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I want to talk about something that I've noticed for quite some time now. As the title says, it's about Neville Chamberlain, the infamous british prime minister who is nowadays primarily known for his appeasement policy towards Nazi Germany. It seems there's a certain new(-ish) train of thought that tries to portray Chamberlain as someone who might have done questionable but ultimately necessary deeds. The idea is that Chamberlain's appeasement policy bought Britain the necessary time to prepare for a war with Germany.
I for myself think that's revisionist nonsense and here's why:

1.Britain might not have been "ready" for a war with Germany, but neither was Germany ready for a war herself in 1935-1938
2.Appeasement gave Hitler easy victories and popularity. He took a gamble when he announced military rearmament or reoccupied the Rheinland, a more determined response by Britain and France might have weakened his position and at the least slowed his plans down
3.Appeasement enabled Nazi Germany to obtain a more favorable geo-political position more easily and therefore increased the risk of war
4.Appeasement sold Czheshoslovakia down the river and brought it under the Nazi heel without a firing a shot. Worse, there was a thought within the German general staff that a war with the West over Czeshoslovakia would bring ruin to Germany and thoughts of a military coup circulated until such were utterly silenced by the Munich Treaty. It convinced much of the military that Hitler ultimately was an expert statesman

Thoughts?

Germany wasn't ready for war in 1939. A more hardline stance on Czechoslovakia would have just made that worse. Everything about the appeasement policy was all about fear of a repeat of the First World War. It was not a good move to hand the Czechs over to Hitler as it only made him bolder. Even with it's treaty navy, Britian could handle the German navy in 1938. That means for Germany no Bismarck, No Turpitz and hardly enough Submarines to even try to interdict british trade. The only good asset they'd have would be the pocket battleships and the Army and air force and they'd not be even close to ready.

I think Chamberlain was in a real hard spot and did the best he could. The French were utterly unwilling to go to war and focused on the Maginot Line, so any offensive action was a bit out of the question for them. The US was nowhere to be found. Japan was threatening the British interests in the east. The British electorate was unwilling to elect hawkish politicians and the defence budget was nowhere near what it needed to be to fight successfully.

So what could Chamberlain have done? Backed Poland to attack Germany? That would not have sat so well with the British parliament considering that Poland was happy gobbling up whatever scraps of Czech territory they could have gotten, nor would Poland probably go to war at that point anyway. With hindsight, it probably would have been better to go to war with Hitler, with Czechoslowakia as an ally who were willing to fight. But it is a really tough sell to do that especially when a lot of the British populace idolized Hitler and viewed Versailles as terribly unfair. And let us not forget the propaganda by the Nazis which was very effective. I am not sure the British ever managed to see what a paper tiger the Wehrmacht was.

But it should be noted that Chamberlain immediately after Germany occupied the Sudetenland made several trips to persuade the French to rearm faster, he tried to get Italy to put pressure on Germany. After Hitler broke Munich, he started rearmament programs - most of the ships that became so iconic in WWII were ordered under his Government, including the KGV battleships and the Illustrious fleet carriers. The Spitfire and Hurricane were both ordered by his Government. Even more importantly, the guarantee given to Poland ensured that Britain would declare war - and it did in 1939.

BTW, Chamberlain's conduct in the first period of WWII was far from timid. The plan to occupy neutral countries to deny Germany resources (which he approved of) was both callous and brilliant, hardly qualities you associate with a coward.

That still means that claiming he made hard, unpopular and difficult yet necessary decisions is wrong because he actually did what was popular and easy until he felt personally insulted by Hitler grabbing the rest of Czech and changed his tune out of a sense of personal betrayal.
I see nothing praiseworthy in there.

Metahive wrote:That still means that claiming he made hard, unpopular and difficult yet necessary decisions is wrong because he actually did what was popular and easy until he felt personally insulted by Hitler grabbing the rest of Czech and changed his tune out of a sense of personal betrayal.
I see nothing praiseworthy in there.

Well, he followed the wishes of his electorate, which was really his job. You might just as well blame the electorate. As to him making hard and unpopular decisions the closest you can get there is his rearmament in the late 30s, which was definitely unpopular (especially his decision to double the existing Army). But other than those, I would agree - though it is a bit too hard to portray him as some sort of little man who got insulted by Hitler and then changed his tune. That is way too black and white for my taste.

Metahive wrote:That still means that claiming he made hard, unpopular and difficult yet necessary decisions is wrong because he actually did what was popular and easy until he felt personally insulted by Hitler grabbing the rest of Czech and changed his tune out of a sense of personal betrayal.
I see nothing praiseworthy in there.

Since he wasn't a dictator, he couldn't impose "unpopular, difficult, but necessary" choices on the electorate. There was a very real chance that if he tried to pursue a course toward war in 1937-38 that he'd simply be kicked out of office and replaced with someone more willing to coddle the Nazis- i.e. someone who would not have taken the basic steps to make Britain ready to fight in 1939 and 1940.

Based on the information he had, and the steps he believed his people actually willing to take, Chamberlain was very obviously trying to make sure that his country would be ready to limit Nazi expansion.

Perhaps he could have gotten his country ready a little faster if he'd known this detail or that. Perhaps he could have afforded to take a few more risks. Perhaps, in hindsight, with all the intimate knowledge of the internal politics of Germany that comes from being able to read the histories of the war, he could have deterred German expansion at Munich or earlier by playing a dangerous game of head-on intimidation.

But he had no way of knowing these things.

Unfortunately, Chamberlain suffers because his wartime administration was unsuccessful, while in peacetime he presided over the tail end of the period when the Allies were totally unprepared to fight. He is thus often compared to the warlike Churchill, who is made out to be a heroic lion while Chamberlain is made out to be a foolish donkey.

Was Chamberlain a lion? No. But neither was he a donkey.

The other factor to remember from WWII was that nobody knew exactly what the effect of bombing on civilians would be. There was a huge fear that the modern air forces could drop the kind of damage on a civilian population that would cause incredible casualties overnight. There was also the actually quite reasonable fear that Germany had the ability to drop biological and chemical weapons on London.

These things did not come to pass it is true, but hindsight gives a huge advantage over Chamberlain in this regard. As far as he knew a war with Germany, unprepared, meant the utter destruction of London such as seen in Guernica.

"The bomber will always get through" was in fact one of the main tenets of the previous Balfour administration as well. And with hindsight, it is really hard to blame the British considering no sane person would have gone to war like Hitler did in 1939.

Uh... Hitler's war plans and their execution in 1939-1940 were hardly insane - they were economically necessary and also well-executed in a timely fashion. But he was a victim of his success. Had he a bit more political talent as opposed to pure military insight and luck, he'd be able to rule the greater part of Europe and keep the conquests.

It was insane to go to war and breaking the Munich agreement. Heck, even after annexing the Czech Republic he could have stopped.

All the way until 1941 he could have stopped. Germany picked comparable rivals and there was little doubt Munich betrayal could have been repeated again with Poland, which was clearly not worth another protracted war in Europe. But going to war with US and USSR at the same time was, yeah, crazy.

Stas Bush wrote:All the way until 1941 he could have stopped. Germany picked comparable rivals and there was little doubt Munich betrayal could have been repeated again with Poland, which was clearly not worth another protracted war in Europe. But going to war with US and USSR at the same time was, yeah, crazy.

Attempting to repeat the Munich betrayal with Poland led directly to the war... because Chamberlain drew a line in the sand and was willing to declare war over violation of Polish territorial integrity.

Simon_Jester wrote:Attempting to repeat the Munich betrayal with Poland led directly to the war... because Chamberlain drew a line in the sand and was willing to declare war over violation of Polish territorial integrity.

Yes - a war rightfully called a 'phoney war', I may note.

What are you saying?

Thanas wrote:What are you saying?

I am saying that until Hitler made some strategic mistakes (like committing to an all-out war on the Western front), he could have still salvaged the situation diplomatically. And until Hitler attacked the USSR and made the idiotic mistake of declaring war against the USA he could've salvaged the situation by military means - the British Empire alone would not be able to retake continental Europe. Ever. Even with some US support in the form of military equipment lease, financial aid and the like.

Stas Bush wrote:

Simon_Jester wrote:Attempting to repeat the Munich betrayal with Poland led directly to the war... because Chamberlain drew a line in the sand and was willing to declare war over violation of Polish territorial integrity.

Yes - a war rightfully called a 'phoney war', I may note.

That is because the Germans lacked the motive, and the Allies lacked the means, to pursue major offensive action on the Western Front during late 1939 and early 1940. I can't think of anything Chamberlain could have done to change that.

I am far from convinced that Hitler could have salvaged the situation by diplomacy at that point, without first defeating France and most likely Britain on the battlefield

As to the observation that Britain could not have actually defeated Germany by itself, this is true- but the British had the advantage conferred by sea power and a reasonably strong air defense that they could afford to bide their time. They could wait for the instabilities and contradictions in Nazi rule to kick in, at which point the Germans would predictably do something unwise and exploitable.

Hitler could not stop in 1940 because the British and French had all the advantages in a long war, and the longer he tarried the stronger the Anglo-French alliance would become. There was no way he could have solved the problem diplomatically, since after his blatant breaking of his part of the Munich Agreement it became clear that Hitler's promises were utterly worthless and few were willing to trust him again (though according to Shirer, Chamberlain hesitated to stand and fight against Hitler at first, and only climbed on the anti-Hitler bandwagon when it became clear to him that his supporters in the populace and even his own party were no longer willing to continue with appeasement, threatening his political position). France and the Low Countries only sued for peace after the Wehrmacht destroyed their armies on the battlefield and occupied their countries. Britain chose to resist precisely because the Heer couldn't swim the entire English Channel.

Simon_Jester wrote:As to the observation that Britain could not have actually defeated Germany by itself, this is true- but the British had the advantage conferred by sea power and a reasonably strong air defense that they could afford to bide their time. They could wait for the instabilities and contradictions in Nazi rule to kick in, at which point the Germans would predictably do something unwise and exploitable.

British seapower was something of a joke when their colonies were being chopped up in the Far East and when they spent quite a bit of time playing cat and mouse with the Japanese when they finally got around to send ships to the Far East. The only area where they were effective was in the Mediteranean and the Baltics somewhat.

If the British were left to their own devices without American support, I wonder how long they could have survived with the Nazi U-boat blockade and all. And at that point of time, I doubt they were hoping the Nazis would simply implode. The Nazis were at their zenith after the Fall of France after all.

Force Lord wrote:Hitler could not stop in 1940 because the British and French had all the advantages in a long war, and the longer he tarried the stronger the Anglo-French alliance would become. There was no way he could have solved the problem diplomatically, since after his blatant breaking of his part of the Munich Agreement it became clear that Hitler's promises were utterly worthless and few were willing to trust him again (though according to Shirer, Chamberlain hesitated to stand and fight against Hitler at first, and only climbed on the anti-Hitler bandwagon when it became clear to him that his supporters in the populace and even his own party were no longer willing to continue with appeasement, threatening his political position). France and the Low Countries only sued for peace after the Wehrmacht destroyed their armies on the battlefield and occupied their countries. Britain chose to resist precisely because the Heer couldn't swim the entire English Channel.

Like you said, Hitler destroyed France militarily (which was not that hard, and the country did not want to commit to total war like the USSR). Which I why I said before the offensive there was a chance to solve the thing diplomatically (and 'Hitler's promises' weren't necessary since plenty of countries coexisted without non-aggression treaties). After the offensive Hitler solved it militarily and there was little Britain could do. Going for a closer alliance with Russia, even if that went against the Main Kampf theses, would've been beneficial for Hitler as he'd have plenty of time to secure the borders in the East and West alike. Britain would have no options. We think time would be playing against the Nazis, but I am not sure that is so - they would not only keep the best of their war cadre, but also build up the industrial potential of occupied European nations into a single industrial system - something they had to do rather haphazardly IRL while embroiled in land war in the East and a very intensive naval conflict in the Atlantic. If they stuck with having just one naval conflict (with Britain), they would be in a better position, especially considering Japan would go against the British Empire anyway.

Could they have made a stronger alliance with the Soviets without making concessions in the Balkans or ending up completely dependent on the Soviets for aid?

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:If the British were left to their own devices without American support, I wonder how long they could have survived with the Nazi U-boat blockade and all. And at that point of time, I doubt they were hoping the Nazis would simply implode. The Nazis were at their zenith after the Fall of France after all.

Seeing that in real life improvements in British ASW started collapsing whole German submarine warfare effort in 1943, I kind of doubt there was anything Nazis could do to blockade Britain. With their codes read virtually at will, UK could sink U-Boats and supply ships by "accident" even without new weapons, with them it was overkill [1][2].

British seapower was something of a joke when their colonies were being chopped up in the Far East and when they spent quite a bit of time playing cat and mouse with the Japanese when they finally got around to send ships to the Far East. The only area where they were effective was in the Mediteranean and the Baltics somewhat.

You mean something like 10% of Royal Navy playing cat and mouse?

Sorry, Japanese had no chance at all fighting '44 radar armed battleships or '44 British carrier planes. I just don't see it.

Irbis wrote:Seeing that in real life improvements in British ASW started collapsing whole German submarine warfare effort in 1943, I kind of doubt there was anything Nazis could do to blockade Britain. With their codes read virtually at will, UK could sink U-Boats and supply ships by "accident" even without new weapons, with them it was overkill [1][2].

So? That's 1943. Could the Brits have survived without American support between 1941 and 1942?

You mean something like 10% of Royal Navy playing cat and mouse?

Sorry, Japanese had no chance at all fighting '44 radar armed battleships or '44 British carrier planes. I just don't see it.

You are kidding right? The Japanese Zero was superior to most British planes.

Never mind that the Japanese carriers could bring more fighters to the fight than the British could at their peak.

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:

You are kidding right? The Japanese Zero was superior to most British planes.

Never mind that the Japanese carriers could bring more fighters to the fight than the British could at their peak.

Well the 2nd line british planes the Zeroes had to deal with are not the Seafires that would be around in 1944 though.

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:So? That's 1943. Could the Brits have survived without American support between 1941 and 1942?

You know that 1942 'u-boot paradise' was only due to sloppy US practices and the losses were falling constantly without it? Why wouldn't they survive? In a pinch, they can always accelerate real life supply ship sinking and Biscay bombing campaigns, German U-boots were really obsolete by then.

You are kidding right? The Japanese Zero was superior to most British planes.

Try Seafire. Then, there is the fact the Japanese carriers would be launching fighters blind, while by 1944 allied fighters were accompanied by targeting planes carrying radars. That was massive advantage.

Oh, and 1945 Sea Vampire comes online. What exactly Japanese can throw against it?

Never mind that the Japanese carriers could bring more fighters to the fight than the British could at their peak.

But they don't really need to. UK carriers can provide better air cover with smaller fighter wings, because you can't surprise them and there is no real way for conventional navy to win the battle with radar armed one. See Duke of York vs Scharnhorst, plus I'd say UK carriers that were cancelled because war was won by then were better than Japanese ones, too.

If we remove american support does that not also mean that there are no supplies coming from america to brittain at all? As in no raw materials and no food. Can Canada and the colonies really feed the isles?