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Stark wrote:Is that a cue for non-Americans to spit the dummy and get cross? Or should it somehow change the content of the documentary?

Hey, Thanas is the one that started presenting anecdotal evidence. I figure mine is at least as good as his, since I interact with other nations uniformed services on a very nearly daily basis. And I don't mean "some dudes on a internet messageboard whose central theme is star wars vs. star trek".

I hear you, but Bean going off the deep end because Thanas essentially said 'this documentary of cherry-picked footage casts the British in a good light' isn't helped by yet more anecdotes.

And telling me 'Australian public servants are unprofessional and lazy' doesn't even raise an eyebrow for me. I've met a lot of solid ADF NCOs, and I've met dozens of absurdbly horrid ADF enlisted goons. This goes back to the way culture (I guess, media? the 'consensus'?) views the military in different countries - the OP documentary certainly presents joining the military as a decision you need to excuse or at very least explain.

Look perhaps different culture's have different perceptions on professionalism?

Stark wrote:I hear you, but Bean going off the deep end because Thanas essentially said 'this documentary of cherry-picked footage casts the British in a good light' isn't helped by yet more anecdotes.

And telling me 'Australian public servants are unprofessional and lazy' doesn't even raise an eyebrow for me. I've met a lot of solid ADF NCOs, and I've met dozens of absurdbly horrid ADF enlisted goons. This goes back to the way culture (I guess, media? the 'consensus'?) views the military in different countries - the OP documentary certainly presents joining the military as a decision you need to excuse or at very least explain.

I believe the problem Bean has, and the problem I know I have is the constant attacks on our professionalism as a force, that we supposedly all act like children. This is something that is constantly harped on here, especially by certain members. I personally haven't watched the series in question and can't comment on it, but I feel that I'm much more qualified than Thanas in commenting on the professionalism of the US military having served in two branches of it in various types of units. It varies from unit to unit, the Marine Light Armor unit I served with being the least professional as far as attitude outside of combat, but most efficient and well drilled in combat, the Intel unit I was attached to being the exact opposite, and the Civil Affairs units I've worked with probably being the right mix of the two for me, but never have I personally run across anything that is anywhere near the sterotypes that get thrust upon us on this site.

That's fair enough, and I doubt anyone would argue that the US military in its various forms has an image problem (regardless of its actual or imagined problems). You didn't rant about cowardly civilians, though, so you don't look like a complete moron.

I wonder what kind of forces affect the kind of thigns civilians see about various militaries. The documentary in question is built around interviews and a bunch of clips taken from film shot by the soldiers in question, and there's a pretty strong agenda/theme running through it. Obviously before and during production a lot of military and political people signed off on it, so maybe in America these decisionmakers simply value a different 'image' of the military (for recruitment reasons, morale reasons, or whatever).

Stark wrote:That's fair enough, and I doubt anyone would argue that the US military in its various forms has an image problem (regardless of its actual or imagined problems). You didn't rant about cowardly civilians, though, so you don't look like a complete moron.

I wonder what kind of forces affect the kind of thigns civilians see about various militaries. The documentary in question is built around interviews and a bunch of clips taken from film shot by the soldiers in question, and there's a pretty strong agenda/theme running through it. Obviously before and during production a lot of military and political people signed off on it, so maybe in America these decisionmakers simply value a different 'image' of the military (for recruitment reasons, morale reasons, or whatever).

Well a lot of the things published in america as far as the military goes don't go through that kind of process other than screening them for information deemed sensitive such as current operation details and the like. Generation Kill, which Thanas mentioned was put together to make a profit, and like any other topic, is sensationalized. I think there's a lot of that regarding the US military, we're a big presence in everyone's mind right now and negativity sells in most places, so it gets highlighted. Similar documentaries in the US tend to get relegated to the Public broadcasting system, or occasionally news magazine shows which tend to focus more on the humanity of the people involved in the documentary and the benefits of what they're doing, such as building schools in afghanistan, restoring power to village x in Iraq, stuff like that. You're right in that it's a different focus, but I'm not sure it's so much a recruiting issue as it is a selling these wars to the American people one.

People comment on (for instance) the sort of stuff posted on Youtube, but there's a selection bias there given both the kind of thing soldiers are likely to upload and what is likely to be upvoted or turn up on searches like OMG EXPLOSION.

Stark wrote:People comment on (for instance) the sort of stuff posted on Youtube, but there's a selection bias there given both the kind of thing soldiers are likely to upload and what is likely to be upvoted or turn up on searches like OMG EXPLOSION.

Fun fact, according to Rob Wilson British troops aren't permitted to upload stuff on youtube or blog while they're in combat zones. The MoD apperantly has a very loose definition as to what constitutes OPSEC violations. It's why I'm sneering a bit at the "The British are more professional" comment. The MoD takes measures to restrict public access to the daily life of a serviceman. The US DoD basically runs on the "Honor System", which works about as well as you'd expect when you have one million 18-25 year olds with lots of disposable income.

Thanas wrote:Did you even read Generation Kill? If so, Captain America would be one. Then of course there is the guy who ordered a bombardement of a civilian village just....because he was so goddamn incompetent? Also, how about the entire parade of hamming it up on Gunner Palace?

The funny thing about reading Generation kill is that almost without fail nobody I've met claiming to have read it has gone through all the way to the epilogue and read the follow up accounts as to the conduct of folks after the first deployment. Nobody realizes that most of the officers and non-coms who screwed up either A) aren't actually Recon trained or B) wound up redeeming themselves on future deployments in non-staff positions.

More notably it would take less than a hand for me to count the number of folks who have read One Bullet Away which is Captain Fick's autobiographical tour through training, Afghanistan and Iraq. Take a Dartmouth grad and let him write a book and you'll get a much clearer picture of what was going on in toto than by reading "Kill" alone.


Anyway, leaving aside simple HR rules of thumb that apply to the military of ANY nation just as much as they do to the corporate world (10% of your workforce is gonna be for shit no matter what you do) you're really stretching here. You've got a little bitsy drop of anecdotal evidence which you turned into a sweeping generalization about a 2.9 million person organization. Even taking the totality of persons involved in both Gunner Palace and Generation Kill not just those for whom the films provide sufficient time to develop a coherent picture you'd still only be looking at a sample size of roughly 4 hundredths of a percent and that becomes your basis for indictment of the entire organization.

Hell lets go back to Generation Kill, for having Encino Man and Captain America the book also offers up Mattis, Fick, Patterson, Pappy, Gunny Wynn, etc. Yes there were fuck ups but you also manage to discount all the professionals displayed and referenced in the same book without realizing that you've managed to cherry pick your already cherry picked data.

I'm watching the documentary right now and it's really good material. It's not very in depth but it gives a good picture of what it was like on the front lines, I think. I'm about to start the third part.

On the Generation Kill tangent, Rudy is the example all Marines should aspire to. The Marine played himself in the movie too.

Lonestar wrote:

Thanas wrote:Also Bean, I received permission from Kendall to name him. You might remember him. You are now going to declare him an anti-american stereotype living in my head as well?

I'm going to declare him "one" instead of "several".

Yeah, I am not going to name names if they do not want to get named or do not post here (anymore).

On my 2004-05 Deployment the Italian and German vessels in the AG or Arabian Sea resolutely refused to communicate with any American ship. At all. As far as they were concerned the only reason why they were there was because their political masters told them to be there, and damned if they actually did anything besides "go to point A, drop anchor".

There's professionalism, and there's "professionalism". If the German ideal of professionalism is to go sulk in the corner then whoop-de-do.

Lonestar, you'll note I pretty much blasted the German Navy for being a joke as well several times. I even posted that video of them managing to crash their ships into each other because they were showboating. That being said, my criticism only applies to the Army and marines and I thought that was also pretty clear from the context of this being a documentary about the war in Afghanistan.

CmdrWilkens wrote:The funny thing about reading Generation kill is that almost without fail nobody I've met claiming to have read it has gone through all the way to the epilogue and read the follow up accounts as to the conduct of folks after the first deployment. Nobody realizes that most of the officers and non-coms who screwed up either A) aren't actually Recon trained or B) wound up redeeming themselves on future deployments in non-staff positions.

How do you redeem yourself after you just bombarded a whole village?

More notably it would take less than a hand for me to count the number of folks who have read One Bullet Away which is Captain Fick's autobiographical tour through training, Afghanistan and Iraq. Take a Dartmouth grad and let him write a book and you'll get a much clearer picture of what was going on in toto than by reading "Kill" alone.

Maybe. I just cannot discount stuff like how different the attitudes there. For example, there was this one scene where the British guys are shot at for several minutes and do not fire a shot in response because they cannot positively identify the target. Throughout the whole documentary, the importance of positively identifying things before you shoot at them is emphasized on.

And then you have stuff like in Generation Kill, where an idiot captain can order an artillery bombardement of a village and get away with nothing, or where that idiot private wasted civilians because he was high on raid, trigger happy and fired at a few shadows. Then you also got the reservist company opening up with heavy weapons on the recon company just because they cannot be arsed to make identification. The same thing with the scene with the prisoner.


The thing is, there is not a single documentary out there that shows in some way american soldiers to be as professional as the British soldiers are shown to be in this documentary. And when you have things like Kill just enforcing that perception...

You say that there are positive counter examples. I am not saying they do not exist and yes, Fick, Papp, Wynn etc. were all pretty good. However, that does not in any way fix the other things displayed, especially when Encino Man gets away scot free with bombarding the village and there is nothing done about that Private fuckup. Where is Encino Man serving his prison sentence for being too fucking stupid or callous? And why are the senior officers not sharing cells for not removing him from command? Why is Pappy the one getting shafted instead? You can't tell me that this is not unprofessional and does not blight the whole organization if clowns like Encino man can just decided to bombard a village and nothing is done about that.

I am not demanding that the USMC or the Army be some kind of angels. But I am demanding there actually be consequences which amount to more than "Ah well, sad to see those brown people die, now don't do it again or I'll get really cross with you, OK?"

Thanas, Generation Kill is the dramatization of a documentary. Have you read the book? Furthermore, the author was attached at the platoon level, and while had conversations with the battalion co, generally was not privy to the administration or justice that may have occured (these things take longer than the couple weeks he was around). Just to keep in mind, because it appears most of your negative perceptions stem from these two documentaries.

Have you ever seen Occupatiom: Dreamland? Because in that documentary, I recall soldiers not openning fire when they were IED'd or shot at, until they were given permission, or had a clear target.

And I don't know, but has the Germans who dropped airstrikes on civilians ever been convicted, or was it deemed a fuckup.

All of this is not to say that there aren't incompetents, or unprofessional soldiers in the states (especially given they've not had the benefit many other nations had of only sending in reg forces), but you need to A) take into account where, and the nature of, your sources, B) remember that the more elements of an organization are thrown into the mix, the more likely the unprofessional elements will be exposed, C) there is plenty of evidence to suggest that other nations militaries suffer their own problems, and D) it always takes time for an institution to shake out the chaff and the kinks in doctrines and methods; the last decade has been a learning experience, to say the least.

Artemas wrote:Thanas, Generation Kill is the dramatization of a documentary. Have you read the book? Furthermore, the author was attached at the platoon level, and while had conversations with the battalion co, generally was not privy to the administration or justice that may have occured (these things take longer than the couple weeks he was around). Just to keep in mind, because it appears most of your negative perceptions stem from these two documentaries.

It certainly did take them a lot less time to relieve the guy who "was not aggressive enough" of command (ergo, about a few hours) than it did to take them to relieve the guy whose massive fuckup ensured civilians received an air barrage. And yes, it is a dramatization, but if you want to say that the incidents are all overplayed in an attempt to make the USMC look back, feel free to point out examples.

Have you ever seen Occupatiom: Dreamland? Because in that documentary, I recall soldiers not openning fire when they were IED'd or shot at, until they were given permission, or had a clear target.

I have not.

And I don't know, but has the Germans who dropped airstrikes on civilians ever been convicted, or was it deemed a fuckup.

What has that got to do with anything? This is a massive tu quoque.

But to summarize:
The guy was ruled to have made mistakes, but not enough to ensure a criminal conviction. However, our highest career military officer and our vice-minister of defence were fired over this when they allegedly tried to cover it up. I also think the guy who ordered the air assault should have been drummed out of the army, but sadly he was not.

All of this is not to say that there aren't incompetents, or unprofessional soldiers in the states (especially given they've not had the benefit many other nations had of only sending in reg forces), but you need to A) take into account where, and the nature of, your sources, B) remember that the more elements of an organization are thrown into the mix, the more likely the unprofessional elements will be exposed, C) there is plenty of evidence to suggest that other nations militaries suffer their own problems, and D) it always takes time for an institution to shake out the chaff and the kinks in doctrines and methods; the last decade has been a learning experience, to say the least.

I was unaware that "check coordinates on artillery strikes, and do not order said strike until you have evidence there are enemy troops hiding among civilians" was a concept that needs a lot of time to be introduced. It is also worth noting that the heavy-handedness of the US ground forces has been criticized by its allies in the past.

man, you must literally not understand how large bureaucratic organizations work

anyway, as for the german airstrike thing, i wasnt trying to score points, but when you directly compare the professionalism of a military with that of another, then i dont see how its irrelevant to then bring up mistakes that other, involved, nations have made. I would be unsurprised to learn that most nations present in force in Afghanistan have made similar errors.

i mean, im a bit surprised thanas, you've read clausewitz, you should understand what friction is.

my point, by the way, was never to directly defend the us, or disagree with you in totality, but to try to provide some context on the issue. The us has been criticized of having an overly aggressive institutional culture, yes, and there are plenty of errors and mistakes made at all levels, but it seems like most of your ideas about the professionalism of the us army come from two documentaries, and one or two guys who are junior NCMs.

I suspect the professionalism varies from unit to unit, with the early war reserve and national guard people being the most varied.

I'm repeating myself, but I think it bears note: the U.S. has 20x as many soldiers in Afghanistan as Germany. By that, we can say that even if they were of equal competence in all ways (unlikely, since the U.S. also drummed up reservists, and many of its best soldiers were in Iraq before eventually ending their tours and going home, etcetera) there would be 20x as many incidents as Germany has had, and further, more incidents of greater magnitude (eg, more mistakes, and larger and deadlier mistakes among those). That's before taking into account that America has shouldered most of the burden in actually going on the offense against the Taliban, and the sheer size of its bureaucracy implies more deficiencies at the bottom.

Thanas wrote:It certainly did take them a lot less time to relieve the guy who "was not aggressive enough" of command (ergo, about a few hours) than it did to take them to relieve the guy whose massive fuckup ensured civilians received an air barrage. And yes, it is a dramatization, but if you want to say that the incidents are all overplayed in an attempt to make the USMC look back, feel free to point out examples.

What exactly are you referring to here?

The only officer relieved of command for 'lack of aggression' during Generation Kill is Colonel Dowdy; he's shown in the second episode getting chewed out by Mattis and then later in the series it's announced that he's been relieved due to a failure in operational tempo - and in real life there was gap of nearly two weeks between Dowdy's initial failure (in Mattis' eyes) and his sacking.

There's more than a few fuck ups where firepower is misdirected but none of them match your description and AFAIK no-one was relieved for them. Encino Man called in an artillery strike on a fantasy RPG team; Fick tried to warn him off and was reprimanded (unofficially?) by Ferrando for disobeying a senior officer. There's also two occassions in the series where a hamlet under observation by Colbert's team is attacked despite Colbert and co judging it non-hostile; once when it gets hit by an artillery strike emanating from somewhere up the chain and once when a different group of Marines on a different come net start shooting at it and Encino Man (unsuccesfully) tries to join in. In both cases its unclear what precipitated the action. There's also the village that gets misidentified as massive T-72 hoard, but the resulting airstrike fell well short.

In fact, pretty sure the only people relieved/seriously disciplined were Captain America and Sgt Koch when a member of Delta reports Cpt America for prisoner abuse.

thejester wrote:What exactly are you referring to here?

The only officer relieved of command for 'lack of aggression' during Generation Kill is Colonel Dowdy; he's shown in the second episode getting chewed out by Mattis and then later in the series it's announced that he's been relieved due to a failure in operational tempo - and in real life there was gap of nearly two weeks between Dowdy's initial failure (in Mattis' eyes) and his sacking.

Dowdy's account is covered (from Dowdy's POV) in Cobra II. The actual chewing out is made out to not be that harsh(p.451), with Mattis trying to let him down Gently. There's also some confusion on Dowdy's part, as he thinks Mattis is talking about a different incident(indeed, something that had happened within the past 24 hrs).

Also, Generation Kill was a David Simon production. It bears remembering that Simon's universal thesis in all his shows is more or less that institutions are fundamentally corrupt and will fail those who buy into them.

Thanas wrote:

CmdrWilkens wrote:]More notably it would take less than a hand for me to count the number of folks who have read One Bullet Away which is Captain Fick's autobiographical tour through training, Afghanistan and Iraq. Take a Dartmouth grad and let him write a book and you'll get a much clearer picture of what was going on in toto than by reading "Kill" alone.

Maybe. I just cannot discount stuff like how different the attitudes there. For example, there was this one scene where the British guys are shot at for several minutes and do not fire a shot in response because they cannot positively identify the target. Throughout the whole documentary, the importance of positively identifying things before you shoot at them is emphasized on.

Christ if we are going to judge professionalism by whether or not target identification is perfect then go yell at the Ukrainians who live by the reconnaissance by fire doctrine or the Italians who lived by the blow the fuck out of anything that so much as makes a pop sound at us both of which I've experienced first hand. I won't speak to the British in particular save to say that if a documentary is being made where positive ID is a fetish that means somewhere in the near past somebody fucked up about it. The things you re-emphasize in combat zones are the things people have been screwing up elsewhere.

As to the larger thing it comes down to rules of engagement, a whole bunch of army lawyers for each set of armed forces sit down for a nice long time before the fighting starts and decide what is the appropriate point at which deadly force may be used. That the American and British forces have a different threshold for when that comes (in terms of perceived threat as against mission requirements and certainty of target identification) has little is anything to do with the professionalism of a given force. If you want to watch a movie where US troops hold off firing until they actually start taking casualties go watch Black Hawk Down. In other words the Rules of Engagement have FAR more to do with the propensity to use deadly force than the professionalism of the unit in question.

I will say by way of example that in 2004 when I was in country the second time the RoE had been seriously tightened, we had to observe a clear and imminent threat before deadly force could be utilized. We had it drilled in to our heads stateside and then in country that we basically had to see the weapon coming out before you could engage. Despite being IED'd and mortared/rocketed a dozen or more times we never fired a single shot during our entire tour.

And then you have stuff like in Generation Kill, where an idiot captain can order an artillery bombardement of a village and get away with nothing, or where that idiot private wasted civilians because he was high on raid, trigger happy and fired at a few shadows. Then you also got the reservist company opening up with heavy weapons on the recon company just because they cannot be arsed to make identification. The same thing with the scene with the prisoner.

Again you are talking about the looseness of the RoE rather than the professionalism of the force in question. If the directive in force, and it was in this case, is that force preservation ranks above target clarity in terms of priorities then as a corollary force will be used with significantly greater frequency. I don't know if its mentioned in the documentary in question not having seen it but during these early stages when British troops were in Basra quick reaction teams composed of medium armor and supporting units basically plowed through anything and everything when moving to support units in distress. That includes literally driving their tanks through civilians cars that were being operated if those same cars were obstructing the path of the reaction force. I'm not going to belabor the point much more but again RoE matters a hell of a lot more in all of the circumstances you've talked about than the professionalism of the force in question.


Also if you want to keep bringing up "Kill" as your sole example of American forces' lack of professionalism then I'd again say if you haven't read the actual book or "One Bullet" then you are getting only about 50-60% of the total story so color me unimpressed with conclusions drawn from just watching the movie.

I recently read "One Bullet Away", it paints a picture that though not being starkly different to that of Generation Kill does have either a) a level of institutional apologetics or b) a higher level of institutional understanding. Honestly, I think it's a bit of both. There are clear cut cases of idiocy, negligence and spiteful/racist behaviour that are covered in both books, but both have their own take on it. In some cases it's clear that one author or the other was a first hand witness while the other wasn't.

Honestly I view them as companion pieces now that I've read both as one in the absence of the other may deliver the same core facts, but both present different takes on the events.

I think there's also the problem of comparing Marines in Iraq, 2003, vs. British soldiers in present day (or almost present day) Afghanistan. If you wanted to compare the American's lack of professionalism, shouldn't you compare the British to American soldiers/Marines in Afghanistan right now? It seems like the invasion of Iraq was light years away from where the troops (of all nations) are right now.

Cecelia5578 wrote:I think there's also the problem of comparing Marines in Iraq, 2003, vs. British soldiers in present day (or almost present day) Afghanistan. If you wanted to compare the American's lack of professionalism, shouldn't you compare the British to American soldiers/Marines in Afghanistan right now? It seems like the invasion of Iraq was light years away from where the troops (of all nations) are right now.

That's a good point and I would agree in principle, but the recent documentaries on the subject matter - see "The Wounded Platoon" are not that great in their portrayal either. I also find it a bit funny that this concept has to be relearned.

CmdrWilkens wrote:Christ if we are going to judge professionalism by whether or not target identification is perfect then go yell at the Ukrainians who live by the reconnaissance by fire doctrine or the Italians who lived by the blow the fuck out of anything that so much as makes a pop sound at us both of which I've experienced first hand. I won't speak to the British in particular save to say that if a documentary is being made where positive ID is a fetish that means somewhere in the near past somebody fucked up about it. The things you re-emphasize in combat zones are the things people have been screwing up elsewhere.

Maybe, but I have been hard-pressed to find the amount of friendly fire or civilians killed incidents on the level of the British, so I won't presume that they messed up in the past.

As to the larger thing it comes down to rules of engagement, a whole bunch of army lawyers for each set of armed forces sit down for a nice long time before the fighting starts and decide what is the appropriate point at which deadly force may be used. That the American and British forces have a different threshold for when that comes (in terms of perceived threat as against mission requirements and certainty of target identification) has little is anything to do with the professionalism of a given force. If you want to watch a movie where US troops hold off firing until they actually start taking casualties go watch Black Hawk Down. In other words the Rules of Engagement have FAR more to do with the propensity to use deadly force than the professionalism of the unit in question.

I doubt that, considering the bombing of the arab village was certainly not done because the RoE allowed for it, but because the officer in question had messed up due to his stupidity.

I will say by way of example that in 2004 when I was in country the second time the RoE had been seriously tightened, we had to observe a clear and imminent threat before deadly force could be utilized. We had it drilled in to our heads stateside and then in country that we basically had to see the weapon coming out before you could engage. Despite being IED'd and mortared/rocketed a dozen or more times we never fired a single shot during our entire tour.

That there are units practicing restraint is certainly good to hear.

Again you are talking about the looseness of the RoE rather than the professionalism of the force in question. If the directive in force, and it was in this case, is that force preservation ranks above target clarity in terms of priorities then as a corollary force will be used with significantly greater frequency. I don't know if its mentioned in the documentary in question not having seen it but during these early stages when British troops were in Basra quick reaction teams composed of medium armor and supporting units basically plowed through anything and everything when moving to support units in distress. That includes literally driving their tanks through civilians cars that were being operated if those same cars were obstructing the path of the reaction force. I'm not going to belabor the point much more but again RoE matters a hell of a lot more in all of the circumstances you've talked about than the professionalism of the force in question.

Preservation of force justifies bombing things now even if no shot was fired and there was no indication of any attack now? That is what I do not get. RoE seem to be much of an excuse for idiotic behavior which should not be allowed.

Like for Trombley - the guy shot at something which nobody else thought threatening. And nothing happens there. This lack of consequences is what I am worried about.

thejester wrote:There's also two occassions in the series where a hamlet under observation by Colbert's team is attacked despite Colbert and co judging it non-hostile; once when it gets hit by an artillery strike emanating from somewhere up the chain and once when a different group of Marines on a different come net start shooting at it and Encino Man (unsuccesfully) tries to join in.

The latter is what I am talking about.



In any case, I have ordered one bullet away and hopefully it will present answers as to why this had no consequences at all.

Lonestar wrote: Hey, Thanas is the one that started presenting anecdotal evidence. I figure mine is at least as good as his, since I interact with other nations uniformed services on a very nearly daily basis. And I don't mean "some dudes on a internet messageboard whose central theme is star wars vs. star trek".

Let's be fair. The BBC documentary probably DOES protray the British soldier in a better, more "professional" light than the American equivalent.

American media likes to pump up the "America fuck yeah" attitude quite often. The History channel documentaries about Iraq or Al Queda played this up quite well. And that's before you go into Fox news.

Artemas wrote:Thanas, Generation Kill is the dramatization of a documentary. Have you read the book? Furthermore, the author was attached at the platoon level, and while had conversations with the battalion co, generally was not privy to the administration or justice that may have occured (these things take longer than the couple weeks he was around). Just to keep in mind, because it appears most of your negative perceptions stem from these two documentaries.

The book definitely doesn't help with the image issue Thanas is attributing to. The trigger happy or friendly fire nature of the American soldiers can be seen in several scenes.

There's a very powerful scene where the soldier fired multiple rounds into the car, engine block and the driver, and how the soldier was affected and rationalising his way through it and the way the author described the scene as well as post hoc, it DOES protray a sense of trigger happy. And the soldier having to cope with the consequences/rationality of it.
Then there's the whole male shepard thing.

Thanas wrote:Maybe, but I have been hard-pressed to find the amount of friendly fire or civilians killed incidents on the level of the British, so I won't presume that they messed up in the past.

There's the British Abu Gahib that someone already referenced you. Similarly,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/u ... 070875.ece
An incident of friendly fire.

http://news.antiwar.com/2011/07/05/brit ... n-helmand/
Civilian deaths.

I should note that if we actually analyze the reasons for friendly fire, it becomes clearer why they happen. Many of the reasons where unintended collateral damage or friendly fire happen is due to stress, exhaustion and time critical events. That or pressure and multiple levels of management/passing of information.
Given that the British has fewer events, and that its the Americans who're providing the bulk of the combat missions and firepower, well, its easier to explain why they're the one's doing it more often then.