Omeganian wrote: What do you exactly mean by reorganization? In his book about the Soviet Army, Suvorov gives examples of significant changes in the army's abilities within months - the Winter War was over a year in the past by then.
Rebuilding an army, changing its ToE (do you know what a ToE is?), changing the structure, balance and function of its units. Suggesting a task of that magnitude can be completed in a year simply shows you have no idea what is involved in running an Army, And Rezun's "examples" simply confirm that the reorganization was in progress. You need to read real books to give you at least a baseline of knowledge as to what is involved and what happened as a result.
Stuart wrote: A few years before that, the forces were not that close to the border. The bunkers weren't either. There was a wide security zone. No "relics" in sight. Where could one suddenly appear from?
Doctrine changed from a defense in depth to a hardshell perimeter defense in the 1930s, largely as a result of lessons from the Spanish Civil War that appeared to discredit blitzkrieg type theories. Then following lessons from 1939/40 (more specifically Poland/France) the Soviet Army realized the hardshell perimeter theory was seriously wrong and tried to shift to a defense in depth. Much as the Japanese shifted from a meet-them-at-the beach defense to defense in depth and then back to meet-them-at-the-beach
I noticed some of his later books suffer from that. But Icebreaker was written at the same time as his serious books (partial publication - 1985). Time didn't pass.
Oh yes it did. Check your publication dates more carefully. Icebreaker fits neatly into the slide of Rezun's work from semi-serious accounts to sensationalized fiction.
But this game (well, there were two games, actually) didn't start from an enemy reaching a specific line. It started after the Soviets from that line threw the enemy back - and they certainly didn't throw it back without possessing the initiative.
Well, you missed the point there completely didn't you. The Soviet exercises in question started from exactly the same foundations as everybody elses when dealing with such situations. Your attempted implications simply do not hold water.
Some years ago, there was an 18 series film about Suvorov and his theory. On the other side, Russian generals were speaking. There were no bad words about his quality of work; in fact it was said he was a good worker, due for a promotion. What's your source?
The man himself.
There are plenty of resource rich places in Russia, and plenty of space. And Ural is in much less danger from bombers. So why concentrate all the industry on the border?
Because, if you look at a map of Russia, that's where most of the power generation, transport and communications facilities etc were. Also, incidentally, most of the centers of population - it's a bit pointless to build factories out in the pine forests where nobody lives. Having said that, the Russians were trying to disperse their industry - that's why there's a submarine building yard at Nizhky Novgorod. That sort of thing does not happen overnight. For your theory to work, we would have to assume that the great plot to launch an offensive in 1941 started in 1780.
And as for USA building a power station a hundred kilometers away from Canada - In this case, it most likely means they are not expecting an attack from that direction.
Congratulations, you have just destroyed your entire argument.
And besides, this is not an ammo facility. If you are fighting, you don't need to deliver full trains of electricity to your forces.
You do realize that factories require immense amounts of electrical power.
And generals state they had plans. Plenty of very detailed plans. Which said absolutely nothing about actions in case of an enemy attack. The contingency lacked variety, it seems. General-Colonel Gor'kov (a prominent Suvorov opponent) claimed that was the plan which was used by the army. Later he claimed that the part about attack was removed from there, but that hardly leaves much of a plan.
That comment hardky makes any sense at all and what little coherent thought it does express is irrelevent to the substance of the argument.
An
official directive to the Kiev district in June 13th stated that all the forces which are not close to the border are to be moved closer by the beginning of July.
Have you looked at a map recently? And do you know where Kiev is?
But why demolish (at least in part) the bunkers on the old borders? No one seems to be in any hurry to destroy WWII bunkers even today.
To deny them to an enemy? In a lot of cases to utilize the equipment therein elsewhere. Or simply to get rid of a nuisance. It really doesn't help a farmer plow his fields if there is a circular block of concrete in the middle.
Let's see. If your bunkers are meant to support an offensive, then:
1) Forces are to be gathered on the primary direction, and bunkers are to be built on the secondary positions.
2) Bunkers are not to be camouflaged; let the enemy think you are preparing for defense.
3) Don't make the fortified lines deep - that way, if you advance on a secondary direction, every bunker can support your forces.
4) Don't cover the bunkers with minefields and barbed wire - it's a hindrance to your own forces.
5) Don't waste too much concrete and steel - those are not long term fortifications.
Since each of those features can be implemented, and can be not implemented, that gives us 32 ways to build a pillbox. Germans, in preparation for an attack on the Soviets, used a particular one of those ways - one matching all five features. The Soviets, on their side, used the exact same way.
That is utter nonsense. It seems as if you are quoting something without understanding what you are reading.
According to Wikipedia "It is assumed that tactical advantage cannot be sustained for very long, so effective Airborne missions require the rapid advance of ground based troops in support." Not a primary source, of course, but do you have one that contradicts it? Now, the troops in question were constantly practicing in close proximity to the border (Why not close to Moscow, or Volga? Is Russia small?). After Germany attacked, the Soviets had to remove thousands of parachutes from the forest (without a command from very high up any commander would have been shot for sabotage if he left parachutes outside).
Of what possible relevence is that? It has no bearing on the subject at all. Irrelevent quotations prove nothing.
Stalin received a small piece of Danube. Into this small piece, he moved about half the forces which were previously sufficient to defend the 2000+ km Dnieper. For defense? looks a bit too much.
Not really; depends on the threat profile.
The river was so narrow there, that the larger ships were very difficult to rotate. Meaning, they were not supposed to go back (and what is the point of moving them there and building a base, if they are to be returned). The enemy threat was low there - so there was no point in them remaining. They couldn't move forward, either - except many people died digging that trench which could serve no purpose other than to give them that exact opportunity.
Again, so what?
If you think that something can reflect the army's purpose and training than its orders and actions... In this case, an order to seize Suvalki and Lublin in two days. Not a word about defense. And the matching action - or, at least, an attempt.
So they launched a counter-attack. Premature no doubt but that's the name of the game. Say again, so what?
And yet Rzheshevsky claims he cannot present any documents against Suvorov's theory.
So you say. More likely, the thoery is so outlandish there is no point in discussing it. I'll bet that Rzheshevsky is also unable to present any papers proving there was no invasion by green martians in 1941. Once again, if you believe the Soviet Union was on the verge of launching an attack in 1941, the onus is on you to prove it. Waving around one book by an author of highly questionable competence and known mendacity doesn't prove anything when compared to works by serious and reputable historians such as Beevor, Glantz, Salisbury and Ericsson that flatly contradict Rezun's claims.
You still have to do a lot better than this. For a start, try making sure that your argument is at least vaguely relevent to the point at issue. In multiple cases above, you fail to do this.