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As it stood no Anderson in real life couldn't have achieved better than he did, the more I read about Gettysburg the less likely this all seems. Even with someone like Napoleon in charge making sure everyone got to the party on time (which apparently was way more of a problem than it perhaps should have been) instead of committing piece meal it would have been a tough ask. Even with guards grenadiers or any other elite unit from the time perfectly equipped and at full strength without either replacing the conditions or the confederates wholesale you will probably end up with the same result. The only real way was for the south to come up with troops and equipment for say 25 extra regiments (not all needed in the east but we must remember it was dire everywhere) at least, unlikely without European aid.

As it stood no Anderson in real life couldn't have achieved better than he did, the more I read about Gettysburg the less likely
this all seems.

Right. This is a What-If scenario. We're not talking about Anderson in real life. Anderson in real life pushed, got rebuffed, and lost. That's not even a debatable point here.

Even with someone like Napoleon in charge making sure everyone got to the party on time (which apparently was way more of a problem than it perhaps should have been) instead of committing piece meal it would have been a tough ask.

Not really. The Confederates had some serious problems with coordination during Gettysburg - and yes, a lot of those were due to circumstances outside of command's control, but still. A better coordinated assault with better timing would have made a huge difference.

Even with guards grenadiers or any other elite unit from the time perfectly equipped and at full strength without either replacing the conditions or the confederates wholesale you will probably end up with the same result. The only real way was for the south to come up with troops and equipment for say 25 extra regiments (not all needed in the east but we must remember it was dire everywhere) at least, unlikely without European aid.

We're not talking about the entire war. We're talking about Gettysburg. The battle of Gettysburg. Not the entire Civil War. You don't need to give the Confederates 25 extra regiments to win Gettysburg.

mithie wrote:Anderson's push wasn't rebuffed immediately. It got rebuffed when Union reinforcements showed up, and Anderson lost control of his men. The fact of the matter is, Anderson DID make progress, his men DID contest the push with some degree of success, and if he DID have another wave behind him to give him the momentum needed to overcome the Union reinforcements, he would have been in an extremely good position to cushion Pickett's charge.

Anderson "made progress" about the same way Armistead "made progress". But without the numbers to back up those small pushes, there was zero chance of exploiting them to any degree. Behind Stannard was the bulk of Hancock's Corps and with enough reserves available to throw back anything the Confederates could have thrown at that portion of the line at Cemetery Ridge that day. You can toss out all the "what-IFs" you like but they remain irrelevant to the issue before the bar. The OP isn't talking about which commander could have made Pickett's Charge with more men than were actually mustered that day, it's talking about which commander could have succeeded in his place with the same numbers and equipment that were available that day. The plain fact is that Gettysburg was Fredricksburg in reverse and Longstreet knew it. About the only narrow chance the Confederates had for success in that campaign was to have avoided fighting in Gettysburg altogether and to have followed through on Longstreet's idea to get between Meade and Washington and to force Meade to come to the Army of Northern Virginia on ground of their choosing. It's what any smart commander would have done, it's what Lee might have done if he had been thinking straight. And even then the end result might have wound up as strategically inconclusive as ever. The plain fact is that no commander without superior numbers to what Lee and co. had could have achieved any different result.

The amazing thing about Pickett's Charge is that despite the number of European military officials observing the war, they did not change their tactics when it came to WWI. If I recall there were no such massive infantry charges of that nature at least not from the Confederates through the rest of war with the possible exception of the Battle of Nashville but General Hood was out of his mind on morphine and supposedly angry with his army.

The infantry charges of both the Civil War and WWI whether successful or not generally had significantly high casualties because the weaponry was more advanced than their Napoleanic tactics.

That might have something to do with the fact that Pickett's charge was written off as a predictable result?

During the French Prussian war there were massed infantry charges and at least some of them succeeded.

Thanas wrote:During the French Prussian war there were massed infantry charges and at least some of them succeeded.

Some but not all but really it's not about success but about casualties sustained. The weaponary of both the Civil War and WWI were too advanced for massed infantry charges of the nature of Pickett's charge ie frontal assaults. Were those charges frontal assaults or flanking attacks BTW? And was the enemy sufficiently weak or weakened prior to the charge? General Longstreet for example led successful flanking assaults on the Union at the Battle of the Wilderness.

ronindave wrote:If I recall there were no such massive infantry charges of that nature at least not from the Confederates through the rest of war with the possible exception of the Battle of Nashville but General Hood was out of his mind on morphine and supposedly angry with his army.

You're thinking of the Battle of Franklin, not Nashville.

Massed infantry attacks against entrenched enemy forces was a common occurence during the Overland Campaign in '64, particularly at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor (which stands out in the sheer futility of such action). Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg could also apply.

That European observations of the civil war did not substantially affect the tactics employed by European armies isn't surprising, considering even American tactics weren't affected. Generals Grant and Sheridan were not particularly impressed by European armies (Sheridan, as an observer in the Franco-Prussian War, reported to then-President Grant that Prussia had absolutely nothing to teach the U.S.), and I would not be surprised if the feeling was mutual.

ronindave wrote:The amazing thing about Pickett's Charge is that despite the number of European military officials observing the war, they did not change their tactics when it came to WWI. If I recall there were no such massive infantry charges of that nature at least not from the Confederates through the rest of war with the possible exception of the Battle of Nashville but General Hood was out of his mind on morphine and supposedly angry with his army.

The infantry charges of both the Civil War and WWI whether successful or not generally had significantly high casualties because the weaponry was more advanced than their Napoleanic tactics.

Before going back to the main issue I figured I take this on...European observers did take note of the charge and decided that when an inferior infantry force advances under supported by artillery against a numerically superior enemy fighting on terrain they know better and have had time for their supply train to fully catch up that such a charge will fail. The problem was not just that several mass charges worked in the Prussian wars against Austria and France but also that in the Russo-Japanese war the later achieved victory (albeit at a huge cost) by going on the offensive supported by solid artillery preparation. Basically 1905 and even the early events of WWI like the attacks on Liege and Namur convinced most generals that artillery could blast through any defensive works which left the offensive by massed infantry the best (and seemingly only) recourse to achieve decisive results in battle. Obviously thats just a skim of the surface to the question but it does point to the fact that Pickett's charge was dismissed so much as its lesson was balanced against others that were far more recent and seemed to indicate the ascendancy of the offensive if properly conducted.


On the OP issue of whether Pickett's charge could have succeeded ... the answer as most have said is no. The simplest reason is ratio of forces and their relative position. Lee's audacity worked at Chancellorsville because the Union Army became diffused in the terrain and lost the cohesion needed to repel a sudden assault. Even then its worth noting that after the initial charge struck home and Hill took over for Jackson that continued attempts to break through and take the remainder of the Union Army from the rear failed because reinforcements arrived ready and in good order to resist troops tried from being on the move for several days straight. Only a superior artillery position for the Confederates (occasioned by a screw up on Hooker's part) forced the withdraw on the 4th. At Gettysburg the working assumption on Lees part was that having struck both the North and South ends of the Union lines that Meade must have reinforced them leaving his center dangerously thin. Unfortunately this wasn't the case and Hancock was able to deploy his Corps with Brigades both on the line and in reserve so that when the charge did strike home it wouldn't be able to penetrate the line. Moreover with the density of the Union line it would have been possible to shift even more troops in should the attack start making headway. Simply put Lee didn't have enough force to both breach the Union line and seal the breach after doing so. Without sufficient force to cover the southern flank of the assault any penetration could easily have been taken up in a sac and the units chopped to pieces, in that sense the shallow penetration probably saved the Confederates from total annihilation as they retained the ability to retreat. About the only way the charge would work is IF the Confederates had managed to drive off the Union artillery (which given the supply situation by the 3rd is asking a lot especially with the poor position of the Confederate artillery force in comparison with that of the Union) and IF they retained enough effectives to breach the line and seal the edges. The first would have been difficult and the later almost impossible though using fresh troops from III Corps might have given a better chance the numbers aren't simply unfavorable they are absurdly difficult to overcome.