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PainRack wrote:Historically, neither the Dutch nor the Portueguese felt the Ming military was weak enough for them to contest a trade factory on the mainland and Manila was considered vulnerable to a Ming raids at various times in her history......

Which is not the same and you should know that. Simply due to the army situation...

Wasn't there a "battle" in World War Two where the U.S. invaded an island in the Pacific and it turned out all the Japanese had already abandoned it but more than 20 Americans were killed by friendly fire?

Thanas wrote:

PainRack wrote:Historically, neither the Dutch nor the Portueguese felt the Ming military was weak enough for them to contest a trade factory on the mainland and Manila was considered vulnerable to a Ming raids at various times in her history......

Which is not the same and you should know that. Simply due to the army situation...

I know. But I feel you're ignoring that China consistently had superior numbers against European powers, indeed, Tien Tse Chang asserted in his book that the Ming dynasty built another naval fleet to reinforce their territories after the initial Portugeuse contact, although this fleet never saw combat against the Europeans and eventually it rotted away and he didn't elaborate details about its technical or military details.

This is certainly the result of the Europeans being at the end of a long supply line and etc rather than Chinese superiority but numbers are still numbers.


I feel that we're debating separate points though. Your earlier comment about
but I cannot see how it proves your point.
seem to miss my thrust.


The whole point of the examples brought up wasn't to show that the Ming navy was technologically on par, or had galleons similar to their European counterparts. It wasn't to show that the Ming could actually engage in a naval conflict with the Europeans and defeat them as a peer competitor.

It was to demolish the argument that
1. The defunding of the treasure fleet meant the Ming government had no navy, private or state.

2. The defunding of the treasure fleet sent Ming china backwards and contributed to her military weaknesses exhibited in the Qing era.

We know that the stopping of Zheng He voyages did not end Ming naval power in the Far East. They remained dominant until the arrival of the European powers a few centuries later. Yes, it was gutted, yes, its importance declined for a hundred years as resources were spent on other areas, but again, given the strategic decision to shift to Beijing and the costs of the Grand Canal to supply their canal, all decisions made so that China can better contest Yuan territories up north, given the military reversals of the Ming dynasty during this period, its difficult to see what other rational course of decision exists.


Said European warships were technologically superior, due to their superior cannons and metallurgy. None of this would had changed if China had still funded the treasure fleets. They were still wooden ships using wooden technologies and Chinese metallurgy lagged behind European throughout the ages.


We can't show that technological innovation stopped, because we KNOW the Ming adopted Portugeuse cannons after contact was made with them. We KNOW from official arguments that the Chinese wanted to import Dutch advisors and cannons to upgrade their navy further.

We can't even argue that the decision to focus up north instead of exerting imperial power down south is wrong. While we can't predict what the advantages of exerting more imperial power down south is, we do know the consequences of the Ming refocusing its attentions domestically and up north. After a gap of a few decades, the Ming military position up north began to decline and the Ming focus of resources up north eventually helped stabilized its frontier defences and her territorial sovereignty . Economically, the Grand Canal logistic route to Beijing along with her garrisons up north helped nurture and kickstart the entire mercantile economy that flourished in the 16th century.


Even the argument that stopping Zheng He= no more Imperialism needs to answer the fact that despite the removal of Zheng He naval voyages, tributary missions from Java still came in every one to 3 years and indeed, had to be LIMITED so as to reduce the cost this imposed on the Ming system. Since the tributary missions still came in, just WHY was the fleet still needed?

PainRack wrote:I know. But I feel you're ignoring that China consistently had superior numbers against European powers, indeed, Tien Tse Chang asserted in his book that the Ming dynasty built another naval fleet to reinforce their territories after the initial Portugeuse contact, although this fleet never saw combat against the Europeans and eventually it rotted away and he didn't elaborate details about its technical or military details.

The thing is though that numbers do not matter much when it comes to this period. 100 junks vs 6 galleons is a fight the galleons should win every time.

This is certainly the result of the Europeans being at the end of a long supply line and etc rather than Chinese superiority but numbers are still numbers.


I feel that we're debating separate points though. Your earlier comment about
but I cannot see how it proves your point.
seem to miss my thrust.


The whole point of the examples brought up wasn't to show that the Ming navy was technologically on par, or had galleons similar to their European counterparts. It wasn't to show that the Ming could actually engage in a naval conflict with the Europeans and defeat them as a peer competitor.

It was to demolish the argument that
1. The defunding of the treasure fleet meant the Ming government had no navy, private or state.

2. The defunding of the treasure fleet sent Ming china backwards and contributed to her military weaknesses exhibited in the Qing era.

We know that the stopping of Zheng He voyages did not end Ming naval power in the Far East. They remained dominant until the arrival of the European powers a few centuries later. Yes, it was gutted, yes, its importance declined for a hundred years as resources were spent on other areas, but again, given the strategic decision to shift to Beijing and the costs of the Grand Canal to supply their canal, all decisions made so that China can better contest Yuan territories up north, given the military reversals of the Ming dynasty during this period, its difficult to see what other rational course of decision exists.


Said European warships were technologically superior, due to their superior cannons and metallurgy. None of this would had changed if China had still funded the treasure fleets. They were still wooden ships using wooden technologies and Chinese metallurgy lagged behind European throughout the ages.


We can't show that technological innovation stopped, because we KNOW the Ming adopted Portugeuse cannons after contact was made with them. We KNOW from official arguments that the Chinese wanted to import Dutch advisors and cannons to upgrade their navy further.

We can't even argue that the decision to focus up north instead of exerting imperial power down south is wrong. While we can't predict what the advantages of exerting more imperial power down south is, we do know the consequences of the Ming refocusing its attentions domestically and up north. After a gap of a few decades, the Ming military position up north began to decline and the Ming focus of resources up north eventually helped stabilized its frontier defences and her territorial sovereignty . Economically, the Grand Canal logistic route to Beijing along with her garrisons up north helped nurture and kickstart the entire mercantile economy that flourished in the 16th century.


Even the argument that stopping Zheng He= no more Imperialism needs to answer the fact that despite the removal of Zheng He naval voyages, tributary missions from Java still came in every one to 3 years and indeed, had to be LIMITED so as to reduce the cost this imposed on the Ming system. Since the tributary missions still came in, just WHY was the fleet still needed?

OK, that makes sense.

Dayton3 wrote:Wasn't there a "battle" in World War Two where the U.S. invaded an island in the Pacific and it turned out all the Japanese had already abandoned it but more than 20 Americans were killed by friendly fire?

One of the Aleutian islands.

Kiska to be specific, and several hundred men were killed or wounded by friendly fire, exposure, mines or simply went missing in the trackless wasteland. The Japanese had full evacuated beforehand, and the lack of AA fire was noticed, but assumed to be the Japanese attempting to conserve ammunition after the fall of Attu cut them off from reasonable resupply. Nobody thought the Japanese would risk fast warships as they did to stage an evacuation.

The US fleet offshore had also earlier managed to get into a pitched battle with what were most likely mountain tops several hundred miles away; but if you look at what the weather conditions were like at the time, the friendly fire and the infamous BATTLE OF THE PIPS become very understandable. The conditions were just utter hell even in the summer. Go from clear skies to zero foot visibility in fourty minutes ect... In all reality the friendly fire wasn't much considering the scale of the operation and what we'd normally expect from green troops.

IMO, some of the biggest epic fails in history are these battles:

1) Massacre of Elphinstone's Army. First they put an incompetent general in charge of an army stationed in Kabul. Second, said incompetent general failed to quell a revolt in Kabul. Third, he then has this brilliant idea to retreat over 90 miles back to Jalalabad. Over 16000 people died due to raids across the mountains, with Elphinstone himself getting captured.

2) The Charge of the Light Brigade. I don't think this one needs an explanation.

3) Fall of Singapore in WWII. Notable in that the British, who were well entrenched and fortified, surrendered to a Japanese division that was outnumbered, outgunned, and under-equipped.

Those are the ones I can think of off the top of my head. Of ancient battles, Hannibal's crossing of the Alps is a strong contender. So is the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, in which the defeat of the Roman army was so bad that they never again attempted to conquer what is now modern Germany (and perhaps to their detriment, since a couple of centuries later, the Germanic barbarians would begin to pillage every Roman settlement they could lay their hands on).

Xelloss wrote:2) The Charge of the Light Brigade. I don't think this one needs an explanation.

It does need a bit of explanation since one can easily point to other cavalry actions that did not turn out that great in history.

3) Fall of Singapore in WWII. Notable in that the British, who were well entrenched and fortified, surrendered to a Japanese division that was outnumbered, outgunned, and under-equipped.

The situation isn't as clear cut as you think but Sea Skimmer will elaborate more.

Those are the ones I can think of off the top of my head. Of ancient battles, Hannibal's crossing of the Alps is a strong contender.

You must be joking.

So is the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, in which the defeat of the Roman army was so bad that they never again attempted to conquer what is now modern Germany (and perhaps to their detriment, since a couple of centuries later, the Germanic barbarians would begin to pillage every Roman settlement they could lay their hands on).

...yeah, you definitely are joking considering none of that is true.

Thanas wrote:It does need a bit of explanation since one can easily point to other cavalry actions that did not turn out that great in history.

This is true, but most of them are not anywhere near as notable. At least in modern history anyway.

Thanas wrote:

Xelloss wrote:Those are the ones I can think of off the top of my head. Of ancient battles, Hannibal's crossing of the Alps is a strong contender.

You must be joking.

Why would you think I'm joking? Hannibal lost almost all of his elephants in that crossing, and at least a quarter (maybe it was half?) of his total invasion force.

It is true that Hannibal was able to still put up a good fight once in Italy proper, and despite the horrendous losses, but from then onwards it was basically a war of attrition, which the Romans had the clear upper hand.

Thanos wrote:

So is the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, in which the defeat of the Roman army was so bad that they never again attempted to conquer what is now modern Germany (and perhaps to their detriment, since a couple of centuries later, the Germanic barbarians would begin to pillage every Roman settlement they could lay their hands on).

...yeah, you definitely are joking considering none of that is true.

[/quote]

Except that it is. A brief primer can be found on the Smithsonian site here: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-a ... c=y&page=1

Tens of thousands of legionaries died, and their conquest was ground to a halt.

Alright, so I will concede one minor point; the Romans did try again shortly afterwards, but they were never able to conquer what is now modern Germany (the best they could do was close it off for a few centuries, until the barbarian tribes were able to get the upper hand).

Xelloss wrote:This is true, but most of them are not anywhere near as notable. At least in modern history anyway.

Notoriety =/= worst fail in history.

Why would you think I'm joking? Hannibal lost almost all of his elephants in that crossing, and at least a quarter (maybe it was half?) of his total invasion force.

It is true that Hannibal was able to still put up a good fight once in Italy proper, and despite the horrendous losses, but from then onwards it was basically a war of attrition, which the Romans had the clear upper hand.

Hannibal was the only external enemy to manage to put the republic close to breaking. His strategy was brilliant, his tactics even more so. By his actions alone he probably extended the lifespan of Carthage by a great deal, just considering how many forces the romans had to spent on keeping him contained alone. And had one or two battles more gone his way, the Republic might have fallen. He did more with less than any other general in Antiquity, except maybe for Caesar.

His achievements are indisputable. There is no doubt whatsoever that his move over the alps, while costly, was still the right thing to do.

Thanas wrote:Except that it is. A brief primer can be found on the Smithsonian site here: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-a ... c=y&page=1

Tens of thousands of legionaries died, and their conquest was ground to a halt.

Alright, so I will concede one minor point; the Romans did try again shortly afterwards, but they were never able to conquer what is now modern Germany (the best they could do was close it off for a few centuries, until the barbarian tribes were able to get the upper hand).

Your viewpoint is so simplistic that it is almost cute. One can tell you've never read a serious book on the subject.

Hannibal's italian campaign failing isn't a testament to his ineptitude, it's a testament to the strength of the Roman Republic. Lesser empires would have crumbled when confronted with Hannibal and few could have recovered as quickly as the Roman's did after the disaster at Cannae.

Hannibal failed because his enemies were strong and because he wasn't properly supported by Carthage.

The defeat at Teutoburg forest was in part because of massive treachery by German auxiliaries and Arminius in particular. Varus was overly trusting of the latter (for good reason considering Arminius appeared to be fully romanized), but when the ambush happened there was very little he could have done. It was one of the worst defeats the Roman Empire suffered, but not an epic fail.

Xelloss wrote:Of ancient battles, Hannibal's crossing of the Alps is a strong contender.

You might as well call Suvorov a dullard too. Ignoring that crossing the Alps was the right thing to do in both cases.

So is the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, in which the defeat of the Roman army was so bad that they never again attempted to conquer what is now modern Germany (and perhaps to their detriment, since a couple of centuries later, the Germanic barbarians would begin to pillage every Roman settlement they could lay their hands on).

Germanicus got his name from campaigning in Germany and pwning Arminius, not even a decade after Teutoburg. In fact, beating the Germanic barbarians was something that pretty much everyone did. Look up Marcus Aurelius and, later on, Julian. Rome was beating the barbarians back until the very end, and the parts of Germany they didn't conquer were cold, poor, forested hellholes.

Metahive wrote:Hannibal's italian campaign failing isn't a testament to his ineptitude, it's a testament to the strength of the Roman Republic. Lesser empires would have crumbled when confronted with Hannibal and few could have recovered as quickly as the Roman's did after the disaster at Cannae.

Hannibal failed because his enemies were strong and because he wasn't properly supported by Carthage.

I agree with all of this, except the "not properly supported" part. Carthage sent reinforcements (massive ones too) but they also had to contend with the other half of the Roman Army being in Spain attacking them as well as trying to keep their critically important trade routes open against the ever stronger Roman Navy while also trying to keep the most capable light cavalry (african tribes) of their time from sacking their farmland. If I were in charge of Carthage and even knew what I know today, I still would probably not be able to send Hannibal more reinforcements than in History. The claim that Carthage did not properly support him is similar to the same claim made by Rommel in North Africa - in both cases it was not because of design, but because of other circumstances making it impossible.

The only thing that might have changed this would have been a general mobilization of the ordinary population of Carthage, but even then their population base was smaller and their economies not comparable. Rome could mobilize, Carthage could probably not because it did not have the same network of cities in Italy the Romans could rely on.

The defeat at Teutoburg forest was in part because of massive treachery by German auxiliaries and Arminius in particular. Varus was overly trusting of the latter (for good reason considering Arminius appeared to be fully romanized), but when the ambush happened there was very little he could have done. It was one of the worst defeats the Roman Empire suffered, but not an epic fail.

Yeah. To elaborate a bit more:

It is not the battle of the Teutoburg Forest. That is a mistranslation of saltus teutoburgiensis. Unlike what later Roman authors writing 200+years after the battle claim, the Roman Army did not march through thick, unknown forests.

What happened was that the Roman Army was marching along a trade road that had been in existence for hundreds of years before, a route they knew well and which they had marched on several times before. It also happened in an area that was at least as heavily romanized as upper Gaul at the time with several Roman colonies and forts. There was no reason to suspect treachery in such an area at all, nor was Arminius a German nationalist. Just ten years earlier he had fought with the Romans to conquer the area after all and his family was roman-friendly (note how his own brother in fact remained a high-ranking Roman officer for life and campaigned against him).

So the Romans were marching through allied territory, over a proven route with no known threats, led by the most trusted German they knew, somebody who was known for his loyalty etc. A comparable situation would be the British Army suddenly attacking the USA during the Iraq war.

Dr. Trainwreck wrote:Germanicus got his name from campaigning in Germany and pwning Arminius, not even a decade after Teutoburg.

Those were not decisive victories and the title was more due to propaganda purposes, to save face while withdrawing from futile campaigns. The losses were just too strong.

In fact, beating the Germanic barbarians was something that pretty much everyone did. Look up Marcus Aurelius and, later on, Julian. Rome was beating the barbarians back until the very end, and the parts of Germany they didn't conquer were cold, poor, forested hellholes.

A few more nuances: Germany wasn't as cold and poor, in fact it had one of the highest population densities at the time. However, it was very hard to defend and to hold on to. Domitian's expansion is probably the height of that the Romans could achieve. However, we have a net of client kingdoms in Germany, Roman troops regularly marched deep into German territory and in some cases even claimed land. For example, the only silver mine in Roman Germania was not in Roman Germania. It was some 80 kilometers in "free" Germania, yet Romans lived there for hundreds of years digging for silver. The history of Rome and Germania is not one of a strong divide between Germans and Romans, it is a history of trade, cooperation and political alliances that were only disturbed by war for a fraction of that time.

Xelloss wrote:Hannibal's crossing of the Alps is a strong contender

Feel obliged to counter this due living in what was once the one Roman stronghold in Northern Italy that resisted Hannibal's invasion.

The situation at the start of the war was more or less this: Italy was almost completely under Roman control due a network of alliances (mostly with the Greek cities) and varying levels of more or less willing subjugation and cultural assimilations (for example the Etruscans and Latins were by then rather loyal to Rome and Romans in almost anything but the names, while the Samnites and Gauls south of the Po river were ready to rebel at a moment's notice if they thought they could win), and, together with Sicily (that was not considered part of Italy at the time), provided Rome with greater manpower and finances than Carthage could get from its African territories and Spain; the 'free' Italians, the Gauls on the banks of the Po river and north of it, were too in alliance with Rome, albeit on more vague and strict terms than other peoples, and Rome had started a program of expansion in their lands and Romanization of the Gauls (including the creation of fortified strongholds at Placentia and Cremona with decent-sized garrisons); Spain provided Carthage with numerous soldiers and money, but was nowhere under control as Italy was for Rome nor as rich; finally, Rome controlled both the sea and, in modern day France, Massilia (a Greek city under Roman protection), blocking the best ways to invade Italy.

Hannibal had recognized that Rome's strength came from control of Italy, and the only way to break such control was to inflict crushing defeats on the Romans on Italian soil, thus causing rebellions first among the Gauls and Samnites and then among the Roman loyalists until the Romans were overran. To attack Italy, he had three possible routes: the sea, that was controlled by the Roman fleet; the area of Nice, that was where the Romans waited for him after going to Massilia by sea, and was presided by pro-Roman Ligurians and their fortress at Genua; and the Alps, where there was no Roman legion to wait him and was inhabitated only by the pro-Roman but relatively weak Ligurian tribe of the Taurini and the stronger anti-Roman Insubres (a Gaulish tribe).

Knowing this, passing the Alps was the best way to invade Italy: crossing the sea was nearly suicidal due the supremacy of the Roman Navy; passing from Nice exposed him to a battle against Scipio's (father of the Africanus) fresh Roman army and, even if victorious, would have forced force him to enter hostile territory and try and storm or besiege a fortified city while another Roman army (possibly reinforced by Cremona and Placentia) marched against him; passing the Alps killed many of his elephants, but allowed him to enter a partially favourable territory, join his troops with powerful allies, knock out of the war one of Rome's allies (the Taurini, whose main or only town was razed) and face Scipio's army tired and weakened by sending parts of the troops to attack Spain. And, by defeating Scipio at the Ticinus river, caused a mass defection among the Gauls allied more or less willingly to Rome and many of the Ligurians to join him.

By all senses, Hannibal should have won the war in 217 A.C., after the annihilation of a Roman army at the lake Transimene, or after the even greater victory at Cannae, and would have had his strategy be even a little more successful or the Romans done what everyone else would have done after such a disaster and sued for peace.

After Cannae, the situation was the following:
Spain was contested, and could send little to no reinforcements;
Carthage's attempt to reinforce Hannibal by sea had to run the blockade of the Roman Navy, that was still intact and much stronger than Carthage's;
Northern Italy was pretty much under Hannibal's allies, with pro-Roman Ligurians overran and Genua destroyed (Placentia would follow in 209, but by then the Romans were counterattacking);
Southern Italy and Sicily were divided, with many of the Greek cities and part of the Souther Italians defecting (most importantly Cuma and the Samnites, then the only possible rivals to Roman hegemony in Italy), but the Greek cities of the Tyrrhenian coast (rivals of Cuma and the campanian peoples) and other in the rest of the territory, the Apulians, and even part of the Samnites remained on Rome's side, with the continued loyalty of Neapolis (the biggest seaport of Campania) and Rhegium (that controlled one of the shores of the Strait of Messina and was literally sitting on Hannibal's communication line with Sicily) being the biggest thorn in his flank and many of the defecting cities being divided between pro-Romans and pro-Carthaginians and liable to switch side;
in Central Italy, the southernmost Gauls had joined Hannibal, but the Etruscans, the Umbrian-speaking tribes and the Latins had stayed loyal, and they commanded most of Italy's manpower and riches, controlled the area around Rome (and the Umbrians had previously foiled Hannibal's initial attempt to attack Rome after the Transimene), and made communications and linking with his northern forces difficult;
total manpower of Rome and the loyalist is estimated in about 500,000 people (minus the 100,000 lost in Hannibal's initial triumphs), fully integrated in the Roman command structure and available for deployment anywhere, while the defectors could muster about 150,000 people, not fully trusted by Hannibal (with the exception of Hannibal's Gaulish veterans that joined him at the start of the campaign), mostly serving in their own units, and, with the exception of Gaulish veterans and Lucani, not available outside of their home territories;
Massilia is mostly a non-factor, as it has enough trouble on its own dealing with the Gauls, but can at least hold down some of the rebelling Ligurians;
almost forgot, Rome's control of the sea meant they could attack Sicily and pick Hannibal's allies there one by one.

As far as I know, Rome's strength was severely tested, and it's almost a miracle they actually resisted long enough to pick off Hannibal's allies, reconquer Northern Italy, conquer Spain and weaken Hannibal's army enough to make it defeatable.

Dr. Trainwreck wrote:Germanicus got his name from campaigning in Germany

A minor nitpick, but actually Germanicus inherited the name from his father(as was the custom) , Drusus, who had gotten the name from campaigning in Germany.

correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't the surrender of Singapore during WW2 due the british commander thinking he was facing a much stronger and better equipted force then he actually was due to insuffient intel and terrain that made it easy to hide your numbers?

They lost because they were outfought at every level, badly led, poorly trained, badly equipped, lacked air support, lacked any naval support leading to them being outflanked time and again, lacked any prepared land defense (well entrenched is nonsense) and generally were totally unprepared to fight, while the Japanese had been intensively preparing for over a year. The British were in fact aware that they outnumbered the enemy to some extent, this made little functional difference.

The final surrender though came about because the Japanese had physically taken hold of the islands drinking water reservoirs, and the front line troops remaining had almost completely run out of ammunition, making further serious resistance impossible. Its not like the British just gave up or anything out of fear.

Sea Skimmer wrote:They lost because they were outfought at every level, badly led, poorly trained, badly equipped, lacked air support, lacked any naval support leading to them being outflanked time and again, lacked any prepared land defense (well entrenched is nonsense) and generally were totally unprepared to fight, while the Japanese had been intensively preparing for over a year. The British were in fact aware that they outnumbered the enemy to some extent, this made little functional difference.

The final surrender though came about because the Japanese had physically taken hold of the islands drinking water reservoirs, and the front line troops remaining had almost completely run out of ammunition, making further serious resistance impossible. Its not like the British just gave up or anything out of fear.

ah I see, I remembered there was more to it then the brits surrendering because they felt like it, just didn't remember the details.

wouldn't the loss of 2 soviet divisions at Soumussalmi and Raate road during the Winter War be a better example of defeat of a larger force that could be considered a fail (in this case due to the soviet leadership underestimating the resolve of the finns and not equiping their forces accordingly).

Would the Battle of Thermopylae count as an epic fail on the part of the Persians? Even though they technically won, they believed the Greeks were a pushover but ended up getting their asses handed to them.

The Greeks fought a delaying action, and the Persians overcame that delaying action, I'm not really seeing the epic fail. The Persians were overconfident, but the outcome was actually pretty predictable given the immense superiority of heavily armored infantry over light infantry on such constricted terrain. All the more so considering that some reasonable estimates of Greek strength are into the quintuple digits, and that the battle might not have even mattered had the Persian fleet not been so disrupted storms on its approach.

But if you want another possible contender for an epic fail in a delaying action, the German failure to encircle the Soviet 62nd Army delaying just short of Stalingrad's suburbs was had massive ramifications. Mainly that it made the entire ensuring battle for the city possible. Had 62nd army not just barely clawed free the Germans would have been able to take most of the city by storm before serious reinforcements could arrive. This encirclement only barely failed, and would certainly not have had the 4th Panzer army infamously been diverted earlier.

I'm not even sure that Thermopylae was a mere delaying action. The army as well as the fleet were fighting there and the defeat gave Persia control over all of Greece north of the Peloponnes. From what I've read on the topic the Greeks were fighting to win at Thermopylae. The Epic Fail would be theirs since they could hold a nearly impenetrable area for just three days.

There are no "the greeks" at Thermopylae. There are Sparta, Theban, Corinth and the armies of a lew lesser powers. Athens noticeably was absent. Most of the other cities remained neutral or even aided Xerxes.

Of course, I used it here for simplicity's sake although it actually perpetuates certain misconceptions about the Persian Wars, sorry.

Metahive wrote:I'm not even sure that Thermopylae was a mere delaying action. The army as well as the fleet were fighting there and the defeat gave Persia control over all of Greece north of the Peloponnes. From what I've read on the topic the Greeks were fighting to win at Thermopylae. The Epic Fail would be theirs since they could hold a nearly impenetrable area for just three days.

Why epic fail? They were far from the first numerically inferior army to be driven back from a defensive position. Probably the Spartans hoped the Persian army would get hit by starvation plus disease and be forced to withdraw, if they could hold them in place long enough. They couldn't, they lost, but their idea wasn't unsound.

Thanas wrote:There are no "the greeks" at Thermopylae. There are Sparta, Theban, Corinth and the armies of a lew lesser powers. Athens noticeably was absent. Most of the other cities remained neutral or even aided Xerxes.

Well, most Greek cities south of Thermopylae were in a loose coalition against the Persians. Athens may have been absent at Thermopylae, but at the same time they were fighting againt the Persian navy at Artemision. Of course some notable cities were in league with the Persians (e.g. Thebes, though some Thebans did fight for the Greek alliance in the battle)