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Lolpah wrote:

Thanas wrote:There are no "the greeks" at Thermopylae. There are Sparta, Theban, Corinth and the armies of a lew lesser powers. Athens noticeably was absent. Most of the other cities remained neutral or even aided Xerxes.

Well, most Greek cities south of Thermopylae were in a loose coalition against the Persians. Athens may have been absent at Thermopylae, but at the same time they were fighting againt the Persian navy at Artemision. Of course some notable cities were in league with the Persians (e.g. Thebes, though some Thebans did fight for the Greek alliance in the battle)

South of Thermopylae does not mean all of Greece either. I don't think you can claim "the greeks" without having Delphi in it.

Borgholio wrote:Would the Battle of Thermopylae count as an epic fail on the part of the Persians? Even though they technically won, they believed the Greeks were a pushover but ended up getting their asses handed to them.

Not really.

The thing that you have to take into account is that almost all of the sources about the battle come from the historian Herodotus, which he compiled from written or from testimonies decades after the battle was fought. He did try with all of his tools to find as many sources and to compile them into a coherent narrative. The result it that he gets testimonies and sources that are somewhat true, somewhat false, somewhat filled wit superstition and fanciful events, and the fact that he was Greek and most of his sources were Greek, so it ended up portraying the Greeks in a more favorable light.

When you get down to it, Sparta and its allies lost big time. The Persians got bogged down for three days in a pass, they managed to find a way around it and they encircled its enemy. After that they basically just walked into Athens, burning and sacking the villages that lay in the way, the army that was supposed to defend it now dead. If it weren't for the Athenians causing a clusterfuck in the Persian Fleet and as a result causing problems with the supply lines and the reinforcements. the rest of Greece would have most likely fallen.

Long story short, Sparta did its best and delayed the Persians, and Athens saves the day again.

Fun fact: So, Herodotus went into enormous detail describing the Persian army and how they were organised and all the provinces each battle group came from and so on. The total number? 2.3 million troops. Yes, the Persian Army managed to raise an army half the size the Germans managed to in the whole invasion of the USSR.

Ok, to be fair, Herodotus says that with that number are included the support troops and the different non-combat units (For one persian troop there was a persian who carried his arms and accompanied him). But still, even for that day that number is unfeasible. Don't even ask how they managed to feed such an army. I've heard through from modern historians that the actual number of troops at Thermopylae only, would have been everywhere from around 30.000 to 70.000 troops.

TheGreekDollmaker wrote:When you get down to it, Sparta and its allies lost big time. The Persians got bogged down for three days in a pass, they managed to find a way around it and they encircled its enemy. After that they basically just walked into Athens, burning and sacking the villages that lay in the way, the army that was supposed to defend it now dead. If it weren't for the Athenians causing a clusterfuck in the Persian Fleet and as a result causing problems with the supply lines and the reinforcements. the rest of Greece would have most likely fallen.

Long story short, Sparta did its best and delayed the Persians, and Athens saves the day again.

I think you are overstating Athen's role. At the Battle of Salamis which crippled the Persian navy, they provided "only" half of the Greek coalition's naval forces, and at the Battle of Plataea, which drove the last Persian ground forces off mainland Greece the Spartans contributed just as much.

Btw, a little-known fact is that at Thermopylae the Greecs actually had a force of 1000 Phocaeans guarding the way around the pass, who might have pushed the Persians back had they not retreated uphill immediately upon making contact.

....If we believe the ancient sources. The sudden retreat of the Phocians is something I do not put much trust in.

Why, may I ask, Thanas?

Thanas wrote:....If we believe the ancient sources. The sudden retreat of the Phocians is something I do not put much trust in.

Interesting. So do you think they were not positioned there at all, or only retreated after a hard-fought battle?

Ziggy Stardust wrote:Why, may I ask, Thanas?

It just is too convenient to me, absolving the main Greek forces of all blame and putting the blame for the loss (besides the treachery) on the Phocians (who btw were during the Peloponnesian war allies of Sparta after having previously been allied with Athens so one can see why Herodotus might not have been so kind towards them).

The main sequence of events is also pretty unbelievable. I mean, the Phocians are told to guard a position. Yet they are totally unprepared for a Persian attack due to what can only be laziness or extreme incompetence and then at the first sign of trouble they vacate that position immediately and let the Persian army pass. Does that sound like men who were fighting for the political survival (and their own survival) of the region and who knew that letting the main army be defeated meant their defeat? Note that they were the ones firmly in the Persian attack path and seemed to have lost political autonomy to the Persians after the battle. So they had the most to lose and yet of all forces they are completely unprepared, with not even sentries and advance parties sent out by people from a region which produced excellent skirmisher forces?

Lolpah wrote:Interesting. So do you think they were not positioned there at all, or only retreated after a hard-fought battle?

I don't know. My gut would tell me that they were forced away by circumstances. The only other explanation (other than them all being so dumb beyond belief) is that they were bribed by the Persians but then the sources would tell us this IMO.

But I freely admit that I don't have anything to back this up, other than me finding the story of the traitor Ephialtes and of the incompetent Phocians pretty unbelievable.

There's no evidence for it, but it wouldn't be the first time the "undefeated hero(es) could only be overcome by treachery" trope has been abused to rationalize an embarrassing defeat away. That trope is wildly popular and pervasive even in more recent history, see Dolchstoßlegende or how certain people deal with the US withdrawal from Vietnam.

TheGreekDollmaker wrote:I've heard through from modern historians that the actual number of troops at Thermopylae only, would have been everywhere from around 30.000 to 70.000 troops.

Herodotus also mentions 29 myriarchs, each commanding a baivabaram, a unit of 10,000 men. If all baivabarams were at full strength, Xerxes' army was composed of 290,000-300,000 combat troops (I have no idea if Herodotus also mentioned the myriarch of the Immortals), plus support forces and the fleet. No idea how many of them were at Thermopylae.

Thanas wrote: The main sequence of events is also pretty unbelievable. I mean, the Phocians are told to guard a position. Yet they are totally unprepared for a Persian attack due to what can only be laziness or extreme incompetence and then at the first sign of trouble they vacate that position immediately and let the Persian army pass. Does that sound like men who were fighting for the political survival (and their own survival) of the region and who knew that letting the main army be defeated meant their defeat? Note that they were the ones firmly in the Persian attack path and seemed to have lost political autonomy to the Persians after the battle. So they had the most to lose and yet of all forces they are completely unprepared, with not even sentries and advance parties sent out by people from a region which produced excellent skirmisher forces?

Interesting. Thanks for the input. I had never really heard the details of the situation, only the vague claim that they "betrayed" or otherwise let down the main Greek force. I had always assumed it was an issue of them deciding it was in their best interest to help the Persians, but the fact that they seemed to have lost political autonomy after the fact does indicate a level of scapegoating involved.

lord Martiya wrote:

TheGreekDollmaker wrote:I've heard through from modern historians that the actual number of troops at Thermopylae only, would have been everywhere from around 30.000 to 70.000 troops.

Herodotus also mentions 29 myriarchs, each commanding a baivabaram, a unit of 10,000 men. If all baivabarams were at full strength, Xerxes' army was composed of 290,000-300,000 combat troops (I have no idea if Herodotus also mentioned the myriarch of the Immortals), plus support forces and the fleet. No idea how many of them were at Thermopylae.

It is quite unlikely that the army was at anything near approaching full strength after the march through Asia Minor and Greece (with not particularly great supply routes). Also, just because the troops are called a certain way does not mean they all have the same internal organization or numbers. Heck, even the organization of the famed Roman legions varied from legion to legion.

As far as engineering epic fails go, would the Russian N1 rocket count? Over-complicated, under-funded, exploded on the launchpad in the biggest non-nuclear explosion ever recorded.

The N-1's principal problem (the overcomplicated first stage) was a logical consequence of what the Russians had to work with. They had to use so many engines because Soviet industry was not able to produce anything approaching the F-1 in power, and the launch failures were a natural consequence of that first stage and the lack of funds for proper testing (plus the rush, of course).

The fail if anything was in trying to build a single rocket instead of going with several launches to accomplish that mission - after all, they knew the failings of their own technology. Problem is, the Proton wasn't ready before the late 1970s anyways.

Xelloss wrote: 3) Fall of Singapore in WWII. Notable in that the British, who were well entrenched and fortified, surrendered to a Japanese division that was outnumbered, outgunned, and under-equipped.

You're kidding me, right?

Well entrenched and fortified by WHAT standards?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sarimbun_Beach
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kranji

There were attempts by the British to fortify the beaches up north, but they simply wasn't finished. Indeed, the paucity of said defences up north is a constant criticism raised by Brigadier Ivan Simson. (He also criticised Simmons, commander of Fortress Singapore proper who fortified the harbor defences down south instead of north although the criticism ignores the larger context).

The failing of their defences are well known. The searchlights didn't work as advertised, since most of them didn't work, they only served to guide Japanese forces in to the landing as opposed to illuminating them up to Australian fire. Fire support was lacking, because of the general shortage of ammunition. There was no concrete bunkers and the network of trenches was incomplete. Field communications back to higher HQ didn't work well although how significant this was to the failure to coordinate artillery fire to suppress the Japanese landing is contested.

And how was the Japanese outgunned? Sure, they didn't actually manage to land tanks..... but they fixed the causeway and charged Jap tanks down the Aussies throat, who didn't have adequate AT guns.
Ammunition was short sure, but let's not forget. Its the BRITISH who ran out of ammunition in the Battle of Singapore first, NOT the Japanese. Percival last command decision, to ask his commanders if they felt that a charge against Bukit Timah to drive away Japanese artillery shelling the city was possible was dismissed because the British forces were out of ammunition.

Was Singapore an epic fail? Sure. It marked the end of an epoch in British colonial history. More than the Boer War, More than the Sepoy Mutiny, more than WW1, it highlighted the impossibility of the British Empire military to defend her empire using the forces from an island nation. The deficiencies showed the Empire military weakness. Even the defence planning showed just how much power had swung to the US, in 1940, Churchill entire plan for defending Singapore rested in the hopes that the US would intervene,since the Japs would be foolish to attack two white powers, and the two strongest navies of the land, especially when the Pacific Fleet is so close at Pearl Harbor.

Xelloss wrote:2) The Charge of the Light Brigade. I don't think this one needs an explanation.

The Charge of the Light Brigade was not that much an epic fail in reality. The Light Brigade was ordered to engage an artillery unit that was withdrawing, something light cavalry was very good at doing with their speed and the light defense of gun crews. The problem was that command had a great view of the battle that the Brigade didn't have. Due to orders that were lacking in clarity, the Brigade went after the wrong battery.

And it managed to cut down the gun crews of that battery, so the charge wasn't a completely useless effort, just badly misdirected. It had what, around 50% losses including POWs? Very bad, but still it was lot more successful then several big cavalry charges in the Franco Prussian War fifteen years later which were slaughtered without accomplishing a thing.

From a modern perspective, the only notable thing about the Light Brigade is Tennyson's poem.

And since English professors can't be bothered to give a little historical background ...

If I knew the background as a young college sophomore, I would have felt more pity than disgust in reading the poem.

Hmmm. For some Civil War flair, how about at Antietam, McClellan failing to decisively defeat Lee despite his possession of Special Order No. 191?

davidutlib wrote:Hmmm. For some Civil War flair, how about at Antietam, McClellan failing to decisively defeat Lee despite his possession of Special Order No. 191?

I don't know if you can realistically describe an incomplete victory as an epic fail, especially since there were so few decisive victories in that war, period.

The Peninsula Campaign was far more of an epic fail then Antietam. Based on reports of a single spy McClellan came to believe that he was outnumbered by more then 50%, when in fact he had closer to twice as many troops as the Confederates. The war should have ended in that campaign.

The same spy reports were a factor at Antietam, but at least at Antietam McClellan had already been defeated by the Confederates, and now saw them invading the north, which would in his eyes have seemed to justify those reports. Certainly more justified then believing them while he pushed up the Peninsula.

I never have really understood why McClellan thought the confederates could be so much stronger. He wasn't a great field general, but he certainly was good on engineering, organization and logistical stuff and so would well understand the problems involved. I guess with such a lack of information he simply assumed that the still very weak blockade had not prevented the rebels from arming every farm boy they had with European rifles. He may have assumed they were just neglecting wagon trains ect... and trying for a quick and dirty army. Hmm, someone has likely published a paper or ten on this somewhere. Can't be unstudied.

Sea Skimmer wrote:The Peninsula Campaign was far more of an epic fail then Antietam. Based on reports of a single spy McClellan came to believe that he was outnumbered by more then 50%, when in fact he had closer to twice as many troops as the Confederates. The war should have ended in that campaign.

The same spy reports were a factor at Antietam, but at least at Antietam McClellan had already been defeated by the Confederates, and now saw them invading the north, which would in his eyes have seemed to justify those reports. Certainly more justified then believing them while he pushed up the Peninsula.

I never have really understood why McClellan thought the confederates could be so much stronger. He wasn't a great field general, but he certainly was good on engineering, organization and logistical stuff and so would well understand the problems involved. I guess with such a lack of information he simply assumed that the still very weak blockade had not prevented the rebels from arming every farm boy they had with European rifles. He may have assumed they were just neglecting wagon trains ect... and trying for a quick and dirty army. Hmm, someone has likely published a paper or ten on this somewhere. Can't be unstudied.

I'm going to feel dirty defending McClellan, who was an arrogant sonofagun and a flawed general, but the large number of Union sick on the Peninsula is far too often forgotten. His own army was not in great shape by the time Lee started counterattacking. Also understated is the fact that the Union cavalry was so poorly led by George Stoneman and Phillip St. George Cooke that he had very little accurate scouting information. Pinkerton's reports were wildly inaccurate, to be sure, but he had no intelligence reports to contradict those falsehoods.

He was at best a C- general, and had some very poor moments, but I'm not sure if McClellan rates any kind of an "epic fail". John Pope at 2nd Bull Run, though...

I know I'm bias but I suppose Winter War (as a whole) would be way better example of an incomplete victory that was an epic fail (from the part of the attackers) then anything from the american civil war, sure the soviets won in the end but it could be considered a phyrric victory as they were unable to achive their primary objectives (aka the conquest of Finland) due to heavy casualities caused by the soviet military and political leadership underestimating the level of resistance the finns were capable of pre-war estimates by the soviets on how long it would take to conquer Finland by force were few weeks, the war lasted 3 months, also at the start Stalin sent troops from the southern provinces to fight the finns thinking that local soviet troops would be too friendly with finns (for those who don't know the winter of 1939-1940 was very cold)

As far as the Civil War goes, I'd consider Gettysburg to be an epic fail on the part of the Confederacy. Arrogance and poor planning led to a massive amount of casualties and a complete turnaround in the course of the war.

Lord Revan wrote:I know I'm bias but I suppose Winter War (as a whole) would be way better example of an incomplete victory that was an epic fail (from the part of the attackers) then anything from the american civil war, sure the soviets won in the end but it could be considered a phyrric victory as they were unable to achive their primary objectives (aka the conquest of Finland) due to heavy casualities caused by the soviet military and political leadership underestimating the level of resistance the finns were capable of pre-war estimates by the soviets on how long it would take to conquer Finland by force were few weeks, the war lasted 3 months, also at the start Stalin sent troops from the southern provinces to fight the finns thinking that local soviet troops would be too friendly with finns (for those who don't know the winter of 1939-1940 was very cold)

Conquering Finland wasn't Stalin's goal, though. What he had originally wanted was some more space in Karelia if I remember corectly, only going to war after the Finns expectedly refused. He got that with a lot of losses and a diplomatic fiasco, but got it nonetheless.

Now, had the Finns broken the offense entirely and counteradvanced against Leningrad (just saying), that would have been an epic fail for Russia.