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What's the difference in their tactics or plans?

Any suggestions on books or links which compare the differences in their methodology?

ryacko wrote:What's the difference in their tactics or plans?

Any suggestions on books or links which compare the differences in their methodology?

It's a bit difficult to compare those three since they were commanding different formations in different situations. Patton for instance never commanded anything bigger than an army (Rommel and Zhukov did) and thus never faced the same wider responsibilities that Zhukov and Rommel encountered. Moreover, at the army level the capabilities of their troops dictated to a large extent how they handled their forces, as opposed to the generals themselves employing radically new tactics or plans.

That being said, Rommel is kinda way overrated. The destruction of the Afrika Korps at 2nd El Alamein was almost entirely his fault, by deciding to stretch an overly taxed supply line to the breaking point and then deciding to fight a pitched battle when his forces had its most success in battles of maneuver.

By asking about 'tactics' you're really asking for a description of how the US, German and Soviet armies fought during the war, as none of the three mentioned were particularly innovative - although Zhukov can probably claim a much greater influence on doctrine than Rommel and Patton.

Zinegata wrote:That being said, Rommel is kinda way overrated. The destruction of the Afrika Korps at 2nd El Alamein was almost entirely his fault, by deciding to stretch an overly taxed supply line to the breaking point and then deciding to fight a pitched battle when his forces had its most success in battles of maneuver.

Huh? When compared to what? Overrated by whom?
Blaming Rommel for the defeat at 2nd El Alamein is very weird.
The background was that the afrika korps wasn't getting the reinforcements that the 8th was getting due to Hitler being an idiot.
So Rommel was left with two choices; either dig in close to his supply or act offensively. Knowing his orders and what happened to people who didn't follow nazi command orders Rommel had no choice but going on the offensive.
Something which he did successfully for longer than expected if you just look at the number of troops and supplies. The 8th had to retreat all the way to El Alamein to find a good enough defensive position to hold, that in itself is a very big achievement.

Then when we go for details surrounding the 2nd El Alamein, then Rommel was fucked up the ass by Turing. This since he tried to do exactly what you falsely try to blame him for not doing. ie a maneuver, however this time Churchill let Ultra give the now appointed Montgommery some very specfic heads up. The result was a concisive allied victory at Alam el Halfa which sapped the mobile strength out of the axis troops. So nope, the destruction was not specificly Rommel's fault. He did relatively good within the given confines.
Who screwed up the afrika korps was Hitler, not Rommel. Or Turing, depending on how you look at things.
So for you to blame Rommel for not winning a battle he pretty much couldn't win is very very weird, its like blaming Zhukov for decisions made by Stalin.
You are not confusing your rangers here are you? The Sherwood Rangers was british.

Please try to make a sensible argument how Rommel could have acted differently before El Alamein that doesn't involve the sentence "...if Hitler didn't..."

Probably the most screwed up thing about the Afrika Korp was that it even existed really. The only reason their was any German presence in North Africa was because Mussolini was totally incapable of protecting his own backyard. As a theater it served little to no purpose to Germany's goals except to assist the ambitions of literally the dumbest Dictator on the planet.

As for Rommel, he proved himself to be a good Divisional commander. His performance in France was fantastic. As a Field Marshall? Not so much. He was an utter dolt about logistics and book work. He had a strong preference for frontline leadership which made him great for commanding mid-size units like Divisions and Regiments. That kind of leadership is not so good for commanding Armies and Groups of which organized office work, political savvy, and reliable communicating are more important than anything else.

By pushing his supply lines beyond their limit at Gazala Rommel had in fact commit a massively stupid blunder. He was ordered not to attack by OKW anyway because keeping him supplied beyond Libya basically wasn't possible. He attacked anyway, and was lucky to have won at Gazala because if the British hadn't colossally fucked up by leaving their Southern flank guarded by a small fort and unprotected minefields he would have lost the entire theater. As it was he basically did ensure his own defeat by pursuing the British to El Alamien, where the terrain ensured no strategic maneuvering would be possible and thus the defenders couldn't possibly fuck up.

I can't speak for Zhukov, I don't know enough about the Red Army, yet. Patton however was pretty good for what responsibilities were entrusted to him. He did a particularly great job during the Bulge where he managed to turn an entire Army 90 degrees and attack the Bulge with near 100% strength in less than 2 days. I can't think of much else he deserved attention for though. He was honestly famous more because of his ego and bluster than because of leadership.

Spoonist wrote:Huh? When compared to what? Overrated by whom?
Blaming Rommel for the defeat at 2nd El Alamein is very weird.

....

Please try to make a sensible argument how Rommel could have acted differently before El Alamein that doesn't involve the sentence "...if Hitler didn't..."

Please try actually reading up on 2nd El Alamein before going Internet tough guy all over again.

The problem wasn't his conduct during the battle. The problem was that the battle was fought at all. He was at the very edge of his supply lines and literally everyone handling the logistics of the Afrika Korps (particularly the Italian Commando Supremo, who supplied the shipping and a good deal of his trucks) told him that they couldn't provide him with sufficient supplies that deep into Egypt. Similarly, the Luftwaffe told him that he could expect little air support that far into Egypt.

The correct course of action would have been to withdraw after 1st El Alamein. The first battle was understandable - he was pursuing a largely broken 8th Army after Gazala and this was his roll of the dice to see if he can reach Suez. When it failed, he could not be faulted for deciding to revert to a defensive stance (he wasn't getting many reinforcements, 8th army was) but Rommel can totally be blamed for stupidly putting his defensive positions that deep into Egypt where he could be barely supplied and had little air support. Why would you make a defensive stand in a spot where your supply lines are so badly attenuated that your Panzer Divisions could barely maneuver due to lack of fuel? There's no spot in the hundreds of miles between Tripoli and El Alamein where he could have also made a stand and yet have a much better supply situation?

Also, Rommel cannot play the "Hitler told me to never retreat!" card. Hitler only issued "no retreat" orders when the 2nd Battle of El Alamein was already in full swing. Rommel, writing in his diary, really makes a big deal of this, but the reality by that point was that his forces could not really retreat anyway because 1) They lacked the fuel to move everyone and 2) Most of his formations were already heavily engaged and would have difficulty disengaging.

As Hawkeye said, Rommel was a brillant tactical commander, but utterly awful about the logistical aspect. No amount of brillant tactics will help you if your troops don't have the resources to actually execute the said tactics, and Rommel lost 2nd El Alamein the moment it started because of his decisions on the strategic / logistical level.

Spoonist wrote: ...then Rommel was fucked up the ass by Turing.

I was going to ignore this but it keeps niggling at me.

This is really actually quite offensive on a number of levels:
A. Turing was actually a gay man who suffered at the hands of homophobia to the point of his own suicide. To make homosexual jokes/innuendo regarding Turing like is patently offensive to his memory and what he went through.

B. It's also denigrating to both Rape Victims and Anal Sex. Rommel was not literally by Turing. While he experienced the hardships of war and combat he did not experience the act of being physically violated by someone like this, and throw out off-hand references to rape like denigrates the experiences of rape victim who do go through unimaginable physical and psychological hardship. You're also equating all anal fucking with power interactions that are not necessarily there, and turns healthy relationships where anal sex occurs (see: the personal side of SD.net for an example of that in action) into something perverse and repugnant. Don't do that.


Be careful with your word choice. Especially over matters like this.

While I understand where you are coming from, is "fucked up the ass" not a common enough expression to warrant some leeway? I mean, when I read it, it's not like the first thing I thought of was a literal image of Turing having anal sex with Rommel, the colloquial implications are too obvious.

Ziggy Stardust wrote:While I understand where you are coming from, is "fucked up the ass" not a common enough expression to warrant some leeway? I mean, when I read it, it's not like the first thing I thought of was a literal image of Turing having anal sex with Rommel, the colloquial implications are too obvious.

Something being a colloquialism doesn't make it correct or inoffensive.

I reacted similarly to Straha. It brings up a lot of really bad stuff, enough that comment is probably warranted. Part of it is precisely because it's a casual idiom that it feels so distasteful. It feels even more like a trivialization that way.

Ziggy Stardust wrote:While I understand where you are coming from, is "fucked up the ass" not a common enough expression to warrant some leeway? I mean, when I read it, it's not like the first thing I thought of was a literal image of Turing having anal sex with Rommel, the colloquial implications are too obvious.

When you use terms like that in relation to a homosexual super genius who was basically tortured to death by the state he saved from oblivion just because he was gay, its pretty amazingly bad taste.

Frankly, Turing should be the poster boy for gay rights, not part of vaguely homophobic 'jokes' about 'those pesky Germans'. I mean, my wife gets fucked up the ass all the time. This does not involve her being ejected from Africa by the American army.

Spoonist wrote:

Zinegata wrote:That being said, Rommel is kinda way overrated. The destruction of the Afrika Korps at 2nd El Alamein was almost entirely his fault, by deciding to stretch an overly taxed supply line to the breaking point and then deciding to fight a pitched battle when his forces had its most success in battles of maneuver.

Huh? When compared to what? Overrated by whom?


Please try to make a sensible argument how Rommel could have acted differently before El Alamein that doesn't involve the sentence "...if Hitler didn't..."

He could have listened to and understood the Logistical difficalty that his army faced instead of charging blindly off into the desert

The sad thing is that the German's did a study of the situation in Libya and the probable outcome (von Thoma I think) and it more or less predicted exactly what happened. At least one German officer (von Paulus) actually turned down the offer of the African command for that very reason. The original mission was only land, stabilize, and evacuate. Rommel smelled an opportunity and pulled a succesful offensive and now the Germans were stuck with this albatross. They wound up having to pour an Army Group's worth of trucks and logistical support into Africa to support Rommel's half a dozen or whatever divisions. That could have made a difference on the Russian Front. Strategically Africa was an utter disaster for the Axis.

Rommel's position at Alamain was so far forward of what the logistical network could deliver that supplies were literally piling up in Tripoli and Tobruk's harbours as the front line units starved for fuel. If Rommel had pulled back to Sidi Barrini or roughly about the Egyptian/Libyan border his army would have been a lot stronger, and had lots of room to manouver. It would all be undone when the Americans landed in Algeria however.

Any suggestions on books or links which compare the differences in their methodology?

I'd recommend Rommel's own Infantry Attacks. You can try "Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the 21st Century" by Dennis Showalter, too.

Ziggy Stardust wrote:While I understand where you are coming from, is "fucked up the ass" not a common enough expression to warrant some leeway? I mean, when I read it, it's not like the first thing I thought of was a literal image of Turing having anal sex with Rommel, the colloquial implications are too obvious.

The fact that it is a common expression is exactly why I object so vehemently. Through using metaphors of penetration as symbols of power we deny women, gay men, and many others the idea that they can be powerful in the world (or even agents in the world.) If we care about equality, agency, and the power of language expressions like this have to be avoided and objected to, otherwise we're engaging in social progress in name only.

Straha wrote:The fact that it is a common expression is exactly why I object so vehemently. Through using metaphors of penetration as symbols of power we deny women, gay men, and many others the idea that they can be powerful in the world (or even agents in the world.) If we care about equality, agency, and the power of language expressions like this have to be avoided and objected to, otherwise we're engaging in social progress in name only.

Obviously this isn't the time and place for this discussion, so we should probably just let it drop, but I do want to just respond quickly and off-the-cuff. I do see where you are coming from, and don't broadly disagree with the logic, but on the other hand the expression in question has become so colloquial that it is entirely removed from its original, literal meaning (a pattern we see with dozens of other words in the English language that are now common but would have once been considered offensive). People aren't even considering the literal meaning of those words when they use that phrase, so how does it deny others any power? Going out of your way to point it out is doing this, because it reminds people of implications they weren't otherwise considering. It's like if you hear someone use the word "hooligan", which has a colloquial meaning completely separate from its original, literal meaning, and lecture them about not insulting drunken Irishmen ... the racial context was completely absent from the discussion until you brought it up. Like calling Jar Jar Binks a black stereotype; you are the one adding the offensive context. Anyway, I apologize for the tangent.

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To get back on topic, vis-a-vis Rommel, I have a question for those of you with more detailed knowledge on the subject than I. A lot of the judgment over Rommel comes from the strategic and tactical blunders involved in Africa, which themselves are mostly a matter of logistics (there are other factors, but the relationship between logistical realities and strategic goals seems to be the biggest). Certainly, the push towards El Alamein may have been short-signed or foolhardy; what if he had somehow won that battle, and been able to push into Egypt or otherwise majorly disrupt British military activity in the region as a result? That is, historically, how much of a precedent is there for commanders/generals to rashly overextend their logistics, but manage to use this to their advantage (either due to surprise or what have you? Was Rommel doomed as soon as he made the decision, or was it a high-risk/high-reward move that just didn't pan out?

History is full of commanders who overextended their logistics and won due to the speed of their advance, the Emperor Julian or even Caesar are just a few of those examples. In Julian's case he even had his army literally starving and yet won. Caesar was cut off several times and may have lost his entire army in Gaul if not for his genius.

Yeah but war had changed substantially from the ancient era. Modern armies are much larger and therefore much more reliant on their supply chain. On top of that, the period of actual fighting for an ancient Army would be much shorter than for a modern Army. An ancient Army would fight a pitched battle or maybe series of battles and then have victory. A modern Army must fight a series of battles that are usually part of a campaign and then that campaign is actually part of many other campaigns comprising an operational area.

Even if the 8th Army was still in tatters by El Alamein. It's a whole army stuffed into an extremely small operational space. By virtue of traffic and space concerns Rommel could not just hope to pass right through the region. Rommel was able to lead his Division to the coast in France, but the terrain favored this move and his supply lines were not overextended. They just needed to catch up to him.

Let's say he does just that again though and the 8th Army totally routs out of Egypt. What then? They'll probably blow up the Suez to prevent its use or crossing and Rommel has no reason to continue into the Sinai anyway. Both the Japanese and British were pretty thoroughly bogged down in Burma and Japan had far greater problems in the Solomons and China. They wouldn't be able to follow up a decisive German victory in the Middle East in a reasonable time frame. Rommel has to return to Libya anyway since the Americans are going to invade sooner or later and even if they'll totally botch it, he can't stay in Egypt.

CaptHawkeye wrote:Yeah but war had changed substantially from the ancient era. Modern armies are much larger and therefore much more reliant on their supply chain.

Not larger per se in norther africa, but I'll give you the more supply-intensive part. I fail to see how that does detract from my answer in any way. The question was asked, I answered.

On top of that, the period of actual fighting for an ancient Army would be much shorter than for a modern Army. An ancient Army would fight a pitched battle or maybe series of battles and then have victory. A modern Army must fight a series of battles that are usually part of a campaign and then that campaign is actually part of many other campaigns comprising an operational area.

This is wrong, ancient warfare did involve all these concepts.

I shouldn't make it seem like i'm saying it didn't. Just not on the same frequency as modern war.

CaptHawkeye wrote:I shouldn't make it seem like i'm saying it didn't. Just not on the same frequency as modern war.

Well, not when you compare numbers but when it comes to proportional resources of society devoted to warfare then nothing beats ancient/medieval times.

Thanas wrote:History is full of commanders who overextended their logistics and won due to the speed of their advance, the Emperor Julian or even Caesar are just a few of those examples. In Julian's case he even had his army literally starving and yet won. Caesar was cut off several times and may have lost his entire army in Gaul if not for his genius.

True, which is why Rommel's decision to fight Gazala and 1st El Alamein were understandable. Risky, but understandable.