From Posleen thread

[Stellar]

Hi ( again)

I believe the point was the Allies competence vis a vis the Germans, as opposed to the fortifications involved.
The Allies certainly faced a much more difficult operational task of assaulting the Atlatnic wall than the Germans did in attacking through the bocage country.

I hoped to make clear that i have reached the conclusion that the German 'Atlantic wall' ( it wasn't) can not sufficiently explain the lack of allied progress after they managed to deceive the Germans as to the target area of operation overlord and to smash trough the 'wall' defenses with significantly less casualties than even they believed. Obviously it should not be forgotten that the successfully deception played a large part in the light casualties but my point remains that after the initial success the allied schedule fell quickly and hopelessly behind schedule showing that either they significantly underestimated remaining German strength ( somewhat accurate) or overestimated their own capacity to fight. Since no one was surprised by how the countryside looked i must logically come to the conclusion that the allies made the same mistakes as in North Africa, Italy by expecting the Germans to fade away in the face of superior fire support.

The Allies difficulties cannot be dismissed purely as a result of German tactical superority.

No it can not but in my reading and opinion that is the conclusion i have reached. The allies has significant and well supplied forces in Normandy and could not employ them in tactically or theater specific ways to gain anything but their immediate objectives.

Neither could the Germans. Kesselring success should not be denied, but the Italian front was always meant to be a secondary front.

A secondary front where given the terrain they had to little chance to inflict significant German casualties without suffering many more of their own.

Indeed, much of the success Kesselring had could be attributed to the bulk of Allied airpower being focused on France and the landing. Supplies, landing craft, POL was all redirected towards the Normandy buildup.

Not in September 1943 it was not. Given the terrain nothing but a more warm bodies could have changed the situation and that's one thing the Allies ran short of shortly after the Normandy landings; the campaign in Italy surely aided the Russians somewhat ( and thus by extension the Allied chances for a successful Overlord) but it was done mostly to mollify the British and to keep Stalin from making ever more rude, but accurate, comments about how the west where not investing anywhere near the blood and resources Russia was. Depending on who you believe Stalin threatened them with coming to terms with Germany and there were secret ( well at the time) meetings between representatives before the campaign season of 1943

If more combat resources had been directed towards the Italian front, Kesselring defence would probably have been less successful, in particular, the use of airpower in interdicting the vulnerable supply routes of the German army.

Not significantly no. What was needed in Italy and Normandy both were more actual soldiers ( not people milling aimlessly around the rear areas) and since the Allies organizational capabilities and force structures were comparatively inefficient and their manpower going to many fronts as well they just didn't have those to commit to the Italian theater in 1943. It can be argued that they always had limited aims with the limited resources they could commit but considering the timetable for reaching various objectives ( notably Rome) it's clear that German resistance and Italian cooperation were not accurately projecte or offensives capabilities once again overestimated.

In what sense? Operation Shingle had 43 thousand casualties for the Allies, 40k casualties for the Axis forces involved. To make matters worse, the Allies have the manpower and medical resources to actually treat and rehab wounded, returning them to the front as effectives.

Yes similar casualties but not gained by employing similar resources. Operation Shingle had the aim of capturing Rome and yet the would be attackers soon found themselves besieged and fighting to maintain the bridgehead which consumed truly vast volumes of resources ( i think The fact that the Germans managed to inflict similar casualties while managing to evacuate Tenth Army in good order fighting nominally better equipped and supported soldiers speaks to the point that i have tried to make so far. I am not arguing that the allies couldn't win but trying to point out that the Germans managed to hang on longer than both sides expected on their worse days.

The Germans don't.
At this stage in the war, Allied medical care was superior to the Germans in every plausible sense, from plasma,blood, antibiotics to even hygiene and bed status. The Germans was so stretched for manpower that casualties were placed back on convalescent duty, and in 1944, back to the front before they have time to properly heal.

As for the casualties as far as i know the Germans managed to return a higher volume of soldiers to active service but admittedly they had little choice and plenty of defensive fighting/guard duties ( Norway, Greece, France etc ) where wounded soldiers could still be maintained while render good service. I can't say this is a area of particular interest to me but if you have a online source i would be most interested to look at the numbers.

There are problems with Allied doctrine, such as US tank doctrine but to suggest that it was the single biggest allied failing when one considers how effective the Allies coordinated artillery and airpower with their ground forces, the logistic superiority, the medical care....

They were copying the Germans, to the best of their abilities, and not doing it very well given the disparity in means and the disparity in resources expended. Again these are all too be expected given German recent experiences in the first world war and their titanic struggle in the East were mistakes were exposed relatively quickly and at cost. Logistical superiority is a function of resource capacity much the same as medical care is and given the very effective German defensive fighting as well as their earlier successes against European and Russian forces it wasn't logistics or a failure of doctrine that led to defeat but Hitlers strategic decisions. The irony of it all is that Hitler could have won his war had he trusted his generals to fight the wars after he so often made the decisive political decisions that allowed them a fighting chance.

Except that US airpower at this time was generating more sorties than the Germans did, with higher readiness rates and etc even when the Germans were at their height during the Battle of Britain.

Mid 1944 i would not consider that too surprising given a country under constant air attack and pilot training and production pretty badly matched in Germany fighting on so many fronts and being under air attack that constantly leads to logistical, parts&fuel supply disruptions. That the Luftwaffe managed to keep inflicting such high attrition rates on so many fronts is again in my opinion the surprising thing. Measuring combat capabilities in terms of readiness rates and sorties mounted is a great peacetime measure ( and a good measure in wartime when you achieve objectives) but in war you can only measure success and without having read enough about the state of both air forces in mid 1944 ( at which point the bomber effort were shifted to France and the transportation network to it) i can only make those objections. Notably the Germans still failed to win the battle of Britain despite achieving it's best readiness and sortie rates? Perhaps there is a lesson in this after all?

Again any specific online sources, with those numbers would gain my undivided attention.

The US would also better air support via Ninth Airforce during the subsequent breakout.
If anything, comparing Operation Goodwood friendly fire casualties, when the Bombers actually violated their own doctrine and orders and not to mention their respective commanders refusal to actually train said squadrons in tactical support is........ misleading.

Perhaps i can correct myself by suggesting that doctrine is as much about how you train and intend to fight as it is about what you have already brought to the fight in terms of human resources and fighting systems? What i am suggesting is that the Germans efforts in this combination were superior and that with the same volume of human resources and war materials their operational and tactical capabilities would have been , or as i see it, remained, greater

Ninth airforce had perfected other means of designating targets other than just laying out panels to mark out to Luffwaffe bombers. Part of the reason is Allied technical superiority in terms of radio at this time.

It's a question of emphasis ( the allies lost twenty two thousand bombers against Germany) and even in that i am not sure how you arrived at this statement of allied technical superiority in radio at this time. Could you elaborate as to why exactly you mean by 'superior'?

It is IMPOSSIBLE to seperate the Allies vast resources from any discussion of their doctrine.

Why? Why must those who have greater resources necessarily use it more efficiently or for it result in proportionally significant combat capabilities?

It is the Allies access to superior metals and electronics that allowed them to have aircraft of better performance, which translates to being able to exploit tactics that the Germans could not use.

Which superior electronics, superior metals and which aircraft with better performance? What does all those possibilities have to do with doctrine? Why do you see a logical connection between greater resources and a efficient employment of it? Why could Russia create so many more tanks out of a hundred tons of steel than the Germans could and why did that not directly translate into those larger numbers of tanks actually defeating the more inefficiently built German models? Why didn't the more numerous and superior British and French tanks have a more telling effect on the course of the battle of France? How did you arrive at the conclusion that greater allied resources, and thus potential, meant that they were destined to win and why do discard the notion that one can still defeat a enemy with higher resources capacity trough superior doctrine and strategic choices?

Ditto to their access to greater fuel and automobile industry, which translates to increased mobility and supplies which then translates to how the US could sustain airpower and ground battles longer.

All of which still nearly resulted in the suspension of the bomber offensive against Germany in October 1943 because of the flawed doctrine that unescorted bombers could strike at vital German targets. Bombers could not defend themselves and churning out bombers by the hundreds, at tremendous cost ( few understand that the bomber offensive cost the allies 160 000 lost in action and tremendous expenditure in resources) could not and did not change this fact. Even with Germans having to divert aircraft to East as well as three other significant fronts the bomber campaign were not sustainable and superior manpower and resources pools merely allowed the allies to absorb the punishment and change their doctrine accordingly; it never meant that they would or must have changed their doctrine.

Stellar

[K. A. Pital]

And you still can't address my points, Stellar. Hello?

[PainRack]

7
I hoped to make clear that i have reached the conclusion that the German 'Atlantic wall' ( it wasn't) can not sufficiently explain the lack of allied progress after they managed to deceive the Germans as to the target area of operation overlord and to smash trough the 'wall' defenses with significantly less casualties than even they believed. Obviously it should not be forgotten that the successfully deception played a large part in the light casualties but my point remains that after the initial success the allied schedule fell quickly and hopelessly behind schedule showing that either they significantly underestimated remaining German strength ( somewhat accurate) or overestimated their own capacity to fight. Since no one was surprised by how the countryside looked i must logically come to the conclusion that the allies made the same mistakes as in North Africa, Italy by expecting the Germans to fade away in the face of superior fire support.

Your comparison is utterly unsimilar. On one hand, you're comparing the broken French Army which had lost its best and most operationally ready divisions moving into Belgium and etc and on ther other, you're comparing a German Army that had not yet been defeated on the field.
A much better comparison would had been the Falaise pocket and etc before Allied supply difficulties and German reinforcements stabilised the line.

As for surprise, is there any indication that the Allies actually did plan for the fighting in brocade country? Or expected the Germans to fade away in the face of superior fire support?

No it can not but in my reading and opinion that is the conclusion i have reached. The allies has significant and well supplied forces in Normandy and could not employ them in tactically or theater specific ways to gain anything but their immediate objectives.

Because the Germans had fortified and planned to fight the battle at Normandy. Your comparision to the broken french army is simply not applicable. As it is, after the Allies broke out, the Germans were utterly routed.

A secondary front where given the terrain they had to little chance to inflict significant German casualties without suffering many more of their own.

Please don't break my cogent points apart. Its irritating.

Not in September 1943 it was not. Given the terrain nothing but a more warm bodies could have changed the situation and that's one thing the Allies ran short of shortly after the Normandy landings; the campaign in Italy surely aided the Russians somewhat ( and thus by extension the Allied chances for a successful Overlord) but it was done mostly to mollify the British and to keep Stalin from making ever more rude, but accurate, comments about how the west where not investing anywhere near the blood and resources Russia was. Depending on who you believe Stalin threatened them with coming to terms with Germany and there were secret ( well at the time) meetings between representatives before the campaign season of 1943

Say what? Are we referring to the campaign where the Allies DID force the Germans and the Italians back and inflicted comparable casualties?

Not significantly no. What was needed in Italy and Normandy both were more actual soldiers ( not people milling aimlessly around the rear areas) and since the Allies organizational capabilities and force structures were comparatively inefficient and their manpower going to many fronts as well they just didn't have those to commit to the Italian theater in 1943. It can be argued that they always had limited aims with the limited resources they could commit but considering the timetable for reaching various objectives ( notably Rome) it's clear that German resistance and Italian cooperation were not accurately projecte or offensives capabilities once again overestimated.

And? You appear to be subtly changing the point of argument.
To clarify, what IS your argument again?

Yes similar casualties but not gained by employing similar resources. Operation Shingle had the aim of capturing Rome and yet the would be attackers soon found themselves besieged and fighting to maintain the bridgehead which consumed truly vast volumes of resources ( i think The fact that the Germans managed to inflict similar casualties while managing to evacuate Tenth Army in good order fighting nominally better equipped and supported soldiers speaks to the point that i have tried to make so far. I am not arguing that the allies couldn't win but trying to point out that the Germans managed to hang on longer than both sides expected on their worse days.

The Americans defence in the Phillipines, the Bostgeune Pocket, the Russians success in holding Leningrad and Stalingrad....... all of these are just as valid examples of Allied tactical success. The Battle of Imphal highlights the British Army renewed ability to fight jungle warfare and sustain a defence via airpower.

Hell, Heath ability to salvage his Indian corps down the Malayan pennisula in somewhat "intact" fighting formation is ALSO an example of brilliant military leadership. Given the known deficiencies of the Malayan command, the roads and the lack of mechanisation/supplies/communications to fight a delaying defence, the Indian formations success in actually remaining as fighting organisations deserves to be recognised. Especially when compared to the Australians which had gained the lion share of the disastrous Malayan campaign credit.

As for the casualties as far as i know the Germans managed to return a higher volume of soldiers to active service

They did it by returning convalescent soldiers back to the front. Soldiers who should had been recovering from wounds and etc.

I can't say this is a area of particular interest to me but if you have a online source i would be most interested to look at the numbers.

Unfortunately, no. But I would like to highlight the key factors that the Allies access to penicillin in and as of itself is a life saving treatment that maintained combat fitness by itself.... just by reducing the rates of VD.

Similarly, the Americans organisation of blood drives is unparalleled by any Axis power.

They were copying the Germans, to the best of their abilities, and not doing it very well given the disparity in means and the disparity in resources expended. Again these are all too be expected given German recent experiences in the first world war and their titanic struggle in the East were mistakes were exposed relatively quickly and at cost. Logistical superiority is a function of resource capacity much the same as medical care is and given the very effective German defensive fighting as well as their earlier successes against European and Russian forces it wasn't logistics or a failure of doctrine that led to defeat but Hitlers strategic decisions.

Sheer nonsense. Even in 1940, the British logistical arm was superior to the Germans. The RAF maintained higher operational readiness rates and had a deeper operational reserve compared to the German Luffwaffe.
They had a larger airfield repair capacity. Industrial production, the use of women ferry pilots also meant that squadrons had a deeper reserve of machines to continue fighting the Luffwaffe.
Resource capacity is nothing without the organisational means to actually sustain it. Witness General Slim campaign in Burma.
Or the stunning logistical means of the US to actually fight on two seperate campaigns in the Pacific and sustain two fleet trains.
Resources do play a role, but the Germans were not superior at logistic areas even in 1940. By 1943 and 44, the Allies superiority in this became decisive as American resources and industrial/management know-how poured in.

The irony of it all is that Hitler could have won his war had he trusted his generals to fight the wars after he so often made the decisive political decisions that allowed them a fighting chance.

The SAME generals that Guderian berated for not understanding armoured warfare, for being too timid in the use of Blitzkrieg, for not understanding the Germans logistical difficulties on the front?

Mid 1944 i would not consider that too surprising given a country under constant air attack and pilot training and production pretty badly matched in Germany fighting on so many fronts and being under air attack that constantly leads to logistical, parts&fuel supply disruptions.

my comparison was with 1940. Not 44. The Allied air sortie rate in 1944 vis a vis Luffwaffe 1940.

Perhaps i can correct myself by suggesting that doctrine is as much about how you train and intend to fight as it is about what you have already brought to the fight in terms of human resources and fighting systems? What i am suggesting is that the Germans efforts in this combination were superior and that with the same volume of human resources and war materials their operational and tactical capabilities would have been , or as i see it, remained, greater

Then that would be discussing the organisational doctrine and knowhow. Are you seriously going to compare American think-tank knowledge with the Germans utter failure in coordinating research and industrial production? Hitler and Goering appointment of incompetents to the above tasks are legendary.

It's a question of emphasis ( the allies lost twenty two thousand bombers against Germany) and even in that i am not sure how you arrived at this statement of allied technical superiority in radio at this time. Could you elaborate as to why exactly you mean by 'superior'?

The Americans and British had superior transistor/valve technology, which allowed them to have greater communications flexibility at this point in time.

Why? Why must those who have greater resources necessarily use it more efficiently or for it result in proportionally significant combat capabilities?

Because the Americans could and did use their resources more efficiently.

Why could Russia create so many more tanks out of a hundred tons of steel than the Germans could and why did that not directly translate into those larger numbers of tanks actually defeating the more inefficiently built German models?

By 1944, the Russians may not have been superior in tactics, but their stragetic and operational means of combat were already SUPERIOR to the Germans. Their success in maintaining deception, concealing beacheads, marshalling resources and coordinating massive assaults is well known. The Germans were not without their failing, namely, the defence and successful recovery of troops encircled by the Russians, but to argue that the Russian doctrine was inferior is...........

[K. A. Pital]

Why could Russia create so many more tanks out of a hundred tons of steel than the Germans could

1) Because Russian tanks look much fewer manhours to complete.
2) Because Russia had an overall more efficient organization of mass design production, not dispersing efforts but concentrating on a few chassis with minor modifications until the very end of the war.
2) Because Russian tanks had a more simple and robust construction in some ways - this resulted to less steel being spent on repairs and fine parts, etc.
3) Because Russia went to total mobilization in 1941 (hence more steel being used directly for war needs), whereas Germany continued a half-assed commitment until 1943.

...why did that not directly translate into those larger numbers of tanks actually defeating the more inefficiently built German models?

It did. Russia defeated Germany, nes pa? Unless there's some other World War II in a parallel world where you live.

[Stellar]

Except that you can have vehicles that are armored enough to be completely invulnerable to rear line troops. As for undefended vehicles, I'm pretty sure that they do have those for demolishing human cities and converting the materials to their use. They probably make interesting explosions.

Since this is a bit of a side issue i will just again say that you are presuming a posleen organizational and supply structure that functions like a human one where no such thing is in evidence. Why they would require it with what we do know about them i don't understand either so i am going to leave it there as i am apparently unable to convince you that the Posleen are not human.

Except we can destroy their equipment and ammunition. At the simplest we can simply make the area the troops died impossible for them to recover. Or we can collect the gear and use it. Or we can simply do enough damage that it is useless. Just naplam the area until everything melts together.

Some of it will be destroyed by artillery and the like but again you are presuming that humans are in control of the field of battle afterwards and that the posleen do not or can not even eat their dead or use what still works.

Except that only their rockets can get through the armor we are talking about.

The 3mm shells also penetrate the suit armor, at right angles in most areas, and the cumulative effect would quickly be severe when the books states that even 1mm shells can weaken the armor significantly in the course of a battle.

What I am proposing has a large enough spread so that it doesn't take up the same slot as artillary.

This is not a war game and we are not attempting to fill 'slots' so that we have 'varied' arms that looks cool. Ideally if it has no place in the doctrine it wont be on the battlefield and i still see no reason to have M1's in the posleen battlefields other than the fact that they are already in the inventory, the factories still going, and their capabilities relatively well understood. That is why we DO see them on the battlefield but not evidence that they are a efficient expenditure of resources or has any place given alternative options such as suits. As many generals have remarked over time they fight with what they have not with what they might have wanted given a choice.

And the Darhel claimed they had problem making AIs that were obedient...

I am talking about our real world capabilities back in the year 2000 when we could have deployed very clumsy armed robots ( entirely different story in the air) that probably would not have done much to stop the Posleen. If the Darhel says the suits needs a person inside to function that's the way it is in that universe or the way it works in the Darhel military industrial complex.

So we have no idea of its effective range.

If it has line of sight and it's sensors locates your position ( and there are less targets than posleen firing) your dead unless you move or have sufficient cover/armor.

How can you evade rounds that are going at a good percentage of c?

I shouldn't have to hold your hand while you work trough basics like this. If you have not figured out why regular bullets ( lets use the M-16 at around 3000 ft/s) can and do miss moving or static targets, such as your average resistance fighter/ terrorist ( select your preference)in Afghanistan Iraq i am beginning to understand why we are not, and probably never will, agree on much here.

Also you don't need to worry about counter-fire if you are killing the enemy before they can get a shot off. Against human armies this doesn't work, but they don't generally come in waves that are unable to use cover.

This is why they use unarmored artillery systems by the tens of thousands in the war against the Posleen. Human armies can not replace their losses ( or train them) faster than they can kill Posleen and they do not outnumber you by a factor of thousands to one at the start with birth to gun totting phase amounting to a couple of years. If ONLY you could stop seeing the posleen as stupid humans with four legs you might not just enjoy the books but start seeing how things could end up the way they do in this particular universe.

That you can simply pull back. They are slower than any vehicle we can build.

Whether they will be faster than a horse at galloping speed with sufficiently armored running gear, or frontal armor in general, to survive such a retreat is a open question. Either way the troops can not retreat that fast so if the tanks must retreat the battle is either lost or the tanks fighting from forward positions where they can trade space for time.

Railgun rounds are supposed to be hitting .1 c. Do you honestly think sand is going to stop that?

At such a high speed the kinetic energy release release will probably be sufficient to fuse any sand/matter it comes into near contact with and will thus probably create penetrating difficulties for the very small 'bullet'. Having said that the heat release and explosive effect of that penetration will probably kill anyone above ground, for some ways around it, as the fused sand explodes when finally penetrated. Someone who has had more training in the field could probably work up a interesting description of what it would be like to try fight/survive from a regular or concrete/steel reinforced trench line....

Thanks- I'm not really a military expert. Of course that could be useless if the armor protects from the rounds... but the momentum causes it to break off from the rest of the vehicle. The laws of physics in the story need work.

I doubt there are any 'military experts' ( certainly not me, remind me more often to apologise for trying to sound like one) here and if they are they not in my opinion participating. This is a sci fi book and frankly speaking there is a whole host of things that we are doing today that were equally 'impossible' or not 'accurate' according to the then 'laws of physics' fifty years ago. The only thing that scientist around the world consistent shows us is that we don't know much and much of what we know are either mistaken or so incomplete that it leads to as many false assumptions as correct one's with detours often consuming decades of effort and resources.

Yes it was. Germany was aiming for a short war unlike WW1 and the only way to do that would be to go through Belgium into France.

The Germans got close enough to capturing Paris in the first world war ( go read about how Paris rail and car/taxi's network were used to shift reserves) and 'blitzkrieg' were already the aim of the Germans who well understood that investing Paris would seriously hamper the French capacity to mobilise manpower or defend France effectively. The Germans had every intent to do in the first world war what they did to France in the second but lost the first relatively quickly ( if you can say that) because they were not as successful as in the prior Prussian/North and South German alliance Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and were forced to fight a two front war much earlier than in the second world war. In fact speed and focusing your military means in decisive ways have always been a hallmark of great conquerors and if there were much doubt the still relatively recent brilliance of Napoleon, not a hundred years ago, certainly showed the way.

That was in no way inevitable until the Nazis seized power.

But the Nazi seizure of power were in no way inevitable either and Hitler and his Nazi's had to steal power when the German people repeatedly showed that they would rather have a pretty near or fully senile Hindenburg in power than him. Historic events are not inevitable by virtue have history having happened that way and the notion that Germany HAD to defeat France, were always set to lose the Battle of Britain, could not have invaded Britain, or could not have defeated the SU is misplaced.

The fact that German occupation policies gradually evolved into mass executions in responce to partisan activity?

Nothing new about that even in the twentieth century.

I'm pretty sure Germany didn't exactly pay for what they took- wasn't it all backed by fiat money that was essentially worthless?

All money is essentially useless as it's just pieces of paper. What makes money work is our trust in each other and in the system and since the French knew that the Germans had the power to do what they pleased their 'fiat' money were good as gold. In the end of the day, sadly, terror works and France was quite the efficient workhorse.

Serious Business.

We have both spent so much time discussing it that i obviously can't be anything but a critically important issue.

Read the responce you gave above this one. The one where you claim their activies are carried out to justify their budget which is why they are non-optimal. When given a real threat that justifies their existance they will no longer need to spend time and energy justifying their activies and will presumably work better.

Sadly i have been compelled to give up on the notion that our 'elected' ( well sometimes at least) leaders often have our collective, or often even national, interest at heart and that their disastrous decisions making processes and policy choices are mistaken or wrong, but good intentioned, or based on some derivative notion of the idea that they are doing what is 'right' even if we can't see it. I a way i am glad that you still have so much faith in the system, as that is easier on the mind, but in many other ways it just shows that you think in a very euro centric ( or American centric if you like) way where the full effects of their inhuman policies are not so often felt.

By which time they will be significantly less radioactive.

Agreed meaning that it is far less likely to cause serious damage by skin contact but no less deadly when ingested or inhaled. The biosphere would still be polluted and water supplies would be contaminated and crops ruined for at least that season.

Generally situations that involve the extermination of the human species by alien hordes are considered acceptable times to ignore the environmental consequences of military action. Mostly because if we lose such considerations become irrelevant.

Again you think my criticism of such a policy is based on my imagined love of polar bears, centipedes or the protection of the biosphere for it's own sake when i am in fact arguing that we would only use a very few such weapons because that's the only way we could secure or food/water supply. If these these resources can be supplied or stored in amounts large enough to sustain the American population of 300 odd million then i would have no objection to using nukes where they would prove to be effective. You might want to consider that the posleen are not much affected by fallout or the like so if you don't kill or incapacitate them outright they will probably just keep coming with whatever they have left.

Stellar

[Stellar]

Hi stas,

And i thought it would be obvious that my questions about the efficiency of the SU's production capabilities were rhetorical.

Just a few points i would still like to make...

1. The 'inefficiently' constructed German tanks still managed to achieve a much higher rate of destruction of Soviet IFV meaning that given their much higher steel production this in itself did not lead to Soviet victory.

2. Russia did have design bureaus that did great work but only in terms of making things relatively reliable and easily constructed. When it comes to actual fighting efficiency there is plenty of negative commentary associated with the KV's and T-34's and later derivative models.

3. I agree that Russia's total mobilization were very important but it should be pointed out that at that point they were so near defeat that anything short of such measures would have invited near immediate defeat.

4. Germany did fight with one hand behind it's back until 1943 and as the historic record shows what they achieved in six weeks in June and July of 1941 took the SU three years to recover from with notable lend lease assistance, and some minor fronts, from two other major global powers.

It did. Russia defeated Germany, nes pa? Unless there's some other World War II in a parallel world where you live.

The SU did defeat Germany but did not do so on it's own and in my opinion could not have done so. As for the claim that Germany never had a chance to defeat the SU why then did it take the SU about 40 months to recover the majority of the pre invasion borders? Why did it take the mighty 'undefeatable' SU three years to take back what the Germans apparently 'stole' , in the dark of night, in two months? Why is it that the brilliant early victories are so easily dismissed as if they were somehow as inevitable as the eventual German defeat? Can't the Russians just win right from the start and if so why hasn't that been the case for the three wars with what we can now call a unified Germany? Why must they always be beaten to near death only to stage at some later, well mostly if you don't count 1917, date a 'inevitable recovery? Why is this seen as par for the course and why are such ludicrous notions not laughed out of the room?

Since you asked i have not responded to your earlier post because i would like to do more than say 'no , this is what happened' and assembling online sources takes time. Since you have ignored the earlier sources ( And cited Hitlers worries as well as mentioning phantom armies that only existed on Russian orders of battle; much like the phantom armies Hitler commanded in May 1945) i would like to use a few more and make them more specific. That will take time so do not bother to invest too much time in responding to this post with much other than proof for the organized existence of the divisions and armies that you claim were ready for a defense of Moscow in late September and August of 1941.

Thanks.

Stellar

[PainRack]

1. The 'inefficiently' constructed German tanks still managed to achieve a much higher rate of destruction of Soviet IFV meaning that given their much higher steel production this in itself did not lead to Soviet victory.

In WHICH year. By 1944 and 1945, the casualty rates had actually swung the other way in terms of tank to tank combat.

2. Russia did have design bureaus that did great work but only in terms of making things relatively reliable and easily constructed. When it comes to actual fighting efficiency there is plenty of negative commentary associated with the KV's and T-34's and later derivative models.

In what sense? The T-34 as a tank alone was superb, up to the 85mm variant. Its only deficiencies when compared to the Germans Panther were the Germans superior sights, communications and relative ease. That and as the war dragged on, the Soviets industrial force began to face quality issues that had up to a quarter of its tank force needing replacement every year.
Then again, the Germans also faced similar quality issues vis a vis their use of slave labour.

The SU did defeat Germany but did not do so on it's own and in my opinion could not have done so.

In terms of the trial of combat as opposed to supplies? Certainly it could. The Germans never withdrew more than 50% of its personnel from the Russian front at any time. The Russians were inflicting the majority of German army casualties in 1943-1945.
At best, one might argue that that the Strategic bombing of Germany was "vital".

As for the claim that Germany never had a chance to defeat the SU why then did it take the SU about 40 months to recover the majority of the pre invasion borders? Why did it take the mighty 'undefeatable' SU three years to take back what the Germans apparently 'stole' , in the dark of night, in two months? Why is it that the brilliant early victories are so easily dismissed as if they were somehow as inevitable as the eventual German defeat? Can't the Russians just win right from the start and if so why hasn't that been the case for the three wars with what we can now call a unified Germany? Why must they always be beaten to near death only to stage at some later, well mostly if you don't count 1917, date a 'inevitable recovery? Why is this seen as par for the course and why are such ludicrous notions not laughed out of the room?

Except NOBODY here has actually made ANY of these comments. The closest you get is that the Germans doomed themselves to failure due to strategic incompetence in 1940.

Since this is a bit of a side issue i will just again say that you are presuming a posleen organizational and supply structure that functions like a human one where no such thing is in evidence. Why they would require it with what we do know about them i don't understand either so i am going to leave it there as i am apparently unable to convince you that the Posleen are not human.

The Posleen do not have teleporters. They still need to transport fuel, arms and ammunition. Even if we do assume the in universe Posleen can survive on mere willpower alone, their miltiary machine still requires ammo. Unless you can bring up in universe arguments to argue otherwise.

This is why they use unarmored artillery systems by the tens of thousands in the war against the Posleen. Human armies can not replace their losses ( or train them) faster than they can kill Posleen and they do not outnumber you by a factor of thousands to one at the start with birth to gun totting phase amounting to a couple of years. If ONLY you could stop seeing the posleen as stupid humans with four legs you might not just enjoy the books but start seeing how things could end up the way they do in this particular universe.

Evidence of this unarmored artillery systems by the tens of thousands early in the war? At best, we see Shiva and some Maelstorm, guns later.
The Ringo military is definitely NOT set up to be an efficient meat grinder. It places too much reliance on walls and infantry as opposed to depth of firepower.

The Germans got close enough to capturing Paris in the first world war ( go read about how Paris rail and car/taxi's network were used to shift reserves) and 'blitzkrieg' were already the aim of the Germans who well understood that investing Paris would seriously hamper the French capacity to mobilise manpower or defend France effectively. The Germans had every intent to do in the first world war what they did to France in the second but lost the first relatively quickly ( if you can say that) because they were not as successful as in the prior Prussian/North and South German alliance Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and were forced to fight a two front war much earlier than in the second world war. In fact speed and focusing your military means in decisive ways have always been a hallmark of great conquerors and if there were much doubt the still relatively recent brilliance of Napoleon, not a hundred years ago, certainly showed the way.

One sees that you neglected to mention that the German warplan was strategically unfeasible and actually had no real strategic goals. They needed to move infantry divisions across vast distances, multiple units along the same roads while facing a defender who could mobilise and entrench much faster than they could. Granted, the second was not ineveitable or a known fact but the first should had been. German brutal orders regarding partisans emerges entirely from this fact that the Germans couldn't afford to be slowed down in Belgium at any costs........ but they did and were.

Similarly, the Germans had no clear idea what to do once they broke through the frontier. This would be repeated continously in the 1st World War as German offensives focus on breaking the defence without any clear strategic goals set before the offensive itself.

[Stellar]

Hi painrack,

In WHICH year. By 1944 and 1945, the casualty rates had actually swung the other way in terms of tank to tank combat.

In the years that mattered before the war when the large majority of the force that got within sight of Moscow were constructed. By 1944/45 the Germans were retreating on all fronts with mobility kills turning into total losses and even then the panthers and Tigers ( which i presume we are talking about since the Mark IV's, Stug's and marders worked quite well) were managing exchange rates with T-34's and Shermans that in my mind at least invalidates the notion that the Allies somehow 'won' because they could and did manufacture tanks more efficiently. Admittedly the purpose of tanks are not to stand off and shoot it out with each other but making tanks that are lost as quickly as you make them ( because you refuse to make them any differently by design changes and production line retooling) is not in my reading any reason for great praise.

In what sense? The T-34 as a tank alone was superb, up to the 85mm variant. Its only deficiencies when compared to the Germans Panther were the Germans superior sights, communications and relative ease. That and as the war dragged on, the Soviets industrial force began to face quality issues that had up to a quarter of its tank force needing replacement every year.
Then again, the Germans also faced similar quality issues vis a vis their use of slave labour.

The t-34 (later 85) were superb in many ways but the two man turret basically meant that it had a very slow rate of fire, poor target acquisition characteristics ( partly trough a overworked commander/gunner arrangements) which invalidated much of the other great attributes and with predictable results when it ran into even inferior mark III's at the start of the war. Perhaps another point that can be made is as to why the war did drag on? If the t-34 were so fantastic how was it ever defeated , and mostly by Pak's, assault guns and whatever else came to hand for a regular infantry formation? The quality issue is bound to happen when the exceptionally high casualties the T-34s suffered could not be made good in the factories and they were pressed to produce more and more or lose their heads for failing. It was not a 'accident' just a question of people doing what they had to to reach production goals that were quickly squandered on the front due to singularly bad design choices that meant that even thought the T-34 could get to the battle, move around it with easy and absorb some hits it was never as effective a combat platform as the Mark IV/V's whether that be combat against tanks, anti tank guns or German assault guns.

In terms of the trial of combat as opposed to supplies? Certainly it could. The Germans never withdrew more than 50% of its personnel from the Russian front at any time. The Russians were inflicting the majority of German army casualties in 1943-1945.
At best, one might argue that that the Strategic bombing of Germany was "vital".

Without the invasion of Italy in 1943, the Invasion of western Europe ( even the threat kept sizable forces there; if they could be supplied in the East is another question thought) in 44 the constant drain on the Luftwaffe fighting on three additional fronts and the massive lend lease efforts i wonder how many offensives they Su could have staged in 1943 and 44 and what their likely results would have been. It is my opinion that the Wehrmacht inflicted such significant economic damage and manpower casualties ( many additional millions by denying access to manpower behind German lines) in 1941 and managed to retain such a significant capability to inflict disproportionate casualties in 1942 and 43 that with different strategic choices( Hitlers insistence on economic strategic aims in my reading lost Germany the war in the East) the war in the East could have still ended in a settlement or a eventual German victory there.

Except NOBODY here has actually made ANY of these comments. The closest you get is that the Germans doomed themselves to failure due to strategic incompetence in 1940.

I think the following shows that even a few of those who are actively participating seem to think that Barbarossa could not have met with success no matter the aims or the potency of the Wehrmacht. Admittedly i attacked a few straw men but at worse i was just making sure they did not complete them by showing how silly it would be to try defend them.( ) Why they said what they did above they would better be able to specify themselves as they have apparently forgotten what happened in 1917 and that the Stalin and his gang ( the one's he had not already killed) kept the SU together by the type of main force that makes even Hitlers theft of power , and killings, look modest by comparison. Since Stas is around i am sure he will clarify his position and perhaps Vehrec wishes to do so too.

His Reich was doomed when he initiated Barbarossa and later declared war on America. Critical failures. The rest matters not, in the grand scheme of things.

Stas Bush

Going after the BEF was taking a major risk. Do you know that taking major risks does not always yield success? The same could be said of the Moscow operation. The entire Barbarossa was a huge gamble anyway - the Germans prepared oils and fuels and supplies only till Autumn. They had no plans for a protracted war.

Stas Bush

Professional study logistics. You understand this, yes? You also should understand that there were very real supply shortages, the Soviet union had NOT been defeated, and that the Panzers had outrun their supply lines and dumps hundreds of miles short of Moscow. By failing to encircle and defeat the entire Soviet Army in their first 500 or so Kilometer dash, the Germans lost all hope of succeeding in Operation Barbarossa.

Vehrec

The Posleen do not have teleporters. They still need to transport fuel, arms and ammunition. Even if we do assume the in universe Posleen can survive on mere willpower alone, their miltiary machine still requires ammo. Unless you can bring up in universe arguments to argue otherwise.

They do not need 'fuel' ( the 'chariot' thingies have built in power sources that last far longer than the owners do) and the Posleen live off the land for the most part and when their food or ammunition runs out they retreat and go fetch more; no mention is made of truck drivers or ammunition trains so i don't understand the presumption and insistence that they are there. The ammunition question is relatively easily settled when we consider that the 'pellets' fired are 1mm in size and owner a horse sized being; he can carry more ammunition than he will expend before he dies in the same way that T-34's where relatively consistently destroyed before they had a chance to break down from whatever design flaws there might have been. The issue of running out of ammunition just doesn't come up very often with so many casualties to scavenge from and so much inherent capacity to carry it along.

Evidence of this unarmored artillery systems by the tens of thousands early in the war? At best, we see Shiva and some Maelstorm, guns later.
The Ringo military is definitely NOT set up to be an efficient meat grinder. It places too much reliance on walls and infantry as opposed to depth of firepower.

Yes, in the second book during the first landing and the battles for the coastal cities there is thousands of artillery tubes of various calibre's in evidence and as the war drags on to a necessarily more static nature ( defending the valley's and fortress cities) the reliance on artillery grows exponentially as effectiveness grows with more limited fields of fire. I am not talking about the Shiva's or the Maelstorm guns which are both experiments to deal with lander being used as fire support. In the first instance the Shiva's guns were not intended to be mobile but in fact a response to the inability of the galactics to supply sufficient weapons to outfit all the designed planetary defense systems as we as local defenses. Since it was observed that 16 inch armor piercing shells had some effect they decided that the PD defense centers would be outfitted with a derivative weapon ( considering the ranges involved and greater abilities around the turn of the century) that had both the range and the penetrating power to defeat the massively armored landers where the lighter losat, based on the same principle but with active guidance, had not much chance.

When the decision was taken to attempt to make these guns mobile i don't think was specified but i presumed ( suspension of disbelief being a required ability for such reading material) that you needed a massive perpetrator to get trough the armor as well as to have a sufficiently destructive effect on the way trough. Either way the Shiva systems turned out to have been the design choice in this universe perhaps only because they already had a gun that they knew could get the job done with one shot. I am sure you are aware of the ongoing arguments about the 'effectiveness' of 5.56 round as compared to the 7.62 ( M16 ,M14) and i think this is basically similar.

As to your statement that there is too much reliance on walls and infantry i don't know what else you can do but have walls ( which if breached channels the posleen and protect your rear lines from direct fire from the entire approaching mass) followed by successive lines of trenches and field works in which to absorb any breaches of your main line defenses that contains the majority of your well supplied robotic defenses.

One sees that you neglected to mention that the German warplan was strategically unfeasible and actually had no real strategic goals. They needed to move infantry divisions across vast distances, multiple units along the same roads while facing a defender who could mobilise and entrench much faster than they could. Granted, the second was not ineveitable or a known fact but the first should had been.

It had the strategic goal of advancing trough Belgium to outflank defending French forces, and encircle them against the German border, thereby cutting them off from their support centers while capturing Paris with the right flank of this wheeling force. The strategically 'unfeasibility' lay mostly in the fact that they left insufficient forces to guard against Russia ( which they i suppose should have known would attack) and where then forced to move reinforcements meant for the Western front to defeat the Russians attack in that critical time where they were still very successful in France. If not for that diversion of manpower the initial supply problems and slower than expected advance towards Paris might, in my lay opinion might have been overcome and Paris probably taken as result. If that would have ended the war i don't know but given the nature of mobilization and the significant casualties France had already suffered i think a second 1870 as outcome was not unlikely.

German brutal orders regarding partisans emerges entirely from this fact that the Germans couldn't afford to be slowed down in Belgium at any costs........ but they did and were.

You say partisans i say Russians..... When a national government has surrendered partisans have no legal standing and they have for most of human history been treated in exactly that way. Why German actions , by making sure that it was understood that partisans were shot on sight, were called 'brutal' because they happen to be more efficient at implementing more efficiently what everyone else did i do not know but i suspect that's one of the results of being successful....

Similarly, the Germans had no clear idea what to do once they broke through the frontier. This would be repeated continously in the 1st World War as German offensives focus on breaking the defence without any clear strategic goals set before the offensive itself.

I am not sure how it can be argued that the Germans had no clear strategic goals in 1914.... As for lacking strategic goals in the later phases of the war i must admit that i would have to do much additional reading before i could suggest that the Germans had more or less clear strategic goals than the allies did during world war one.

Stellar

[K. A. Pital]

Why they said what they did above they would better be able to specify themselves as they have apparently forgotten what happened in 1917

I know quite a lot about what happened - what do you know and how is that relevant to the thread and my or Vehrec's statements?

and that the Stalin and his gang ( the one's he had not already killed) kept the SU together by the type of main force that makes even Hitlers theft of power , and killings, look modest by comparison.

How so? Explain yourself.

Since Stas is around i am sure he will clarify his position and perhaps Vehrec wishes to do so too.

The only one who has to clarify a position is you. You lied twice - first, when I asked you a direct question, which unit, paramilitary or otherwise, has achieved a kill rate (i.e. intensity of deaths per unit of time) comparable to that of the Nazis. You failed to answer. Next, when I unambigiously stated that the Reich Industry was vastly superior to the USSR by sheer output, and provided statistics.

[Stellar]

I know quite a lot about what happened - what do you know and how is that relevant to the thread and my or Vehrec's statements?

Hi Stas,

Because in 1917 after years of destruction and many defeats a corrupt system of government where overthrown, and a armistice signed, and replaced by sadly yet another corrupt and even more brutal system. My question is whether you think Stalin stayed in Moscow because it couldn't happen again or because he understood that in Russia people respected power and would mostly accept being ruled by those who were most ruthless. I am questioning your apparent faith in the idea that Russia could not be defeated by capturing Leningrad ( could have happened, road was open for a couple of days), Moscow or other seats of government and industry after having lost as many men under arms as i started the war with.

How so? Explain yourself.

Stalin was a brutal dictator long before Hitler got his hands on a modicum of power and ruled the SU in a way that made nazi Germany seem almost progressive. The people of SU did not at first resist because they cared much who ruled them but because they were compelled to fight or face execution; in fact there were division sized battles between police units and retreating formations who were then 'liquidated' for not holding positions as ordered. Only many propaganda days later and on retaking some of the German held areas did it become clear to most Russian citizens that they wouldn't be much better off under a German dictatorship and might in fact be a whole lot worse off. Well done Hitler.

The only one who has to clarify a position is you. You lied twice - first, when I asked you a direct question, which unit, paramilitary or otherwise, has achieved a kill rate (i.e. intensity of deaths per unit of time) comparable to that of the Nazis.

Since i never specified a era ( you decided on that because you probably don't know that history extends a bit further back than sixty years) you can go look at what happened to Baghdad in 1258 or to China shortly afterwards.

Since i am lazy ,and you can't seem to do anything for yourself, there are more complete genocides ( of actual peoples, not quasi tribal religious groups) but you can start with some of the better known one's here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Destructio ... gol_Empire.

Where the Chinese bad at addition or what happened to roughly 60 million out of 120 million Chinese between 1280 and 1300 ? What happened to the Persian population? Russia? Romania?

Again this is what i consider to be accurate and it in no way means that the lesser genocides or crimes should not be condemned. I just can not stand the shortsightedness and ignorance that results in people thinking of Germans as uniquely 'evil' or 'efficient' and thus that these things did not happen before and can not or will not happen again.We must ALWAYS be on guard to prevent societies from decaying into these kinds of barbaric behaviour and we should not consider it impossible based on the evidence that that society were 'progressive', were in the forefront of medicine and technology or otherwise nominally a example to others. THAT is the only sentiment i wish to defend when it comes to war crimes and genocides without being accused or suspected of base motives.

You failed to answer. Next, when I unambigiously stated that the Reich Industry was vastly superior to the USSR by sheer output, and provided statistics.

I have not addressed that post at all because i would like to it properly, which takes more time than i really have, but given your petulant behaviour i feel i should point out that i never claimed that the Reich industry were more efficient or that it did not in fact produced armaments efficiently as compared to the either the SU or the USA. Since we DO disagree on many things perhaps you could stick to those issues instead of inventing additional 'reasons' ( strawmen) to fuel your hostility?

Not sure what exactly it is i did to so greatly offend your sensibilities but perhaps you can at least pretend to be the better man by calming down and arguing with what i have said instead of with me? Either way that's what i will be trying to do and i know that everyone learns in their own time and way.

Stellar

[Stellar]

Hi again,

After reading my post again ( and finding that i can't edit it so soon afterwards) i must suggest that you best ignore my advice, at the end, until i start following it myself.

Sorry.

Stellar

[K. A. Pital]

Because in 1917 after years of destruction and many defeats a corrupt system of government where overthrown, and a armistice signed, and replaced by sadly yet another corrupt and even more brutal system.

How is this relevant to anything discussed so far? Which point would that be?

My question is whether you think Stalin stayed in Moscow because it couldn't happen again or because he understood that in Russia people respected power and would mostly accept being ruled by those who were most ruthless.

How is this relevant to anything discussed so far? Which point would that be?

I am questioning your apparent faith in the idea that Russia could not be defeated by capturing Leningrad ( could have happened, road was open for a couple of days), Moscow or other seats of government and industry after having lost as many men under arms as i started the war with.

1) The German command did not want to take Leningrad, opting to starve it instead, because it was not interested in it's capitulation anyhow. They didn't want to waste men to take it, so regardless of them having possibilities to take the city, they were not willing to... hence the point is irrelevant.

2) Like I said, the loss of Moscow would be a heavy blow, but a fair share of the industrial potential of Russia was still there.

Your point is?

Stalin was a brutal dictator long before Hitler got his hands on a modicum of power

How so?

and ruled the SU in a way that made nazi Germany seem almost progressive.

Evidence?
and ruled the SU in a way that made nazi Germany seem almost progressive.[/quote]
The people of SU did not at first resist because they cared much who ruled them but because they were compelled to fight or face execution; in fact there were division sized battles between police units and retreating formations who were then 'liquidated' for not holding positions as ordered.[/quote]
Evidence of that, especially "division sized battles?"

Since i never specified a era ( you decided on that because you probably don't know that history extends a bit further back than sixty years) you can go look at what happened to Baghdad in 1258 or to China shortly afterwards

Actually I did, the XX century. Too hard to comprehend?

I have not addressed that post at all because i would like to it properly, which takes more time than i really have

Because you were wrong. Face it, you asshole. And concede.

[Bakustra]

You know, apart from reliability issues of Wikipedia, the article itself lacks sourcing for the claim of the Mongols killing 60 million people in China, while a claim that he killed "millions" in northern China is sourced. However, the source itself is in French, which I am not gifted with the ability to read, and is a collection of essays, of which the one on the Mongol conquest and its effects on population is not apparently included within Google Books' excerpts. Of course, the article itself is very vague about when the 120 million figure comes from, beyond "before the Mongol conquest" which is practically eighty years before the 1279 finish date. Even if we accept this figure as true and solely due to the Mongols, then they still come out with a ~810,000 a year killing rate! Of course, there are other factors, such as Bubonic Plague potentially cropping up towards the end of this time period, even if we presume the 60 million figure to be accurate. Note that this is about two-thirds of the estimated death toll from the Black Plague in Europe and Asia.

[Stellar]

How is this relevant to anything discussed so far? Which point would that be?

It's relevant to the issue of whether the Su could be defeated by the German invasion creating sufficient casualties and/or economic upheaval for Russians to turn on the system in the same way they did in 1917.

How is this relevant to anything discussed so far? Which point would that be?

It is relevant because despite the fact that 2 million Russians left Moscow ( Because you evacuate what you can when you fear losing your capitol ) Stalin stayed knowing that his party and governmental system would lose too much of the respect they had from the Russian people and in so doing perhaps compromise not only the defense of the city itself but possibly the grasp on power the communist party held.

1) The German command did not want to take Leningrad, opting to starve it instead, because it was not interested in it's capitulation anyhow. They didn't want to waste men to take it, so regardless of them having possibilities to take the city, they were not willing to... hence the point is irrelevant.

Fact; One of the major objectives of Army group North was to capture Leningrad. When they failed to capture it the objectives were changed to siege and starvation.

2) Like I said, the loss of Moscow would be a heavy blow, but a fair share of the industrial potential of Russia was still there.
Your point is?

Moscow was still the industrial center and transportation center of the Su and if it were encircled in late September or mid August ( as this particular theory goes) very little of the Ukraine's and European Russia's fleeing industry would have escaped intact with obvious direct consequences to the potential for a great military revival in 1942/43. That is my point or at least the reason why choosing to halt and divert Army group center's panzer forces had under this scenario the effect of squandering the best chance of meeting the objectives of operation barbarossa and thus creating a situation where Germany could continue to fight , in good order, the strong but broken Asiatic remains of Russia.

How so?
Evidence?

If it is not self evident from your own study that people in the Su were far worse off under Stalin than Germans were under Hitler you need to go back to them until you have discovered at least that little. As for evidence i will presume it to be self evident despite your ignorance of that particular set of facts. I do understand that theories attempting to change our accepted perspective of history needs to be well sourced but asking me to 'prove' the obvious is merely tedious.

Evidence of that, especially "division sized battles?"

Again the first part is widely known( Massive famines in the Ukraine due to forced removals of food?) given the various show trails and 'purges' to say nothing of the concentration camps that contained millions by the 30's. As for the specific claim i made about division sized battles i read about that a decade ago and i don't know where to start searching for reference for it. This should do in terms of showing how bad the situation generally were and what Stalin thought necessary actions to keep the 'Rodina' defended with so many unwilling subjects.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barrier_troops
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_Troops

And if you do not 'like' wikipedia feel free to go find your own sources that shows otherwise.

Actually I did, the XX century. Too hard to comprehend?

I never specified a era when i said that greater "crimes had been committed in the past and will be in the future" thus not singling out Germans when they had not done anything i consider uniquely evil or that can't and sadly wont be improved on. Hutu's and Tutsi ( Rwanda for those who don't know better) anyone?

You think the SS are not evil? They killed at a rate of several humans per MINUTE in East European territories. That's a far larger degree of evil than anything encountered in history that far.

Stas bush

That is a earlier quote from you which managed to somehow jump to the conclusion that i considered the SS a organization full of saints or were interested in per-minute-kill rates for comparative measure. I am not interested in that and never thought i would have to defend something i considered to be both a fact and obvious to everyone else. Now at least i know not everyone knows even that little.

Snip ( Rude, i would say childish, remarks)

Actually i don't have as much time as i like but i will get to that post if not on your apparent student schedule.

Stellar

[K. A. Pital]

It's relevant to the issue of whether the Su could be defeated by the German invasion creating sufficient casualties and/or economic upheaval for Russians to turn on the system in the same way they did in 1917.

It's evident they could not. I mean, they inflicted ~27 000 000 casualties on the Soviet Union. Unlike Tsarist Russia, it did not collapse, but won the war. So your example demonstrates that the USSR was more resilient than Tsarist Russia which collapsed in 1917. Anything else?

It is relevant because despite the fact that 2 million Russians left Moscow ( Because you evacuate what you can when you fear losing your capitol ) Stalin stayed knowing that his party and governmental system would lose too much of the respect they had from the Russian people and in so doing perhaps compromise not only the defense of the city itself but possibly the grasp on power the communist party held.

So Stalin stayed in Moscow to help public and military morale; and ...? Where is the point?

Fact; One of the major objectives of Army group North was to capture Leningrad. When they failed to capture it the objectives were changed to siege and starvation.

8th July 1941, Franz Halder's KTB:

The Fuehrer's decision to annihilate Moscow and Leningrad is unshakeable, to completely do away with the population of these cities, which we would otherwise be forced to feed during the winter. The task of annihilating these cities falls to the aviation. Tanks are not to be used.

On 7th October, Jodl:

The capitulation of Leningrad, and later Moscow, shall not be accepted even if it were offered by the enemy... We should be wary of epidemic. Not a single German soldier shall enter the city. Those who shall try to leave the city through our lines should be forced back inside by fire... It is unacceptable to risk the lives of German soldiers to save Russian cities from fiery destruction, and likewise to feed the populations of these cities at the expense of the German fatherland... That will of the Fuhrer should be transferred to all field commanders

The same was reported by the Finns who said they simply had "no means" to occupy Leningrad and thus even if the city capitulated, it would be just cordoned off and left to starvation. So you admitted that they weren't able to take Leningrad. I have shown also that even if they city fell, they wouldn't bother occupying and supplying it.

Moscow was still the industrial center and transportation center of the Su and if it were encircled in late September or mid August ( as this particular theory goes) very little of the Ukraine's and European Russia's fleeing industry would have escaped intact

As I have demonstrated, there were enough units to battle for Moscow even if Army Group Center continued it's offensive - I have even listed them by name.

That is my point or at least the reason why choosing to halt and divert Army group center's panzer forces had under this scenario the effect of squandering the best chance of meeting the objectives of operation barbarossa and thus creating a situation where Germany could continue to fight , in good order, the strong but broken Asiatic remains of Russia.

Yeah, that was their "best chance" - except it didn't make failure any less likely than reality. AGC would advance on Moscow alone, without aid from AGS units. There were plenty of forces to meet Army Group Center there.

If it is not self evident from your own study that people in the Su were far worse off under Stalin than Germans were under Hitler

Why are we speaking about Germans under Hitler, but not of, say, the Jews? And incidentally, explain to me what do you mean. The average life expectancy of a Russian/Soviet citizen nearly doubled under Stalin, despite the horrible losses of the war, the hunger and privations. How did Hitler improve the life standard of the common German?

As for evidence i will presume it to be self evident

Nothing here is "self-evident". Hard facts have solid foundations. Your opinion is not evidence of anything. You made a specific claim - that Stalin ruled the USSR so bad that Hitler seemed progressive. Under Hitler, the industrialized nation of Germany was brought into a world war which resulted in the destruction of Germany as a nation. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union became an industrial superpower and the life expectancy of citizens doubled, as well as acquiring a huge sphere of influence and winning World War II. Your explanations of these facts?

Again the first part is widely known( Massive famines in the Ukraine due to forced removals of food?) given the various show trails and 'purges' to say nothing of the concentration camps that contained millions by the 30's.

You mean prison labour camps? So? I mean, you made a specific claim - that the forces had division sized battles between them and the barrier troops when they retreated in 1941. That is patently false.

As for the specific claim i made about division sized battles i read about that a decade ago and i don't know where to start searching for reference for it. This should do in terms of showing how bad the situation generally were

How so? You've shown no proof of these division sized battles! Are you an idiot who can't prove your point? Until a point is proven, it cannot serve to illustrate anything How do references to the existence of barrier troops constitute proof of your claim of "division sized battles"?

And if you do not 'like' wikipedia feel free to go find your own sources that shows otherwise.

Shows otherwise what? No one here disputed the existence of barrier troops. However, their existence is warranted and easily explained by the dire situation of massive retreat. You made a specific claim that the situation was so bad the retreating troops had "division sized battles" with barrier troops or something. That is patently false. You can try to prove it, of course, but so far you haven't.

I never specified a era when i said that greater "crimes had been committed in the past and will be in the future" thus not singling out Germans when they had not done anything i consider uniquely evil or that can't and sadly wont be improved on. Hutu's and Tutsi ( Rwanda for those who don't know better) anyone?

Yeah, the Rwanda genocide - good example, thanks for finally answering the question. Score 1 for you. Yeah, the Nazis had a lower intensity than Hutu death squads.

That is a earlier quote from you which managed to somehow jump to the conclusion that i considered the SS a organization full of saints or were interested in per-minute-kill rates for comparative measure. I am not interested in that

I was. So, prior to the SS other units didn't have such extreme kill rates; but there were future similar intensity kills, the Siege of Pnom Penh and in 1994, there was the Rwanda Genocide. Okay, two examples that could compare or top the intensity of kills by the SS, one given by me and the other by you. Serves me right for forgetting the Rwandan massacres and concentrating on nations outside Africa; that point is accepted and conceded.

As for the rest, feel free to continue when you have time.