Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, etc.

[Darth Wong]

Hey guys, I'm working on a long-overdue addition to the main StarDestroyer.Net website. It's a discussion of real-life military strategy as it is applied to science fiction, and the current in-progress work (obviously still very preliminary) is at:

http://www.stardestroyer.net/Strategy/

One particular page (the Strategic Models page) attempts to very briefly cover the most famous names in strategy from history such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, and I was wondering if (since I know some of you are enthusiasts in that area) anyone could provide any feedback on whether they think I've misrepresented anything or left out something really important (keeping in mind that brevity is a concern). You can find the partially completed version here.

Comments?

[Pablo Sanchez]

In the Sun-Tzu section:
It is spelled Al-Qaeda, no "u." It's also untrue to say that Al-Qaeda participated in the Afghanistan Campaign against the USSR; many of the same people who were in the Mujahideen, including Osama bin-Laden, were later in the leadership of AQ, but as an organization it's distinct.

Personally I'm not sure that all asymmetric warfare qualifies under Sun-Tzu's ideas, because in the specific case of AQ it's at best a misapplication of them. Terrorists do use psychological warfare, misdirection, and economical application of force, but their strategy isn't good. After all, Al-Qaeda's terrorist strategy against the USA resulted in its effective neutralization as an organization after we invaded Afghanistan, and only the USA's colossal strategic blunder in choosing to fight the Iraq War allowed AQ to recover at all. The leadership set their highest priority on sending a message of fear to the USA, without anticipating the obvious outcome--an overwhelming counterstrike.

There are better examples of Sun-Tzu's concepts at work, like Vietnam or even the closing stages of the Chinese Civil War, where Mao made extensive use of propaganda, infiltration, and maneuver in addition to pitched battle.

[Rogue 9]

"To fight and conquer in all our battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." - Sun Tzu

Sorry, just one of my favorites. Anyway, I know more about Sun Tzu than von Clausewitz, but I don't see anything remarkably out of place concerning Sun Tzu. One thing, though. There are probably many ways to transcribe the word to English from Arabic script, but the accepted spelling of the terrorist organization is "al Qaeda," so far as I can determine. I know it looks strange without the U to native English speakers, but what can you do?

[K. A. Pital]

It's also untrue to say that Al-Qaeda participated in the Afghanistan Campaign against the USSR; many of the same people who were in the Mujahideen, including Osama bin-Laden, were later in the leadership of AQ, but as an organization it's distinct.

Yeah, I would change that to "Mujahed structures that later evolved into Al-Quaeda and the Taliban".

But basically the point about Al-Quaeda is true.

They hide, not fight in the open. That's why they are hard to kill, and manage to "recover" somehow after what the enemy thinks is an "overwhelming strike" - even if it really overwhelms some nation, and it's military, the Al-Quaeda can flee.

Al-Quaeda also uses islamist influence in all surrounding Middle East nations to disperse and hide, eg. Pakistan's heavily islamist regions.

And they do await weakness from the enemy. Witness how they sat out the fall of the USSR, then invaded the Tajikistan and put the nation into a 7-year war.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Although it is not as well publicised, the Byzantines do have a similar war manual where they tailored their tactics for each particular enemy they fight with. The Byzantines also employed very Sun Tzu like tactics against the Sassanids in the last war against them. Might provide quite a good read, especially with regard to empire vs empire wars.

[Thanas]

Although it is not as well publicised, the Byzantines do have a similar war manual where they tailored their tactics for each particular enemy they fight with. The Byzantines also employed very Sun Tzu like tactics against the Sassanids in the last war against them. Might provide quite a good read, especially with regard to empire vs empire wars.

The Strategikon of Flavius Mauricius Tiberius Augustus (Maurikios). Sadly there is no online version available, but excerpts can be found here.

It really is an excellent read on strategy and I do prefer it even to Sun Tzu. Luckily my university's library has several copies of it, since it is impossible to find online.


Select quotes:

"one should not be satisfied with merely driving the enemy back. This is a mistake made by inexperienced leaders who do not know how to take advantage of an opportunity, and who like to hear the saying: 'Be victorious but do not press your victory too hard.' By not seizing the opportunity, these people only cause themselves more trouble and place the ultimate results in doubt. There can be no rest until the enemy is completely destroyed. . . . One should not slacken after driving them back just a short distance, nor . . . should one jeopardize the success of the whole campaign because of lack of persistence. In war, as in hunting, a near miss is still a complete miss."

A general who takes nothing for granted is secure in war.

[Adrian Laguna]

Well it looks good so far. Just one minor, mostly tangential, nitpick.

at one point, one of them even says they have gone mad; surely if they had truly gone mad, they would not be able to determine that they had gone mad

People do occasionally check themselves into metal institutions because they fear they've lost it, and they are sometimes right in doing so.

[Simplicius]

From the Identifying Threats page, this stuck out:

Interestingly enough, given the fact that suppression or prevention of internal dissent is a national security matter of paramount importance, it is possible to argue that an adversary with sufficiently effective subversive propaganda and no other military forces could still be considered a threat. Of course, this is not a popular viewpoint, particularly in nations that pride themselves upon their guarantees of certain freedoms, such as
freedom of speech.

It's worth noting - in general, if not in your strategy pages - that the two Red Scares in the US were a response to this kind of "message-only" threat, and that the threat was addressed not only by reactionary clampdowns but by the continuation and expansion of New Deal liberalism.
________

On your Basic Models page, I wonder if there isn't space for mention of the body of strategic thought concerning modern counter-asymmetric warfare, even though there are no handy historical figures to name it after and few all-encompassing books which cover the matter.

One book that might do so is General Rupert Smith's The Utility of Force. I've only just started it, but the reviews have been favorable and the book has made its way through the counterinsurgency weblogs and the like. Smith's central points concern the character of modern warfare:

"The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided."

"We fight amongst the people, not on the battlefield."

"Our conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending."

"We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain the objective."

"On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which are the products of industrial war."

"The sides are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multinational grouping against some non-state party or parties."

In addition to these, you have the reality that fighting a guerrilla/insurgent force places you on the defensive more often than not, that your most useful weapons are sources of legitimacy, respect, or material coercion rather than of firepower, that the weak points targeted by the guerrilla/insurgent will include things you have no direct control over (especially perception), and that even if you 'win' in the short term your opponent may never actually go away. This creates a strategic environment not at all like that of Clausewitz or even of Sun Tzu, in the latter case because that is, by definition, asymmetric.

Other recent COIN writers of note are John Nagl, David Galula, and Thomas Hammes; they've all got articles published online as well as books out. But they may well be more specific than Smith overall (maybe not Hammes, but his 'generations of war' doesn't really work when Sun Tzu wrote thousands of years before he did), and Smith's book is the sort more likely to turn up in a public library for easy perusal.

[phongn]

I think some discussion on A. T. Mahan's ideas would be a good addition and there's the added bonus that like Sun Tzu and Clauswitz's writings, The Influence of Sea Power upon History is in the public domain.

[Simplicius]

Isn't Mahan still of the Clausewitz/Jomini school of decisive battle and concentration of force, though? His focus was different, but his overall method was much the same, no?

[phongn]

Isn't Mahan still of the Clausewitz/Jomini school of decisive battle and concentration of force, though? His focus was different, but his overall method was much the same, no?

Certainly so, but Mahan's naval focus could use some examination, especially in a science-fiction context where great navies seem to be par for course.

[CmdrWilkens]

I've mentioned and don't know if I could put one together but a detailed treatise on the difference between Tactical, Operational, and Strategic decision making coudl be useful. What most people think of as "Strategy" is really Operations, as it consists solely in engaging in war the most efficient way and pointing out the interplay between all the various levels and all the interconnected agencies and agendas involved in those levels could be interesting.

[MKSheppard]

Skimmer put it best the division of strategy as related to military art:

The division of planning into strategy, operations and battles/tactics isn’t really abstract. Strategy is basically “we will invade North Europe, and occupy the Ruhr to utterly destroy the Nazi war making potential.” Operations planning would go along the lines of “we shall land in Normandy with seven divisions in the first wave and three army groups behind, this, this and this beach will be assaulted.” Then you get to planning the specific battle and the tactics, and that’s like ‘these squads flank that strongpoint so we can overrun the mortar battery behind the seawall to open the beach for follow on forces.” Logistics affects all levels of planning and even small unit tactics. Obviously, the better your logistics, the more options planners have.

[Darth Wong]

Couldn't you say that everything prior to the operations phase is strategy? The decision to go to war in the first place is strategy.

[The Grim Squeaker]

Couldn't you say that everything prior to the operations phase is strategy? The decision to go to war in the first place is strategy.

That Depends if you make the differentiation between military strategy and Grand strategy (politics and the non military echelons).

EDIT: Removed comment to Wilkens.

[Darth Wong]

That Depends if you make the differentiation between military strategy and Grand strategy (politics and the non military echelons).

If war is truly the continuation of politics by other means, as Clausewitz believed, then there is no distinction between military strategy and "grand strategy".

[MKSheppard]

Couldn't you say that everything prior to the operations phase is strategy? The decision to go to war in the first place is strategy.

Well, the decision to go to war is generally almost always political than strategic -- the best example is Nazi Germany -- Hitler virtually overrulled the General Staff on just about every major decision made from 1938 onwards.

The Generals knew just how bad Germany's position was in 1938 in regards to Czechslovakia and the Allies; and there actually was a coup plot against Hitler set to go forward if resistance had been encountered; this was the last real coup plot until about mid 1943 IIRC.

[MKSheppard]

"Basic Concepts: Identifying Threats"

Threat definition is very fundamental to what a military is. It drives procurement and R&D; as well as force levels. You cannot just say "I want a tank"; you need to define what that tank is meant to fight against.

Of course, if you screwup your threat definition, you're in trouble. Best example is the Royal Air Force up to the very late 1930s/early 1940s. During the late 20s and early 30s; the British government had to define a threat, so that aircraft designers and military airfield construction could be put out logically. So they picked France as the most likely threat.

This meant that when Germany re-armed and became a very strong credible threat in the late 1930s; the RAF had all of it's major airfields arrayed where they would do best in a war against France, and all of it's heavy bombers and fighters were designed around a war with France; e.g. it's only a 200 mile round trip (400 miles total) from the south of England to Paris; whereas to hit Berlin, you have to do a 500 mile round trip (1,000 miles total) on the most direct route.

This mainly was why Britain completely folded in 1938 when Germany invaded/annexed Czechslovakia; Chamberlain had been hearing the horror stories about what the Luftwaffe could do to Britain, and the RAF was still re-arming to fight the German Threat. A year later, the RAF had been improved sufficiently for Chamberlain to declare war on Germany following the invasion of Poland.

[thejester]

"Basic Concepts: Identifying Threats"

Threat definition is very fundamental to what a military is. It drives procurement and R&D; as well as force levels. You cannot just say "I want a tank"; you need to define what that tank is meant to fight against.

Of course, if you screwup your threat definition, you're in trouble. Best example is the Royal Air Force up to the very late 1930s/early 1940s. During the late 20s and early 30s; the British government had to define a threat, so that aircraft designers and military airfield construction could be put out logically. So they picked France as the most likely threat.

This meant that when Germany re-armed and became a very strong credible threat in the late 1930s; the RAF had all of it's major airfields arrayed where they would do best in a war against France, and all of it's heavy bombers and fighters were designed around a war with France; e.g. it's only a 200 mile round trip (400 miles total) from the south of England to Paris; whereas to hit Berlin, you have to do a 500 mile round trip (1,000 miles total) on the most direct route.

This mainly was why Britain completely folded in 1938 when Germany invaded/annexed Czechslovakia; Chamberlain had been hearing the horror stories about what the Luftwaffe could do to Britain, and the RAF was still re-arming to fight the German Threat. A year later, the RAF had been improved sufficiently for Chamberlain to declare war on Germany following the invasion of Poland.

I thought it was the other way around - the British air defence system was planned with bombing from Germany in mind and thus the sector stations and Group boundaries were poorly placed to deal with a threat from France. Meh, I guess the point remains largely the same.

On the al Qaeda thing - they actually welcomed a direct military confrontation with the US in Afghanistan because they believed it was a war only they could win. Just as the Soviets had been unable to engineer a military victory over the mujahideen and so had become bogged down in a quagmire that saw steadily increasing casualties and cost a shit load, so AQ hoped that in 01/02 a similar fate would befall the US. Again, something of a nitpick but worth keeping in mind.

[K. A. Pital]

Well, the decision to go to war is generally almost always political than strategic

Politics is part of strategical warfare, the lines are blurred. Sometimes you might need to seize some resources for the war, thus attack a nation, et cetra. Hitler is also a prime example here. He used the resources of Europe a lot to run his massive war.

If "Grand Strategy" is of any worth, it tells explicitly that the choice of theaters of war may very well be a political one; but it's not separate from the grand strategy itself.

Things like mobilization, both human and economic, also factors into strategy. Germany was largely screwed because of it's strategic decision to keep the economy unmobilized (free murketism wahoo!) and instead use the pillaged and essentially looted resources from the European nations whcih they stomped, coerced or otherwise dominated. Germany started a full mobilization around 1943, and managed to easily force it's economy to outproduce the early war years, even though it was pounded from all sides.

Smarter nation would have mobilized after the BoB defeat, clearly realizing that it is falling behind and time is not playing for it. Germany went for invading Russia instead... well, so much for that and still refused to mobilize fully, even to replenish the losses of units with the "permanent mobilization" concept that drew on the mob resources of the army and reserve units. Russia did use the "permanent mobilization" concept from the war onset. Not only it allowed to keep the RKKA functional even after it lost over 3 million men in the war start, but it allowed to slow down the Germans with ever new units pushed into battle, creating a seemingly endless mobilizational power. Germany did not realize this in 1941-1942, and suffered for it.

[PainRack]

In "The Art of War", written some two and a half millennia ago, the Chinese military author Sun Tzu promoted a strategic doctrine based on deception, misdirection, and the judicious use of force against enemy weak points, bypassing his strong points. In the modern age, his theories find application in the strategies of unorthodox forms of warfare such as guerilla warfare, armed insurgencies, and terrorism.

I guess the reason why you quoted Sun Tzu here was to discuss unconventional warfare, but the compilation of works by Sun Tzu was more about state strategic power.
The whole spy chapter has been seriously inflated by Western analysts in the context of intelligence operations and the like but in Sun Tzu era, it was a rejection of the popular superstition of astrology and omens then used by generals. Essentially ,the chapter premise and purpose was"Don't be superstitious pricks and use guides for terrain, spies to acquire intelligence and agents to misinform the enemy. Not wind flapping over poles to discern the possibility of raids and magic to befuddle the enemy".
The use of intelligence operatives such as the Beauty trap would actually belong to other chinese strategists. Fan Kuai, another popular Chinese strategist of the Warring States era used these tactics against the state of Wu, recovering the lost cities of Yue and ending Wu dominance of the Central Plains. Unfortunately, his extant work was lost to history and only extrapolated copies exist, but his treatise on the use of women to manipulate the king, wasting of state resources on grand projects via flattery and etc are examples of true deceptive operations at work.
Similarly, despite Mao epousation of Sun Tzu works, his works in particular aren't really applicable to modern day unconventional warfare. The Fire chapter is utterly pointless, Sun Tzu believed in a short, limited conflict as opposed to long drawn out campaigns in modern unconventional warfare campaigns. Similarly, his treatises have very little information on how to fight against opponents with superior numbers and firepower other than his terrain guides.


Similarly, isn't Shock and Awe more of the "inside information loop" and RMA strategy of the nineties?

[CmdrWilkens]

Repost of something I said myself, cleaned up and edited a little:

Generally speaking war ocurs on three levels, four if you consider the totality of circumstance which leads to armed conflict. Note this is talking about conflict itself, the decision to go to war lies on the fourth level. The other note i would add is that most folks onlyreference three levels and I think it misses the distinction between the decision making amongst various agencies in government and the larger socio-political issues in regards to whether to wage war and also how to achieve the economic position to be a war winner.

Tactical: This is the battle level where small units engage in direct conflict. This would be gun on gun with supporting arms. Tactical focuses on utilizing resources which are available and does not deal with HOW to make those resources available or why resources are in a certain place. Rather tactical is the level devoted to taking a given set of tools and resolving an immediate action.

Operational: This is the level at which most military campaigns take palce. It deals more with positioning available resources so that tactical commanders are best placed to achieving limited objectives. The operational level is principally concerned with moving units and supplies to appropriate places in appropriate times to maximize tactical flexibility. Notice this still focus almost exclusively on actual combat and direct support of combat operations.

Strategic: At this level it becomes a matter of integrating not just operational plans but the supporting establishment which supplies the operational commanders including the logistics chain from supplier to end user, resource allocation to given operational commands, and the intellgence/diplomatic/propoganda/etc support for various operational commands. This would be the first level at which non-military policy makers would be expected to play a part regulalry. The strategic is essentially the level at which policy decisions are executed (note not where they are forumlated). Essentially the strategic level is where resource planning meets resource allocation (and then the operational level takes the resource allocation and distributes it to the appropriate tactical situaiton who, in turn, uses it to engage in action).

Socio-economic/political: This is the level of national strategy and it ceases to be a purely military matter at this point. Once you reach this level it becomes a matter of the political leadership (whomever it may be) identifying threats and establishing long as well as short term goals for which force (military, diplomatic, intelligence, and socio-economic) will be brought into play. This is also the level at which the decision is made for how to both maximize resources available for the nation and then how to divy those resources amongst competing groups of which the general populace (and its socio-economic health) tends to compete against the resource demands of the diplomatic and military establishments.

So in a nutshell it boils down to this:

Political: Figures out how to generate resources and then how they should be allocated amongst economic, diplomatic, and military users
Strategic: Identifies the goals for achievment within the scope of the policy laid out at the political level including how to allocate resources amongst operational commands
Operational: Utilizes the resources allocated and directs where they will go and when they will go there in order to acheive the goals directed (and both when and as directed by the strategic decision makers)
Tactical: Utilizes the resources given by the operational commander to achieve goals dicated by the operational commander.

[Pelranius]

I don't mean to be anal, but shouldn't the Empire have used Intelligence instead of the ISB for gathering data on their military enemies in "Identifying Threats"?

[phongn]

I don't mean to be anal, but shouldn't the Empire have used Intelligence instead of the ISB for gathering data on their military enemies in "Identifying Threats"?

Both ISB and II conducted intelligence operations.

[PainRack]

For unconvetional warfare, should the working model be that of "On Guerilla Warfare" by Mao Zedong, along with supporting examples from Che Gevaure and Giap?

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archi ... a-warfare/
Statements as the guerilla must hide in the population such as a fish in water would show how the Rebels hid their sabotage cells and anti Imperial missions with smugglers, pirates and other criminals. The use of privateers and etc would tie in well with Mao policy of relentless warfare. The Yavin IV campaign also highlighted Mao principles(Enemy advance, we retreat. Enemy rest, we hary, Enemy retreat, we destroy). Post ANH, stronger Imperial forces mounted a blockade of Yavin before moving in to capture and destroy the base. The Rebels mounted a campaign of constant harrassment, tying up Imperial units, engaging isolated elements, securing supplies and the like. They left booby traps on yavin iv to take on and destroy Imperial elements securing the base.

Sun Tzu model would then be moved to a concept of "limited" warfare or military expeditions. Examples of this would probably be the Ssi-Ruuk campaign by the New Republic, the Black Fleet Crisis and Correllian Crisis from Star Wars. Relatively limited forces were used from the New Republic, campaigns were short and with defined objectives and an "exit" policy...... albeit tied up with superweapons of the week. The Federation would serve as how NOT to fight a limited war, with the Cardassian campaign being the premier example.