Halsey acted stupidly

[Stravo]

I caught "Hunt for Red October" this weekend and there was that cute little scene when Ryan is explaining that he was CIA but wrote books for a living one of them being "Admiral Halsey the Fighting Sailor" and Ramius grimaced and said "I know this book, you were all wrong, Halsey acted stupidly."

Now my knowledge of the Pacific Theater in WWII is rather limited can anyone tell me if this is a straight up throw away line or is there some evidence concerning Halsey's activities during the Pacific campaign to support Ramius' disdain?

[That NOS Guy]

I always thought he was referring to the Leyte Gulf where Halsey took the bait and chased the Japanese carriers instead of making sure the Japanese center force was destroyed/turned back.

That mistake nearly lead to the center force getting to the invasion beaches and really hurting the American landing forces there.

EDIT: There's also the infamous "Halsey's Typhoon" incident.

[Big Phil]

He's referring to Halsey's conduct during the Leyte Gulf battles. I won't waste time repeating what's in the article below, but I'll summarize my take on it:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf

Halsey's job was to defend the amphibious forces against Japanese airborne and seaborne attack. His carriers did a superb job of driving back the Japanese warships and air attacks during the first part of the battle. Unfortunately, Japanese carriers were sighted and Halsey wanted his fleet to sink the Japanese carriers in a last blaze of glory. Unfortunately the Japanese carriers had few or no planes, and were simply a decoy. Halsey chased after the carriers - which were all but useless by this stage in the war, with few airplanes and no trained pilots - and left the amphibious forces uncovered, allowing the Japanese to attack them on the morning of the 25th. In other words, Halsey took his eyes off the prize in order to destroy a fleet of ships that were of no threat to the invasion force.

It's been years since I read HFRO, but I believe Jack Ryan was arguing that Halsey's actions had eliminated a potential future threat (from the Japanese carriers). Of course, Jack Ryan is a douchebag, who didn't understand that without planes and trained pilots, those carriers were nothing but expensive transports, but what do you expect from Tom Clancy.

[Sea Skimmer]

Halsey's job was to defend the amphibious forces against Japanese airborne and seaborne attack. His carriers did a superb job of driving back the Japanese warships and air attacks during the first part of the battle. Unfortunately, Japanese carriers were sighted and Halsey wanted his fleet to sink the Japanese carriers in a last blaze of glory.

All logic dictated that carriers were the main threat, and Spruance had been heavily criticized with acting with excessive caution and allowing most of the Japanese fleet to escape at the Philippines Sea. This was not some random lunge to go out and make a name for himself.

Unfortunately the Japanese carriers had few or no planes, and were simply a decoy. Halsey chased after the carriers - which were all but useless by this stage in the war, with few airplanes and no trained pilots

We know that now, Halsey didn’t, not fully anyway. In fact the Japanese carriers had small air groups ONLY because they had stupidity flown off all the planes they had assembled for them to oppose the early October raids on Formosa, which were mistaken for an actual invasion attempt. Potentially the Japanese could have committed six rather then four major carriers with 250 odd planes. Japanese air power was a shadow of its former self, but even without kamikazes it was still a threat. A single Japanese dive bomber had just sunk USS Princeton on October 24th after all, and was not until late on the 24th that the Japanese northern force was even detected.

- and left the amphibious forces uncovered, allowing the Japanese to attack them on the morning of the 25th. In other words, Halsey took his eyes off the prize in order to destroy a fleet of ships that were of no threat to the invasion force.

Actually by that point most of the amphibious shipping had already unloaded and departed Leyte Gulf, and the beachhead was already far too well established to be at any long term risk, something like 35,000 men went ashore on the first day alone. Halsey should have assigned the Task Force 34 battleships to watch San Bernardino Strait, but the communications problems which led other commanders to assume he had in fact done this are well known. This is the only thing he can be faulted with, and while it’s a serious fault it is independent of the decision to use his carriers against the Japanese carriers, something which most certainly should have been done. The USN had far too many assets to work with for a highly conservative strategy to make sense.

It’s also generally ignored that the 7th Fleet Battleships, which defeated the Japanese southern force with ridiculous ease, had to steam just 30 miles to be in a perfect position to cap the Japanese T yet again as the Center Force entered a largely empty Leyte Gulf. The invasion force was thus never unprotected as is often claimed.

[Omega18]

On top of the other problems with Halsey's actions during the Battles of Leyte Gulf, he should have at an absolute minimum left several destroyers behind to give the amphibious force including the escort carriers warning that the Japanese force was coming.

If they had this warning the escort carriers could have started conducting aerial operations against the Japanese forces from quite a distance away. Instead they didn't have any warning the Japanese battle force was coming until it was practically on top of them.

Halsey's actions during the whole sequence were remarkably stupid in fact when you take an objective look at them.

[Omega18]

It’s also generally ignored that the 7th Fleet Battleships, which defeated the Japanese southern force with ridiculous ease, had to steam just 30 miles to be in a perfect position to cap the Japanese T yet again as the Center Force entered a largely empty Leyte Gulf. The invasion force was thus never unprotected as is often claimed.

The time it would have taken the 7th Fleet Battleships to get there once the Japanese battle fleet was spotted, especially with battleships only able to go about 21 knots at max speed, would have given the Japanese way to much time to sink parts of the amphibious invasion force if they had pressed the engagement. The Japanese fleet also had enough of a speed advantage to actually potentially get away once they were engaged by the way.

To be sure the fact the transports had unloaded much of their forces would have limited the damage from this situation somewhat, but the loss of those transports could have limited what was available for future campaigns for awhile and extended the duration of the war. (In practice the atomic bomb might have eneded things at the same time regarrdless, but the general point holds.)

[That NOS Guy]

It’s also generally ignored that the 7th Fleet Battleships, which defeated the Japanese southern force with ridiculous ease, had to steam just 30 miles to be in a perfect position to cap the Japanese T yet again as the Center Force entered a largely empty Leyte Gulf. The invasion force was thus never unprotected as is often claimed.

Didn't they have to restock ammo after their engagement with the Southern Force?

[Big Phil]

Halsey's job was to defend the amphibious forces against Japanese airborne and seaborne attack. His carriers did a superb job of driving back the Japanese warships and air attacks during the first part of the battle. Unfortunately, Japanese carriers were sighted and Halsey wanted his fleet to sink the Japanese carriers in a last blaze of glory.

All logic dictated that carriers were the main threat, and Spruance had been heavily criticized with acting with excessive caution and allowing most of the Japanese fleet to escape at the Philippines Sea. This was not some random lunge to go out and make a name for himself.

Be that as it may, Halsey's job was to cover the landing, and he utterly failed to do this.

- and left the amphibious forces uncovered, allowing the Japanese to attack them on the morning of the 25th. In other words, Halsey took his eyes off the prize in order to destroy a fleet of ships that were of no threat to the invasion force.

Actually by that point most of the amphibious shipping had already unloaded and departed Leyte Gulf, and the beachhead was already far too well established to be at any long term risk, something like 35,000 men went ashore on the first day alone. Halsey should have assigned the Task Force 34 battleships to watch San Bernardino Strait, but the communications problems which led other commanders to assume he had in fact done this are well known. This is the only thing he can be faulted with, and while it’s a serious fault it is independent of the decision to use his carriers against the Japanese carriers, something which most certainly should have been done. The USN had far too many assets to work with for a highly conservative strategy to make sense.

Conservative or not, Halsey's job was to protect the amphibious forces, and he neglected to do this. He didn't detach TF34, he didn't communicate (clearly) what he was doing to the other force commanders, and he then threw a tantrum when messages started coming in asking him where the hell he was and what he was doing.

It’s also generally ignored that the 7th Fleet Battleships, which defeated the Japanese southern force with ridiculous ease, had to steam just 30 miles to be in a perfect position to cap the Japanese T yet again as the Center Force entered a largely empty Leyte Gulf. The invasion force was thus never unprotected as is often claimed.

I'm not sure what you're getting at here; the 7th Fleet battleships would probably have prevented any serious damage to the amphibious forces, is that what you're saying? If so, while I agree completely about 7th Fleet, it still doesn't excuse Halsey's reckless push northward while leaving San Bernadino completely uncovered.

[Sea Skimmer]

If they had this warning the escort carriers could have started conducting aerial operations against the Japanese forces from quite a distance away. Instead they didn't have any warning the Japanese battle force was coming until it was practically on top of them.

That’s not really physically possible. Taffy 3 spotted the Japanese pretty much as the sun rose and the CVEs launched the first ASW patrols of the day. First contact was at 6:30am on the radar scope of a TBF. Japanese voice radio transmissions were intercepted at 6:37, and visual contact from the TBF confirmed the presence of Japanese ships just three minutes later.

The time it would have taken the 7th Fleet Battleships to get there once the Japanese battle fleet was spotted, especially with battleships only able to go about 21 knots at max speed, would have given the Japanese way to much time to sink parts of the amphibious invasion force if they had pressed the engagement.

Actually, no. The battleships moved back into the middle of Leyte Gulf about 25 miles west of the invasion beaches right after they finished shooting at the southern force to avoid the risk of torpedoes. From that position they could cover every approach into Leyte Gulf with gunfire without needing to maneuver Funny you know, its almost as if they read a map to do it!

The Japanese fleet also had enough of a speed advantage to actually potentially get away once they were engaged by the way.

So fucking what? Japanese warships of every type had consistently higher speeds then USN equivalents throughout the entire war. The Japanese center force could have run away from everything in TF34 too, except USS Iowa and USS New Jersey, which would be ill advised to get into a gunnery action when outnumbered twenty three on two. If the Japanese run from the gulf then all they can do is run back to straight the way they came, and probably into the arms of TF 34 which would now have time to make an interception, even with its belated formation. It is physically impossible for the Japanese to get around the American battleships; they can fire shore to shore. All the Japanese could do is turn around, or steam straight into annihilation.

To be sure the fact the transports had unloaded much of their forces would have limited the damage from this situation somewhat, but the loss of those transports could have limited what was available for future campaigns for awhile and extended the duration of the war. (In practice the atomic bomb might have eneded things at the same time regarrdless, but the general point holds.)

This same Japanese force couldn’t annihilate a 20 knt CVE force, its sure as shit not going to blast past six battleships and thirty other significant warships, and then inflict heavy damage on a transport force that’s making the worlds largest smoke screen and scatting out of the gulf in every direction.

[Omega18]

Actually, no. The battleships moved back into the middle of Leyte Gulf about 25 miles west of the invasion beaches right after they finished shooting at the southern force to avoid the risk of torpedoes. From that position they could cover every approach into Leyte Gulf with gunfire without needing to maneuver Funny you know, its almost as if they read a map to do it!

I need to do some more research to figure out to what extent transports in the area could have potentially been taken out first, but there is another relevant point to make here regardless of that conclusion.

If the Japanese Southern force had timed things better and the US battlefleet force was just starting their engagement in the Surigao Strait when the Japanese force was spotted by the carriers and was just about in range, in that situation the outcome certainly could have been ugly for the transport forces in the area if the Japanese battlefleet had pressed things. The key here is Halsey was LUCKY his rash actions didn't lead to serious military loses.

By the way at a minimum, hypothetical destroyers being left behind as a picket line that spotted the Japanese battlefleet earlier would have given the escort carriers more advanced warning to move further back so they were not being actually shot at as they launched aircraft. This also would have meant the escort carriers could have been almost entirely ready to immediately launch aircraft equipped specifically for antishipping missions as soon as it was light enough to do so. That's different than doing so haphardly when suddenly surprised by an enemy fleet. The transports that were closest to the area that the Japanese battle fleet was coming from could have presumably have moved somewhat further back to given the escort carriers and other ships in the area more time to work with along with potentially more time for other US forces in the area to engage the Japanese battlefleet force.

[Sea Skimmer]

Didn't they have to restock ammo after their engagement with the Southern Force?

The supply of APC shells in the ships magazines wasn’t vast, but it still amounted to a few thousand rounds, and they did have hoards of HE shells that will still fuck up another battleship. Main gun ammo expenditure at Surgo Straight was very low, just 245 rounds split between five ships, though West Virginia fired only 43 rounds and Mississippi just 12. Poor old Pennsylvania didn’t get to shoot at all. Yamato will take a while to sink, everything else can be dealt with. Two of the Japanese ‘battleships’ are in fact battlecruisers with mere 8in belts and 3-5in decks after all.

I'm not sure what you're getting at here; the 7th Fleet battleships would probably have prevented any serious damage to the amphibious forces, is that what you're saying? If so, while I agree completely about 7th Fleet, it still doesn't excuse Halsey's reckless push northward while leaving San Bernadino completely uncovered.

Yeah 7th fleet was able to cover its own ass is what I’m saying. Most popular histories go out of there way to ignore and hide this fact when damning Halsey.

The fast carriers existed to roam and inflicted maximum damage on the enemy; the USN deliberately designed our carriers to be lightly armored floating bombs to do this in fact. As I’ve said I don’t agree with leaving the straight uncovered, but going after the Japanese carriers was absolutely the right thing to do. A chance had been provided to annihilate the entire Japanese Navy and it couldn’t just be ignored. Remember that Japanese carrier planes had superior range to American ones, so if Halsey did not actively move to attack the Japanese then they’d be able to pelt him from a distance and then run away. That’s more or less exactly what happened at the Philippines Sea, and it then left the Japanese intact enough to try for another fleet action at Leyte.

[Sea Skimmer]

If the Japanese Southern force had timed things better and the US battlefleet force was just starting their engagement in the Surigao Strait when the Japanese force was spotted by the carriers and was just about in range, in that situation the outcome certainly could have been ugly for the transport forces in the area if the Japanese battlefleet had pressed things. The key here is Halsey was LUCKY his rash actions didn't lead to serious military loses.

Luck is always a factor in warfare. However as it is the fact is the USN had plenty of warning of the approach of the two surface groups, and the long delays it took those forces to get into action were an inherent flaw of the entire Japanese strategy. The Japanese knew it, but they couldn’t logistically support or defend anchorages closer to the expected battle zone. If the positioning of the Japanese forces had been different, then Halsey almost certainly would have acted differently, for better or for worse. As it was he gave the order to head north knowing that it was a physical impossibility for both Japanese surface groups to strike together, unless one of them spent a whole day steaming in circles first.

Anyway, the USN just as well could have been even luckier, some bad luck with a collision after all just taken two of its battleships out of action, and there withdraw had to be covered by an entire carrier group.

By the way at a minimum, hypothetical destroyers being left behind as a picket line that spotted the Japanese battlefleet earlier would have given the escort carriers more advanced warning to move further back so they were not being actually shot at as they launched aircraft.

That’s just asking to get a couple destroyers sunk. The whole of TF34 should have been sent, or a submarine, but then the submarine force had already done its job with great success in the battle so we can’t really blame them.

[Omega18]

That’s just asking to get a couple destroyers sunk. The whole of TF34 should have been sent, or a submarine, but then the submarine force had already done its job with great success in the battle so we can’t really blame them.

That probably would have been an even better option, although the destroyer option reality is a destroyer is expendible if it comes down to that, and they at least have speed to get away with.

The point is Halsey had highly valid options to effectively provide a covering force even if he was heading to pursue the carriers, without realistically compromising his ability to deal with those carriers, and not doing so was simply pure stupidity on his part.

As far as the USN having plenty of warning regarding the approach of the two Japanese surface groups, that turned out not to be completely true in the case of the northern group the way things turned out. It would have been potentially possible for the Southern Japanese force to delay their actual approach a bit, so the impossible to attack similatniously claim is over stating it somewhat. There was actually a bit longer period in which the timing could have been much better from the pespective of the Japanese, if the US force was merely getting close to engaging the Japanese force coming from the South when they learned about the Japanese group from the North, they would have been in a tough position. They definitely would have considered dealing with the incoming battlefleet from the South first and moving to deal with the Northern battlefleet later. Especially without the benefit on hindsight, they would probably be concerned that otherwise the two fleet could effectively combined when they have to fight them putting the US battleships in potential trouble.

[Sea Skimmer]

That probably would have been an even better option, although the destroyer option reality is a destroyer is expendible if it comes down to that, and they at least have speed to get away with.

Some Japanese cruisers could reach the realistic sea speed of American destroyers, Japanese destroyers are faster. Probably radar warning would let the DDs escape, but they would be at considerable risk. Also remember that the American fleet was short of destroyers for its ever growing carrier groups, so detaching a couple for picket duty would be highly undesirable.

As far as the USN having plenty of warning regarding the approach of the two Japanese surface groups, that turned out not to be completely true in the case of the northern group the way things turned out.

That’s why I specified the two surface groups, as in surface action groups.

It would have been potentially possible for the Southern Japanese force to delay their actual approach a bit, so the impossible to attack similatniously claim is over stating it somewhat.

Have you ever looked at the southern forces approach route on a map and the way it cuts across the entire battlespace? Intentionally delaying that passage, when the reason for the delay is yet another delay that befell the center force already, is a bit insane. Delay too long and besides the absurd risk of submarine attacks, the destroyers with the various forces could start running out of fuel. Some of the southern forces ships had to come all the way from Japan after all.

[Patrick Degan]

It is true that William Halsey followed what was the seemingly logical course of action in pursuing a carrier attack force, given how carriers were the long punch of any warfleet. He could not have known just how weak Jisaburo Ozawa's force actually was or that it was a diversion. Nonetheless, Halsey was foolish to have taken the entire Third Fleet away from the San Bernadino sector and failed to coordinate with Thomas Kinkaid. He should at least have left a carrier group to cover the Leyte beachead. He had more than enough airpower and firepower at his disposal to destroy Ozawa even without one carrier group and the force left on guard would have made very short work of Takeo Kurita —who let himself get spooked by haphazard attacks from a bunch of jeep flattops. So on that score, Halsey did behave stupidly and let his personal craving for glory override his military judgement.

But as it was, Halsey's strategic insights back in June and July regarding the weakness and disorganisation of the Combined Fleet which led to the Philippines invasion being advanced two months early pretty much ensured that the Japanese plan was doomed even before it was put into operation.