.S. and Russia Sign Nuclear Arms Pact

[Redleader34]

[quote="[The New York Times]
U.S. and Russia Sign Nuclear Arms Pact
By PETER BAKER

PRAGUE — With flourish and fanfare, President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia signed a nuclear arms control treaty on Thursday and opened what they hoped would be a new era in the tumultuous relationship between two former cold war adversaries.

Meeting here in the heart of a once-divided Europe, the two leaders put aside the acrimony that has characterized Russian-American ties in recent years as they agreed to bring down their arsenals and restore an inspection regime that expired in December. Along the way, they sidestepped unresolved disputes over missile defense and other issues.

“When the United States and Russia are not able to work together on big issues, it is not good for either of our nations, nor is it good for the world,” Mr. Obama said as his words echoed through a majestic, gilded hall in the famed Prague Castle. “Together, we have stopped the drift, and proven the benefits of cooperation. Today is an important milestone for nuclear security and nonproliferation, and for U.S.-Russia relations.”

Mr. Medvedev called the treaty signing “a truly historic event” that will “open a new page” in Russian-American relations. “What matters most is this is a win-win situation,” he said. “No one stands to lose from this agreement. I believe this is a typical feature of our cooperation. Both parties have won.”

The Russian president signaled general support for the American-led drive to impose new sanctions on Iran, saying that Tehran’s nuclear program has flouted the international community. “We cannot turn a blind eye to this,” Mr. Medvedev said, while adding that sanctions “should be smart” and avoid hardship for the Iranian people.

The apparently warm relationship between the two presidents was on display as they entered the hall to trumpet music. They whispered and smiled with each other in English as they sat side by side signing copies of the so-called New Start treaty, then traded compliments during a follow-up exchange with reporters.

Mr. Obama called the Russian a “friend and partner” and said “without his personal efforts and strong leadership, we would not be here today.” For his part, Mr. Medvedev said the two had developed a “very good personal relationship and a very good personal chemistry as they say.”

While the treaty will mandate only modest reductions in the actual arsenals maintained by the two countries, it caps a turnaround in relations with Moscow that sunk to rock bottom in August 2008 during the war between Russia and its tiny southern neighbor, Georgia. When he arrived in office, Mr. Obama made restoring the relationship a priority, a goal that coincided with his vision expressed here a year ago of eventually ridding the world of nuclear weapons.

Even as the two presidents hailed the treaty, however, they found no common ground on American plans to build an anti-missile shield in Europe to counter any Iranian threat. Mr. Obama refused Russian demands to include limits on missile defense in the treaty, nearly scuttling the agreement. In the days leading up to the ceremony here, Russian officials alternately claimed the agreement would bind the program or complained that it did not and threatened to withdraw if it went forward.

The treaty, if ratified by lawmakers in both countries, would require each country to deploy no more than 1,550 strategic warheads, down from 2,200 allowed in the Treaty of Moscow signed by President George W. Bush in 2002. Each would be limited to 800 total land-, air- and sea-based launchers — 700 of which can be deployed at any given time — down from 1,600 permitted under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991, or Start.

Because of counting rules and unilateral reductions over the years, neither country would have to actually eliminate large numbers of weapons to meet the new limits. Moreover, the treaty does not apply to whole categories of weapons, including thousands of strategic warheads held in reserve and tactical warheads, some of which are still stationed in Europe.

But the treaty would re-establish an inspection regime that lapsed along with Start last December and bring the two countries back into a legal framework after years of tension. Moreover, both sides hope to use it as a foundation for a new round of negotiations that could lead to much deeper reductions that will cover weapons like stored or tactical warheads.

The first task for Mr. Obama after returning to Washington will be persuading the Senate to ratify the new treaty and advisers planned to head to Capitol Hill on Thursday, even before his return, to brief senators.

Ratification requires a two-thirds vote, or 67 senators, meaning the president needs at least eight Republicans. The White House is counting on the support of Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, the senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee and one of his party’s most respected voices on international affairs, to clear the way.

But it could still have to contend with skeptics like Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, the Republican whip, who have expressed concern about limiting American defenses. And the polarized politics of Washington heading into a mid-term election are volatile, meaning a vote could be delayed until after the election, which would further put off other elements of Mr. Obama’s anti-nuclear agenda, such as consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The White House wants a vote by the end of the year and Robert Gibbs, the president’s press secretary, reminded reporters on Air Force One during the flight here that past arms control treaties have received near-unanimous votes. “We are hopeful that reducing the threat of nuclear weapons remains a priority for both parties,” he said.

But what he did not note is that the Senate has also rejected an arms control agreement in recent times, refusing to ratify the test ban treaty when it was originally brought up in 1999. Moreover, it took three years in the 1990s to ratify the first Start follow-up treaty, known as Start 2, which never went into force because of a dispute over Russian conditions attached during its own ratification process.

Mr. Obama hopes to use the trust built during the treaty negotiations to leverage more cooperation from Moscow on other issues, most notably pressuring Iran to give up its nuclear program.

Speaking after signing the treaty with Mr. Medvedev, Mr. Obama said the United States and Russia were “part of a coalition of nations insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran face consequences, because they have continually failed to meet their obligations” under international rules governing the use of nuclear materials.

“Those nations that refuse to meet their obligations will be isolated, and denied the opportunity that comes with international integration,” he said. Iran maintains its nuclear program is for civilian purposes, but the United States and its western allies suspect Tehran wants to build a nuclear weapon.

Warmer relations with the Kremlin worry American allies in Central and Eastern Europe, which were already concerned that Mr. Obama’s decision last year to scrap Mr. Bush’s missile defense plan in favor of a reformulated architecture was seen as a concession to Moscow.

Hoping to soothe those concerns, Mr. Obama plans to have dinner Thursday night in Prague with 11 leaders from the region, including the presidents or prime ministers of Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Similarly, Mr. Obama made sure before leaving Washington to speak by phone with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia to reassure him of American support. He will meet separately with Czech leaders on Friday morning before returning to Washington.

Alan Cowell contributed reporting from Paris.

[/quote]

Well, at least with less nuclear arms the world should be a better place

[MKSheppard]

Incorrect. The world was safer when everyone had 55,000 deployed nuclear warheads. As warhead numbers trend ever downwards, a successful disarming first strike becomes more and more feasible.

[Twoyboy]

Incorrect. The world was safer when everyone had 55,000 deployed nuclear warheads. As warhead numbers trend ever downwards, a successful disarming first strike becomes more and more feasible.

Surely 1,550 nukes and 800 launchers is still well above the threshold an enemy could hope to take out in one go? I assume that the locations of these are also pretty secret?

[adam_grif]

Incorrect. The world was safer when everyone had 55,000 deployed nuclear warheads. As warhead numbers trend ever downwards, a successful disarming first strike becomes more and more feasible.

Surely 1,550 nukes and 800 launchers is still well above the threshold an enemy could hope to take out in one go? I assume that the locations of these are also pretty secret?

Couple of things:

- It's not necessary to blow up their whole arsenal. What you need to do is neutralize it, i.e. make it ineffective.
- Not all 1,550 devices are capable of striking every target.
- ABM capabilities are improving.


For now you may be right, but it's not a desirable direction to go in. Arsenal sizes are shrinking but ABM capabilities are increasing, and at some stage it will meet at the middle unless they start putting more warheads into service or rendering the defenses obsolete.

[Pint0 Xtreme]

I've read about nuclear arms deal we've had with Russia/USSR over the past several decades and today is another in a series of arms reduction agreements. But how are we enforcing these arms reductions? It would seem like either country could just say we're reducing arms while secretly keeping a large stockpile. Forgive me if this seems like a stupid question but I've never read or heard of any kind of enforcement mechanism nor has it been apparent to me.

[Admiral Valdemar]

I've read about nuclear arms deal we've had with Russia/USSR over the past several decades and today is another in a series of arms reduction agreements. But how are we enforcing these arms reductions? It would seem like either country could just say we're reducing arms while secretly keeping a large stockpile. Forgive me if this seems like a stupid question but I've never read or heard of any kind of enforcement mechanism nor has it been apparent to me.

The START and SALT pacts, as far as I recall, required arms inspectors from both sides oversee disarmament. There'd really be no point in signing something with such pomp and circumstance if at the end of the day everyone knew it was bullshit.

[MKSheppard]

You mean like how the Soviets followed START I or the Biological Weapons Convention?

[Admiral Valdemar]

Well, okay, not all of them. But I would hope that lesson has been learned, given the initial distrust both sides would have about such things when at a state of Cold War still. And they did have a big problem with collapsing around that time too, so give them the benefit of at least having their house in order today.

[phongn]

Well, okay, not all of them. But I would hope that lesson has been learned, given the initial distrust both sides would have about such things when at a state of Cold War still. And they did have a big problem with collapsing around that time too, so give them the benefit of at least having their house in order today.

The opposite lesson might've been learned, i.e. "we can hide our weapons from the silly Americans any day of the week and twice on Sundays"

[Admiral Valdemar]

That too. But if they get caught out this time, it won't be a nice message the world gets. I still don't see this stopping proliferation anyway, but it's always nice to have less nukes pointing at me. Yes, me personally; I'm notorious for being a target.

[phongn]

That too. But if they get caught out this time, it won't be a nice message the world gets. I still don't see this stopping proliferation anyway, but it's always nice to have less nukes pointing at me. Yes, me personally; I'm notorious for being a target.

Why would the Russians (or for that matter, the Americans) quite care about the message the world gets?

[Admiral Valdemar]

They wouldn't, unless they do care about other nations not going for their own nuke programmes and feel this move is actually helping to stop such actions.

[Sea Skimmer]

Surely 1,550 nukes and 800 launchers is still well above the threshold an enemy could hope to take out in one go? I assume that the locations of these are also pretty secret?

They are not at all secret. You can't hide an ICBM silo (in fact in the US you can walk almost right up to every single one of them, they have a fence at 100 foot radius around the silos), you can't hide a bomber base, you can't hide an SSBN base. Only an SSBN actually deployed at sea in deep water is safe, and only then if it was not trailed by an SSN when it deployed.

With so few launchers, only a few SSBNs are going to be at sea at any given time, and losing even one of them means 16-24 launchers (depends on the SSBN model) lost. In addition the treaty counts a bomber as one launcher even though it might carry as many as 24 nukes, but the US and Russia each have only a few actual bases for nuclear capable bombers. The bombers could disperse in times of tension (very expensive, and very hard to sustain for any length of time), but this still is a major vulnerability that allows one nuclear warhead to destroy multiple launchers.

In addition the 1,550 warhead limit is only on deployed strategic warheads. Everyone can have as many nuclear warheads in storage as they want, and no real time verification mechanism (or really any verification at all) exists to ensure those warheads stay stored.

So the US or Russia could fire 1,550 deployed warheads at 800 launchers, double targeting them for reliability of destruction, and then load up with stored warheads to start attacking other targets. A few SSBNs might survive to counter attack, but even a very limited ABM system should be able to deal with a few dozen SSBN fired missiles. This is one of the reasons why Russia goes so crazy about the US national ABM system, even though it only has a small pool of interceptor missiles.

[K. A. Pital]

This is one of the reasons why Russia goes so crazy about the US international ABM system, even though it only has a small pool of interceptor missiles.

I think you forgot about the US forward-deploying ABM elements in foreign nations on the same continent where Russia is.

[Sky Captain]

But why on earth Russia or US would want to do such disarming first strike on each other? What would any of these nations gain by it? Imagine US did a succesful first strike against Russia destroying most launchers and intercepting few missiles that get launched from submarines on counterattack. What would US gain by it other than becoming internationally recognized rogue state and having to live in fears that other nuclear powers may consider doing a first strike against US, and ending up in international isolation like North Korea.

[phongn]

But why on earth Russia or US would want to do such disarming first strike on each other? What would any of these nations gain by it? Imagine US did a succesful first strike against Russia destroying most launchers and intercepting few missiles that get launched from submarines on counterattack.

It's unlikely that any such attack would occur without events already moving to war. Such a surprise attack would give victory and both sides recognized it in the Cold War.

What would US gain by it other than becoming internationally recognized rogue state and having to live in fears that other nuclear powers may consider doing a first strike against US, and ending up in international isolation like North Korea.

Why would the US be considered a rogue state or be isolated? And in this scenario the US has a working missile defense shield to shoot down anyone else trying to take their own disarming shots.

[Sky Captain]

Why would the US be considered a rogue state or be isolated?

Why? Because you know it just nuked another sovereign country supposedly without provocation. If Pakistan suddenly launched unprovoked nuclear surprise attack against India or China it would be considered rogue state by most nations.

And in this scenario the US has a working missile defense shield to shoot down anyone else trying to take their own disarming shots

Any missile defense has a capacity beyond which it becomes saturated. It may succesfully take down few dozen launched from lone submarine, but what if there are hundreds of missiles with multiple warheads each coming in?

[Sea Skimmer]

I think you forgot about the US forward-deploying ABM elements in foreign nations on the same continent where Russia is.

No actually those are completely irrelevant to defending the US against an SLBM attack. That would come out of the Atlantic or the Pacific and it would be physically impossible for a GBI launched from Europe to do anything about it. Nor for that matter can GBI in Europe chase down an ICBM in central Russia aiming for the US. But its not like facts ever get in the way of Russian complaining about things. Russia is just paranoid that some future even more massive US ABM weapon might plug into the GBI fire control system, and gain such an intercept capability. Since the US is going to have a web of space based lasers orbited as 'communications satellites’ sooner then latter, such a potential far future development doesn’t even matter. GBI was always intended to be a stop gap solution. That's why even Bush only called for deploying 40 of them in the US and 10 in Europe. Instead Obama has limited this to 38 in the US, though not all are yet deployed.

A GBI with clustered strap on booster rockets to allow a tail chase intercept would be cool though.

[TimothyC]

Any missile defense has a capacity beyond which it becomes saturated. It may successfully take down few dozen launched from lone submarine, but what if there are hundreds of missiles with multiple warheads each coming in?

The current GBIs have the range to hit incoming missiles before the warheads are released (so did Spartan, and I would guess that the Russian Gorgon and Galosh).

Oh, reading the treaty I've pulled out the following:

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
[...]
Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between
strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that
this interrelationship will become more important as strategic
nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive
arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the
strategic offensive arms of the Parties,

I wouldn't put it past the President to try and use this as a rational for stopping the Land-based SM-3 program to be deployed in Europe.

1. Each Party shall base:
(a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;
(b) deployed heavy bombers only at air bases.
[...]
8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy
bomber flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other
than test heavy bombers shall be located only at repair
facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers.
9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing
of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise
agreed by the Parties.
10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at
eliminated facilities except during their movement through
such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such
facilities.

While I don't know the last time the US sent the Bombers to the dispersal fields, doing so would be against the law now.

3. Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM
launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense
interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert
and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors
for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision
shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to
signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense
interceptors therein.

And we can't convert the ICBM silos into ABM silos. I don't know if we had any plans to do so, but I would like to know why it was included.

[Sea Skimmer]

And we can't convert the ICBM silos into ABM silos. I don't know if we had any plans to do so, but I would like to know why it was included.

It’s probably included so that Russia does not have to worry about the US mass converting Minuteman silos into GBI silos in a surprise surge deployment to take the world hostage. I’ve never heard of serious plans to convert ICBM silos like this for GBI, but its very likely been studied along with countless other basing options. Road-Rail-Barge-Truck-Transport Plane-Submarine combined with numerous different types of hardened structures are all potential basing options. The US has no actual need to use silos at all, it’s just convenient for the moment. The two silo farms in Alaska have the silos tightly clustered, so a single nuke could take out all of them. They are basically just protection against low level hazards like special forces attack or a weak air raid.


Model of a proposed truck mobile GBI concept.