Thanas wrote:
This fails to explain why antiquity was not chosen as all of that is also present in antiquity.
What systems would you have chosen to compare then? Because it seems essentially you are saying you can never examine different cultures alongside each other in any sense because "Duh, they're DIFFERENT". Taken to that extent, one might say it is pointless to examine any history other than the present, because everything in the past is so different.
Similar social constructs and methods of organization have arisen throughout history and some of these are similar enough to be grouped together. Hence why it is even possible to talk about "monarchies", "kingdoms", and other general institutions. Sure there are differences from how the Pharaoh of Egypt of any period ran things compared to Imperial China and so on, but that doesn't mean there cannot be comparisons on the points of similarity, and also the points of difference.
Of course there are broad themes of things like knock-on effects, but the discussion is in the details. Every decision of any polity has knock-on effects for good or ill.
But again, why focus on medieval politics? Surely it would have been more honest to compare systems of their time to each other?
As the quote said earlier, the times were chosen because of the view they were going through similar social and political changes and states despite their separation in time. It isn't a comparison of systems as they were on opposite ends of Eurasia at a single point in time.
I do not understand what you mean with "equalized out".
Equalized out in that no state had significant technological advantage over another. Qin and its peers were about equal technologically, and the European comparison for equal states of the same period. Each state gaining or failing to gain advantage over its peers could not be therefore laid at the feet of technological advantage or disadvantage.
And I think you missed the main point of my reply which is that it is unproven that tax farming is weakening to the state per se. That is an assumption a priori which must be justified according to the specific situations, especially in the context of medieval/ancient societies.
Are you arguing that tax farming
isn't weakening to the state in the long run, at least in the form it was conducted historically? It may have been done due to limits of government apparatus to conduct census and assessment or due to issues of saving time and effort, but how is paying interest to private individuals to collect government taxes (or signing away administrative rights to the farmed area) not weakening the state? Quite apart from the financial take, it diluted the state's power over its own territory. It creates regional centers of powers around what could end up as warlords (which is what happened under later Chinese dynasties when military powers were farmed out in addition to fiscal and administrative).
Iracundus wrote:Well that point is up for discussion too. The author disagreed and cited Machiavelli who said they exhibited "cowardice" and were "useless for they have no reason to stand firm apart from the little bit of pay you give them." "To compound the problem, military entrepreneurs who were not paid surrendered to the enemy, and foreign mercenaries who were not paid deserted, mutinied, and pillaged the countryside" (Footnote cites and gives desertion rate reaching 50-70%).
You've got to be shitting me. This author uses Machiavelli as an authoritative source on renaissance mercenaries? Sorry, but her credibility just went into the shitter. Please note that Machiavelli (out of political ideology, not study of warfare) argued for a citizen militia. Guess what happened when a citizen militia formed according to Machiavelli's principles went up against a mercenary army? They got their asses kicked so hard the idea of a citizen army was abandoned for the next 100 years.
Machiavelli was cited to say the words and argue the point. There are a range of other papers cited supporting the idea of high desertion rates among mercenary forces.
As for the high desertion rate, that was from Parrott, David A. 1995 Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War.
They mutinied because they were unpaid and starving, not because they were "BAD MERCENARIES". Every army that is starving will mutiny, mercenary or no mercenary.
While any army will either disband or mutiny with no support, the issue of the revolt was tied into the other issue of fiscal burden, namely that the fiscal burden of mercenaries exceeded the capability of early European rulers to reliably pay them. Would the the fiscal burden of raising a massed levy army have been different? Certainly the effort on the part of the government would have been greater in establishing the logistical infrastructure and capabilities, but would it have paid out financially in the long term?
A prediction that is false for every period of history until the french revolution, when the sheer mass of "citizen troops" made their relative inefficiency irrelevant. Mercenaries were always used in every age of warfare. In an era of no professional armies until the advent of the 18th century you really cannot say that mercenaries were inefficient and bad value.
Sure mercenaries might be the best option in the lack of national armies, but why weren't there national armies until that much later? A mobilized national army of sufficient size be sufficient to achieve the sheer mass you talk about. Granted, this would be an option only for states with sufficient population.
Qin and the Warring States certainly went down that route of mass citizen troops. Certainly there is no mention of mercenary companies on any scale. If they could do that in circa 350 BC, why wasn't the same implemented in post-Roman states?