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Would it be possible to placate the Czechs by splitting off Bohemia and Moravia from the Austrian lands to make a separate kingdom in the German Empire, either still under the Hapsburg King or one of his relatives?

Of course, that assumes the Austrians and Sudetens would go along with such a plan, and it probably wouldn't satisfy the radical Czechs.

I assume that Austrian Galicia joins the Kingdom of Poland?

Pelranius wrote:Would it be possible to placate the Czechs by splitting off Bohemia and Moravia from the Austrian lands to make a separate kingdom in the German Empire, either still under the Hapsburg King or one of his relatives?

Possibly. Nobody knows for sure.

Of course, that assumes the Austrians and Sudetens would go along with such a plan, and it probably wouldn't satisfy the radical Czechs.

Indeed. In either case, I suspect there will be oppression going on, with a large number of Czech emigrating.

I assume that Austrian Galicia joins the Kingdom of Poland?

I don't think so. IMO the Poland that would exist would solely consist of the former Russian territories. Austrian Galicia was strategically important and Austria had invested a lot in it especially in the buildup to WWI, so I don't see any successor to the Austrian state just giving it up. Certainly not Cracow and Premzsyl.

Elheru Aran wrote:Under the circumstances Poland and Ukraine could well be German principalities.

I doubt they would be. This would be counterintuitive to the German efforts of assimilation - there is simply no way to add them as member states of the German Empire. I think the most realistic ones is that they are nations whose independence is guaranteed by Germany and who got close ties and maybe alliances with Germany. But there is no way to just add that many non-Germans without turning the German Empire into the HRE. Remembert that they already got the Czech, Belgians and whatever portions of France they grabbed to absorb. That alone will be a momentous task.

Tribble wrote:Alternatively, you could have had a scenario where Germany plays defensive in the West while smashing Russia in the East. If that were the case the Russian army would have been beaten pretty quickly, though as was previously stated the Germans couldn't afford to occupy captured Russian territory.

I highly doubt the war in the east would have gone much quicker, as the main constraints were, in no particular order, the winter (without it, Warsaw might fall in middle 1915 or earlier), logistics, The Russian Navy and a need for troops in the west. Of these three factors, only the fourth one is probably alleviated.

I see talks of 'constitutional monarchy'. The Tsar was forced to abdicate, guys, and that was by the members of his own general staff, too - in February already. Russia was turning republican, there is no way this tsar crap could've persisted. Not after the collapse of the Russian Empire and utter defeat in WWI, seriously.

I highly doubt the war in the east would have gone much quicker, as the main constraints were, in no particular order, the winter (without it, Warsaw might fall in middle 1915 or earlier), logistics, The Russian Navy and a need for troops in the west. Of these three factors, only the fourth one is probably alleviated.

Had the Germans played defensively turning 1914 I think the war would have been over by 1915.

In the West, it's unlikely that France would have mounted a serious offensive in 1914. Their choices would have been to invade the German border, which was every bit as heavily defended as France's was, or to invade Germany via Luxembourg and Belgium in order to bypass those defences. I doubt Belgium and Luxembourg would have granted French armies access through their territory given their objective of remaining neutral, and if France wanted to take that route they would of had to invade. It's highly unlikely that France would have been willing to do so, especially given Britain's treaty with Belgium. Basically France's only real option if they wanted to go onto the offensive would be to attack Germany directly, and Germany would be able to hold off those attacks without needing to commit anywhere near the amount of forces required for the Schlieffen Plan.

At the start of the war, Germany only had the 8th army on the Eastern frontier to oppose the Russian 1st and 2nd armies, and the Germans were outnumbered by more than 3-1. The Russians ended up attacking sooner than the Germans were anticipating as they thought it would take longer for Russia to mobilize. If the Germans had remained on the defensive in the west and were able to divert more of their forces to the East, Russia's invasion would have been curb-stomped even more thoroughly than it was historically. With both sides likely remaining on the defensive in the west (with Britain remaining neutral) and the initial Russian invasion being crushed, would the war have even continued at that point? I can't see Russia wanting to go on given that they had no chance of conquering Germany on their own and the French were unlikely to invade Germany on the other side.

The main reasons the Germans won in the East were that a.) the Russian military was a horribly dysfunctional army of peasant soldiers being kicked about by aristocratic officers and b.) the Revolution cut out the Russians' ability to wage war. Most of what I've read indicates that the Germans made decent headway into Russia until they surrendered. The French and British (and later Americans and Italians) were much more disciplined and capable soldiers.

Tribble wrote:

I highly doubt the war in the east would have gone much quicker, as the main constraints were, in no particular order, the winter (without it, Warsaw might fall in middle 1915 or earlier), logistics, The Russian Navy and a need for troops in the west. Of these three factors, only the fourth one is probably alleviated.

Had the Germans played defensively turning 1914 I think the war would have been over by 1915.

In the West, it's unlikely that France would have mounted a serious offensive in 1914.

That's exactly what they did. They launched a massive offensive, and suffered massive casualties, in the Battle of the Frontiers in the opening few weeks of the war.

France had an extremely aggressive tactical and strategic doctrine during the pre-WWI era.

Now, to be fair, the French lost in that offensive, and would have lost harder if they'd pushed harder into the German defense. But do bear in mind that the French were at this time very offensive-minded, and that the von Schlieffen plan was actually based entirely on their awareness of that fact. It only came close to working because the French would predictably launch all-out attacks into Alsace-Lorraine.

At the start of the war, Germany only had the 8th army on the Eastern frontier to oppose the Russian 1st and 2nd armies, and the Germans were outnumbered by more than 3-1. The Russians ended up attacking sooner than the Germans were anticipating as they thought it would take longer for Russia to mobilize. If the Germans had remained on the defensive in the west and were able to divert more of their forces to the East, Russia's invasion would have been curb-stomped even more thoroughly than it was historically. With both sides likely remaining on the defensive in the west (with Britain remaining neutral) and the initial Russian invasion being crushed, would the war have even continued at that point? I can't see Russia wanting to go on given that they had no chance of conquering Germany on their own and the French were unlikely to invade Germany on the other side.

The main issue here is that the Germans had actual war aims which were, frankly, aggressive. They weren't just trying to 'survive' the war. They were trying to extract concessions from both France and Russia, in order to improve the position of Germany and its allies in Europe.

Now granted that France and Russia had aggressive war aims too- that's not the point. The point is that Germany didn't enter the war just thinking "how can we convince France and Russia to stop wanting to fight us?" They entered the war thinking "how can we beat on France and Russia enough that they sacrifice certain concessions in order to stop fighting us?"

A purely defensive strategy could not accomplish this, because no matter how strong your defense is, you can't actually force the enemy to keep attacking you so hard that they exhaust themselves. Sooner or later they'll stop- and they'll usually stop short of the point where they might feel inclined to surrender to you and give you what you want.

Actually, there were no definite German war aims as they were generally unprepared for it. The first time any plan on what to do after victory was discussed was in 1916.

OK, in fairness I said that muddily.

The Germans didn't have clearly defined war aims. They did, however, have something recognizable as goals. They wanted their allies to survive, their enemies to be weakened. They would presumably have been looking for some kind of economic or territorial aggrandizement in any plausible settlement. They did historically do things like demand demilitarization of certain fortresses from France.

And I'm pretty sure bare survival for themselves, at the price of not gaining any other objectives, would not have been acceptable to the 1914 German leadership.

So to tie this back into my original argument... Sure, the Germans could have not lost the war by standing on the defensive. But they'd have risked losing their allies when the Entente powers figured out that they didn't actually need to throw more warm bodies at the German lines. And they would never have been able to force the Entente to suffer enough harm from the war to make them willing to actually concede anything.

Thus, the need to take the offensive.

Moreover, taking the offensive helped the Germans in some ways, I'd argue, because it meant that the broad zone of totally destroyed "no man's land" fought over on the Western Front was not located on German soil. Instead it was located on French soil, with the effect that a great deal of French industry and manpower was at least dislocated and at most destroyed.

Simon_Jester wrote:The Germans didn't have clearly defined war aims. They did, however, have something recognizable as goals. They wanted their allies to survive, their enemies to be weakened. They would presumably have been looking for some kind of economic or territorial aggrandizement in any plausible settlement. They did historically do things like demand demilitarization of certain fortresses from France.

I agree with this except for a bit of a caveat. As far as I can discern from my (admittedly limited) university reading about this, the sole reason anybody could agree on was that Austria-Hungary should not collapse. Anything else - including how the enemies could be weakened - wasn't really in the forefront of discussion.

And I'm pretty sure bare survival for themselves, at the price of not gaining any other objectives, would not have been acceptable to the 1914 German leadership.

Given how the German leadership thought that any war post 1920 was unwinnable, I would argue that bare survival in addition to the casualties inflicted on the enemy would have been viewed as a success.

So to tie this back into my original argument... Sure, the Germans could have not lost the war by standing on the defensive. But they'd have risked losing their allies when the Entente powers figured out that they didn't actually need to throw more warm bodies at the German lines. And they would never have been able to force the Entente to suffer enough harm from the war to make them willing to actually concede anything.

How would they have lost their allies though? As for the suffering harm part, if they manage to knock out Russia then they might be able to deal with the west.

Thus, the need to take the offensive.

Moreover, taking the offensive helped the Germans in some ways, I'd argue, because it meant that the broad zone of totally destroyed "no man's land" fought over on the Western Front was not located on German soil. Instead it was located on French soil, with the effect that a great deal of French industry and manpower was at least dislocated and at most destroyed.

This is an important part and actually why I would argue that they needed to go on the offensive. Why? Because France lost the Lorraine region, where iirc. over 30% of their industrial arms output was located - and those mines and factories were put to use by the Germans. This loss of the region hit the French war machine very hard. I don't think that without taking Lorraine Germany would have had the same level of success on the Western front. Germany also took Belgium, which meant that the Uboots could be efficient against the British and that the Ruhr valley would be safe.

Now, in hindsight, I would argue that the Germans should not have done the following:
- Transfer troops from the Marne to the east. Those troops there and the battle of the Marne might go the other way, which might end the war early. This was the greatest mistake of the war IMO. I would sacrifice all of East Prussia if France gets knocked out of the war, the eastern territories can be retaken. Also, replace von Kluck and Bülow with more competent commanders so that maybe the Marne battle does not happen at all and the two armies just march straight on to Paris.
- As for going on the defensive in the West post 1914, I am not so sure of that, simply because the casualties between defenders and attackers were almost always close. That said, this might save a few divisions.
- Definitely do not do Verdun

That's exactly what they did. They launched a massive offensive, and suffered massive casualties, in the Battle of the Frontiers in the opening few weeks of the war.

France had an extremely aggressive tactical and strategic doctrine during the pre-WWI era.

Now, to be fair, the French lost in that offensive, and would have lost harder if they'd pushed harder into the German defense. But do bear in mind that the French were at this time very offensive-minded, and that the von Schlieffen plan was actually based entirely on their awareness of that fact. It only came close to working because the French would predictably launch all-out attacks into Alsace-Lorraine.

True, but the Germans were already engaged in Belgium and Luxembourg when the French decided to attack. The French believed that while the Germans were busy in the low countries they wouldn't have sufficient forces remaining to repel a French attack. If they were facing the entirely of Germany's western forces instead they would have thought twice before attacking. And if they decided to attack anyways they would have lost much harder than they did historically.

The main issue here is that the Germans had actual war aims which were, frankly, aggressive. They weren't just trying to 'survive' the war. They were trying to extract concessions from both France and Russia, in order to improve the position of Germany and its allies in Europe.

Now granted that France and Russia had aggressive war aims too- that's not the point. The point is that Germany didn't enter the war just thinking "how can we convince France and Russia to stop wanting to fight us?" They entered the war thinking "how can we beat on France and Russia enough that they sacrifice certain concessions in order to stop fighting us?"

A purely defensive strategy could not accomplish this, because no matter how strong your defense is, you can't actually force the enemy to keep attacking you so hard that they exhaust themselves. Sooner or later they'll stop- and they'll usually stop short of the point where they might feel inclined to surrender to you and give you what you want.

I'm not sure that would have been the case. With the initial French and Russian attacks curb-stomped and Britain remaining neutral, one could imagine that the French and Russians would not be as keen on continuing. A lull in the fighting could have led to cooler heads prevailing and some kind of negotiation being worked out. Failing that, by remaining on the defensive in the west the Germans would have had plenty of forces to spare in crushing any further Russian attacks and going over to the offensive if they had too. With Russia eventually collapsing and Britain / US staying out of it, would France really want to take on Germany by itself? IMO probably not.

This is an important part and actually why I would argue that they needed to go on the offensive. Why? Because France lost the Lorraine region, where iirc. over 30% of their industrial arms output was located - and those mines and factories were put to use by the Germans. This loss of the region hit the French war machine very hard. I don't think that without taking Lorraine Germany would have had the same level of success on the Western front. Germany also took Belgium, which meant that the Uboots could be efficient against the British and that the Ruhr valley would be safe.

Except that attacking into Belgium and Luxembourg was what drew Britain into the war (and it didn't help their relations with other countries either). The loss of the Lorraine region was more than made up for by the fact that the Britain was now at war with Germany! That is what balanced the odds in 1914 as France and Russia could not have won against Germany by themselves.

Germany should have focused on Russia in 1914 and knocked them out of the war first, while staying out of Belgium and Luxembourg. The Germans had more than enough to repel any French attacks while doing so. With Russia knocked out early and Britain staying neutral, France couldn't have realistically carried on by itself and expected to win. IMO the French would probably want to negotiate peace, and if not the Germans would have been in a position where they could launch a invasion if it became necessary.

Plus, this would of had the bonus of making the Germans looked upon more favourably by other countries. Afterall, in this situation the Germans would not have been seen as the aggressors by attacking neutral countries (or attacking first in general), and any later attacks against France or Russia could be seen as a justified response to French and Russian aggression.

There is no chance of Britain not entering the war, seeing as how the British establishment and press was pushing for it ever since 1905.

If Britain due to whatever miracle stays out, then Germany does indeed not need to attack at all in the West. But Britain will enter the war for the simple reason that if Germany easily beats Russia and France - and without British help this is exactly what will happen - then she will dominate the continent for decades to come. Britain will not allow that for dreams of empire do not die easily.

For that matter, one could reasonably argue that a continent-bestriding Germany would actively be a threat to Britain, not just in that it undermines their empire but in that it would pose a serious strategic danger. The Second Reich historically couldn't come close enough to matching British shipbuilding efforts, but if their economy continued to grow for another decade or two, and if their rivals on the continent were suppressed...

At that point Britain could be looking at a naval peer competitor, requiring them to concentrate their entire fleet in home waters just to establish parity. And naval parity is an unsatisfactory condition when trying to secure a nation that is an island dependent on foreign trade.

Just as Germany had reason to expect to lose a continental land war with the Entente after 1920, Britain might well have had good reason to expect to lose a naval war with a victorious Germany after 1920-25.

How plausible would it be for Germany to win WWI by getting the USA on their side? If not via direct military action, then by economic support.

Darmalus wrote:How plausible would it be for Germany to win WWI by getting the USA on their side? If not via direct military action, then by economic support.

We discussed the possibility in 2006 and 2008.

Darmalus wrote:How plausible would it be for Germany to win WWI by getting the USA on their side? If not via direct military action, then by economic support.

The question is how would that happen? Ethnic Germans and Irish excepted, most Americans were more sympathetic to the Allied cause with it being especially the case for America's political elites (who after all were largely WASP during this time). The only way I can see this happening is if Anglo-American relations have been bad for some years before, like in Turtledove's Timeline 191 where the British recognize Confederate independence resulting in an eventual alliance and the US to ally with Germany instead. Maybe not something that far back (which probably would cause a whole bunch of earlier differences making World War I at least one with the exact same circumstances unlikely), but perhaps something like the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895 going bad.

A better, concerted propaganda effort with a lot of lies and slander (hey, it worked for the British) might do wonders in swaying the US to another side. For example, Germany actually has a point with the illegal and criminal blockade erected by Britain, which did get some time in US newspapers (and one US senator introducing a declaration of war against Britain in the US senate).