Percussion Rifles And ACW Tactics?

[Aaron]

I'm not sure if belongs in the history forum or not, my apologies in advance if it doesn't.

My recent foray into black powder and rifles left me with (to me) an interesting question; if a percussion cap rifle is good out to around 300 yards or so, then why was the Civil War fought in massed ranks of infantry ala the Peninsula War? Surely the weapons would have been accurate enough to dispense with the massed ranks and adopt a practice of "fire and movement" akin to modern combat or even that of the British Rifles in the Peninsula Wars. Was it a lack of ability to control large amounts of dispersed troops, the troops themselves being poorly trained, plain inertia or something else?

[thejester]

Mixture of those things. Paddy Griffith discusses it pretty extensively in Battle Tactics of the American Civil War, but I haven't read it in ages so my memory is a bit cloudy.

[Adrian Laguna]

To begin with, there weren't enough percussion cap rifles to go around. The vast majority of troops used muzzle-loaded rifled muskets, and early in the war smoothbores were still commonplace. So that right there constrained the tactical options of both sides.

Secondly, in 1860 there were 16,000 men in the US Army. A couple of years later the Union was fielding multiple armies numbering in the several tens of thousands each. The massive increase in troop number over such a short period of time was done at the expense of training, and meant that most soldiers couldn't hit anything past 50 yards. The tiny minority who could were used as snipers rather formed into fire & manoeuvre units.

Thirdly, there was also a general shortage of experience in the command chain. Officers who participated in the Mexican-American War became the upper part of the chain of command, but none of them had ever commanded such large masses of men before. The new crop of junior officers was thus very green, and there were precious few NCOs with any experience. As such it was very difficult to maintain sufficient command and control at any level without forming up the men in massed ranks. Later in the war veteran units would behave in a more modern manner, such as fighting in more dispersed formations, taking individual cover, and using aimed fire instead of massed fire.

[Adrian Laguna]

Finally, I note that close order drill was still used in the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, despite the en masse issuance of faster firing, longer ranged, and more accurate rifles than those widely used in the American Civil War. When it comes to ease of control and volume of fire, it's hard to beat massed ranks. They were only discontinued because widespread use of repeating rifles, machine-guns, and fast firing artillery made such formations very vulnerable. Even then, commanders were often forced to employ them anyway. The opening campaigns of the First World War saw close order drill being used both successfully (Germans at Tannenberg) and disastrously (Russians at Tannenberg). It was later on used by the British during the Battle of the Somme, for which Haig has received endless criticism, but it was arguably a necessary measure to prevent the loss of command, co-ordination, and order.

[thejester]

It was later on used by the British during the Battle of the Somme, for which Haig has received endless criticism, but it was arguably a necessary measure to prevent the loss of command, co-ordination, and order.

Even ignoring the fact there remains considerable debate as to how British battalions attacked on July 1, there's no way you could call it 'close order drill'. The myth is they advanced in lines, but these were not in anyway 'drilled' and were reflections of both British Army inexperience and the lack of time to train the New Army battalions.

[Dark Flame]

From what I remember it was that technology advancements outpaced new tactics. So basically, inertia. I hadn't heard much about the problems with training before, but it makes sense to me, so I can see a combination of those factors.

[Sea Skimmer]

In most cases soldiers fired a single round of ammunition in training, or none at all, and then might only fire a few shots in each battle before being killed. Under those circumstances accuracy would have been utterly dismal even with the first high velocity smokeless powder rifles of the 1880s. The main reason for so little training was simply that neither side had anything like enough gunpowder. As it took eighteen months to make nitrates the supply could not be rapidly increased, and most of what was produced was absorbed by the demands of the new generation of heavy artillery pieces. Lots of powder was also just poorly made to the point of being worthless, or got wet and was ruined, wasting huge amounts of material.

This is why the National Rifle Association was founded in 1871, to provide marksmanship training to Americans in peacetime when ammo was available, so that they’d do much better after a wartime mobilization. Of course the NRA has changed over time, but that remains one of its missions.

[CaptHawkeye]

The life of an infantry lineman looked pretty dismal from all appearances. It's not hard to understand why gunpowder era armies had such ridiculous desertion rates and commonly low morale. Conflicts as early as the Seven Years War showed just how much better off musketeers were in cover even if that came at the cost of rate of fire.

Of course the advantage means nothing if your enemy has modern, wildly superior artillery and you don't.

Skimmer probably knows more about this than I do, but their seems to be a reason armies rarely fought Starforts head on. Even poorly prepared positions like the Alamo and Rorke's Drift allowed the musket armed defenders to hang on despite ridiculous odds against them.

[Adrian Laguna]

Even ignoring the fact there remains considerable debate as to how British battalions attacked on July 1, there's no way you could call it 'close order drill'. The myth is they advanced in lines, but these were not in anyway 'drilled' and were reflections of both British Army inexperience and the lack of time to train the New Army battalions.

Okay yes, the specific terminology was incorrect, it didn't look like redcoats with muskets. The point is that they were advancing in formed lines at walking pace, not in independent squads using fire and manoeuvre. That this was a reflection of British inexperience and lack of training just reinforces my point about it being a necessity rather than a poor decision.

Skimmer probably knows more about this than I do, but their seems to be a reason armies rarely fought Starforts head on. Even poorly prepared positions like the Alamo and Rorke's Drift allowed the musket armed defenders to hang on despite ridiculous odds against them.

Neither of those is very good example. At the Alamo the attacking commander was incomprehensibly incompetent, and at Rorke's Drift the attacking force was poorly armed, had been moving at a rapid pace for six days, not eaten properly in two, and were still a few days march away from their nearest supplies.

However, you are right tha at attacking a fortified position head on was risky proposition, since the defenders could shoot from cover, while the attackers had not choice but to charge into their fire. Taking a dedicated permanent fortification required artillery to open breaches in the walls and suppress defending fire, time to dig saps and trenches, and expertise to direct it all. However, good siege engineers could and did take fortresses without suffering more casualties than they inflicted.

[CaptHawkeye]

Just how successful was gunpowder artillery against different fort types? I imagine it had a lot to do with the technology available.

Something i'd like to see is some kind of list or research showing trends and comparisons between Musket-era Fortifications and the artillery used against them. Their was definitely a, long, complex tech race between fort design and artillery power during the era. Sometimes the artillery would be too powerful for the fort, sometimes the fort would be too well designed for the artillery.

Generally nobody expects a wooden fort to hold out against even light artillery, i'm more interested in evolution of Starfort design.

[Aaron]

Just how successful was gunpowder artillery against different fort types? I imagine it had a lot to do with the technology available.

Something i'd like to see is some kind of list or research showing trends and comparisons between Musket-era Fortifications and the artillery used against them. Their was definitely a, long, complex tech race between fort design and artillery power during the era. Sometimes the artillery would be too powerful for the fort, sometimes the fort would be too well designed for the artillery.

Generally nobody expects a wooden fort to hold out against even light artillery, i'm more interested in evolution of Starfort design.

You might find this of interest then. The site has a bit of info on the Citadel in Halifax. Nova Scotia, a star fort designed to defend the harbor. I've toured it and it's quite interesting. There's also Fort Henry in Kingston, Ontario but it is no where near as impressive.

Thank you to everyone who answered my question in the thread, the eighteen months to make nitrates was especially interesting.

[Thanas]

If you ever get to Fort Ticonderoga, they have an excellent exhibition about starforts.


Castillo de San Marcos in Jacksonville is also a good american example of what well-built forts can accomplish (It is also the site of one of the more humiliating british/american colonists defeats due to fortifications).

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Also remember that mass was considered necessary to achieve victory by bringing a sufficient concentration of men against a single place in an era in which sweeping fire from artillery was much more difficult, and the guns had to be concentrated at the point of the breakthrough. Also remember that fortifications were used extensively in earlier conflicts. Indeed, as early as Malplaquet, field fortifications consisting of lines of breastworks and abbatis were employed to good effect by Marshal Villiers to make the battle the Borodino of the War of Spanish Succession. The idea that commanders did not extensively fortify before the mid-19th century is simply false; it's just that the technology of the era forced the concentration of troops on the offensive without fortifications. And it's not like fortifications even then substantially improved the survivability of the warfare; they just improved your ability to hold a position. Look at the French casualties at Malplaquet or the Russian casualties at Borodino; both battles saw the defenders succeed insomuch as they made the victories of their enemies pyrrhic ones at a time when a pyrrhic victory would be sufficient to stand in the way of further progress, but in doing so the casualty lists were utterly murderous; the point of the defences, as it has always been, is to aide in the holding of the position, and not to preserve the lives of the troops.

[FOG3]

The reason for tight formations in the arquebus -> musket era was two fold. While artillery was better able to take out infantry that were massed up, cavalry would tear them apart if they were not. The second issue that tended to influence depth of ranks was the practical rate of fire, which is a function of both training regimen and equipment.

These reasons didn't really become a relatively minor issue until at least Napolean's Minie-ball musket-rifle equipped infantry and advanced horse drawn artillery level of technology, which the American Civil War didn't really showcase. Only at that point did the skirmisher considerations become minor and the bayonet start to become something that was carried only for rare contingency situations.

The American Civil War saw use of plenty of cavalry.

NOTE: Above is in context of time period. I know perfectly well a Napolean era horse drawn artillery piece is obsolescent next to a WW1 or WW2 one.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

You would be referring to the minie-ball rifled muskets and rifled artillery of the era of Napoleon III, I take it? Since Napoleon I had none of these things...

[FOG3]

As I was.

I was remembering Napolean's chief surgeon Larrey was on record with the one hundred bullet or artillery wounds to bayonet wound comment, and was thinking that correlated with the introduction of the Minie ball by French initiative and the corresponding thinning of the ranks. A combination of mixing up dates, and thinking Napolean's rise included more then the development of practical horse drawn artillery such as the 12 pounder known as the Napolean which Napolean was skilled at employing. These were deployed in the American Civil War, but I cannot recall them being effectively maneuvered to take out the infantry instead of things like Gettysburg.

Effectively employed artillery was the direct counter to the massed formations. Massed formations in turn were the direct counter to cavalry charges and a way to deal with the other failings of early firearms in terms of accuracy and rate of fire. That was the origin of the training regimen, and it was the refinement of artillery making it able to be effectively maneuvered against infantry and increasing accuracy and rate of fire that eventually rendered it impractical.

The American Civil War was far enough along you also had the issue that would deadlock WW1, where you could transport lots of material efficiently by rail, but were lacking in terms of logistics beyond that. This eventually hit the point where you were deploying forces so large to a certain extent they couldn't move as it wouldn't be possible to deliver the necessary material to support them if they moved too far from the railroad lines. Even WW2 Germany wasn't entirely free of these issues still largely being a horse army.

[Sea Skimmer]

Heck even with a fully motorized army, if you get too far away from a railroad or port you can still be screwed. The rule of thumb is you can sustain a military about 250 miles from the logistics bases using truck convoys, and then establish a second set of bases and go another 250 miles with a second cycle of trucks. But that’s really inefficient. Beyond those ~500 miles you’re just totally shit out of luck, the trucks will just consume far too much fuel to bring any useful level of supplies forward.

We saw this at work in 1944 when the allied advance to German plain ran out of gas after advancing about 400 miles by road (somewhat less as the crow flies). Even today, while we have much better and bigger trucks, our militaries also need far more supplies per man, so this limitation is largely unchanged. Luckily the world now has lots of railroads and ports. In fact just in the past two months we resumed use of the Iraqi railroad system to move supplies (such use had been suspended in late 2003 when a key bridge was blown up), and work has begun on an extension of an existing rail spur in Afghanistan to reach Manzar-e Sharif to support the new trans-Russian supply line. Horray for trains.