Patrick Degan wrote:I disagree. First, I don't see how you come to the formulation that people "don't count" in a proportional system, since under winner-take-all, if 29,000 people in Wyoming voted Obama but 33,000 voted McCain, that means McCain gets all of Wyoming's 3 electoral votes, Obama zero and 29,000 Obama voters definitely "don't count". Under the outlined system, McCain gets two votes but Obama still gets one, which means his voters did gain him one more electoral vote to his tally instead of none. NPV has the same defect you decry, only it simply shifts the ground on the winner-take-all mechanism from one pathway to another.
Because the popular vote matters. In the NPV system, whoever wins the popular vote wins. Period.
Example: 240,000 wyoming residents vote, being split into 80,000 margins for a single EV.
If 40,000 Wyomingans vote for Obama but 200,000 for McCain, here's what happens:
NPV: Obama count is incremented by 40,000, McCain count is incremented by 200k. Both count equally towards determining who is the President of the US (not the president of wyoming, or the president of the swing states).
Your model: Obama gets 0 EV, McCain gets 3 EV. Obama voters in Wyoming still do not matter unless the election is more contentuous.
Wrong. My model outlines that Obama gets at least 1 EV. It is not winner-take-all but proportional allocation and I don't know where you are getting any other interpretation of what I laid out.
Clearly, the NPV model is unfair because the EV of a state don't go to whoever the state wants but whom the nation wants.
Which is what the NPV proposal actually says.
I think either you didn't read it or didn't understand the idea behind it- the states are made irrelevant by the fact that they all vote en-bloc to the winner of the popular vote. That's the whole point- EV isn't supposed to be proportional to popular opinion, or else it's just a grainier measure of popular opinion.
Too bad that flies in the face of the federalist model on which the country's government is actually based.
Why bother taking the popular vote totals of a state and then dividing them into blocks of 80,000 when you can just look at the popular vote for the nation, and whomever has the highest number of votes is the winner.
Who said anything about dividing the state vote into blocks? That is not what the proportional representation model I propose incorporates at all. The EV allocation is based on a simple mathematical formula.
Is there a reason behind turning an election of 300,000,000 people that is 50 elections of unequally sized blocks into an election of 538 more equally sized elections? Why not just make it a single election and stop futzing about with grainy count totals when the popular vote is clearly whoever wins.
You touch upon a key question underlying the entire debate about the electoral college's role in American politics dating from the first days of the republic. The problem is that different states have different concerns and different political worldviews. The compromise between straight democracy and a centralised republic (and I am constrained to point out that a republican form of government need not operate with any reference to popular vote at all) requires a mechanism to address these concerns electorally; so that whole states aren't rendered politically irrelevant. Besides which, if you think vote fraud is a problem now, I would point out that it would be far easier to rig a single election than it would be for fifty separate elections.
The Compact method of bloc voting the EV is meant to destroy the EV as a unit of measure by making it nonfunctional, not to divide up EV in accordance with public opinion, for the reason of the flaw I just pointed out above.
In that case, why not abolish it altogether? Why even bother with an NPV mechanism that keeps the EC as a useless sham existing only out of tradition?
Another flaw: Your method, every single state must join or else that state's votes being non-proportional would imbalance the system. Or, it would take a constitutional amendment. NPV method, only about 20-30 states must join until their bloc vote for the popular winner will decide the election every time. So it either takes 50 states agreeing (something that almost never happens) or a constitutional amendment- and if you're going to constitutionally amend the process, why keep the EV in the first place just to make it a grainier popular vote?
Hate to tell you this, but your model shares that exact same flaw along with the other aforementioned problems.