Iran Elections Thread

[Zac Naloen]

It's being reported on blogs that following the arrest the BBC have been ordered out of Iran. ABC and NBC have had their equipment confiscated (ABC reporter stated this on twitter).

Plenty of hear say that violence is on the up-tick as well.

[Straha]

It's being reported on blogs that following the arrest the BBC have been ordered out of Iran. ABC and NBC have had their equipment confiscated (ABC reporter stated this on twitter).

And that would explain why the rest of the mainstream media's coverage has been shit.

[Pablo Sanchez]

Because Iran prides itself on being the only proper democracy in the Middle East. Can't have a proper democracy without a proper vote.

Even the gesture is wasted because of how obvious the fraud is. They're not even pretending to having a vote, it's like they're pretending to pretend.

I disagree. The lesson the Pasdaran have learned over and over again is that if you crush protest right as it begins with massive, overwhelming force it wont go anywhere. They did it over and over again during the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij did it in the mid-90s when the Pasdaran told the government to change its tune, the Basij and Pasdaran did it during the protests in '99, and the lesson that everyone who looks at the Islamic Revolution seems to parrot is that if the Shah had marched the troops out in the streets '78 and forcibly shut down the revolution he would have survived.

Probably, but then it comes to a matter of how far the Ahmadinejad clique is willing to go. The protests are likely to be bigger and better supported by the populace than anything since '78.

Second, I buy your idea of a palace coup but I don't think it was pre-planned at all.

It's not my idea, it comes from the NYT's Lede Blog. But, I agreed with the lack of planning, which is why I said that I thought that the coup was triggered by the election results rather than being set up beforehand.

That being said, the only way they can make their position look legitimate is if they crush all the protests now and make sure there's no serious protesting Monday and Tuesday (when people are supposed to take to the streets and then strike, respectively.) If they don't crush those, then they might as well call it a day and go back to the barracks.

This is true, if a general strike holds together in the next few days then the jig is up.

[Straha]

Because Iran prides itself on being the only proper democracy in the Middle East. Can't have a proper democracy without a proper vote.

Even the gesture is wasted because of how obvious the fraud is. They're not even pretending to having a vote, it's like they're pretending to pretend.

I know what you mean. Honestly it's like they cribbed notes on how to fake an election from Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong-Il. It's so utterly amateur as to be farcical that they could think they'd get away with it.

Probably, but then it comes to a matter of how far the Ahmadinejad clique is willing to go. The protests are likely to be bigger and better supported by the populace than anything since '78.

I think it all hinges on tomorrow and Tuesday. If the people march then the rest of the establishment will fall in line and the clique will have to know the gig is up. If they can suppress or put off the march without causing massive bloodshed then, maybe, they have a chance to pull off a coup.

It's not my idea, it comes from the NYT's Lede Blog. But, I agreed with the lack of planning, which is why I said that I thought that the coup was triggered by the election results rather than being set up beforehand.

I hadn't seen it there, my bad. I've been meaning to check it more often but there's just so much coming out of Iran right now and there's only so much of my attention to go around. :p

Now we play the waiting game, I guess.

[MarshalPurnell]

There are a lot of reports of the reformist leadership being arrested or confined. Some of the early reports of Mousavi being arrested were clearly wrong, but the situation may have changed now. Khatami and Sanei have also been reported under house arrest, and there are reports of security police around the residences of other opposition figures. Unfortunately of course just about everything coming out of Iran are the blatant lies of the government, and rumors that may or may not be exaggerated and cannot be verified.

If there are widespread arrests of moderates though it is a rather bad sign. Mousavi, Khatami, and the like are all establishment figures, not really liberals except in Iran's warped political system. They aren't going to be organizing and leading a revolution and would probably prevent their followers from getting too far out of line during the scheduled demonstrations this week. In truth their presence would be a stabilizing factor, encouraging the protesters to vent their anger in ways that reflect solely on Ahmadinejad and the agencies he is alleged to control and not to challenge the basic structure of the Islamic Republic. Leaders who emerge from the students and workers who will make up the majority of the protesters are going to be more radical and less invested in the present system, and with the unapologetic suppression of the moderate reformist wing may turn against the ruling elite as a whole rather than in part.

That, well, is the recipe for a massacre or for a revolution. If the election is really a Pasadaran coup d'etat with the support of a few powerful ayatollahs it may even be planned that way. If Ahmadinejad and his supporters can convince the rest of the establishment that the Islamic Revolution is at stake that will (theoretically) end dissent among the political and religious elite and force them to rally to Ahmadinejad as the savior of the state. The Army is rumored to have told conscripts that it will under no circumstances open fire on protesters, but it's been expected for a while that the professional military is completely unreliable when it comes to suppressing internal unrest. The real muscle is with the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij militia, and the Basij are almost entirely creatures of Ahmadinejad and the hardliner clerics. Unfortunately it looks as if the Pasadaran is united behind Ahmadinejad as well, and only substantial clerical opposition is likely to crack that facade, which would certainly encourage the government to clamp down on all means by which such dissent could be communicated.

[Straha]

If there are widespread arrests of moderates though it is a rather bad sign. Mousavi, Khatami, and the like are all establishment figures, not really liberals except in Iran's warped political system. They aren't going to be organizing and leading a revolution and would probably prevent their followers from getting too far out of line during the scheduled demonstrations this week. In truth their presence would be a stabilizing factor, encouraging the protesters to vent their anger in ways that reflect solely on Ahmadinejad and the agencies he is alleged to control and not to challenge the basic structure of the Islamic Republic.

Ironically, that's probably the best thing for the opposition right now. If they go out there in a controlled fashion lead by a moderate leadership intent on not destabilizing the Islamic Republic then the clique around Ahmadinejad can sell the idea that it's not really that bad, and that they can work out a backroom deal with the opposition leadership to make it all go away, quietly. If the protesters come out there screaming their head off at Ahmadinejad then two things happen: First, the establishment figures that haven't taken sides see that their legitimacy is being undermined by this election result and that they need to fix it fast. Second, the clerics will realize that if they legitimize this result while leaving establishment figures gone under house arrest it's only a matter of time before the Pasdaran decides that they're not hardline enough and tosses them in with Khatami and Sanei. But, if the election result is loudly and publicly repudiated then the Pasdaran have no legs to stand on, and have to stand down or face intense public wrath.

If the election is really a Pasadaran coup d'etat with the support of a few powerful ayatollahs it may even be planned that way. If Ahmadinejad and his supporters can convince the rest of the establishment that the Islamic Revolution is at stake that will (theoretically) end dissent among the political and religious elite and force them to rally to Ahmadinejad as the savior of the state.

The question is who's threatening the Islamic Revolution. Half of the establishment will be pointing at Ahmadinejad, the Pasdaran, and everything he and they have stood for over the past four years as being the most serious threats to the revolution at the moment. Also, he's done himself no favors with power figures over time. Especially not with the real backroom movers like Khameini and Rafsanjani. If the establishment comes out against him his days are numbered.

The Army is rumored to have told conscripts that it will under no circumstances open fire on protesters, but it's been expected for a while that the professional military is completely unreliable when it comes to suppressing internal unrest.

If they have to call out the Artesh to suppress a coup then they're done. Finished. Game over.

Now, I could see the Artesh being used by the establishment as a tool in a counter-coup to take out the revolutionary guard. That's different, however.

Unfortunately it looks as if the Pasadaran is united behind Ahmadinejad as well, and only substantial clerical opposition is likely to crack that facade, which would certainly encourage the government to clamp down on all means by which such dissent could be communicated.

I don't know if they're united. We haven't seen any signs of unison anywhere in Iran. And the botched fraud job makes it look like this was a last second hackjob put together by people who had no real experience with this sort of thing (meaning, not the Pasdaran experts.) And there are signs that even the government media has no clue what to do (the English language service of the official media has been announcing that Mousavi won the vote in Tehran, but lost it elsewhere. Directly at odds with what's coming out of the Farsi-language media.) As I said, we have to wait and see how it goes.


P.S. I got your PM. I've been meaning to reply to it, and will in very short order.

[Straha]

And the Iranian twitters are ablaze with reports that Tehran University has been raided and hundreds of students teargassed and arrested.

[The Original Nex]

Photos of the University carnage. The site's in Farsi, but the pics speak for themselves:

http://entesabat88.persianblog.ir/post/2/

[Straha]

My Farsi isn't what it once was (and it was never fantastic) but I do believe that took place in Isfahan and not Tehran.

Doesn't change the horror and impact of the pictures though.

[CmdrWilkens]

No. Look at the graph of votes counted for each candidate.



An R^2 of 0.998 for that line. There is no way that is natural.

I don't think anyone had mentioned this elsewhere in the thread but I figured it was worth pointing out that this has actually been debunked (as in it has been shown that the correlation is NOT proof of rigging). By means of promoting my favorite statistics guy I present Nate Silver on the subject.

Like most Americans, there are few things I would like to see more than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's hateful President, to be voted out of office. Elections in thuggish, authoritarian states like Iran need be treated with the utmost skepticism and scrutiny. I can't say I have any real degree of confidence in the official results, which showed Ahmadinejad winning with some 62 percent of the vote.

There is a statistical analysis making the rounds, however, which purports to show overwhelmingly persuasive evidence that the Iranian election was rigged. I do not find this evidence compelling.

Iran's election results were reported by its Interior Ministry in six waves. The first wave covered about one-third of the total vote; there were then two relatively large waves that reported about 20 percent of the vote each, and then three smaller waves that reported the remainder of the vote. What other observers have found is that, over the course of the six waves, there is an extremely strong, linear relationship between the number of votes reported for Ahmadinejad and the number reported for his principal opponent, Mir Hussein Moussavi (who had declared victory before any results were officially announced):



This relationship is superficially very impressive -- an R-squared of .998, which suggests a nearly perfect relationship.

Just how remarkable really is it, however? Rather than deal in abstractions, let's try a more concrete sort of experiment. Suppose that results from last November's election between Barack Obama and John McCain were revealed in this fashion, in six large waves. Suppose moreover that these waves were determined based on the alphabetical ordering of the states:

Wave 1: Results from Alabama-Illinois are reported; this represents about 33% of the total vote.
Wave 2: Results from Indiana-Mississippi (17% of the total vote) are added to the above totals.
Wave 3: Results from Missouri-North Carolina (19%) are added.
Wave 4: Results from North Dakota-Pennsylvania (12%) are added.
Wave 5: Results from Rhode Island-Texas (10%) are added.
Wave 6: Lastly, results from Utah-Wyoming (9%) are added and the counting is complete.

If results were released in this fashion, here is what we would get for the total number of votes for Obama and McCain at each stage:



Now, let's plot these on a graph:



Wow! The correlation is extremely high -- an R-Squared of .9959 -- almost as high as the one we saw for Iran. Does that mean the U.S. election was rigged too?

Of course not. The apparently extremely strong relationship is mostly an artifact of the exceptionally simple fact that as you count more votes, both candidates' totals will tend to increase. In our example, Wave 5 happens to be a very good one for McCain: it contains the results from South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas -- four red states -- plus Rhode Island, which went for Obama but contains a tiny number of votes. And yet, the impact of Wave 5 is barely visible when the results are presented in this fashion.

Likewise, there was more wave-to-wave variation in the Ahmadinejad-Moosavi results than the statistical analysis I cited above seems to imply. Ignoring votes for minor candidates, Ahmadinejad won a high of 70.4 percent of the votes in Wave 1, and a low of 62.3 percent in the votes newly added in Wave 6. By comparison, Obama's share of the newly-added votes in our experiment ranged from 56.4 percent in Wave 3 to 44.7 percent in Wave 4. That's slightly more variance than we saw in the Iranian results but not much.

To be clear, these results certainly do not prove that Iran's election was clean. I have no particular reason to believe the results reported by the Interior Ministry. But I also don't have any particular reason to disbelieve them, at least based on the statistical evidence. If Moosavi truly did have the support of a majority of Iran's citizenry, the best evidence we will have of that is what happens in the streets of Tehran over the next days and weeks.

The graphs may not come across but suffice to say you can look for yourself and the arrangement of reporting for Obama v McCain has an R-squared damn close to the Iranian announcement numbers.

[The Original Nex]

My Farsi isn't what it once was (and it was never fantastic) but I do believe that took place in Isfahan and not Tehran.

Doesn't change the horror and impact of the pictures though.

Ah well according to a number of Tweets (I can't recall if I saw it on Sullivan's site or on Huffington) there are reports of attacks on a number of universities across the country. It's probably an attempt to intimidate people from participating in protests tomorrow and beyond.

Also there are increasing reports that many of the thugs beating people up are imported Arab members of Hezbollah, not Persians. Whether this means Ahmadi couldn't get Iranian forces to beat their own people or something else, I cannot say.

One wonders what tomorrow will bring. The Islamic Republic will never be the same again, that's for sure, assuming it even survives the coming days and weeks.

[Big Phil]

As bloody as it would be, it would be GOOD for Iran to have a revolution to overthrow the Revolutionary government established thirty years ago. Maybe get something approaching sanity in charge of that country as opposed to the despots and religious wackos they've had for the last thirty years (recognizing that while the Shah was a despot, at least he wasn't a religious nut too).

[CmdrWilkens]

As bloody as it would be, it would be GOOD for Iran to have a revolution to overthrow the Revolutionary government established thirty years ago. Maybe get something approaching sanity in charge of that country as opposed to the despots and religious wackos they've had for the last thirty years (recognizing that while the Shah was a despot, at least he wasn't a religious nut too).

While I think a chage in government would be wonderful I can't say that blood running through the streets like back in the early 80s is the way to go. The slow destruciton of the credibility of the mullahs through this sort of tinkering in the government might continue to work the slow road towards a truly open government. I can't say for sure but I'd much prefer another 2 decades of back and forth between reformers and theocrats before we get a new government to hundreds of thousands dead to install a new government by next year.

[Straha]

The EU has recognized the election as legitimate, with some note for concern.

Rafsanjani has resigned as leader of the expediency council according to some reports.

Al Arabiyya is down

And some more emerging...

[Prannon]

The Presidency of the Council of the EU closely followed the course of the Presidential elections held on 12 June 2009 and notices Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected for the second term as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Presidency is concerned about alledged irregularities during the election process and post-electional violence that broke out immediately after the release of the official election results on 13 June 2009.

The Presidency hopes that outcome of the Presidential elections will bring the opportunity to resume the dialogue on nuclear issue and clear up Iranian possition in this regard. The Presidency expects the new Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will take its responsibility towards international community and respect its international obligations.

I want to comment on this link that Straha posted. Although he says that this is the EU Presidency's betowal of legitimacy on the election results, it's actually a far cry from it. It's a cautious statement recognizing that an election took place and that "official" results were announced showing Ahmadinejad as the winner.

I highlighted some of the key terms. First, the Presidency doesn't congratulate Mahmoud or state that he is the president of Iran, nor does it say that it recognizes the results. It merely "notices" them. This is a passive word, indicating that the EU says nothing or does nothing in support or denial of the results.

Furthermore, the EU Presidency states its concern about the violence and takes great care to say that it broke out "immediately" after the results were announced. This is a shadowy, politico-speak way of saying "something isn't right here and the results are shady somehow." Again, it's cautious, but insupportive and, most importantly, suspicious in tone.

Finally, the EU Presidency is not clear on which specific government it is addressing in the last paragraph. It merely states "the new government," whatever that may be. This can be applied to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, or perhaps if things get really ugly, something else entirely. And what's more, the last clause in the EU statement - "respect its international obligations" - is something that can be said of Ahmadinejad's government...or of a brand new governmental system that might be coming to power. Normally a government is recognized on the outside once other countries are reasonably assured that government will fulfill their obligations to debts and other institutions.

I don't see this as an EU endorsement. It really isn't anything other than a statement saying, "Yeah, an election occurred."

[Straha]

Wilkins, problem with the graph off the top of my head: The Iranian election is ordered by the timing of vote results (chronologically), the timing of the U.S. election is done by random (or, alphabetical order.) If you were to look at the U.S. results chronologically it'd show far more deviation along the way then what's shown there I'm willing to bet.

[Straha]

>SNIP<

While, yes, it is far from supportive in the "Good Job Mahmoud!" sense, it's certainly not condemning anything, and certainly not in the context of past EU statments.

When they want to find their balls, they can. Like with:

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe again

Georgia

Mild Approbation at Egypt

Election in Comoros is "Not Valid"

And I encourage you to look for the rest. So, while it ain't fully supportive, it does recognize 1. That an election took place, 2. That Ahmadinejad was re-elected, 3. Recognizes the continuing legitimacy of the government in Iran. And it lacks none of the punch of moral reproach that the EU has been able to call up in the past when it wanted to.

[Straha]

Sorry for the triple post.

Andrew Sullivan says Mousavi is trying to get this message out via the BBC:

I AM UNDER EXTREME PRESSURE TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF THE SHAM ELECTION. THEY HAVE CUT ME OFF FROM ANY COMMUNICATION WITH PEOPLE AND AM UNDER SURVEILLANCE. I ASK THE PEOPLE TO STAY IN THE STREETS BUT AVOID VIOLENCE

[Prannon]

So, while it ain't fully supportive, it does recognize 1. That an election took place, 2. That Ahmadinejad was re-elected, 3. Recognizes the continuing legitimacy of the government in Iran. And it lacks none of the punch of moral reproach that the EU has been able to call up in the past when it wanted to.

I see your point with the past statements, but would it be fair to say that Iran is something of a special case? Zimbabwe isn't a strategically important country in the grand scheme of things in spite of the suffering of the people there. The EU can say whatever it wants and get away with it. Same for Comoros. Egypt is a strategically important country, so the EU would naturally have more guarded language in store for them in regards to their Shura Council election. Even so, those elections didn't threaten the immediate stability of the government, so the EU can call up it's "moral reproach" without any major consequences.

Regarding Iran however, consider that 1) Major powers in Europe and the US have been negotiating with Iran to end its nuclear program, and need to be delicate in their language, 2) Iran is an extremely strategic country and has a great deal of regional power, so what happens there has a big effect, and 3) the immediate stability of Iran's government is threatened at this time, and words from abroad can have a big effect if not crafted carefully. It follows that the EU would take a more guarded approach in their language and try to avoid taking sides. Perhaps they are doing this to keep Ahmadinejad from crying wolf at the Great Satin Spectre, or perhaps they just don't want to get involved and will take whoever comes out of this with a diplomatic handshake.

[Straha]

I don't buy it because the simple reaction if they didn't want to take sides yet would be to delay any announcement on the election. It reads to me like they're recognizing the election and Ahmadinejad while leaving a backdoor open to criticize it if they feel like later, and I don't like that. But, that may just be me.

[Prannon]

True. That's a very good point. In the end the statement is exactly what the news sources have been saying about international reaction. It's cautious. Taken at face value and without prior context though, it's vague enough not to endorse the election results outright. I read it as extremely, extremely guarded, and not a recognition of the election as legitimate, and that satisfies me for the moment.

[Pablo Sanchez]

EU recognition for Ahmadinejad's victory is a simple calculation. If he succeeds in suppressing the opposition to him, and the EU had refused to recognize him, Iran will become even more diplomatically intransigent. If he loses and the reformists come to power, they're going to want to improve relations with the west whether or not the EU backed them at this moment. The somewhat equivocal nature of the recognition isn't just to cover their asses with the European population, it's also so they have a window to crawl out if the reformists win, so they can still say they were with them. Then there's the fact that Ahmadinejad is in the stronger position and the EU probably believes him likely to win, as well as the argument that public disapproval of the elections by the great powers would be counterproductive, by stoking fears that the West was plotting another coup, or at least by energizing Ahmadinejad's base to defend Iranian honor against Western slander.

[Straha]

Mousavi has called off the Rally because he was told that the police would be armed with live rounds today. No word on the strike yet.

A Farsi Language Photoblog. The pictures are all you need to see.

Canadian reporter beaten up, and detained and then told "You are my friend!" by Interior Ministry

Germany is having words with the Iranian ambassador in Berlin.

Ahmadinejad goes on a weird meandering reply to a question as to the safety of reform leaders.

And a picture:

[Straha]

German report that Khameini has ordered an investigation into the allegations of electoral fraud.

[Zac Naloen]

I don't buy it because the simple reaction if they didn't want to take sides yet would be to delay any announcement on the election. It reads to me like they're recognizing the election and Ahmadinejad while leaving a backdoor open to criticize it if they feel like later, and I don't like that. But, that may just be me.

Remember the EU isn't a real government, despite it's pretensions to be so.

Some of the big member states have announced how disturbed they are, that should carry far more weight.