How long could Apartheid South Africa have lasted?

[Straha]

I was just talking with someone over the practical uses of Nuclear Weapons, and I made the point that Nuclear Weapons can be, and have been, used as tools to ensure the indestructibility of a particular government or regime and pointed out South Africa as the prime example. Which got me thinking that I don't know how long South Africa could have survived if it had decided not to renounce Apartheid. I know it was facing massive international pressure, sanctions and home discontent, but so many other nations have been able to carry on that I can't imagine the South African government couldn't have kept going. So here are my two questions that I hope someone has an answer to:

1. When did South Africa cross the threshold where getting rid of Apartheid was inevitable?

and

2. How long could it have survived if it had decided not to renounce apartheid?

[Samuel]

and I made the point that Nuclear Weapons can be, and have been, used as tools to ensure the indestructibility of a particular government or regime and pointed out South Africa as the prime example.

Isn't the USSR a really good counter example?

know it was facing massive international pressure, sanctions and home discontent, but so many other nations have been able to carry on that I can't imagine the South African government couldn't have kept going.

While not an expert on this (that would probably be Axis Kast) the fact that the formerly friendly states bordering South Africa were replaced by ones sympathetic to the African National Congress was also a major factor.

[Straha]

and I made the point that Nuclear Weapons can be, and have been, used as tools to ensure the indestructibility of a particular government or regime and pointed out South Africa as the prime example.

Isn't the USSR a really good counter example?

I'd make the argument that Gorbachev essentially chose to dismantle the USSR, and that the USSR broke up for its own internal reasons and not due to any outside pressure (which is what my original comments were made in the context of.) In fact the continuity of government from the USSR to the new Russian Federation would only bolster my point.

[K. A. Pital]

Straha's right. Gorbachov's political decision to allow the USSR to break up and internal pressures were the reason of it's change of government. External pressure had quite little to do with it, as the USSR was a pretty well-off industrialized economy, and in any case it was more well-off than what happened to Russia after the collapse, but did not lead to a change of government. If you look at the DPRK, you can see that even a nation still stuck with the 1950s version of hyper-Stalinism can survive for a reasonably long time and make projections of it's putative downfall a joking matter. This should indicate that outside pressure is pretty much a pointless indicator in predicting the downfall of a government.

Internal issues of South Africa are far more important here. Though undoubtely a measure of connection between inside and outside pressure exists, as well as a correlation between the two, even as correlation doesn't imply causation.

[Sarevok]

Would North Korea be a correct analogy for a hypothetical apartheid South Africa in the 21st century ? Afterall mere speculation about whether North Koreans have nukes is enough to deter outside forces. South Africa had functional nuclear capability and was rather advanced and powerful militarily. .

[Straha]

Would North Korea be a correct analogy for a hypothetical apartheid South Africa in the 21st century ? Afterall mere speculation about whether North Koreans have nukes is enough to deter outside forces. South Africa had functional nuclear capability and was rather advanced and powerful militarily. .

No, because South Africa was partially democratic and was geared around maintaining a high standard of living for its white citizens, unlike NK which isn't democratic and doesn't really give a shit about living standards about any but the tiniest portion of its population.

[K. A. Pital]

North Korea isn't a "correct analogue", it just shows that governments, even those who don't give a shit about the population, can survive under extreme outside pressure. I never said it was meant to be an analogue, and it was used to illustrate my point that outside pressure is a pretty pointless indicator as to when a government would collapse.

[Axis Kast]

I was just talking with someone over the practical uses of Nuclear Weapons, and I made the point that Nuclear Weapons can be, and have been, used as tools to ensure the indestructibility of a particular government or regime and pointed out South Africa as the prime example.

How would access to a nuclear weapon have helped South Africa overcome domestic strife? By 1989, the Cubans were committed to leave Angola. SWAPO and the ANC were never conventional threats susceptible to nuclear blackmail.

When did South Africa cross the threshold where getting rid of Apartheid was inevitable?

Arguably, in April 1974, when the Carnation Revolution toppled the Salazar regime in Portugal and led to the rapid decolonization of Portuguese Africa. This smashed any hope for a bloc of white settler powers in which each member took some of the uncomfortable spotlight off the others. Subsequent fighting in Angola, during which South Africa intervened unsuccessfully (and probably at the invitation of the United States), later provided an enormously valuable propaganda victory for the liberation movements in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Until 1975, the white population in Southern Africa had been growing steadily. Afterward, the South Africans spent blood and treasure aplenty in Angola and Namibia, reducing the appeal for European immigration and gradually bringing on a sense of siege that sapped the will of the white electorate to continue sustaining apartheid government.

The other "tipping points" are either 1975 (victory in Angola might have generated enough respite for South Africa to tend to political divisions at home) or 1988/9, when Soviet involvement in the Third World declined markedly, and the last politically credible raison d'etre for Western governments to back the white settler governments disappeared.

How long could it have survived if it had decided not to renounce apartheid?

Probably a decade or so at minimum, but with massive and ugly violence in the townships.

[The Spartan]

as the USSR was a pretty well-off industrialized economy, and in any case it was more well-off than what happened to Russia after the collapse, but did not lead to a change of government.

Sorry for the tangent, but it was my understanding that by the time Gorbachev came to US to visit that the Soviet Unions economy had been stagnant for around 25 years. Was I misinformed or was it the other factors that contributed to the collapse?

[K. A. Pital]

Sorry for the tangent, but it was my understanding that by the time Gorbachev came to US to visit that the Soviet Unions economy had been stagnant for around 25 years. Was I misinformed or was it the other factors that contributed to the collapse?

There were far more political factors than economic ones. Being stagnant is a deceptive term; in the case we're looking at it means extensive industrial growth (as opposed to intensive). The actual GDP stagnation, or stagnation of separate industrial sectors, is also not something readily bringing a collapse of governmebt - Russia's government weathered lots and lots of collapses like this (1900s, 1930s, 1940s, 1990s and late 2000s). On the other hand, government collapsed in years when the GDP was growing (1991, 1917). Not to mention the other examples provided. If people still believe external pressure can do stuff, why not look at Cuba? External pressure can do nothing. Cuba experienced a throwback from the best GDP/pc among independent LA states in the 1980s to the arguably worst after the end of Soviet subsidies and destruction of it's export market for sugar; that didn't lead to a collapse of power, even under an embargo that never was lifted.

The point I'm making is that internal political reasons will always mean more than external pressure, even coupled with an economic downturn. The hardening of a political power is one of the alternative outcomes of such a development.

[The Spartan]

Oh, I don't doubt that it was internal, rather than external, factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, it's just that I had a different understanding of which of those factors was most prominent.

[TC Pilot]

If people still believe external pressure can do stuff, why not look at Cuba? External pressure can do nothing.

I've been debating whether or not to jump in on this point, but for the time being I'm going to ask you to clarify yourself, because you're repeatedly straying into a line a wildly false overgeneralization. "External pressure" refers to economic measures like the Cuban embargo, correct?

[Pablo Sanchez]

Oh, I don't doubt that it was internal, rather than external, factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, it's just that I had a different understanding of which of those factors was most prominent.

Understanding of the end of the Cold War in the West is heavily inflected by political considerations as well as the euphoria of winning in the end. You don't hear much in American schools about the seriously negative effects of the USSR's fall on the population of most post-Soviet states, for example. The same disconnect holds true for the approximate causes of the collapse.

[K. A. Pital]

I've been debating whether or not to jump in on this point, but for the time being I'm going to ask you to clarify yourself, because you're repeatedly straying into a line a wildly false overgeneralization.

"Wildly false overgeneralization"? I would love to see examples of success of external pressure causing a nation-state to perform internal political changes. If you're claiming I am "overgeneralizing" something. The vaunted effect of sanctions, political pressure and the like for the most part has very low resultativity in the world, and had so historically.

"External pressure" refers to economic measures like the Cuban embargo, correct?

Yes, the Cuban embargo, as well as using that embargo as a tool of international pressure on Cuba, among other venues for political pressure (press criticism, et cetera).

[The Spartan]

Oh, I don't doubt that it was internal, rather than external, factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, it's just that I had a different understanding of which of those factors was most prominent.

Understanding of the end of the Cold War in the West is heavily inflected by political considerations as well as the euphoria of winning in the end. You don't hear much in American schools about the seriously negative effects of the USSR's fall on the population of most post-Soviet states, for example. The same disconnect holds true for the approximate causes of the collapse.

No doubt. As I'm sure you can imagine, I've had to routinely dissuade people of the notion that Reagan is the reason we won the Cold War.

[TC Pilot]

Yes, the Cuban embargo, as well as using that embargo as a tool of international pressure on Cuba, among other venues for political pressure (press criticism, et cetera).

That's what I figured, but I wanted you to clarify, since "external pressure" could easily be construed to mean a lot more than just economic or political factors like those at play against countries like Cuba, and include the military and clandestine operations notorious in the Cold War.

[Axis Kast]

"Wildly false overgeneralization"? I would love to see examples of success of external pressure causing a nation-state to perform internal political changes. If you're claiming I am "overgeneralizing" something. The vaunted effect of sanctions, political pressure and the like for the most part has very low resultativity in the world, and had so historically.

Rhodesia is probably the preeminent example, because in that instance, external pressure, effectively employed, meant that they could not sustain sufficiently high standards of living to entice immigration of additional Europeans, and were ultimately fighting a boot-strap war effort.

South Africa is a close second. The political elite had a mandate to enforce apartheid for only as long as they fulfilled the white voters' expectations about a certain quality of life. After 1977, the South Africans were progressively isolated, and, despite a very robust economy, ultimately chose not to keep up "the good fight."

[Sea Skimmer]

Rhodesia was fucked no matter what happened, even when the war was at its best the white government had no choice but to cede control of vast areas of the country to the rebels. With only 1% of the population white they just never had any realistic chance of winning. South Africa only barely had a high enough ratio of whites to blacks to keep the population oppressed in all corners of the country.

[K. A. Pital]

I wanted you to clarify, since "external pressure" could easily be construed to mean a lot more than just economic or political factors like those at play against countries like Cuba, and include the military and clandestine operations notorious in the Cold War

Heh. Now, that's true, but I'd never refer to clandestine operations as having low result. They were notorious and simultaneously very resultative in replacing the governments of certain nations, far more so than any sanctions.

[Axis Kast]

Rhodesia was fucked no matter what happened, even when the war was at its best the white government had no choice but to cede control of vast areas of the country to the rebels. With only 1% of the population white they just never had any realistic chance of winning. South Africa only barely had a high enough ratio of whites to blacks to keep the population oppressed in all corners of the country.

That isn't an accurate description of the situation.

Although the cession of large areas of the country to rebel operators had significant negative impact on the economy, the UDI government successfully co-opted a great many blacks. Unsurprisingly, Africans greatly outnumbered whites in the armed forces. Rhodesia also successfully skirted international sanctions with the active help of Portugal and South Africa. Portuguese colonial forces in Mozambique routinely crossed the border to assist the Rhodesian military on operations against the rebel movements. It is conceivable that the Rhodesians could have held out much longer -- perhaps until the collapse of the Soviet Union changed geopolitical battle lines -- had the Portuguese continued to "soldier on" in Africa.

[Bilbo]

Rhodesia was fucked no matter what happened, even when the war was at its best the white government had no choice but to cede control of vast areas of the country to the rebels. With only 1% of the population white they just never had any realistic chance of winning. South Africa only barely had a high enough ratio of whites to blacks to keep the population oppressed in all corners of the country.

That isn't an accurate description of the situation.

Although the cession of large areas of the country to rebel operators had significant negative impact on the economy, the UDI government successfully co-opted a great many blacks. Unsurprisingly, Africans greatly outnumbered whites in the armed forces. Rhodesia also successfully skirted international sanctions with the active help of Portugal and South Africa. Portuguese colonial forces in Mozambique routinely crossed the border to assist the Rhodesian military on operations against the rebel movements. It is conceivable that the Rhodesians could have held out much longer -- perhaps until the collapse of the Soviet Union changed geopolitical battle lines -- had the Portuguese continued to "soldier on" in Africa.

Rhodesia was subjected to much stronger external pressure than South Africa felt. It can be very entertaining to see what kind of statements are made by Britain and the United States aimed at Rhodesia while much less was said of South Africa when the almost exact same situation existed.

In the long run the long standing situation in Zimbabwe has proven that the removal of the white government in Rhodesia most certainly did not improve the situations. Mugabe needs to go (in reality he needed to go the second day he was in office).

[Pelranius]

To be fair, I don't think that anyone could have realistically predicted that Mugabe would have changed so drastically after his first decade in power (that, or he somehow managed to pull the wool over everyone's eyes for so long).

One of the Rhodesian ministers claimed that the South Africans sabotaged Rhodesia because the Boers were apparently still mad at the English for the Boer War (though the Minister in question was of Cape Boer descent, so go figure).

[Axis Kast]

The South Africans jettisoned Rhodesia as a sacrificial offering in the hopes of gaining American gratitude which could be stored away for a later date. They accomplished the trick, but then discovered that they had never been guaranteed their expected reward.

As for external pressure, Rhodesia's problems really gained steam when Caetano left office. Before that time, they could tell the international community to suck wind and get away with it, essentially scott free. The Nixon Administration cared not one whit about what was going on in Southern Africa at the time, contrary to many accusations ever afterward. During one infamous gathering of the NSC, Vice President Spiro Agnew conflated Rhodesia with South Africa and was told politely to "shut up" by Richard Nixon.

[mopheme]

The apartheid regime could have not lasted beyond the 90's because of its high debt which the current regime still had to pay at the expense of having to put more resources into improving the standard of living of the non-white members of SA.

By the mid 80's, the black population had also become militant to the point that the white population realised that if the country had to be brought back from the brink of a civil war, apartheid had to be abolished.

[Simon_Jester]

Sorry for the tangent, but it was my understanding that by the time Gorbachev came to US to visit that the Soviet Unions economy had been stagnant for around 25 years. Was I misinformed or was it the other factors that contributed to the collapse?

Even economic stagnation usually is/would be survivable. It takes one hell of an economic collapse to bring down a government by itself, unless there are other factors in play such as ideological movements or a foreign invasion.

And I rather doubt the USSR was headed for such a tremendous collapse in any event. I don't know how efficient the central planning system was, but it was at least efficient enough to deliver bread to the public and keep the trains and electricity running and so forth. And you really have to start losing those kinds of things before people will seriously consider overthrowing the government purely because the economy is bad.

In the long run the long standing situation in Zimbabwe has proven that the removal of the white government in Rhodesia most certainly did not improve the situations. Mugabe needs to go (in reality he needed to go the second day he was in office).

What did he do the second day he was in office?