Stellar wrote:There was no million man army on the Southern flank of Army group center.
There was over half-a-million men in the units of the SWF alone. Regardless of losing their "tank strength", Hitler doubted - and so would anyone sane in his place! - that Army Group South would be successful in dealing with the Soviet SWF on it's own. And what if it weren't? In that case it would expose the advancing AGC to a flanking attack - not against the bulk of the Army Group Center forces, but against it's overextended supply lines.
Moreover, the turn southward was pre-ordained even before Hitler's main directive, because he consistently ordered the Wehrmacht to destroy Potapov's 5th Army that was threatening Reichenau's advance on Kiev from the Pripyat region, which was difficult terrain and quite rightly judged by Hitler as a major risk point.
But, if instead of turning for Kiev, Army Group Center peristed with the advance on Moscow, the proportion of forces would not guarantee success. Units of Army Group South would not be available for us. The advance of 60 divisions of Army Group Center would be going against 43 divisions of the Western Front, 35 divisions of Reserve Front, partly the Briansk front (up to 20 units), and up to 20 units formed in the Moscow Military District. More than that, the reserve of the Stavka for the Moscow direction also had 8 more divisions. This is 130 divisions all in all, capable of taking it to the battle of Moscow against a single 60-division strong German Army group, with no assistance from either North or South, because both of those would not be available for help.
Yes, I would agree with you that the turn south had only a secondary goal of eliminating the flank threat. It's first and foremost goal was
freeing up the units of Army Group South to be used in the Moscow offensive.
Stellar wrote:The operations in the Ukraine were far removed from the operations against Moscow and there were a very specific reason why there was a Army group North, Center and South.
See above. It all started after the Wehrmacht continously (!) failed to destroy and disperse Potapov's 5th Army, quite unlike other units. Then it was a matter of determining risks. Hitler thought the risk of advancing to Moscow with just Army Group Center is too great. Who're you, Mr. Armchair General, to think otherwise? With hindsight we know that the forces opposing AGC were large enough to make the issue not clear cut.
Stellar wrote:The entire Wehrmacht force were not directed at Moscow and both the South and Northern Groups were meeting with sufficient success ( about as conservative a claim as can be made) to guarantee that large forces could not disengage and threaten Army group Centers supply lines.
At the same time they were binding themselves in heavy combat, and failing to eliminate certain threats. See above. Moreover, them getting bogged down meant they would not be able to assist AGC in the fight for Moscow.
Stellar wrote:Army Group center was the strongest group but it was also logically expected to face the most Resistance on it's direct approach line to Moscow. As it turns out it was both strong enough to clear the approach Axis to Moscow by mid August 1941
Bull-shit. See the force proportion above.
Stellar wrote:...how the Russians could have defended Moscow with much less forces than the panzer's went up against in the Ukraine.
Really? See above. The USSR was already employing "permanent mobilization" by August. You're having your dates off. It's not just "OH THE SIBERIANS" who solved the battle for Moscow. The USSR already started forming new divisions, and in rather large numbers.
Stellar wrote:Well i think it is really a waste of my time to argue with people who believe in the inevitability of the German defeat when they were clearly defeating the USSR in 1941 and clearly defeating the USSR in 1942.
No, it failed to capture a major part of the Soviet industries (thanks to the masterfully done evacuation of factories in 1941), failed to utilize them efficiently, and failed to meet Barbarossa deadlines. The Wehrmacht wasn't "clearly defeating" the USSR in either 1941 or 1942, because it hadn't even met it's own targets of victory, and FAILED - I repeat for those too dense - FAILED to destroy the RKKA as a fighting force. The RKKA was badly beaten, but it never ceased operating as an Army.
Stellar wrote:Why this, according to you, changed when operation Barbarossa were initiated i do not know and why, when they had in two months destroyed or captured the entire army that were deployed against them at the start of the war
They had
not destroyed the
entire RKKA. That was the goal of Barbarossa, but
it was failed. A major part of it was destroyed, but the USSR's permanent mobilization strategy, industrial evacuation and mobilization started... and guess what, the task of Blitzkrieg is to DEFEAT the enemy until he mobilizes. The Germans failed to do that. The USSR mobilized, and turned the scales. Unlike Poland and all other nations, where the Blitz destroyed their standing armies COMPLETELY before they mobilized.
I think you should read a history book.
Stellar wrote:Why they kept right on losing in 1942 when they were not defeated in 1941 one doesn't know
Because tactical defeats can continue even after the strategic situation is decisively changed. If you're a moron who can't determine the difference between strategic success and tactical success, I can only feel sorry for you. But there are good books on why 1942 was a year with many losses, and yet the USSR won.
Stellar wrote:and why they suffered far more casualties in 1943 than they managed to inflict on the 'losers' in 1943 we can also just guess at.
Because 1943 was the breakneck year. The Wehrmacht was not broken in 1942 as a fighting force.
Stellar wrote:He managed to halt the German formations that could have, at some cost i will admit, have smashed the BEF
That's completely irrelevant for the war outcome.
Destruction of the BEF meant little in the grand scheme of things. It made a difference for Britain, but not for Germany if it still attacks the USSR and USA.
Stellar wrote:With the escape of the BEF he lost his chance for a invasion ( yes, it could be done given slight alternations to Luftwaffe strategy against RAF)
It couldn't. You should read Halder's diaries or something. The OKH did not consider "Sealion" feasible. After checking the ability of German industries to create enough landing craft, it found that it was completely infeasible in the 1940-1941 period. And how would they do it without landing craft?
Stellar wrote:Barbarossa was not a gamble in the sense that the campaign yield unexpected results as if one looks at the staff work and projections they are very accurate for the initial ten week campaign and only start diverging significantly in November. Up to that time casualties were lower than what they prepared for
Casualties matter not. What matters is reaching target keypoints. That was failed.
Stellar wrote:Remember that there is a difference between idealized expectations and what the General Staff projected they could accomplish with what they had; these projections are based on a thorough understanding of means and methods and it proved highly accurate up until the point where the Wehrmacht had defeated and captured more Russians than were under arms when they started the campaign.
The General Staff projected, and hoped to, annihilate the entire RKKA (well over 4-5 million men, if we include reservists and other drawn-up formations in mid-1941) before winter. It
was a failure. Either you don't understand what failure is, or what?
Let me explain it to you, moron. The German submarines sunk more tonnage than their cost. They were cost-effective. Also, Germany possessed the largest-in the world submarine fleet at the time of it's defeat. What does this mean? It means the German submarines were an utter failure. Because regardless of how much you ACCOMPLISH, it's irrelevant if you don't accomplish THE GOAL. The goal was NOT accomplished, no matter how you twist, and spin, the facts. The RKKA was not destroyed, and the USSR was NOT annihilated and defeated politically and militarily, which the Germans expected to occur BEFORE winter.
Stellar wrote:Which does not explain why they managed to clear the approaches to Moscow with the battle of Smolensk where another 600 000+ man army were routed with more than half being captured or killed.
Yeah, except the defence of Smolensk was a major slowdown. And see above. Why do you care about tactical victories, when the strategic situation was changing not for the Germans'?
Stellar wrote:The 'mistake' i am attempting to discuss happened after this and as the actions of Army group center proved they were very fighting fit still and not only managed to defeat a much larger Soviet force months later but also to give up their 'depleted' ( so called) panzer formations to aid in the destruction of a similar force in the Western Ukraine.
See above. Army Group Center would face Soviet permanent mobilization with newly forming divisions already in August.
Stellar wrote:Yes, i am sure we read the same books ten-fifteen years ago only it's clear that you stopped there.
Because you're an idiot who can't look up the numbers, right?
Main Industrial Output Gauges:
1940, Coal:
Germany [pre-war borders] 233,7 million ton
Annexed Reich regions 34,0 million ton
European Axis (Nazi satellites and occupied nations) 96,9 million ton
Total for the European Axis, including imports 364,6 million ton
USSR 165 million ton
Reich [Germany+Austria] to USSR ratio, coal production, 1940: 1,62
European Axis to USSR ratio, coal production, 1940: 2,21
1941, Coal:
Germany [pre-war borders] 239,5 million ton
Annexed Reich regions 76,0 million ton
European Axis (Nazi satellites and occupied nations) 87,3 million ton
Total for the European Axis, including imports 404,3 million ton
USSR 151,4 million ton
Reich [Germany+Austria] to USSR ratio, coal production, 1940: 2,08
European Axis to USSR ratio, coal production, 1940: 2,67
(Addendum - in 1942 coal production in the USSR: 75,5 million ton)
Steel, 1940
Reich alone [Germany+Austria]: 31,8 million tons
USSR: 18,3 million tons
(in 1941-1942 production in the USSR plummeted to 8,5 million tons and steadily was around 8-11 million tons during following years, and until the very end of the war, the USSR did not overcome the Reich in steel production)
Electricity, 1940
Reich [Germany+Austria], 77 billion kwt-h
USSR: 48,3 billion kwt-h
In 1942, the USSR made 29,1 billion kwt-h, in 1942 - 32,3 billion, and in 1944 - 39 billion. Meanwhile Germany in pre-war borders produced 46,5 billion in 1942, 47,4 billion in 1943 and 49 billion in 1944 (approximately) before collapsing in late 1944-1945.
Pig Iron, 1941
Germany: 37,9 million ton
USSR: 14,9 million ton
Oil, 1940
USSR: 31 million ton (1941: 33 million)
Germany [w/imports and captured holds]: IIRC 19,5 million ton
However, after the attack against the USSR, oil production fell to 18 million ton in the Soviet Union 1943, whereas Germany in the same year produced 8,9 million + 18 million of Romanian oil imports (+ minor other imports, including the US-Spanish oil deals, and European Axis imports). In 1945, the USSR barely made 19 million ton due to all the wartime ravage, and it took time to restore oil production to pre-war figures.
By all major industrial gauges, the USSR was inferior to Germany (not to mention the entire European Axis!), and only in one critical raw material it had supremacy (oil), which was negated by the German attack which made the European Axis have more oil than USSR.
Disparity in production:
The USSR produced 8 times more airplanes per 1 steel-cutting machine in service.
The USSR produced 5 times more tanks per 1 ton of steel.
The USSR even in 1942, the worst industrial year, produced
24 504 tanks and self-propelled artillery, whereas Germany - only 6 189 tanks. Germany had a 4 times advantage in tons of steel produced, but since the USSR produced 8 times more per ton, that equalled to 2 times more tanks overall than Germany. DESPITE the massive industrial advantage of Germany and the European Axis.
You're either a lying asshole, or what?
Stellar wrote:That was the ideal line for a efficient defence of European Russian against remaining Soviet power in Asian Russia. Even without capturing Leningrad or Moscow 1942 was a terrible year for the Red army and the only thing that kept it in fighting shape was that it were inflicting sufficient casualties on the Wehrmacht to prevent it from reaching such a defensible line.
See how you lied above? Now you admit that the RKKA was still "in fighting shape" and even managed to inflict enough casualties on the Wehrmacht so that it did not reach a "defensible line". That is a failure. Germany failed to destroy the RKKA as a fighting force, neither in 1941 nor in 1942.
Stellar wrote:Had Moscow and Leningrad fallen in 1941 as per this new time line the counter attacks staged by the fresh Siberian divisions could not have taken place and the German armed forces of 1942 very significantly stronger and it's possibilities for conquest in 1942 even greater than they turned out to be in historic fact.
"Fallen"? I think you're missing something. The Germans were not intent on taking Leningrad. They were intent on starving the entire city to death. Hitler and the OKH even had a special order that FORBADE to even ACCEPT the capitulation of Leningrad, even if such were offered, and the entire city was to be killed with it's whole population. As for Moscow, see above. There is absolutely no "hard evidence" Army Group Center could have TAKEN the city on it's own since the USSR already started re-forming units.
Stellar wrote:...the Red army consistently lost more troops, more equipment and more aircraft in those desperate winter assaults that more often than not utterly failed with heavy casualties. The winter war of 1941 was a terrible time for Red army made bearable only because they actually managed to inflict significant casualties while going on to take the punishment they had so far.
Yeah, well I never disputed it was a terrible time. However, the Germans failed their goals - that's "A". And "B", the USSR mobilized it's industry which was more efficient at producing armaments than Germany. This was doomspell.
Stellar wrote:I said nothing about the XX century but i can see why you wish to restrict it so.
Actually, I would love to see other examples of such intensity of slaughter per unit of time. The Nazi slaughter in Belorussia achieved a rate of 1,7 civilians killed per minute. Such a rate is only replicated by the Pnom Penh massacre. And yes, Nazi Germany commited unheard of a crime, and wanted to commit an even greater crime. You don't know it slated the "lesser races" for destruction and slavery? How much do you actually know, "Wikipedia"? How the fuck are "wars and disasters" relevant to fucking intensity of mass slaughter of civilians? Tell me.
Don't fucking throw general references to Wikipedia, go on and show me a unit, military, paramilitary or otherwise, which has achieved a similar kill rate of civilians or POWs (not soldiers!) per unit of time. I.e. over 1 person per minute or the like.
I excluded pre-XX century to not touch upon genocide of the American Indians and the like, which was more utter and complete, even if it took a longer time.
Stellar wrote:I suppose i should have said Waffen-SS ( The guys that draws all the fan boys and the one's raised to fight the Posleen) as they are what i presumed you understood we were talking about. The waffen SS committed more of their share of war crimes ( killing prisoners, etc) but were not generally involved in Holocaust.
If you understand "the Holocaust" only as killing the Jews in gas chambers? Or what? Let me explain: the Waffen SS has been formed from HARDCORE Nazi units (police battalions, Nazi volunteers and such) who had ALREADY been tained by such stellar actions as:
1) guarding death camps, a Crime A in itself
2) massacring civilian populations, assisting the Einsatztruppen and their like
3) pogroms
4) guarding concentration camps, a Crime A in itself
Stellar wrote:People have been getting annihilated for thousands of years in episodes that tragically doesn't make the NAZI efforts stand out to anyone other but those who don't know human history.
Yes, Nazi efforts do stand out. They murdered 10% of my country's population is THREE, and let me make it clear to you, boy, THREE YEARS. Unless you can find ANOTHER example of such brutality and intensity, I can very STRONGLY assure you the Nazi efforts DO stand out.
Stellar wrote:know that worse has happened and believe that worse can and will happen in the future.
What was worse than the Nazis that has happened? The genocide of American Indians, complete and utter, comes to mind. Other than that - I'm all ears.
Stellar wrote:On the other point why wouldn't my part of the world be affected?
Are you from the USA? In that case you should well know Germany lacked the ability to do shit to the USA. In fact, no one in the Axis had the resources for a military invasion of the USA. It was out of the question. Meanwhile, the USA industrial power alone was enough to bring the Axis to defeat. Hope that is clear enough.