you can) to prevent further strikes.

Well, wouldn't it make sense to start beefing them up now?

The US has plenty of advanced tactical fighters, but its strategic bomber force isn't exactly in top shape either - at least Russia is building new bombers, albeit slowly, while the US (AFAIK) is still in the 'doing some preliminary design studies' stage.

[brianeyci]

This is very interesting, always the best posts come from people with expertise and experience, had I known Stuart would show up I wouldn't have opened my fat mouth. My stones from a glass house comment was mostly directed towards the single point that Russia was acting "paranoid" not that ABM systems are of themselves wrong for national defense.

I've always had a question for a nuclear policy expert I wanted to ask. That is, why strategic weapons at all, in this day and age. Or more appropriately, why not nuclear artillery. If the United States' strategy is to strangle opponents economically and politically, why not allow all strategic forces except a token force to rot. The Soviet tank swarm of the cold war comes to mind. Why not equip your army with very large number of tactical nukes ranging from less than one kiloton to twenty-five kilotons, nuclear artillery. It seems to me the aversion to using tactical nuclear weapons is because whoever first uses nukes opens himself for strategic retaliation, and that need not be the case, especially on defense.

For example, let's say all you say comes to pass. China launches strategic nuclear weapons against some Russian city, that gets defeated by Russian ABM. Russia retaliates -- with an invasion and widespread use of tactical nukes. Saturation will defeat any "multi-warhead" system. Plus maintaining a very capable tank force isn't as economically draining. It's not as if China has any moral ground to object in the UN in such a situation. It seems to me that the only reason for existence of strategic weapons is to be able to threaten the United States homeland, and if you're asking policy makers to concede the US will never pursue all-out war with Russia (they had many chances to do so in the past, even if they knew about the missile gap (the real one with the Soviets unable to respond until late 1970's not the fake one)) then why not forget strategic weapons all together except for a few subs that can possibly destroy ten or so major US cities.

[K. A. Pital]

My take on the "political attitude" would be that nuclear forces themselves are a recent phenomena - but a one that is unlikely to go away in the near or far future.

Simply, there would still be nuclear forces at the coming of year 2100.

And quite simply, the US rose as an economic superpower during a short period of time too, which coincided with major wars (luckily none of them, I mean for the US, have ravaged their homeland and ruined their industries).

The idea that the thinking of an economic power will always be the US modus operandi is naive IMHO. Who knows what future crises may give? And what if the US (phew-phew-phew) actually breaks in two and starts violent conflict on it's own territory?

The nuclear forces are not concerned with such things, their task is to be ready to any turn of events. This is why, the major scrapping of nuclear triade (bombers - subs - MICBM) was an irresponsible act. Today we will try to re-build the triade to meet new challenges, such as the pan-European ABM system.

[brianeyci]

See, but that is the kind of thinking that led to the cold war.

Call me naive if you want, but I still think that an agreement between two modern nations to reduce their arms can work in principle. First because of the recent phenomenon of mass media, which is unlikely to go away. How can an Imperialist Japan clone rise in this day and age of 24-hour news networks. Putin for example, got his power through his incredible charisma, public speaking and rock songs (lol). Now leaders can become very popular as the de-escalator. For example in the Cuban missile crisis, had Kruschcev played it properly, the Soviet Union could have been the world hero, saving the world from nuclear annihilation by swallowing their pride. Of course that's not what happened, was widely perceived that the USSR lost at that time. But in this day and age, with instant news and the Internet, a country attacked by nuclear weapons can play the wounded tiger. All that's needed is the ability to cripple, not destroy the US. Such can be done through other ways than strategic nuclear weapons, such as oil, political pressure, and maybe a token strategic force.

[Pelranius]

To be honest, wouldn't the strategic dominance of America guaranteed by the NMD (if the thing ever becomes operational on a large scale) drive Russia and China together?

A big power usually causes the other second place powers to band together to counterbalance it, successfully or unsuccessfully (see the coalitions of the Napoleonic War). Such an alliance may not be able to compete military with us in the short run, but China has a lot of money and the Russians have a lot of natural resources if nothing else.

[CC]

The problem is that once the first missiles fly, the internal dynamics of a situation mean that all limits are off. There's another saying about this "one flies, they all fly". The reason is very simple. Country A detects an inbound missile - it has three choices.

1 - don't respond at all - the launching country gets its strike in, Country A is defeated without firinga shot.

2 - A limited response - Country A fires a similar number of missiles back. But. what happens to the rest? What if the launch country has fired all its missiles - Country A gets hammered and only gets a limited strike in as retaliation.

3 - A full response, empty the arsenal at the launching country. At leats the launching country will be equally devastated so doesn't win.

In practice option 3 is the only viable choice. However, suppose a frantic call comes in "Sorry, that was a mistake, we didn't mean it for God's sake don't shoot, we'll pay reparations, do whatever you like, just don't shoot."

The options

1 - The call is genuine. Its believed, country A holds fire disaster is averted

2 - The call is genuine. Its not believed, Country A shoots back with everything it has.

3 - The call is a ruse, its believed, Country A holds fire and is devastated without any retaliation

4 - The call is a ruse, its not velieved, Country A lets fly, both countrys devasted.

That's 3 to 1 in favor of shooting. In reality, the decision is always, ignore the call and shoot. Now, the country that originally launched knows that, they know their call won't be believed. So they have to choices after the single-missile launch.

1 - Pray that something will happen and country A won't shoot.

2 - Let fly with everything they have.

Follow the logic tree and no matter how one fiddles it, in the absence of ABM, one flies, they all fly.

Now add ABM to the equation. Country A shoots down the first missile and calls the launch country with a simple message. "We shot it down. Now, do you want to talk or fry?" It's a break point, one that stops the slide.

Add in something else. The decision time high up is limited by the time for the missile to reach its target - a few minutes at best. That's what makes it inevitable. There's no time to do anything clever. With ABM, we buy time for somebody to think of something.

Don't SSBN's grant the same protection however? Even with every single landbased ICBM knocked out, there's still enough firepower in reserve to totally devastate Country B. Therefore it would seem to follow that with the sea based deterrent there is no need for either side to launch all of its weapons since Country A cannot lose its ability to devastate Country B.

[Vympel]

What is the current status of America's missile defense efforts, anyway? What sort of timeframe are we talking about with "the end of the ICBM?" if we put it that way?

The only two "working" programs I know about are the AEGIS BMD system, which is incapable of intercepting ICBMs (except for using their radars as part of a larger network to track ICBMs, I believe) and is so far a relatively successful program, and the far less impressive GMD (Ground-based Midcourse Defence) program- the one with the interceptors at Ft. Greely, Alaska (and a few more in California?)

Now, the GMD program as I recall uses GBIs (ground based interceptors)- missiles- to shoot EKVs (extra-atmospheric kill vehicles) to destroy enemy warheads in flight. IIRC, they are not designed to hit the target before MIRV separation, correct me if I'm wrong? In that case, in the short term future, Russia could take steps to MIRV it's Topol-Ms (three warheads instead of one) as a response to GMD, if it ever becomes operational.

As far as I can recall, GMDs current intercept track record against targets in highly scripted situations from start to finish is 5 out of 10. In fairness to the actual systems purported interception abilities, two of the failures (December 04 and February 05, IIRC) were failures of the missile to launch, rather than a launch and a miss. The last test for GMD was I think in December 05, whoose objective was only to launch the missile, which was successful.

The sea-based X-band radar for the system is in testing- while the space based tracking system (STSS) isn't going to be up and running until at least 2012, and probably later than that (didn't it have it's funding cut in the F7 07 budget by ~70 million?)

And let's not even start with MDA as a bureaucracy (have they even come up with an operational requirements document yet?)

ABL by most accounts is in trouble (it's not very relevant to Russia anyway), I don't know about KEI though.

[Stormbringer]

Don't SSBN's grant the same protection however? Even with every single landbased ICBM knocked out, there's still enough firepower in reserve to totally devastate Country B. Therefore it would seem to follow that with the sea based deterrent there is no need for either side to launch all of its weapons since Country A cannot lose its ability to devastate Country B.

The missiles maybe secure but the command and control that would let you use them isn't necessarily going to be. At best you've just wrecked a nation and severely degraded their ability to respond effectively.

And on top of that, most nations only have part of their nuclear arsenal at sea anyway. Letting yourself be hit may mean that you lose a good chunk of your capability.

[Stuart]

To be honest, wouldn't the strategic dominance of America guaranteed by the NMD (if the thing ever becomes operational on a large scale) drive Russia and China together? A big power usually causes the other second place powers to band together to counterbalance it, successfully or unsuccessfully (see the coalitions of the Napoleonic War). Such an alliance may not be able to compete military with us in the short run, but China has a lot of money and the Russians have a lot of natural resources if nothing else.

We're now moving into the shady world of international relations theory (people get PhDs for writing about this sort of thing. There are many, many theories of how international politics and relations work. Every one of them has its cadre of supporters who insist that they have the true image of reality and everybody else is hopelessly deluded. The appropriate theory here is called "Realism " (the names are dreamed up by people they're designative, not descriptive). Realism proposes that international relationships is a game where everybody is struggling to reach the top of a pile. The nation that achieves the top of that pile is called the Hegemon and its the Hegemon's stance on political, economic and military issues that shape the world.In this context, “realism” is used to describe a situation of continuous conflict in which the countries of the world are constantly struggling to establish an international hierarchy, to improve their own positions in that hierarchy and to reduce the positions of others. “Realism” sees the world political arena as being a zero-sum game in which a win for one player necessarily means that another must suffer a loss. Under the concept of “Realism” this immediately draws a distinction between political and economic interactions. Economic interactions are not a zero-sum game; it is quite possible, indeed usual, for an economic interaction to benefit both parties involved. Political interactions do not do this; even if a political agreement appears to benefit both parties, there will be an unseen third party or parties whose interests are harmed. This basic conceptual position leads to an early manifestation of US policy; a firm belief that trade agreements are more productive and desirable than political agreements.

The concept that the success of a given power in achieving the Hegemon position usually causes the other powers to band together to counterbalance it is called Minimal Realism. It is the dominant theory of international relations in the US Government although its challenged by Liberalism from the left of the Democrat Party and by "Maximal Realism" from the Reaganite Republicans. "Minimal-Realism” has two direct implications. On one level (where the US is not the Hegemon or where the position of Hegemon is disputed) the US should be taking a lead in forming and directing coalitions to take the existing or rival Hegemon down. However, once in the position of being the undisputed Hegemon, it should be spending its efforts on watching for the formation of hostile coalitions and ensuring that they do not move from the formative to the active stage. Implicit in this assumption is that the US should not make its Hegemonic position obvious or exploit that position in overt ways. In fact, the US should not act as a Hegemon at all but continue to act as a leader of a coalition to bring down a selected target. In this perception, overt displays of power are not only undesirable but are counter-productive and detrimental to US interests. Another consequence of this construct is that the US should take part in international organizations, not because they are worthwhile or useful but to conceal its Hegemonic position and to ensure that by dominating such organizations they serve rather than oppose US interests.

“Maximal-Realism” sometimes known as “Bandwagoning” sees the world as working in an entirely different way. It sees the Hegemonic power as occupying the summit of the international order effectively unchallenged. The other powers, recognizing the futility of challenging the Hegemon make accommodations with it; they bend to its needs and make the noises that the Hegemon will find acceptable. However, eventually a challenge to the Hegemon’s position is mounted. This may happen because the Hegemon has started to give the impression that its power is slipping either in real terms or in terms of ability and/or desire to use that power, it may happen because the challenger has grown more confident in its own power or has achieved supremacy in a given aspect of power politics. The effect of a challenge to the Hegemon’s position obviously depends on the results; a resounding defeat for the Challenger will ensure the position of the Hegemon and cause additional nations to seek accommodations and favor with that power. On the other hand, any decline in the Hegemonic power will cause the less-committed of its supporters to reconsider their positions and open the way to seeking accommodation with the challenger. If the Hegemon suffers enough defeats and its international prestige is sufficiently badly dented, more of its allies will join the bandwagon, transfer their allegiance to the challenger and the Hegemon will be toppled.

From the US point of view, “Maximal-Realism” also has some interesting implications. One is that the US is only secure in its position as Hegemon as long as it overtly and openly exerts that power to defend its interests and those of the nations that owe allegiance to it. Anything that dilutes the US’s ability to mastermind its own affairs or weakens its ability to act in its own interests is seriously detrimental to US interests. Another is that the US has to be watchful for the rise of potential challengers and cut these down before they become serious risks. “Maximal-Realism” is the political equivalent of the quote “to those that hath, more shall be given”. It is the successful exercise of power that is important for it brings with it greater security and sets the bar higher for any subsequent challenger.

The Napoleonic Wars are an interesting example of the way these debates work. They're quoted by the Minimal-Realism school as an example of how a hegemonic power causes everybody else to form a coalition against it. Maximal realists see it differently; they see France going into the Napoleonic Wars as a hegemon but the weakening in its position caused by the revolution allowed Britain to challenge France's position. France's inability to decisively crush Britain's challenge caused Britain to pick up credibility that grew as the years of its challenge extended without any decisive French response until the UK had enough bandwagoned support to bring France down. Maximal realists note that Britain was the undisputed world Hegemon between 1815 and 1914 and there was not one case of a coalition being formed to bring it down. In fact, in the only European war in which Britain was involved (against Russia, 1854-55) the challenger was Russia, its challenge was so weak that it was obviously doomed and the coalition that was formed bandwagoned around the UK. According to the Minimal-Realism school, there should have been a major European coalition forming against the UK.

So, the presumption of the question here, that a secure US would cause a coalition against it is fundamentally flawed. Us cold-hearted, flinty-eyed imperialists of the maximal realist school would suggest that the reverse will happen, that the establishment of a proper defensive screen against missile attack would make the probability of a decisive challenge to US Hegemony much less and that would make the formation of a coalition against the US less rather than more likely.

[Stuart]

What is the current status of America's missile defense efforts, anyway? What sort of timeframe are we talking about with "the end of the ICBM?" if we put it that way?

Once again, the critical thing here is that we're not just dealing with a US effort to develop missile defense systems. More than a dozen countries have well-funded, well-based efforts to develop such systems Over a dozen more are either partnering those countries or have invested in them in the hope of buying systems once they're developed. These systems should be on line by 2015-2020. I'd say by 2025, ballistic missile defense systems will be widespread enough to mean that ballistic missiles themselves will be of only very limited utility.

The ability to hit an MIRV bus before separation was demonstrated back in 1966. The ability to hit an MRV bus was demonstrated two years earlier so we're not dealing with esoteric capability here. Again, I stress another key point, there is nothing difficult about shooting down ballistic missiles, they're easy targets. Technically, we don't even need a guidance system in the interceptor to do it (what a guidance system does is allows us to use a kinetic energy kill vehicle rather than a nuclear warhead but that's another long, technical debate).

As far as I can recall, GMDs current intercept track record against targets in highly scripted situations from start to finish is 5 out of 10. In fairness to the actual systems purported interception abilities, two of the failures (December 04 and February 05, IIRC) were failures of the missile to launch, rather than a launch and a miss. The last test for GMD was I think in December 05, whose objective was only to launch the missile, which was successful.

By way of comparison, of the first 72 launches of the TOW anti-tank missile, all but three were complete failures. Of the 32 initial launches of tthe Gabriel anti-ship missile, every single one failed. I don;t think anybody would describe TOW or Gabriel as failures. In fact the present GBI program has been extremely successful by missile development standards. The purpose of the tests is not to get a hit but to try out various aspects of the system, find out what doesn't work or needs improvement and fix them. That's why tests are scripted, we need to have solid bases for evaluation of results. A s a result of the tests carried out to date, we know that all the key parts of the system work.

I'd also point out we were getting skin-to-skin hits in RVs with Zeus missiles fired out of Kwaj back in 64-66. There's nothing difficult about this other than the normal problems in getting a complex system running. Those problems are being systematically addressed and solved, whcih is the way development normally runs. Build a system, check it out, find what breaks and strengthen it.

[Stuart]

Presumably it makes sense for the US to keep some ballistic missiles around just to force the enemy to spend money defending against them? But is this an argument for maintaining a minuteman force, or are SLBMs sufficient for that? I assume dispersed missile silos are only a warhead sponge if they're enough of a threat to merit trying to take them out before they launch - though if you can't rely on your ABM shield staying operational once the bombers have arrived I suppose it makes sense to kill the ICBMs (if you can) to prevent further strikes.

That's certainly plausible although I'd argue that SLBMs do that job just as well (ABM systems can handle SLBMs, its just the shorter warning times and unpredictable trajectories make the job harder). I'd be reluctant to use the land-based silos as a missile sponge, knocking them out needs big ground bursts and they're horribly contaminating, giving fallout plumes hundreds of miles long. Using ICBMs as a deterrent is rather like a family under a home invasion locking themselves in a room with open windows and inviting the bad guys to throw hand grenades inside. I'd rather not have ICBMs on our territory at all.

The US has plenty of advanced tactical fighters, but its strategic bomber force isn't exactly in top shape either - at least Russia is building new bombers, albeit slowly, while the US (AFAIK) is still in the 'doing some preliminary design studies' stage.

It's a bit more advanced than that but not much. I agree; I regard the development of a new manned bomber as the USAF's highest priority. Unfortunately, the USAF is run by fighter jocks and they don't agree. Perhaps we should buy Tu-160s.

[Stuart]

And quite simply, the US rose as an economic superpower during a short period of time too, which coincided with major wars (luckily none of them, I mean for the US, have ravaged their homeland and ruined their industries). The idea that the thinking of an economic power will always be the US modus operandi is naive IMHO.

In US eyes, the fact that we haven't had a ravaged homeland and ruined industries is why we're an economic superpower. Our faith in the economic system we have is such that we continue to regard it as the basis of national strategy. Will the situation change? Probably, in time, although its hard to see a direct rival arising in the short or medium term. If that happens, then we'll have to adapt (or, more likely crush that rival before it becomes serious).

The nuclear forces are not concerned with such things, their task is to be ready to any turn of events. This is why, the major scrapping of nuclear triade (bombers - subs - MICBM) was an irresponsible act. Today we will try to re-build the triade to meet new challenges, such as the pan-European ABM system.

The problem is that the Triad was designed to meet the requirements (technical and strategic) of a situation that existed more than 20 years ago. Given the time taken to develop things, a new system won't be available until 2020 - almost half a century after the triad system. By then, ABM (if not US then somebody elses) will be online and the viability of ICBMs seriously threatened. Recreating the triad is going back to the past; it was good while it lasted but its days are gone. We need to be looking at new systems, ones that are suited to a new technical and strategic environment.

A couple of suggestions. Space-based weapons, manned sub-orbital attack planes. Why look to 1980 for solutions to the problems of 2020?

[Stuart]

Call me naive if you want, but I still think that an agreement between two modern nations to reduce their arms can work in principle. First because of the recent phenomenon of mass media, which is unlikely to go away. How can an Imperialist Japan clone rise in this day and age of 24-hour news networks.

Which is why rising countries (China for example) start by putting severe restrictions on the news and the Internet. What you are saying is perfectly correct - assuming everybody has unfettered access to the news etc. If they don't, the argument falls apart.

But in this day and age, with instant news and the Internet, a country attacked by nuclear weapons can play the wounded tiger.

If a country is attacked with nuclear weapons, there's nothing left to play the wounded tiger (unless the spiritualists are correct and the tiger knows how to use an ouija board or is on friendly terms with John Edwards et al).

All that's needed is the ability to cripple, not destroy the US. Such can be done through other ways than strategic nuclear weapons, such as oil, political pressure, and maybe a token strategic force.

That's harder than it seems. One of the reasons behind the 9/11 attacks were an attempt to cripple the United States militarily and economically. The planners assumed that the New York financial district and the Pentagon represented the sum total of American economic and military power (they weren't terribly bright people, OBL himself has virtually no real knowledge of the world or how it works). In fact, the US is a very dispersed, very decentralized country, much more so than people might think. That isn't an accident. Crippling us would need some overt attack and, as 9/11 showed, an overt attack gets a devastating response (not necessarily a military one).

[K. A. Pital]

A couple of suggestions. Space-based weapons, manned sub-orbital attack planes. Why look to 1980 for solutions to the problems of 2020?

Space-based weapons are a nice idea, although I can imagine what kind of stink there will be if a word gets through that "Soviets", as Condoleeza said in a slip-of-tongue, are actively (and covertly) pursuing the creation of a space-based strike group, or produce space planes with a military function (something that today's space ministry seems to be keen on).

Given the time taken to develop things, a new system won't be available until 2020 - almost half a century after the triad system. By then, ABM (if not US then somebody elses) will be online and the viability of ICBMs seriously threatened. Recreating the triad is going back to the past

Basically the elements of the triade still hold water today, I mean bombers and submarines (although the latter are quickly losing utility since the advancement of coastal ASW).

But I would agree with your assessment that newer systems are required. Space-based weapons look like an interesting idea - every year we launch tons of satellites, and it's not like the "peaceful space exploration" treaties are having any sense in today's circumstances either.

[Stuart]

Space-based weapons are a nice idea, although I can imagine what kind of stink there will be if a word gets through that "Soviets", as Condoleeza said in a slip-of-tongue, are actively (and covertly) pursuing the creation of a space-based strike group, or produce space planes with a military function (something that today's space ministry seems to be keen on).

I've met Condi. She never - repeat never - makes "slips of the tongue". everything she says is calculated for a specific message and specific effect. And, yes we'd kick up a fuss about it - we don't want you (nothing personal it applies to everybody else as well) to have weapons that threaten the US homeland

Basically the elements of the triade still hold water today, I mean bombers and submarines (although the latter are quickly losing utility since the advancement of coastal ASW).

Coastal ASW won't hit SSBNs; there's still no way they can be tracked reliably. ICBMs are in their twilight as a viable force, as ABM develops SLBMs will follow them. The question really is to find new elements and construct a new triad. The way to do that is to ask the first question. "What do you actually want to achieve?" Then answer it in ever-increasing detail until the answers emerge.

But I would agree with your assessment that newer systems are required. Space-based weapons look like an interesting idea - every year we launch tons of satellites, and it's not like the "peaceful space exploration" treaties are having any sense in today's circumstances either.

I agree, it always makes me laugh hysterically when the tree-huggers wail about "preventing the militarization of space". Space was militarized in 1957 and its been getting more so ever since. I'd say 70 percent of the assets up in space are military-orientated (thats a WAG but I bet its close).

[K. A. Pital]

And, yes we'd kick up a fuss about it - we don't want you (nothing personal it applies to everybody else as well) to have weapons that threaten the US homeland

I know. But today Yeltsin is dead, Putin is no longer a big friend of George, and I think technically our country would be a semi-socialist or bourgeois-nationalist regime in the next 20 years depending on who gains the upper hand. Which means we won't be really listening to your advice.

As for Condoleeza, no, I don't believe her "just slipped". Today's government of the United States is acting behind a facade of simplicity and sometimes even what looks like blatant idiocy but my gut instinctively fears that they are a lot more cunning than they seem to be.

The question really is to find new elements and construct a new triad. The way to do that is to ask the first question. "What do you actually want to achieve?" Then answer it in ever-increasing detail until the answers emerge.

The basic idea is simple, assured destruction of the enemy in case a full-blown conflict arises. The basic problem so far is to create such a system that would not only reliably dodge ABM, but inflict the needed degree of damage to industrial targets since the scale, goals and extent of the war would most likely not be exactly known in the first days of such a conflict. The task is non-trivial.

I'd say 70 percent of the assets up in space are military-orientated (thats a WAG but I bet its close)

However, a lot of them are targeting&exploration assets like photosats, precise-targeting sats. Today we need to think a bit further than that. For example, in the 1980s we thought about using the "Buran" as a military space plane, as well as a civilian analogue of the shuttle.

[Pelranius]

Stuart: Personally, I'd say that the reason why no European coalition formed against Britain from 1815 to 1914 was because the British did not meddle in European affairs in any extensive manner. It was only around the time that Germany started throwing weight around overseas that European alliances started to form (that, and French desire for revenge against Germany, and ethnic nationalist issues in Eastern Europe).

I'd like to go on more, but I have a very long International Relations paper due in less than a week.