Soviet Oil sources - WWII

[atg]

I've heard and read that the Germans should have concentrated more on taking the Caucasus, with the aim of depriving the Soviet Union of the oil from there. The questions being then is how badly would the Soviets be affected if Germany was able to do so? Did they have other sources of oil big enough to supply the army? Is it a case of the Soviets running out of oil and the Red Army's motorised units coming to a halt? Or is it an overblown myth like "take Moscow = German Victory"?

Personally I'd think its more on the myth side of things but I don't have any numbers to prove either way.

[Sea Skimmer]

Loosing the Caucuses and the refinery around Baku would have been a very serious near crippling problem. Large scale offensive mechanized operations would not be able to take place after stockpiles were drained. The oil would be needed for the industrial economy. Other oil fields did exist, but control of the Baku-Astrakhan area would place many of them within reasonable Luftwaffe bombing range. The Russians imported most AVGAS during the war, but greatly expanding imports of fuel would be highly problematic in a timeframe of less then two years. However loss of Baku would have also led to a major British-US build up in Iran and Iraq that would create whole new set of problems for Nazi Germany in a period when historically most British-US ground troops did nothing at all but wait for an invasion in the UK. Germany was also simply never very close at all to taking the region; the historic attack was a complete disaster and the attack Hitler’s generals actually wanted to launch wasn’t even going to try to take Baku in the spring of 1942. Its no sure thing even a much more limited attack wouldn’t have failed as well given how much of the forces involved were Italian-Romanian-Hungarian and how underequipped and undermanned the Germans had become by that point.

[bz249]

Moscow offered a way better chance for the Germans to achieve something. First by being closer to the border it was a much more realistic target. The Caucasus was simply out of reach in 1941 and by 1942 the chance for victory was practically nil. This was a result of the economic conditions (Germany was outnumbered and outproduced by the Allies) but also of the Blitzkrieg tactic, which concentrated the resources into one hurrah. A major offensive, even a succesful one, resulted in the exhaustion of the troops and machines so the Wehrmacht needed a long period to gather strength. Germany could never win a war of attrition and never intended to fight one.

The second thing which made the Caucasus oil producing regions a worse target than Moscow is the psychological factor (an important component of the Blitzkrieg) is much less. The key element was targeting the political and military leadership and trying to move them off-balance. Now the evacuation of Moscow might not be enough to cripple the Red Army through the loss of organization and morale, but it is at least possible. And don't forget that the USSR was a brutal dictatorship ruled by iron fist of Stalin. Such a serious blow could question his position and someone who would be perfectly happy with a Vichy-Russia could grab the power. None of those things are certain to happen, but the relocation of the administration would surely produce a turmoil. The loss of the oil producing regions, yes it would hamper the mechanized operation (though the Soviet mechanized forces were not that effective that time anyway to say it mildly) but by clever rationing they could operate at lower scales. But the loss of the Caucasus is unlikely to cause political problems.

As an ecomomic target Moscow was an extremely important railway hub. Practically no Moscow way fewer Lend-Lease, so even as an economic target it is as valuable, if not more than the Caucasus oil fields.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Moscow offered a way better chance for the Germans to achieve something. First by being closer to the border it was a much more realistic target.

As an ecomomic target Moscow was an extremely important railway hub. Practically no Moscow way fewer Lend-Lease, so even as an economic target it is as valuable, if not more than the Caucasus oil fields.

Moscow may appear to be a more realistic target, but on closer look it presented serious problems. The Soviet winter counteroffensive had pushed the Germans relatively far from Moscow and the Soviets spend the rest of the winter and spring in strengthening the defenses around Moscow. The Germans were still badly exhausted, which was the main reason why a multiple prong offensive similar to Barbarossa was not possible. The Moscow direction could have become a huge material battle, which logistically would have favored the Soviets, who at this point had the advantage of better internal communications.

The fact is that the only really realistic target for the Germans in 1942 was Leningrad direction, but it also offered the least strategic benefits. It would have allowed to cut off the Lend-Lease through Murmansk and of course Leningrad was psychologically important as well as a fairly important industrial area, but in general it offered no chances for a quick victory. Of course taking Leningrad would not have been easy either; it was a much larger city than Stalingrad, but at least the Germans had a reasonable chance to fully encircle it.

[bz249]

Moscow may appear to be a more realistic target, but on closer look it presented serious problems. The Soviet winter counteroffensive had pushed the Germans relatively far from Moscow and the Soviets spend the rest of the winter and spring in strengthening the defenses around Moscow. The Germans were still badly exhausted, which was the main reason why a multiple prong offensive similar to Barbarossa was not possible. The Moscow direction could have become a huge material battle, which logistically would have favored the Soviets, who at this point had the advantage of better internal communications.

The fact is that the only really realistic target for the Germans in 1942 was Leningrad direction, but it also offered the least strategic benefits. It would have allowed to cut off the Lend-Lease through Murmansk and of course Leningrad was psychologically important as well as a fairly important industrial area, but in general it offered no chances for a quick victory. Of course taking Leningrad would not have been easy either; it was a much larger city than Stalingrad, but at least the Germans had a reasonable chance to fully encircle it.

By 1942 the Germans have no chance of winning a war if the Allies act semi-reasonably. The victory of Moscow was a big enough morale boost for the Red Army and the position of Stalin remained unquestionable, so this means the war entered the meat grinder stage and Germany had much less warm bodies to be grinded. A negotiated peace with the Soviet Union might be possible, but it would be an uneasy truce with a very likely Soviet attack as soon as the German positions would have been weakened enough or they feel themselves strong enough. Germany lost the initiative and could not dictate the pace anymore, so the Allies can easily go into the material war direction to maximize the benefits of the economic disparity.

In the Leningrad direction I agree, from the spirng 1942 positions taking Leningrad and shortening the front is a realistic tactical victory which would improve the German positions (of course there is a chance that in the end the Germans suffer unacceptable casualities there also). And then... Germany still holds some trump cards, and until an effective Panzerwaffe exists the Allies have to be more careful in their strategic operations (Harkov 1943 style counteraatcks are possibile) but sooner or later the Allies will win.

[LaCroix]

Did they actually reach the fields? I heard about that they had started exploiting them or were so close that they already had started delivering pipes to the Caucasus.

Anyway - would it have been notably beneficial to destroy the fields and dry them up (preferably setting them on fire with incendiary bombs) to keep the oil out of the soviet hands, if you can't get it for yourself.

I mean at one point they must have realized that they were outmatched - didn't they try to destroy them? Like, bombing the fields, and disrupting the pipelines, all that stuff...

I doubt it would have won that front, but it would have been a massive relief, as the Red Army needed a huge amount of fuel.

[Sea Skimmer]

The Germans captured the oil fields at Maykop which had only a small fraction of the oil that could be found at Baku. It looks like Baku was in fact 80% of Russian oil production in 1942; a few small fields in the Ukraine had already been lost to the Nazis. Maykop itself was demolished; the Russians poured concrete down the wells and completely destroyed all aboveground derricks, pipes and storage tanks as well as the only refinery. Other refineries and minor fields existed at Grozny, German ground troops got within about fifty miles at one point but no hope could exist to capture something so easily destroyed.

The Germans did have a special unit for exploiting the oil fields, seems it was formally called Mineralöl brigade Kaukasus with about 11,000 men. It was on site at Maykop for a while and didn’t really accomplish anything, the scale of the work required was that of building entirely new oil fields and would have taken six months to a year to return to a worthwhile scale of crude production. If the area had been secured larger labor forces direct from Germany no doubt would have been sent out. It looks like the goal of the Mineralöl brigade was simply to try to reestablish production to support German troops in the region. Without an intact refinery this was a futile mission.

The main fields, all tightly clustered around Baku, never came close to falling, and this should be no surprise. To reach Baku from the start line of Blue was similar to the distance German armies had already advanced from Poland to the start line in 1941! Except the tallest mountain range in Europe was in the way, and Russian troops retreated in good order instead of being encircled enmass over and over again.

The Germans did fly some bombing missions against the oil installations, but they simply did not have the available planes, fuel or munitions at forward airfields to make a serious effort of it. By the time the Germans realized they would not capture the oil fields, the situation on the ground was very bad and close air support and battlefield interdiction tasks demanded every available sortie. The Red Air Force also underwent a major resurgence at this point in the war and began seriously challenging air superiority. In general Germany never had the air power to spare for strategic operations in Russia. Even in 1941 the largest raid that could be mustered on Moscow was only IIRC 147 bombers (something close to that figure anyway) and even finding sorties for operational tasks like bombing the rail system ahead of the German advance became problematic as serviceability rates plunged to 50-60% on good days. Throughout the first year in Russia the Germans had about 2,500 combat planes in the theater and flew about 1,200 sorties a day, 2,000 during intensive periods. Even 2,000 sorties a day does not go very far spread across a battle area over a 1,600km across across and 600km deep to be rather conservative on the area that needed to be covered. In contrast for Operation Overlord the Allies had 11,500 combat planes available and flew something like 14,500 sorties in the first 24 hours when the paratrooper transport plane sorties are also counted.

[LaCroix]

Just to be sure - even if the Germans were only been trying to cut off supplies to the Russians, instead of trying to capture them - they'd never be able to attack Baku via bombing runs from where they managed to get to?

[Marcus Aurelius]

Just to be sure - even if the Germans were only been trying to cut off supplies to the Russians, instead of trying to capture them - they'd never be able to attack Baku via bombing runs from where they managed to get to?

Their bombers could reach Baku, but Sea Skimmer's point was that they did not have the bombers to spare. In addition they would have probably been limited to inaccurate night attacks, since German fighters lacked the range to escort bombers in strategic missions and like Skimmer also wrote, the Soviet Air Forces were recovering rapidly (well, at least numerically; the pilot quality was still pretty bad at that point).

[Sea Skimmer]

Yeah, if the Germans had adapted the more limited plan suggested by generals but rejected by Hitler, and only aimed to capture Maykop and then consolidate they'd end up with airfield realistically about 600 miles from Baku. That's okay for twin engine bombers with a very light payload, totally out of range of single engine fighters. To put it in context, this is about the distance from an airfield in Calais to far northern Scotland. The Caucuses are a big place.

[spaceviking]

If the example of the capture of Maikop is any indication, the German chances of exploiting Soviet oil wells was minimal. The Soviets would likely destroy any and all significant oil wells before capture, and Germany did not have the equipment to repair them. (at least according to Richard Overy's why the Allies won)

Loss of oil supplies would have hurt the Soviets, but it would not fix Germany's oil problems.

[Sea Skimmer]

Germany also had serious issues with how to transport the oil back to Germany, the most viable short to medium term plan seems to have been building hoards of concrete and wooden barges and shipping it all the way back to Italy to then go by rail to the Fatherland. The Danube was already very busy with Romanian oil barges and pipelines of such great distance would take a very long time to construct as well as being very exposed to partisan attacks (the genocides will need a few years to clear out all the Russians). However I don't think German fuel issues would really matter if they starved Russia of fuel. The German oil supply was not good in 1942, but it would suffice if they could cripple Russian's ability to counter attack. After one to two years the Russian fields would begin producing plenty of oil. But this all assumes a means to capture and hold the fields at all. Plenty of reason exist to believe even the more limited attack considered for Blue would have met ultimate failure. It certainly would not have left German troops in a good position for the winter.

[ComradeClaus]

How would the caucasus battles have gone if the 6th Army drove for Baku rather than get bogged down in Stalingrad? They had roughly 600,000 men IIRC .even if they couldn't hold Baku, if they destroyed the wells their like the soviets did at Kaykop it must've put a wrench in the red army's plans. Oil was THE resource of modern war. no oil, no air force or mech units. Denying it tto the Soviets would've taken a huge mount of pressure off the Germans, might've given them more leverage for a cease fire.

And for the luftwaffe bombers & fighters, what was the combat radius for them? wikipedia seems to only list the max range, which is misleaing (doesn't include payload or Time-over-target). (It would've helped if they built the Heinkel 177 as a conventional heavy bomber rather than an exotic freak w/ paired engines, dive brakes & remote barbettes.) And was there a reason the Luftwaffe kept building Bf 109s when the Fw 190 outperformed it in ever aspect including range? Wouldn't the 190 modified w/ extra internal fuel tanks have made an adequate escort for the He 111s & Ju 88s? Is there an existing thread here discussing WW 2 aircraft where this can be discussed?

Finally, what would the chances of barbarossa have been if the German army only used one thrust rather than 3?

1.If they went North only, they'd have more forces to 'Finnish' off Leningrad, Murmansk & Archangelsk. Which they could leave to the Finns to free up their forces for the next phase.

2 Going straight to Moscow would've dealt a morale blow to the Soviets, though it'd be nigh impossible to guess the full impact of such an event.

3. going straight to the caucasus w/ all available Barbarossa forces would've netted the greatest tangible, results, oil, w/ a possibility of triggering the Iranians & Iraqis into rising against the allies, which as we are aware would tie down considerable resources.

Of course, going for all 3 at once doomed barbarossa to failing completely. (Plus the resources sent to Africa at the time also spread them too thin, might it have been wiser to drive the british from the mediterranean first. )
W/ the mediterannean secure they'd have more forces freed up for barbarossa or a retry of Sea Lion. There might have even been a chance of convincing Turkey to join the Axis if there was enough success in the Caucasus or North Africa. (Say in exchange for what the Ottoman Empire lost) True, the Turks would've been useless in a straight fight, but if used as occupation troops in greece & N Africa, they'd have freed up numerous German Units.

Back to oil, when did the Soviets/Russians find oil in Siberia? Since apparently now they have an unbelievable amount.

[Simon_Jester]

How would the caucasus battles have gone if the 6th Army drove for Baku rather than get bogged down in Stalingrad? They had roughly 600,000 men IIRC .even if they couldn't hold Baku, if they destroyed the wells their like the soviets did at Kaykop it must've put a wrench in the red army's plans. Oil was THE resource of modern war. no oil, no air force or mech units. Denying it tto the Soviets would've taken a huge mount of pressure off the Germans, might've given them more leverage for a cease fire.

If the Germans hadn't taken Stalingrad, all the Soviet troops historically thrown into the Stalingrad battles would instead have been thrown across the river at Stalingrad (a major industrial and logistical center), and gone smack into the flank of the Axis forces. Note that I said Axis, not German, because to accomplish anything further southeast the Germans would have had to (as historically) rely on Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, and the like to hold their flanks.

Since Soviet troops were greatly superior to these units, I'd think that the Soviets would have (as historically) been able to outflank the 6th Army, surround it, and crush it.

And was there a reason the Luftwaffe kept building Bf 109s when the Fw 190 outperformed it in ever aspect including range?

Guess what happens when you shut down your Me-109 production line for six months to retool it for production of Focke-Wulfs in the middle of the largest air war in history?

Finally, what would the chances of barbarossa have been if the German army only used one thrust rather than 3?

This strikes me as a stupid plan. I'm pretty sure the answer is... zero. The Soviets would have been free to concentrate their forces against that thrust, while (in all probability) counterattacking on the other fronts.

The German offensives were dictated by available rail transport, they attacked in directions that let them use Soviet railroads to support the army. This means that the amount of troops they could put on any one front was limited by transportation- how many tons of freight could they move along that rail line, plus a little for road and air transport? Soldiers in battle require food, fuel, medical supplies, and ammunition. If you try to support three times as many men along the same rail line, and you can't triple the amount of stuff you send them along the rail line, then some of those troops are going to starve. Or their trucks and tanks will run out of gas. Or their artillery will run out of shells and they'll be overrun.

The Germans packed so many men along each of those rail lines that by November 1941 they couldn't get extra clothing to soldiers facing a Russian winter. Stop and think about what that implies for how overloaded the transportation network was. Then think some more: given that, what are the odds that the Germans could have put significantly more manpower into an offensive on any one of the three fronts?

If the Germans had attacked on only one front, the attack would have been smaller than the historical Barbarossa and therefore less dangerous to the USSR as a whole. Even if it had slightly better chances of achieving its ultimate goal (Leningrad, Moscow, or the Caucasus), it would need much better chances in order to actually succeed, not just slightly better. Meanwhile, the Russians would learn just as many valuable lessons about how to fight Germans as they did historically, while still having great armies camped out on the un-attacked parts of the border. These great armies would be beating the Axis nations' doors down in pretty short order.

Of course, going for all 3 at once doomed barbarossa to failing completely. (Plus the resources sent to Africa at the time also spread them too thin, might it have been wiser to drive the british from the mediterranean first. )

The Axis were in a lousy position to "drive the British from the Mediterranean." Even if God himself had been on their side, they wouldn't have been able to pull it off in time to stage Barbarossa in 1941, and waiting until 1942 would mean the Soviets would be that much stronger and better prepared.

The Germans didn't send really significant resources into Africa until 1943, when they started pouring manpower into Tunis at the last minute. By which point the war on the Eastern Front was already decided. One or two more German divisions in Russia instead of Africa wouldn't have made a damn bit of difference in 1942.

W/ the mediterannean secure they'd have more forces freed up for barbarossa or a retry of Sea Lion.

Sea Lion was royally fucked no matter what the Germans did. They'd need roughly the kind of assets the British and Americans used for the Normandy landings, but they didn't have them, didn't have the facilities to build them, and couldn't have gotten them built without spending about two or three years doing practically nothing else... by which point the Russians would be strong enough to utterly kick their asses, and the British would be strong enough to disrupt German attempts to bomb and amphibious-invade them into submission, with resources they didn't have in 1940.

This is stupid.

[Purple]

What bugs me is why they went against the USSR in the first place. Ideological reasons aside it was a clearly stupid thing to do even at that time. It would have been stupid even if Britain had magically capitulated at the same time as France. So how was it not clear to them that the whole thing was doomed to failure?

[spaceviking]

[quote= Denying it tto the Soviets would've taken a huge mount of pressure off the Germans, might've given them more leverage for a cease fire.
[/quote]

Yes denying oil to the Soviets would have put German in a better position to pursue negotiations for a peace treaty or the like, however the biggest obstacle to this was not Soviet strength but Nazi ideology. If I recall correctly up unit the battle of Kursk their was significant support for making peace with Germany. (with quite favorable terms for the Germans)

[Simon_Jester]

What bugs me is why they went against the USSR in the first place. Ideological reasons aside it was a clearly stupid thing to do even at that time. It would have been stupid even if Britain had magically capitulated at the same time as France. So how was it not clear to them that the whole thing was doomed to failure?

Germany got the math wrong, simple as that. They flat out didn't believe the estimates of just how many tanks and such the Russians had. They assumed the Soviet government was brittle enough that the people would turn against it and the structure of the bureaucracy would collapse as soon as their frontline armies started to lose. And they underestimated some of the logistical difficulties, or at least underestimated how much hard fighting they'd have to do at the end of their logistics pipeline- which makes the problems with the pipeline worse.

When a man goes to a war he's going to lose, it's usually because he misjudged the odds.

[Sea Skimmer]

groups operations, and while the generalized plan was to destroy Russia armies in western Russia the army groups did not work together to accomplish this goal. The result was a hodgepodge of operations that neither struck deep enough, rapidly enough, to prevent a Russian retreat wholesale, nor which created sufficiently large encirclements to destroy those forces close to the border at the expense of limiting the depth of the invasion in the first season. They could reach Moscow and Rostov in one season, or destroy as many troops as possible, but not both. Both concepts have merit. Taking the Caucasus in one season is physically impossible.

Sea Lion was royally fucked no matter what the Germans did. They'd need roughly the kind of assets the British and Americans used for the Normandy landings, but they didn't have them, didn't have the facilities to build them, and couldn't have gotten them built without spending about two or three years doing practically nothing else... by which point the Russians would be strong enough to utterly kick their asses, and the British would be strong enough to disrupt German attempts to bomb and amphibious-invade them into submission, with resources they didn't have in 1940.

This is stupid.

I would suggest that Sicily is a little better comparison for the scale of amphibious forces and level of air control required then Normandy; but either way it wasn’t going to happen.

[Simon_Jester]

I think you're missing your first paragraph, Skimmer.

Anyway, yeah, Sicily is probably closer- but the Germans need to basically obliterate the Royal Navy and Air Force before the landings can occur, and that requires a much larger air and naval commitment, especially if (as claimed elsewhere) the British can wreck a credible 1940-41 landing attempt just by running warships down the English Channel at thirty knots and swamping barges.

At that point, the scale of the requirements goes up- it's not just the sealift assets, it's the air and naval power required. Either way, though, it simply isn't going to happen. The Germans can't possibly do it without giving up on other fronts, and maybe not even then.

[Sea Skimmer]

Anyway, yeah, Sicily is probably closer- but the Germans need to basically obliterate the Royal Navy and Air Force before the landings can occur, and that requires a much larger air and naval commitment, especially if (as claimed elsewhere) the British can wreck a credible 1940-41 landing attempt just by running warships down the English Channel at thirty knots and swamping barges.

Well it requires air superiority for a period of months, not weeks or days, in ordered to role back RN basing and above all, minesweeping. If the US didn't come through with lend lease, who knows, it might actually have been possible but that requires the US to somehow just cease to see the Nazis as a threat which was not going to happen. The amount of material the US supplied in 1940 and early 41 is pretty staggering, thousands of artillery pieces and a half billion rounds of small arms ammunition for example.

I've come to the conclusion that the barge swamping claim is pretty nonsensical, even if it is physically possible at a close distance; if a destroyer came close enough to do it then a mere 20mm flak gun on the deck of the barge would be more then able to disable the destroyer with AP rounds through the boilers, the tops of which are well above the waterline on destroyers in WW2. That assumes sustained light gunfire doesn't explode the destroyer torpedoes or depth charges which is no small issue and the fate of many warships subject to air attacks. The river barges the Germans were using were on the lines of 600 ton vessels; not exactly small, like ten times the size of the average allied landing craft in 1944, and a good many of them were in fact sea going barges. A bigger problem is simply that the barges are for the most part towed in 1940. Sink the tug with gunfire and four or five barges are adrift. It'd also be near impossible to pull all the barges off the beach after the first wave was ashore, a serious enough problem for dedicated landing craft designs, meaning the invasion beaches are quickly clogged. Given most of a year of prep time the bulwarks of the barges would have been built up anyway, more ballast added and more of them motorized. In general I think we've become far more dismissive of Sealion then is actually warranted; certainly the British at the time took it deadly serious. More then one implausible thing was taken dead serious in the war, like the US Army hiding tanks in the desert to repel an invasion of California, but we've gone a bit far on it. It is worth examining that the allies were never able to stop German night coastal traffic in the Mediterranean which largely used craft built for sea lion. Certainly a much different situation, but one worth looking at considering the vast increases in allied air-radar-sea power. If Germany really went all out to do it, and the British were truly left alone in the world that'd be some serious shit for them. But Hitler was always intent to attack Russia, and simply had to keep the victories flowing, and the US was not hiding in the closet.

[bz249]

What bugs me is why they went against the USSR in the first place. Ideological reasons aside it was a clearly stupid thing to do even at that time. It would have been stupid even if Britain had magically capitulated at the same time as France. So how was it not clear to them that the whole thing was doomed to failure?

Ideology aside, the worlds greatest/largest army was standing at the backyards of Germany and even if they do not attack in 1941 there is no guarantee that the Russians would sit on their backs in 1943-1944 when the Western Allies starts to probe the Atlantic Wall (World Revolution? The expansion of Communism?). The mere existence of the Red Army was the greatest strategic threat to the German position, because they had at least some intention to invade and had the tools for it. Eliminating this threat by a preemptive action was a rather reasonable strategy.

Now in 1941 it was so was so:
- Britain alone could not mount an offensive against the continent and the USA, while slowly drifting towards the war, was still far from being a threat. So Germany could concentrate the most amount of troops for an offensive operation. Any later year for an offensive, and especially being caught in defensive campaign makes the things much worse.
- The Red Army was in the middle of a reorganization. Any later year the Wehrmacht would met a better organized Red Army, with upgraded equipment and a finished Molotov Line.

So it was a time window, when the Soviet Union was the weakest, while Germany was in the strongest position, thus the best chance to achieve victory.

[Thanas]

It was not a reasonable strategy and German High Command was dead set against it. They knew the soviets were concentrating on a defensive mindset. Attacking Russia made no sense whatsoever, especially not with the lessons of WWI in mind.

[bz249]

It was not a reasonable strategy and German High Command was dead set against it. They knew the soviets were concentrating on a defensive mindset. Attacking Russia made no sense whatsoever, especially not with the lessons of WWI in mind.

Sure the really good strategy would have been an alliance with the Soviet Union (and at least it was somewhat possible in 1940).

However which lessons would you refer from WWI? The fact that someone is neutral now means nothing about his stance next month (Italy and Romania was neutral at the beginning yet they attacked the Central Powers when they felt it was right)? Or that Russian morale will hold (they collapsed in WWI after smaller losses than in the early phase of the Barbarossa, though it took more time)? Or that two front wars are bad? But then how exactly to avoid a two front war in 1943-44 when the situation of Germany turns darker, what can Germany offer to Stalin for maintaining a peace? In 1940-1941 there was no serious chance for a Soviet attack, since their army was in a bad shape... but time was on their side. Each year they grow stronger and stronger, could this change their mindset? There were pro-offensive circles in the Red Army before the Purges. Could they regrow and convince Stalin to strike?

[Simon_Jester]

Anyway, yeah, Sicily is probably closer- but the Germans need to basically obliterate the Royal Navy and Air Force before the landings can occur, and that requires a much larger air and naval commitment, especially if (as claimed elsewhere) the British can wreck a credible 1940-41 landing attempt just by running warships down the English Channel at thirty knots and swamping barges.

Well it requires air superiority for a period of months, not weeks or days, in ordered to role back RN basing and above all, minesweeping. If the US didn't come through with lend lease, who knows, it might actually have been possible but that requires the US to somehow just cease to see the Nazis as a threat which was not going to happen. The amount of material the US supplied in 1940 and early 41 is pretty staggering, thousands of artillery pieces and a half billion rounds of small arms ammunition for example.

I've come to the conclusion that the barge swamping claim is pretty nonsensical, even if it is physically possible at a close distance; if a destroyer came close enough to do it then a mere 20mm flak gun on the deck of the barge would be more then able to disable the destroyer with AP rounds through the boilers...

In general I think we've become far more dismissive of Sealion then is actually warranted; certainly the British at the time took it deadly serious. More then one implausible thing was taken dead serious in the war, like the US Army hiding tanks in the desert to repel an invasion of California, but we've gone a bit far on it.

A very good point. Thank you, and I'll bear that in mind.

[Purple]

@bz249

What makes you think there would have been a chance for a soviet attack at any time down the line? I mean sure there were some generals that advocated it but its a long way from there and actually going to war. Certainly a Germany that has kicked the allies out of the Mediterranean (something I assume they could have done if not for Barbarossa) and is besieging Britain with 100% of its power would have seemed like a formidable opponent. And the many years of non aggression between the two countries could have been the tipping point to ensure things newer flare up.