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Historically, the SCW ended in the first day of April 1939, with the Spanish Republicans on the loosing side. They lost due to lack of support from the West (Britain and France most of all), costly Soviet aid (the whole Spanish gold reserve was used up because the Soviets demanded payment for their assistance), and, worst of all, acrimonous divisions within the Republicans themselves, which were reflected in the field. The victory of Franco resulted in a decades-long dictatorship, and a pro-Axis nation that, however, remained neutral and proved more useful that way.

Was there any realistic way for the Republicans to last long enough so that the SCW is still raging when the Panzers roll across Poland? What would need to change for that to happen, and are those changes possible? What would a Spain still wracked in civil war affect the early period of World War II?

Britain and France providing aid to the Republicans, or conversely blocking aid by anyone to either side, would likely have gone a long way toward either allowing the Republicans to win, or dragging it out for much longer. Imagine if Franco couldn't cross back over to Spain, or if the French sent 60,000 troops across the border to save the Basques.

Conversely, though, what effect would that have on WWII? An active Spanish Civil War might inspire Hitler to send troops over the Pyrnees (or to try at least), not to mention a victorious Republic.

The Spanish civil war could have lasted much longer for many different reasons. France could have allowed the border to stay open more than a few short periods. Foreign 'volunteers' could have been forced out earlier. The Republicans could have had a more competent military command structure, and avoided certain wasteful offensives at several different points. The Republicans could have been more efficient about the Siege of the Alcázar in the first weeks of the war; they also might have forestalled the entire war in large part by arming the population before the military takeover of the provinces was in full swing. Very easily the British and French could have taken far more serious action to counter act the Italian 'pirate' aircraft and submarines sinking armaments ships sailing from Russia, eventually the British did order to attack such 'pirates' in defense of its shipping and the attacks mostly ceased but only after tens of thousands of tons of supplies had gone to the bottom. The US might also have at the least, not blocked the Republicans from taking delivery of armaments they had already paid for.

Hitler certainly would have intervened in 1940 if the Spanish civil war was going on; but I can't see how France wouldn't have already done so with radical effects on the plans for French defenses in the North. An allied naval blockade alone would have quickly exhausted Franco's forces, as the Italian blockade attempt nearly defeated the Republicans on its own, but this could also see Italy become involved in the war earlier too. If the French don't rush into Belgium meanwhile, they might not loose the battle for France even with major forces deployed in Spain. Soviet aid to Spain would also be likely to step up to try to counteract French involvement, though perhaps not.

The Nationalists won mainly because they got more air and artillery support in the end, and had that because they had more aggressive friends. The Republicans really hurt themselves by massacring so many people at the outbreak of the war, which was probably unavoidable without radical changes to the nature of the war, but nationalist victory was no foregone conclusion.

Well, if Casado and Besteiro hadn't staged a coup in an attempt to remove Negrin that essentially collapsed the last of Republican resistance, the war would have lasted at least a few more months.

I think any attempt by the allies to aid the Republic more would have seen Italy directly militarily intervene on Franco's side. Which leads to an interesting possibility--that he's too busy in 1940 with his army bogged down in Spain to join Hitler in the actual fighting of WW2.

Italy already crippled its military to a considerable degree because they expended so much war material in Ethiopia and Spain. Overt Italian intervention would have run high chances of war with France, and Italy suffering mass humiliations in battle, again. Franco already hated the Italian troops he was forced to accept, he only allowed them to stay and keep failing because Mussolini declared that either they stay and got key roles in battles or he'd suspend all aid. We already know how an Italian offensive vs France goes. They might gain over a thousand vertical yards!

On the other hand, if Mussolini gets stuck fighting in Spain, he wouldn't be so crazy to go to war against Greece, and thus allowing Hitler to deal with the Balkans at the time of his choosing instead of rushing down to prop up the Italians. At North Africa the Italians may end up staying entirely on the defensive, instead of a shallow push into Egypt that would give the British an easy victory. Not that defense would help the Regio Esercito from its OTL debacle, courtesy of O'Connor.

The Balkan invasion is largely a matter of the government in Yugoslavia staying pro Axis, which I should think becomes only less likely if Italy is having its ass kicked for an extra year, and France may not fall in 1940 or at least not nearly as easily via adapting a more sensible defensive posture. Meanwhile its a serious British advantage if Greece is neutral, rather than filled with axis bombers. This would also mean the North African campaign gets heavy reinforcements instead of diversions to the Greek front. I have to wonder though if Hitler wouldn't delay invading Poland in the first place when if it was so clear the French will fight over stuff. Economically he was really being pushed in that direction, but some level of delay was not impossible.

It's probably worth noting that if France and/or Britain get involved on the side of the Republicans, that's going to have some serious flow-on effects for the far left in Spain - the PCE in particular, but the left in general, got a very solid boost from the fact that the only countries overtly aiding the Republican cause were also overtly Socialist.

Sea Skimmer wrote:I have to wonder though if Hitler wouldn't delay invading Poland in the first place when if it was so clear the French will fight over stuff. Economically he was really being pushed in that direction, but some level of delay was not impossible.

The question is, what would Russia do in that case? The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was signed in August, and only as a necessary evil because Hitler wanted to invade Poland. Russia waited for Germany to win the invasion and occupied 'their' territories later.

But without Germany attacking, it raises the question of whether Russia would sign the cease-fire with Japan as it did once Poland fell? Or would it turn it's attention towards the Sino-Japanese conflict, wanting a piece of the cake? Finland? Baltic? These operations must have been well into planing at the time the pact originally was signed.

Finland and the Baltic states seem a lot more likely for a Soviet objective. Greater risk would be involved, but they were seen as vital strategic objectives by Stalin, both for defensive purposes and to support his planned battleship navy. But really, after Nomonhan it was the Japanese who itched for further battle, and they were gathering forces for a counter offensive at the time the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact went into effect. This meant Japan had no hopes of facing down a USSR with a free hand militarily, and they backed off. Without that, I dunno, they might try something big. Japanese forces actually did pretty well at Khalkhin Gol prior to the massive Soviet armored counter attack, and had destroyed hundreds of tanks and armored cars during earlier deployments of Soviet army so they had some reason to think they could get a better result if they deployed a larger force the Soviets could not so easily outnumber. On the other hand, the upper levels of Japanese command don't seem to have gotten to the point of approving such an operation, and might never have.

I think the red terror in Spain along with Russian support might have been detrimental rather than helpful altogether - considering the world was still reeling from the USSR atrocities and Europe had to suppress some red rebellions in the early twenties as well less Russian involvement most likely would have meant less public support from the Axis and would have allowed Britain and France to support the republican side more.

Seems like the Soviets should've learned some lessons from the Peninsular War, when one reason Napoleon failed to take over Spain, was because his Spanish puppets presented themselves as a threat to the Catholic Church- and by doing so, pissed off a religiously devout general public, robbing the regime of whatever legitimacy and popular support it could've had.

It’s a pretty interesting thing to look at, but Japan never managed to get over 500 planes into the Solomon’s and New Guinea at one time, effectively no more numerical strength then they had when striking at Pearl Harbor. Saburo Sakai made this point in his book Zero. Japan’s effective air strength didn’t increase until 1944, what they had before was the maximum effort. The 1944 forces deployed for the Philippines Sea and later the Leyte Campaign were larger, but had such awful pilot quality and generally dated aircraft they could be effective with convetional tactics.

These charts from the strategic bombing survey show how things slowly built up, and then just collapsed under US pressure.

http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/33 ... hinng.jpg/
http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/44 ... hatra.jpg/

Wrong thread on this last one, should have gone in the Japanistani thread