"Give us Poland and Finland!" crowd shouts in Moscow

[Simon_Jester]

I would be interested to hear anyone with a serious, intellectually coherent alternative to Duchess' ideas.

I mean seriously, at least Duchess is suggesting a plan, that for whatever faults one might find with it, can present a credible claim for preventing further open warfare in Eastern Europe while giving every ethnic group in the region as much as possible of what they want.

The plan is not really that great because the solution seems to be to:
a) capitulate to Russia's demands completely
b) introduce nukes to every volatile region.

I would like to point out one key issue regarding (b). Duchess appears to be working on the theory that when nuclear weapons are introduced to a volatile region, but not under control of a volatile polity, it can actually make things more stable rather than less.

This is related to the "nuclear tripwire" doctrine used during the Cold War. If you give troops on the ground access to atomic weapons, then while those troops may not use them for an attack, they will assuredly use them to avoid being overrun.

For example, the US 2nd Infantry Division is based in South Korea, to discourage a North Korean invasion and help defend against it. There was a period when the 2nd Infantry Division was armed with tactical nuclear weapons. During that time, the North Koreans (or anyone else) knew that if they actually invaded South Korea and cross the 'line in the sand' represented by those troop positions, they would come under nuclear attack and would face a very high likelihood of nuclear war breaking out.

Duchess has observed that, as an example of this effect, Pakistan and India have basically stopped fighting conventional wars since Pakistan developed a nuclear arsenal.

Basically, as long as all the weapons in a given area are conventional, even a nuclear power can pretend to itself that the war will not go nuclear... but it becomes impossible to pretend this if nuclear weapons are physically stationed in the territory under debate.

Now, this theory may well have drawbacks, but it's a well-understood part of nuclear doctrine, and it does seem to work for purposes of deterring anyone from sending large forces of conventional troops to fight over the frontier of a nuclear power. It's an intentional feature of the plan, not a bug.

A much better plan would be to simply continue to contain Russia, continue sanctions, continue diversifying the gas supply and watch as their economy collapses. While giving out generous visa allowances and work permits for those who want to flee.

That might very well work better for all I know. This will take some thinking-about.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

As long as China refuses to participate in them, sanctions will fail, and as long as the Ukraine is not part of NATO, Russia has the ability to launch a full-scale conventional invasion to prevent it from becoming part of NATO. And the more we increase sanctions for something less than a full-scale conventional invasion of the Ukraine, the more likely it is that invasion will occur, because the Russian government knows that full Iran-style sectoral sanctions are the worst outcome it can possibly face from this confrontation. So if the sanctions keep ramping up over activities less than a full-scale conventional invasion of the Ukraine, we're essentially inoculating Russia to any consequence for that full-scale invasion. And as long as China refuses to participate in a sanctions regime, then Putin will almost certainly be able to maintain enough of a simulcra of an economy to survive politically by blaming the west for the hardships.

So I think the current course of action is merely making a full scale conventional Russian invasion of the Ukraine progressively more likely.

SJ of course correctly explained the basic justification for stationing tactical nuclear weapons in eastern Europe.

[Flagg]

The people that are the subject of this thread are calling for a course of action that, if pursued, would probably lead to a nuclear world war. That doesn't mean Putin will necessarily listen to them, but I trust him as far as I could throw him. He's certainly been rather belligerent lately, so forgive me for not trusting his good intentions.

And I think its appropriate for the US to take some steps to prepare for the worst case scenario.

I do sometimes engage in melodrama or hyperbole, but on the whole I try to post what I honestly think based on the information I am aware of. You are, of course, free to disagree with me.

Has Putin shown any signs that he want's to die and take his entire country and a massive chunk of the world with him? Because I trust Putin far less than how far I could throw him (at this point, probably couldn't even pick him up ) but he's shown absolutely no signs of being a suicidal lunatic, just your general megalomaniac propped up by the oligarchs.

And while I agree that we should always prepare for the worst, we should do so in a way that isn't seen as antagonistic (ie, putting non-functional (last I heard, anyway) ballistic missile defense systems all over central Europe). Sanctions are the way to go IMO, and hopefully they weaken Putin as much as they weaken the Russian economy, rather than strengthen Putin's grip on power because he will just blame "The West" and nothing strengthens a rulers power than an existential threat. That's my 2 cents (and it's probably worth less than that).

And not to further criticize you, but I don't mind hyperbole as long as it's on point, where yours is almost from Tom Clancy novels. Because I will film removing my left pinky with a dull knife, sticking the stump in a mixture of salt and lemon juice, de-boning my lost appendage, cooking it until well done, eating it, and then post it on YouTube if Russia attacks a NATO member any time within the next 20 years on orders from the Kremlin. As for the melodrama, I dislike it because to me, it makes you sound hysterical. But being guilty of it myself in the not too distant past and occasionally the present when presented with certain issues, I can't really complain about it and not be hypocritical.

[K. A. Pital]

Ukraine is already partitioned, but not nearly to the extent Russia hoped since pro Russian sentiment failed to reach critical mass anywhere other than in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk. The economic situation in Ukraine is tough but not as tough in Western Germany in 1946 and US did manage to make a strong ally out of it.
How close Russia will move to China is ultimately up to Russia though the closer Russia and China get the closer India and US will get.

You are of course very correct here (lately I've been finding myself agreeing with you more than I normally do). What I meant to say is that the 'better plan' is anyway going to follow the larger trends. A better plan can't return the situation to the status-quo that existed prior to the Ukraine events. It can't realign Russia with the West, realistically, and it most likely will not help Ukraine restore integrity.

The question is whether it's gonna be Yugoslavia, Georgia, Moldavia, Northern Cyprus with a full-scale "Atilla" from Russia, or some other, yet unseen partitioning scenario for Ukraine, too. There's no real option to restore Ukraine as it was before 2014. Well, not with Crimea, that's for certain.

A better plan cannot realign the West with Russia too, since whatever trust there was, it's hundred percent gone by now. That was my key point: any sort of a 'better plan' is just choosing the least of evils here.

[The Romulan Republic]

The people that are the subject of this thread are calling for a course of action that, if pursued, would probably lead to a nuclear world war. That doesn't mean Putin will necessarily listen to them, but I trust him as far as I could throw him. He's certainly been rather belligerent lately, so forgive me for not trusting his good intentions.

And I think its appropriate for the US to take some steps to prepare for the worst case scenario.

I do sometimes engage in melodrama or hyperbole, but on the whole I try to post what I honestly think based on the information I am aware of. You are, of course, free to disagree with me.

Has Putin shown any signs that he want's to die and take his entire country and a massive chunk of the world with him? Because I trust Putin far less than how far I could throw him (at this point, probably couldn't even pick him up ) but he's shown absolutely no signs of being a suicidal lunatic, just your general megalomaniac propped up by the oligarchs.

And while I agree that we should always prepare for the worst, we should do so in a way that isn't seen as antagonistic (ie, putting non-functional (last I heard, anyway) ballistic missile defense systems all over central Europe). Sanctions are the way to go IMO, and hopefully they weaken Putin as much as they weaken the Russian economy, rather than strengthen Putin's grip on power because he will just blame "The West" and nothing strengthens a rulers power than an existential threat. That's my 2 cents (and it's probably worth less than that).

And not to further criticize you, but I don't mind hyperbole as long as it's on point, where yours is almost from Tom Clancy novels. Because I will film removing my left pinky with a dull knife, sticking the stump in a mixture of salt and lemon juice, de-boning my lost appendage, cooking it until well done, eating it, and then post it on YouTube if Russia attacks a NATO member any time within the next 20 years on orders from the Kremlin. As for the melodrama, I dislike it because to me, it makes you sound hysterical. But being guilty of it myself in the not too distant past and occasionally the present when presented with certain issues, I can't really complain about it and not be hypocritical.

I think I was thinking more about increasing missile defence in North America than doing so in Europe (which is admittedly motivated somewhat by self-interest, as I do not wish to be killed). The latter might well cause an escalation. Which sucks, because we really should be able to protect allied countries in that area better, but making the crisis worse would be a poor way to protect them.

As to weather Putin is suicidal, I don't believe he is (though not having met the man and not having any psychological training, I cannot say for certain). But I worry that if he recklessly causes crises and increases tensions, he might blunder past the point of no return without meaning to. And nationalism can motivate a man to do some very stupid things.

[Purple]

The "point of no return" as you put it is only such if both sides are willing to commit suicide. It takes two suicidal idiots to start an atomic war. But only one to avoid it.

[Simon_Jester]

Has Putin shown any signs that he want's to die and take his entire country and a massive chunk of the world with him? Because I trust Putin far less than how far I could throw him (at this point, probably couldn't even pick him up ) but he's shown absolutely no signs of being a suicidal lunatic, just your general megalomaniac propped up by the oligarchs.

And while I agree that we should always prepare for the worst, we should do so in a way that isn't seen as antagonistic (ie, putting non-functional (last I heard, anyway) ballistic missile defense systems all over central Europe).

The ballistic missile defense systems function; the problem is that against the sheer scale of a ballistic missile attack that the Russians would launch in an all-out war, you'd need lots of missile defense sites. Setting up such a defense network would take many years and many many billions of dollars before it could be completed.

Sanctions are the way to go IMO, and hopefully they weaken Putin as much as they weaken the Russian economy, rather than strengthen Putin's grip on power because he will just blame "The West" and nothing strengthens a rulers power than an existential threat. That's my 2 cents (and it's probably worth less than that).

How do you feel about Duchess' remarks that the sanctions, so long as China does not participate, will predictably fail to have the desired effect and may "inoculate" Russia against the threat of sanctions in response to a Russian escalation?

This is a point that bears remembering. What Russia has done in the Ukraine is actually a lot less provocative than what they could do, in principle. It would be quite easy for Russia to send formed, organized army units with the full arsenal of modern conventional war into the Ukraine. Given how bad a job the Ukrainian army has done fighting the separatists (who admittedly have some Russian weapons and probably trainers, but remain a relatively light and irregular force), I doubt the Ukrainian military would last long in that situation.

Now, this is not a compliment to Russia. It's just a fact. If Putin wants to escalate, he still has a lot of options for doing so. If we apply MAXIMUM SANCTIONS RAARGH to him now, then we have literally no recourse in the future except to threaten him with (nuclear) war, which is not a believable threat because we'd be out of our minds to fight World War III over the Ukraine.

Meanwhile, if we apply intense but less-than-maximum-possible sanctions to Russia, then this mainly serves to get Russians used to economic hardship under a despotic ruler, as happened with similar sanctions regimes in Cuba, Iraq, and North Korea. It won't solve the problem... unless the Russian economy outright collapses and the country degenerates into chaos.

In which case we've "solved" the problem of the Russian government interfering in the Ukraine at the price of touching off a second Russian Civil War. And then we'd be scrambling to answer the question of "Who takes charge? Are they lunatic ethnic-nationalist-Russians? Are they fascists? Who has the nukes?"

[K. A. Pital]

See what I told Kane above, Simon. The sanctions cannot realign Russia with the West. Appeasement cannot do that either, since... well, the point is kind of lost - once you go appeasement, that means you let Russia recreate its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. That's a sizeable space, also GDP-wise. It means Russia gets what it wants (a currency union, as it suggests, and more or less control over the other economies bordering it), and it has little reason to listen to the West anymore.

Basically, it is a situation where 'realign Russia with the West' is not an outcome that can be achieved. Once this is understood, one can proceed further.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

I concur insomuch as that outcome of Russia returning to a western orbit is pointless to obtain or attempt. The objective of my proposal is to allow western Ukraine to join the EU and NATO like it wants (and also Georgia proper and Moldova, minus secessionist regions). I think that at this point, any attempt to hold onto eastern Ukraine or a united Ukraine is throwing good money after bad. Just like Stas I don't think the relationship can be fixed, thus why once a border has been negotiated, NATO troops should be deployed to enforce it.

Also it keeps more people from dying in wars.

[Vympel]

I concur insomuch as that outcome of Russia returning to a western orbit is pointless to obtain or attempt. The objective of my proposal is to allow western Ukraine to join the EU and NATO like it wants (and also Georgia proper and Moldova, minus secessionist regions). I think that at this point, any attempt to hold onto eastern Ukraine or a united Ukraine is throwing good money after bad. Just like Stas I don't think the relationship can be fixed, thus why once a border has been negotiated, NATO troops should be deployed to enforce it.

Also it keeps more people from dying in wars.

Any solution to the Ukraine crisis that ends with any part of Ukraine being a member of NATO will be totally unacceptable to Russia - a huge factor in the crisis is the (not unjustified) perception in Russia that NATO expansion is directed against them and is being pushed by the US to encircle Russia along its entire western frontier.

Luckily, this is something of a moot point since after the events of 2014, NATO will never unanimously vote to allow Ukraine (or Georgia) to join NATO. Heck, even if they were so inclined, 'minus secessionist regions' is a huge problem - the nation state in question would have to formally give up its claims over them.

A recent article I read (can't remember where - either FP or NI) noted that everyone in the West knows now that Ukraine will never join NATO - so the only thing gained by not formally admitting same to the Russians is the completely illusory principle that 'the Russians don't have a veto over who joins NATO' - except that they do, and they just exercised it.

Ukraine has to remain neutral - it can benefit from a relationship with the EU and a relationship with Russia (on whom it remains heavily dependent), but it can never be aligned with the West in any formal fashion.

[Flagg]

Has Putin shown any signs that he want's to die and take his entire country and a massive chunk of the world with him? Because I trust Putin far less than how far I could throw him (at this point, probably couldn't even pick him up ) but he's shown absolutely no signs of being a suicidal lunatic, just your general megalomaniac propped up by the oligarchs.

And while I agree that we should always prepare for the worst, we should do so in a way that isn't seen as antagonistic (ie, putting non-functional (last I heard, anyway) ballistic missile defense systems all over central Europe).

The ballistic missile defense systems function; the problem is that against the sheer scale of a ballistic missile attack that the Russians would launch in an all-out war, you'd need lots of missile defense sites. Setting up such a defense network would take many years and many many billions of dollars before it could be completed.

They work now? As in, they work in tests that aren't rigged for the General's pleasure anymore? That alone surprises me and I guess it's a good thing... Sort of. IMO unless you can, like you said, knock down everything the Russians can throw at everyone then they are pointless provocation. Anyway, it's my understanding that ABM systems are far more effective against a small scale launch, so basically against North Korea and maybe one day Iran.

Sanctions are the way to go IMO, and hopefully they weaken Putin as much as they weaken the Russian economy, rather than strengthen Putin's grip on power because he will just blame "The West" and nothing strengthens a rulers power than an existential threat. That's my 2 cents (and it's probably worth less than that).

How do you feel about Duchess' remarks that the sanctions, so long as China does not participate, will predictably fail to have the desired effect and may "inoculate" Russia against the threat of sanctions in response to a Russian escalation?[

She's probably right. I pretty much meant and mean "political solutions" because "we must do something" after all. And I think the least stupid thing to do politically, is ratchet up sanctions, to what degree, I do not know.

As for an actual solution? Beyond coming to the realization that at best we'll have 2 brand spanking new partitioned states in Europe (that Crimea will not be a part of) and that there isn't a goddamned thing we can do short of sparking off a war that could possibly go nuclear over parts of Ukraine and Georgia that largely want to be part of the Russian Federation, anyway... I got no clue beyond just sitting down all parties and force them to negotiate an agreement with Russia while Russia "has their hand on a gun sitting directly in front of them". Which basically means, "Force Ukraine and Georgia to eat shit". So I guess that would be appeasement? In any case it should be made clear to Russia that that's as far as it goes, mainly by adjusting exactly which countries get the bulk of NATO troops stationed in them.

[Thanas]

I would be interested to hear anyone with a serious, intellectually coherent alternative to Duchess' ideas.

I mean seriously, at least Duchess is suggesting a plan, that for whatever faults one might find with it, can present a credible claim for preventing further open warfare in Eastern Europe while giving every ethnic group in the region as much as possible of what they want.

The plan is not really that great because the solution seems to be to:
a) capitulate to Russia's demands completely
b) introduce nukes to every volatile region.

I would like to point out one key issue regarding (b). Duchess appears to be working on the theory that when nuclear weapons are introduced to a volatile region, but not under control of a volatile polity, it can actually make things more stable rather than less.

Yes, sure, I get that. But what seems to be missing there is that during the Cuban crisis the idiot in charge of the US bomber command (Butcher LeMay) was arguing for war. And without the action of one soviet submarine officer (who I believe you used to quote in your sig) it might just as well have gone all up in mushrooms. Point is, this system works perfectly well unless it doesn't. And the sample size is way to small to argue that it is guaranteed to work every time, which is not acceptable to me given the risks.

How do you feel about Duchess' remarks that the sanctions, so long as China does not participate, will predictably fail to have the desired effect and may "inoculate" Russia against the threat of sanctions in response to a Russian escalation?

I would argue that you are vastly overstating the current importance of China to Russia and vice versa. As it stands now, the Russian economy is being hit very hard (just four days ago they announced figures of 17% inflation, real wages being decreased by 10%, economy contraction of -3%). And that is without adding the cost of keeping eastern Ukraine and Crimea supplied with food and electricity which will come to hit Crimea real hard soon. China will not ride to the rescue of the Russian economy..

[K. A. Pital]

Any solution to the Ukraine crisis that ends with any part of Ukraine being a member of NATO will be totally unacceptable to Russia - a huge factor in the crisis is the (not unjustified) perception in Russia that NATO expansion is directed against them and is being pushed by the US to encircle Russia along its entire western frontier.

To put it bluntly, Russia will have no option but to accept if it accepts the partitioning of Ukraine. It will no longer be able to prevent Western and Central Ukraine to become a part of NATO, short of a nuclear war. And no, Ukraine is not worth a nuclear war for Russia either.

Ukraine has to remain neutral - it can benefit from a relationship with the EU and a relationship with Russia (on whom it remains heavily dependent), but it can never be aligned with the West in any formal fashion.

Cut that. Ukraine will never benefit from being a corrupt hellhole at the crossroads - which it will be for ages to come. Ukraine's life standards have fallen to almost African levels. Its wages are not just below world average, or below Chinese, or whatnot - they're abysmal, something like 50 bucks per months. Ukraine remaining neutral only means eternal uncertainty and no investment whatsoever for a very, very long period. On the other hand, if it firmly belongs to one or the other side, investment can resume.

I would argue that you are vastly overstating the current importance of China to Russia and vice versa. As it stands now, the Russian economy is being hit very hard (just four days ago they announced figures of 17% inflation, real wages being decreased by 10%, economy contraction of -3%).

Surely you must be joking with your 'very hard' bit? Russia in the 1990s had hyperinflation, 50% poverty, barter trade and barter wages (I could go into details), child malnourishment and an economic contraction of 50 to 60% of GDP. And guess what? It's still there.

[Thanas]

I would argue that you are vastly overstating the current importance of China to Russia and vice versa. As it stands now, the Russian economy is being hit very hard (just four days ago they announced figures of 17% inflation, real wages being decreased by 10%, economy contraction of -3%).

Surely you must be joking with your 'very hard' bit? Russia in the 1990s had hyperinflation, 50% poverty, barter trade and barter wages (I could go into details), child malnourishment and an economic contraction of 50 to 60% of GDP. And guess what? It's still there.

Of course it still is there and it will IMO always be there. But what happens here is that the west is determined to make Russia pay with sanctions, and pay they will. Are the sanctions hitting as hard as the collapse of the Soviet/Russian economy? No and I very much doubt that this is the goal of them. Nobody in the west wants a total economic collapse of Russia.

[Simon_Jester]

They work now? As in, they work in tests that aren't rigged for the General's pleasure anymore? That alone surprises me and I guess it's a good thing... Sort of.

They work in tests that are fairly honestly intended to, y'know, test the system. Even the General would like to know that his very expensive missile interceptors can actually intercept a missile before it falls on his head and blows him up, after all.

IMO unless you can, like you said, knock down everything the Russians can throw at everyone then they are pointless provocation. Anyway, it's my understanding that ABM systems are far more effective against a small scale launch, so basically against North Korea and maybe one day Iran.

Yes. It's like this:

To shoot down one missile you fire, say, two or three antimissiles.

To shoot down one thousand missiles, you fire, say, two or three thousand antimissiles.

So obviously, if you're willing to spring for only a few dozen antimissiles (the current state of American ballistic missile defense)... you aren't going to be shooting down a thousand-missile attack.

It's not so much that ABM systems are ineffective against a large attack as such, it's just that if the enemy is going to launch a huge number of missiles you need an even huger number of antimissiles to anti those missiles before they fall on you. We haven't paid for those missiles yet.

Sanctions are the way to go IMO, and hopefully they weaken Putin as much as they weaken the Russian economy, rather than strengthen Putin's grip on power because he will just blame "The West" and nothing strengthens a rulers power than an existential threat. That's my 2 cents (and it's probably worth less than that).

How do you feel about Duchess' remarks that the sanctions, so long as China does not participate, will predictably fail to have the desired effect and may "inoculate" Russia against the threat of sanctions in response to a Russian escalation?

She's probably right. I pretty much meant and mean "political solutions" because "we must do something" after all. And I think the least stupid thing to do politically, is ratchet up sanctions, to what degree, I do not know.

As for an actual solution? Beyond coming to the realization that at best we'll have 2 brand spanking new partitioned states in Europe (that Crimea will not be a part of) and that there isn't a goddamned thing we can do short of sparking off a war that could possibly go nuclear over parts of Ukraine and Georgia that largely want to be part of the Russian Federation, anyway... I got no clue beyond just sitting down all parties and force them to negotiate an agreement with Russia while Russia "has their hand on a gun sitting directly in front of them". Which basically means, "Force Ukraine and Georgia to eat shit". So I guess that would be appeasement? In any case it should be made clear to Russia that that's as far as it goes, mainly by adjusting exactly which countries get the bulk of NATO troops stationed in them.[/quote]Thank you for addressing the question. [nods]

---

Yes, sure, I get that. But what seems to be missing there is that during the Cuban crisis the idiot in charge of the US bomber command (Butcher LeMay) was arguing for war. And without the action of one soviet submarine officer (who I believe you used to quote in your sig) it might just as well have gone all up in mushrooms. Point is, this system works perfectly well unless it doesn't. And the sample size is way to small to argue that it is guaranteed to work every time, which is not acceptable to me given the risks.

Two points that militate against each other, followed by a third about the historical record.

1) The Cuban Missile Crisis predates, and in large part caused, the rise of measures such as I described a post or two ago:

"But [the risk of nuclear war breaking out is...] not [decided by] pure blind chance, especially when both sides take certain reasonable steps to reduce the probability of a random crisis blowing up in their faces. Such as having a presidential hotline between the nations, such as getting together and actually negotiating the partition of a territory the two sides might want to fight over, rather than just posturing and squabbling and sending 'advisors' to shoot at each other."

Unfortunately, right now we are 'posturing and squabbling and sending 'advisors' to shoot at each other.'

2) In fairness, the risk of a nuclear war is always non-zero, no matter how you arrange matters. Even now the risk of a nuclear war between the US/NATO powers and Russia isn't zero, even if it is vanishingly small.

The main question is, what is the actual risk of such a war happening, versus what are the costs of allowing the status quo to remain in place?

3) LeMay's main argument for war was that he expected the Soviets to use a well armed base in Cuba to launch a nuclear surprise attack on the US that would render it unable to fight back effectively. Especially since at this time the US nuclear deterrent still relied overwhelmingly on the Strategic Air Command's bombers, a significant fraction of which would be wiped out on the ground in such an attack. I would not call this lunacy, even if his concern was misplaced now that we have access to the actual thoughts of the Politburo at the time (which he did not).

Of course, one can easily see how a Russian counterpart of LeMay might see NATO forces stationed in the Ukraine the same way.

---

How do you feel about Duchess' remarks that the sanctions, so long as China does not participate, will predictably fail to have the desired effect and may "inoculate" Russia against the threat of sanctions in response to a Russian escalation?

I would argue that you are vastly overstating the current importance of China to Russia and vice versa. As it stands now, the Russian economy is being hit very hard (just four days ago they announced figures of 17% inflation, real wages being decreased by 10%, economy contraction of -3%). And that is without adding the cost of keeping eastern Ukraine and Crimea supplied with food and electricity which will come to hit Crimea real hard soon. China will not ride to the rescue of the Russian economy..[/quote]The argument she advanced did not appear to be "China will rescue the Russian economy," so much as "China will allow the Russian economy to limp along in a half-crippled state while the crisis continues, until such time as Chinese economic growth and (possibly) declining Russian standards of 'acceptable economic conditions' remove the effectiveness of the sanctions."

Do you feel that your counterargument is strong enough to negate the second form of the argument, as well as the first?

I would argue that you are vastly overstating the current importance of China to Russia and vice versa. As it stands now, the Russian economy is being hit very hard (just four days ago they announced figures of 17% inflation, real wages being decreased by 10%, economy contraction of -3%).

Surely you must be joking with your 'very hard' bit? Russia in the 1990s had hyperinflation, 50% poverty, barter trade and barter wages (I could go into details), child malnourishment and an economic contraction of 50 to 60% of GDP. And guess what? It's still there.

Of course it still is there and it will IMO always be there. But what happens here is that the west is determined to make Russia pay with sanctions, and pay they will. Are the sanctions hitting as hard as the collapse of the Soviet/Russian economy? No and I very much doubt that this is the goal of them. Nobody in the west wants a total economic collapse of Russia.

If the sanctions do not cause the Russian economy to collapse, is there any meaningful sense in which they accomplish the desired goal? If they cannot force the Russians to abandon their claims in Crimea and the Donets basin, the sanctions will continue indefinitely without actually changing anything, and their secondary effects will be entirely negative.

I mean, this is starting to sound like the US sanctions against Cuba- which assuredly made the US 'pay' for nefariously remaining communist. But if anything this made the situation in Cuba worse and made it actively harder for anything like an end to communism in Cuba to happen.

[Thanas]

Simon, fix your quote tags because I don't know who is arguing what in your post.

[Flagg]

They work now? As in, they work in tests that aren't rigged for the General's pleasure anymore? That alone surprises me and I guess it's a good thing... Sort of.

They work in tests that are fairly honestly intended to, y'know, test the system. Even the General would like to know that his very expensive missile interceptors can actually intercept a missile before it falls on his head and blows him up, after all.

Sorry, I wasn't clear enough: Back in the early '00s, the contractors selected to build and test the ABM systems would basically put on a show for visiting Generals and other DoD staff by essentially "telling" the sensors what the exact trajectory of the incoming missile to be shot down was to vastly increase the likelihood of a "successful test". Basically putting on a show that was "Rigged for their pleasure".

Though a good 10+ years can surely change such technology for the better and I shouldn't have been so surprised that they are now functional.

[Simon_Jester]

Version of my previous post, with quote tags fixed- I can understand not wanting to do the forensics, and my apologies. The post was made in two separate sessions over a period of an hour and I neglected to make sure I'd fixed all the tags.

They work now? As in, they work in tests that aren't rigged for the General's pleasure anymore? That alone surprises me and I guess it's a good thing... Sort of.

They work in tests that are fairly honestly intended to, y'know, test the system. Even the General would like to know that his very expensive missile interceptors can actually intercept a missile before it falls on his head and blows him up, after all.

IMO unless you can, like you said, knock down everything the Russians can throw at everyone then they are pointless provocation. Anyway, it's my understanding that ABM systems are far more effective against a small scale launch, so basically against North Korea and maybe one day Iran.

Yes. It's like this:

To shoot down one missile you fire, say, two or three antimissiles.

To shoot down one thousand missiles, you fire, say, two or three thousand antimissiles.

So obviously, if you're willing to spring for only a few dozen antimissiles (the current state of American ballistic missile defense)... you aren't going to be shooting down a thousand-missile attack.

It's not so much that ABM systems are ineffective against a large attack as such, it's just that if the enemy is going to launch a huge number of missiles you need an even huger number of antimissiles to anti those missiles before they fall on you. We haven't paid for those missiles yet.

Sanctions are the way to go IMO, and hopefully they weaken Putin as much as they weaken the Russian economy, rather than strengthen Putin's grip on power because he will just blame "The West" and nothing strengthens a rulers power than an existential threat. That's my 2 cents (and it's probably worth less than that).

How do you feel about Duchess' remarks that the sanctions, so long as China does not participate, will predictably fail to have the desired effect and may "inoculate" Russia against the threat of sanctions in response to a Russian escalation?

She's probably right. I pretty much meant and mean "political solutions" because "we must do something" after all. And I think the least stupid thing to do politically, is ratchet up sanctions, to what degree, I do not know.

As for an actual solution? Beyond coming to the realization that at best we'll have 2 brand spanking new partitioned states in Europe (that Crimea will not be a part of) and that there isn't a goddamned thing we can do short of sparking off a war that could possibly go nuclear over parts of Ukraine and Georgia that largely want to be part of the Russian Federation, anyway... I got no clue beyond just sitting down all parties and force them to negotiate an agreement with Russia while Russia "has their hand on a gun sitting directly in front of them". Which basically means, "Force Ukraine and Georgia to eat shit". So I guess that would be appeasement? In any case it should be made clear to Russia that that's as far as it goes, mainly by adjusting exactly which countries get the bulk of NATO troops stationed in them.

Thank you for addressing the question. [nods]

---

Yes, sure, I get that. But what seems to be missing there is that during the Cuban crisis the idiot in charge of the US bomber command (Butcher LeMay) was arguing for war. And without the action of one soviet submarine officer (who I believe you used to quote in your sig) it might just as well have gone all up in mushrooms. Point is, this system works perfectly well unless it doesn't. And the sample size is way to small to argue that it is guaranteed to work every time, which is not acceptable to me given the risks.

Two points that militate against each other, followed by a third about the historical record.

1) The Cuban Missile Crisis predates, and in large part caused, the rise of measures such as I described a post or two ago:

"But [the risk of nuclear war breaking out is...] not [decided by] pure blind chance, especially when both sides take certain reasonable steps to reduce the probability of a random crisis blowing up in their faces. Such as having a presidential hotline between the nations, such as getting together and actually negotiating the partition of a territory the two sides might want to fight over, rather than just posturing and squabbling and sending 'advisors' to shoot at each other."

Unfortunately, right now we are 'posturing and squabbling and sending 'advisors' to shoot at each other.'

2) In fairness, the risk of a nuclear war is always non-zero, no matter how you arrange matters. Even now the risk of a nuclear war between the US/NATO powers and Russia isn't zero, even if it is vanishingly small.

The main question is, what is the actual risk of such a war happening, versus what are the costs of allowing the status quo to remain in place?

3) LeMay's main argument for war was that he expected the Soviets to use a well armed base in Cuba to launch a nuclear surprise attack on the US that would render it unable to fight back effectively. Especially since at this time the US nuclear deterrent still relied overwhelmingly on the Strategic Air Command's bombers, a significant fraction of which would be wiped out on the ground in such an attack. I would not call this lunacy, even if his concern was misplaced now that we have access to the actual thoughts of the Politburo at the time (which he did not).

Of course, one can easily see how a Russian counterpart of LeMay might see NATO forces stationed in the Ukraine the same way.

---

How do you feel about Duchess' remarks that the sanctions, so long as China does not participate, will predictably fail to have the desired effect and may "inoculate" Russia against the threat of sanctions in response to a Russian escalation?

I would argue that you are vastly overstating the current importance of China to Russia and vice versa. As it stands now, the Russian economy is being hit very hard (just four days ago they announced figures of 17% inflation, real wages being decreased by 10%, economy contraction of -3%). And that is without adding the cost of keeping eastern Ukraine and Crimea supplied with food and electricity which will come to hit Crimea real hard soon. China will not ride to the rescue of the Russian economy..

The argument she advanced did not appear to be "China will rescue the Russian economy," so much as "China will allow the Russian economy to limp along in a half-crippled state while the crisis continues, until such time as Chinese economic growth and (possibly) declining Russian standards of 'acceptable economic conditions' remove the effectiveness of the sanctions."

Do you feel that your counterargument is strong enough to negate the second form of the argument, as well as the first?

I would argue that you are vastly overstating the current importance of China to Russia and vice versa. As it stands now, the Russian economy is being hit very hard (just four days ago they announced figures of 17% inflation, real wages being decreased by 10%, economy contraction of -3%).

Surely you must be joking with your 'very hard' bit? Russia in the 1990s had hyperinflation, 50% poverty, barter trade and barter wages (I could go into details), child malnourishment and an economic contraction of 50 to 60% of GDP. And guess what? It's still there.

Of course it still is there and it will IMO always be there. But what happens here is that the west is determined to make Russia pay with sanctions, and pay they will. Are the sanctions hitting as hard as the collapse of the Soviet/Russian economy? No and I very much doubt that this is the goal of them. Nobody in the west wants a total economic collapse of Russia.

If the sanctions do not cause the Russian economy to collapse, is there any meaningful sense in which they accomplish the desired goal? If they cannot force the Russians to abandon their claims in Crimea and the Donets basin, the sanctions will continue indefinitely without actually changing anything, and their secondary effects will be entirely negative.

I mean, this is starting to sound like the US sanctions against Cuba- which assuredly made the US 'pay' for nefariously remaining communist. But if anything this made the situation in Cuba worse and made it actively harder for anything like an end to communism in Cuba to happen.

[Simon_Jester]

They work now? As in, they work in tests that aren't rigged for the General's pleasure anymore? That alone surprises me and I guess it's a good thing... Sort of.

They work in tests that are fairly honestly intended to, y'know, test the system. Even the General would like to know that his very expensive missile interceptors can actually intercept a missile before it falls on his head and blows him up, after all.

Sorry, I wasn't clear enough: Back in the early '00s, the contractors selected to build and test the ABM systems would basically put on a show for visiting Generals and other DoD staff by essentially "telling" the sensors what the exact trajectory of the incoming missile to be shot down was to vastly increase the likelihood of a "successful test". Basically putting on a show that was "Rigged for their pleasure".

Though a good 10+ years can surely change such technology for the better and I shouldn't have been so surprised that they are now functional.

Two notes to that.


One is that we are, yes, ten years further along in the development of a system that was previously only in development for one or two decades, which can make a lot of difference.


Two is that the kind of test you describe isn't as "rigged" as you make it out to be. The thing is, you can actually do a valid and useful test of an ABM system by having it fire at a missile that you knew was coming well in advance. Such a test will, for example, test the terminal guidance sensors on your antimissile (because the trajectory of the ballistic missile is never exactly predictable, your antimissile still has to be able to home in on it to actually hit the target). It will test your ability to launch at a precisely determined moment in time. It will test the physical ability of your antimissile to destroy the target as opposed to merely causing light or no damage.

The main part of your ABM system that is NOT tested under that condition is the ability of your long range tracking systems to spot missiles far in advance and predict their trajectories, then hand that information over to the antimissile batteries to start lobbing antimissiles.

But we actually have missile tracking radars already. Radars that already know how to precisely determine the trajectory of an incoming ballistic missile. And the reason we call them 'ballistic' is that once the rocket engine burns out a couple of minutes into the flight, the trajectory of the missile becomes very predictable indeed.

If your ABM system was prepared to handle an enemy attack in the first place, knowing the exact trajectory of the incoming missile ten minutes in advance and knowing it ten hours in advance aren't that different in practice- either way the missile still has time to get into position to shoot down the incoming threat.

And having your ABM system alert and ready to shoot down enemy missiles is a job for your training command, plus whoever reads the newspapers to determine when and whether an enemy missile attack is likely. As some nuclear war theorists pointed out during the early Cold War, even if in theory an enemy might launch a nuclear sneak attack at any moment, in reality, such a "bolt from the blue" attack is highly unlikely. It's far more plausible that an attack would be preceded by several weeks of trouble, crises, and posturing. The enemy won't shoot first until convinced that shooting first is worth the risk of getting wrecked by your retaliation.

[Thanas]

Thanks Simon.

Yes, sure, I get that. But what seems to be missing there is that during the Cuban crisis the idiot in charge of the US bomber command (Butcher LeMay) was arguing for war. And without the action of one soviet submarine officer (who I believe you used to quote in your sig) it might just as well have gone all up in mushrooms. Point is, this system works perfectly well unless it doesn't. And the sample size is way to small to argue that it is guaranteed to work every time, which is not acceptable to me given the risks.

Two points that militate against each other, followed by a third about the historical record.

1) The Cuban Missile Crisis predates, and in large part caused, the rise of measures such as I described a post or two ago:

"But [the risk of nuclear war breaking out is...] not [decided by] pure blind chance, especially when both sides take certain reasonable steps to reduce the probability of a random crisis blowing up in their faces. Such as having a presidential hotline between the nations, such as getting together and actually negotiating the partition of a territory the two sides might want to fight over, rather than just posturing and squabbling and sending 'advisors' to shoot at each other."

The boldened parts sounds quite disturbing to non-americans, I hope you realize that.

Unfortunately, right now we are 'posturing and squabbling and sending 'advisors' to shoot at each other.'

2) In fairness, the risk of a nuclear war is always non-zero, no matter how you arrange matters. Even now the risk of a nuclear war between the US/NATO powers and Russia isn't zero, even if it is vanishingly small.

The main question is, what is the actual risk of such a war happening, versus what are the costs of allowing the status quo to remain in place?

I don't know, but I am pretty sure that sending nukes into conflict regions is not a great thing to do. Sooner or later somebody will mess up, increasing the risk of it happening is not something a sane person would advocate for. We already had the Air Force losing some bombs, I don't want the next messup to be "bombs left on Ukrainian runway".

3) LeMay's main argument for war was that he expected the Soviets to use a well armed base in Cuba to launch a nuclear surprise attack on the US that would render it unable to fight back effectively. Especially since at this time the US nuclear deterrent still relied overwhelmingly on the Strategic Air Command's bombers, a significant fraction of which would be wiped out on the ground in such an attack. I would not call this lunacy, even if his concern was misplaced now that we have access to the actual thoughts of the Politburo at the time (which he did not).

Of course, one can easily see how a Russian counterpart of LeMay might see NATO forces stationed in the Ukraine the same way.

I was also referring (though not making it sufficiently clear) how the Butcher and his ilk were arguing for using nuclear weapons when the going got tough in the wars America fought at the time. I am not sure the mindset of the US military has changed sufficiently in the time we are talking about, the full number of warcrimes known (and the coverup attitude by the US military) from Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that the mentality of the US military is not at all different. And I don't think the Russian one is saner either.

So IMO one should give warmongers less reason and opportunity to actually start a shooting war, and even less reasons for accidents to happen. In short, not doing this

The argument she advanced did not appear to be "China will rescue the Russian economy," so much as "China will allow the Russian economy to limp along in a half-crippled state while the crisis continues, until such time as Chinese economic growth and (possibly) declining Russian standards of 'acceptable economic conditions' remove the effectiveness of the sanctions."

Do you feel that your counterargument is strong enough to negate the second form of the argument, as well as the first?

I don't think that it really matters because Duchess assumes the west wants to collapse Russia. That is not the case. The West wants to make it harder for them to continue on and the sanctions do that. In short, forcing Russia to pay a steeper price than they otherwise would have.

If the sanctions do not cause the Russian economy to collapse, is there any meaningful sense in which they accomplish the desired goal? If they cannot force the Russians to abandon their claims in Crimea and the Donets basin, the sanctions will continue indefinitely without actually changing anything, and their secondary effects will be entirely negative.

Why? It will force Russia to spend billions more on Crimea than they otherwise would have. It will keep the east of the Ukraine ruined unless Russia spends billions it won't have. These are all good things because at the very least they will occupy Russian power and make them aware that there comes a bill to be paid.

What's the alternative? Just give in and let Putin have it all without a fight? Yeah, that sure will teach him.

I mean, this is starting to sound like the US sanctions against Cuba- which assuredly made the US 'pay' for nefariously remaining communist. But if anything this made the situation in Cuba worse and made it actively harder for anything like an end to communism in Cuba to happen.

I don't see how Cuba is comparable to Russia.


EDIT: In case some idiots don't get it - the picture I linked to is a joke.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Thanas, the European objective may be to increase costs, but I have no doubt that Zbignew B. et. al. and the russophobes in the Obama administration actively want to disintegrate the Russian state, and have even been working at cross-purposes from the EU to insure that takes place. Since the Carter administration a peculiar kind of Russophobia inoculated by Polish-Americans crept into the Democratic party that prevented sane policies and rapproachment during the Clinton years, guaranteed both political parties were lockstep Russophobic, and set up the modern crisis.

[Kane Starkiller]

You might have no doubts but I, for one, would like to see some evidence that US is actively trying to disintegrate Russia. As in list concrete steps that US made towards that goal.

[Simon_Jester]

"But [the risk of nuclear war breaking out is...] not [decided by] pure blind chance, especially when both sides take certain reasonable steps to reduce the probability of a random crisis blowing up in their faces. Such as having a presidential hotline between the nations, such as getting together and actually negotiating the partition of a territory the two sides might want to fight over, rather than just posturing and squabbling and sending 'advisors' to shoot at each other."

The boldened parts sounds quite disturbing to non-americans, I hope you realize that. [/quote]In this case, the sides are Russia and NATO, and frankly if the US had an ounce of sense it would let the EU take the lead in negotiating the partition of the territory. The US certainly should not announce a partition of the Ukraine, that would be folly.

What it comes down to is that partitions are better than border wars, and a partition of the Ukraine is better than an indefinite Ukrainian Civil War.

Unfortunately, right now we are 'posturing and squabbling and sending 'advisors' to shoot at each other.'

2) In fairness, the risk of a nuclear war is always non-zero, no matter how you arrange matters. Even now the risk of a nuclear war between the US/NATO powers and Russia isn't zero, even if it is vanishingly small.

The main question is, what is the actual risk of such a war happening, versus what are the costs of allowing the status quo to remain in place?

I don't know, but I am pretty sure that sending nukes into conflict regions is not a great thing to do. Sooner or later somebody will mess up, increasing the risk of it happening is not something a sane person would advocate for. We already had the Air Force losing some bombs, I don't want the next messup to be "bombs left on Ukrainian runway".

Since this part of the decision hinges on imponderables, I will not weigh in for or against the idea.

There are reasons to expect security to be increased by 'nuclear tripwire' forces. There are reasons to expect it to be decreased. At the moment, I am neutral on the matter.

3) LeMay's main argument for war was that he expected the Soviets to use a well armed base in Cuba to launch a nuclear surprise attack on the US that would render it unable to fight back effectively. Especially since at this time the US nuclear deterrent still relied overwhelmingly on the Strategic Air Command's bombers, a significant fraction of which would be wiped out on the ground in such an attack. I would not call this lunacy, even if his concern was misplaced now that we have access to the actual thoughts of the Politburo at the time (which he did not).

Of course, one can easily see how a Russian counterpart of LeMay might see NATO forces stationed in the Ukraine the same way.

I was also referring (though not making it sufficiently clear) how the Butcher and his ilk were arguing for using nuclear weapons when the going got tough in the wars America fought at the time. I am not sure the mindset of the US military has changed sufficiently in the time we are talking about...

It has, in fact.

The Eisenhower administration marked a decisive change in the overall nuclear doctrine of the United States. Douglas MacArthur more or less lost his job for failing to get with the program on that issue, for instance. LeMay was one of the last holdouts, in part because he was a nearly indispensable man in getting the US's bomber forces into a condition fit to fight a nuclear war and thus present an effective nuclear deterrent.

But LeMay, too, faded away, and the US nuclear doctrine of the '70s and '80s has been firmly based on the idea of deterrence and "no first use," and that is not going to change purely because of American soldiers bayoneting babies in Fallujah or whatever else they've done in the past fifteen years. Any more than the Russians are going to obliterate Kiev over the current conflict.

The amount of insanity required to willingly launch a nuclear first strike now is higher (for the established nuclear powers) than it was in the early 1960s, and much higher than in the early 1950s.

So IMO one should give warmongers less reason and opportunity to actually start a shooting war, and even less reasons for accidents to happen. In short, not doing this

Again, this is a valid argument, and by the way, the cartoon you link is very relevant to the case of a 'nuclear accident' caused by carelessness or mishap, which is probably the highest risk of nuclear war today.

Compare and contrast the roles of Vasily Arkhipov and Stanislav Petrov in averting nuclear war, twenty years apart, for an example of this- Arkhipov saved the world by actively refraining from consenting to the launch of a nuclear weapon in a crisis, while Petrov did it by refraining from overreacting to a complete accident that was all a misunderstanding and misperception.

Each man's action was representative of his times, when it came to the threat of nuclear war.

The argument she advanced did not appear to be "China will rescue the Russian economy," so much as "China will allow the Russian economy to limp along in a half-crippled state while the crisis continues, until such time as Chinese economic growth and (possibly) declining Russian standards of 'acceptable economic conditions' remove the effectiveness of the sanctions."

Do you feel that your counterargument is strong enough to negate the second form of the argument, as well as the first?

I don't think that it really matters because Duchess assumes the west wants to collapse Russia. That is not the case. The West wants to make it harder for them to continue on and the sanctions do that. In short, forcing Russia to pay a steeper price than they otherwise would have.

It is questionable to me whether even making it "harder for them to continue on" is wise, given data points like the role of economic hardship in the politics of the Weimar Republic...

And Duchess made her own point about the split between US and European foreign policy on the Russian question.

If the sanctions do not cause the Russian economy to collapse, is there any meaningful sense in which they accomplish the desired goal? If they cannot force the Russians to abandon their claims in Crimea and the Donets basin, the sanctions will continue indefinitely without actually changing anything, and their secondary effects will be entirely negative.

Why? It will force Russia to spend billions more on Crimea than they otherwise would have. It will keep the east of the Ukraine ruined unless Russia spends billions it won't have. These are all good things because at the very least they will occupy Russian power and make them aware that there comes a bill to be paid.

What's the alternative? Just give in and let Putin have it all without a fight? Yeah, that sure will teach him.

Again, I am strongly reminded of the desire for a humiliating peace at the end of World War One, which did not end well. "Punishing" a proud and potentially strong nation by imposing upon it conditions that will humiliate it without defeating it can backfire horribly.

I mean, this is starting to sound like the US sanctions against Cuba- which assuredly made the US 'pay' for nefariously remaining communist. But if anything this made the situation in Cuba worse and made it actively harder for anything like an end to communism in Cuba to happen.

I don't see how Cuba is comparable to Russia.

The point of comparison is simply and exclusively that sanctions often do not achieve a desired effect of forcing policy change on a nation, if the policy in question is valuable and entrenched enough that the nation is willing to accept inconvenience.

Long-term sanctions, in particular, have a poor track record; they tend to cause humanitarian hardship out of proportion to the political changes they bring into being.

[Thanas]

What it comes down to is that partitions are better than border wars, and a partition of the Ukraine is better than an indefinite Ukrainian Civil War.

Given how my country was partitioned for almost half a century I am not sure if a border war is not preferrable, because the cost of integrating a collapsing soviet country was over 1400 bn after that criminal state collapsed.

Point is, it depends on the border war and on the partition.

Since this part of the decision hinges on imponderables, I will not weigh in for or against the idea.

There are reasons to expect security to be increased by 'nuclear tripwire' forces. There are reasons to expect it to be decreased. At the moment, I am neutral on the matter.

Given how Europe would be most closely affected by any such mishap I would argue that they would have to vote on this and decide. No offense to americans, but it is quite easy to send explosives to other people doorsteps.

It has, in fact.

The Eisenhower administration marked a decisive change in the overall nuclear doctrine of the United States. Douglas MacArthur more or less lost his job for failing to get with the program on that issue, for instance. LeMay was one of the last holdouts, in part because he was a nearly indispensable man in getting the US's bomber forces into a condition fit to fight a nuclear war and thus present an effective nuclear deterrent.

But LeMay, too, faded away, and the US nuclear doctrine of the '70s and '80s has been firmly based on the idea of deterrence and "no first use," and that is not going to change purely because of American soldiers bayoneting babies in Fallujah or whatever else they've done in the past fifteen years. Any more than the Russians are going to obliterate Kiev over the current conflict.

The amount of insanity required to willingly launch a nuclear first strike now is higher (for the established nuclear powers) than it was in the early 1960s, and much higher than in the early 1950s.

Again, I cannot help but feel very worried about the statements of high US generals on the Ukraine. If it were to them, US troops would already be rolling into the Ukraine. I don't trust them to keep a sane head on the issue. Nothing good has ever come by letting the military be the leading voice on political issues (WWI, for one) just because people are too stupid to heed Clausewitz dictum of policy trumping military.

It is questionable to me whether even making it "harder for them to continue on" is wise, given data points like the role of economic hardship in the politics of the Weimar Republic...

That depends on whether you belive one can trust Putin and his ilk to be honorable partners or not. Do you? Because I don't.

Again, I am strongly reminded of the desire for a humiliating peace at the end of World War One, which did not end well. "Punishing" a proud and potentially strong nation by imposing upon it conditions that will humiliate it without defeating it can backfire horribly.

What are you talking about? Germany was defeated. That is the only reason why the entente was able to impose such conditions in the first place. The sanctions don't even approach that level. Russia is not defeated. It is expanding.

This would be akin as to putting Sanctions on Hitler for breaking the Munich agreement. (Not a great analogy, but I hope you get my point with regards to the situations).

Not doing anything and continuing business as usual would just send the wrong message, it would tell Russia that the west would be okay with it reestablishing their lost empire over the bones of the dead.

The point of comparison is simply and exclusively that sanctions often do not achieve a desired effect of forcing policy change on a nation, if the policy in question is valuable and entrenched enough that the nation is willing to accept inconvenience.

Of course. But it slows the spread of expansion.

Long-term sanctions, in particular, have a poor track record; they tend to cause humanitarian hardship out of proportion to the political changes they bring into being.

That depends on the sanctions.

[Simon_Jester]

It is questionable to me whether even making it "harder for them to continue on" is wise, given data points like the role of economic hardship in the politics of the Weimar Republic...

That depends on whether you belive one can trust Putin and his ilk to be honorable partners or not. Do you? Because I don't.

If imposing economic hardship destabilizes a dishonorable government and causes it to be replaced by a dishonorable and considerably more warlike and vicious government, then the fact that the previous government was dishonorable is irrelevant.

Again, I am strongly reminded of the desire for a humiliating peace at the end of World War One, which did not end well. "Punishing" a proud and potentially strong nation by imposing upon it conditions that will humiliate it without defeating it can backfire horribly.

What are you talking about? Germany was defeated. That is the only reason why the entente was able to impose such conditions in the first place. The sanctions don't even approach that level. Russia is not defeated. It is expanding.

The point here is that the desire to 'discipline,' to 'punish' a country can backfire by making its populace angry and vengeful.

I mean, you are better placed than I to know what Germans actually thought of the Versailles peace treaty in the 1920s and '30s, but it seems pretty clear to me that a lot of them resented it, felt it was unfair, felt that their nation was being unjustly deprived of territory that was rightly German, and felt that German nationals were being unjustly forced to live under foreign rule.

This resentment then seems to have played a large role in the rise of a Nazi government that basically said: "You know, the real mistake of the Second Reich is that they weren't militarist enough, weren't violent enough, weren't ferocious enough in ripping out the gentle and tolerant elements in our society. That is how we wound up humiliated and "punished" by foreigners."

And this is today a cautionary tale for anyone who wants to impose humiliating but non-crippling "punishments" on a nation. Watch out; they may respond to this nonviolent threat with more nationalism and jingoism.

This would be akin as to putting Sanctions on Hitler for breaking the Munich agreement. (Not a great analogy, but I hope you get my point with regards to the situations).

Not doing anything and continuing business as usual would just send the wrong message, it would tell Russia that the west would be okay with it reestablishing their lost empire over the bones of the dead.

The Russians already know that the West is trying to oppose them; the problem is that they appear to have decided that despite that, the 1993-era frontiers of Russia proper are not an appropriate set of boundaries for an ethnic Russian state.

So the question then is, how far is the West prepared to go to defend the principle that literally all borders everywhere are sacrosanct and non-negotiable no matter who lives on either side of the border?

Controlling the Russians with nonviolent threats may very well not work, so the West must be prepared to cope with what happens if they don't work. So either the West has to be prepared to go to war to defend these borders, or it has to be prepared to negotiate the status of the borders.

The point of comparison is simply and exclusively that sanctions often do not achieve a desired effect of forcing policy change on a nation, if the policy in question is valuable and entrenched enough that the nation is willing to accept inconvenience.

Of course. But it slows the spread of expansion.

Maybe, but it's hard to say how much, given that a nation in the grip of a nationalist resurgence can get away with sacrificing a larger proportion of its wealth to foreign adventures. If the sanctions have the effect of perpetuating the Russians' distrust of foreigners and desire to integrate all Russians into a single, secure polity... that may well accelerate their expansion more than the actual sanctions decelerate them.