Iran Elections Thread

[Solauren]

I wonder what the odds of things getting so cocked up in Iran that they ask for an outside agency all parties could agree on to handle a re-vote.

Probably pretty damn low, but man, the situtation in Iran is, 'interesting', to say the least.

[Guardsman Bass]

Straha, are Sullivan and Tehran Bureau the best sources to follow this from? I'm hesitant to use the BBC and NYT, since you mentioned two pages back that the Iranian government was kicking foreign reporters out of the country.

[The Spartan]

MSNBC.com is reporting that McCain is saying that Obama needs to get tougher on Iran and come out in support of the people and against the "sham" of an election. (Quotation marks because that's the word he used, not because I think the election is Kosher, er, Halal)

Didn't we try that already, repeatedly? Haven't we already tried to get tough with them only to have it backfire? My memory is fuzzy on it but I remember the last time we tried to be the big dog rather than sit back and watch we ended up with Amadinejad.

[Straha]

Straha, are Sullivan and Tehran Bureau the best sources to follow this from? I'm hesitant to use the BBC and NYT, since you mentioned two pages back that the Iranian government was kicking foreign reporters out of the country.

Tehran Bureau is very good. Sullivan has been great as a compiler of news and info. For twitter I've been using this site. It gets a lot of chaff, but the good stuff is very good. If you follow those sites you'll get all the good stories sooner rather than later. BBC has been better since the first day (when their coverage was absolute shit), but they have a history of being biased towards the regime and their stories have not been prompt by any stretch of the word. The Guardian has actually been posting a number of very good stories and blogs about this. The New York Times, on the whole, has been mediocre, but the Lede blog has been good.

MSNBC.com is reporting that McCain is saying that Obama needs to get tougher on Iran and come out in support of the people and against the "sham" of an election. (Quotation marks because that's the word he used, not because I think the election is Kosher, er, Halal)

Didn't we try that already, repeatedly? Haven't we already tried to get tough with them only to have it backfire? My memory is fuzzy on it but I remember the last time we tried to be the big dog rather than sit back and watch we ended up with Amadinejad.

It's a bad idea because Ahmadinejad has been declaring left, right and sideways that the opposition are tools of foreign powers. If Obama comes out strongly in their favor then he's legitimizing Ahmadinejad. Much better for Obama, and the west as a whole, to not say anything and play a waiting game for the playing field to get a little clearer.


Though Anderson Cooper reports that the state department has asked Twitter not to go down for maintenance in light of the seriousness of Iran's situation. So that might add a little ammo to Ahmadinejad's claims.

[Straha]

BIG NEWS!

Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has come out with an unequivocal statement on the election. I'll let you read it for yourself:

In the name of God

People of Iran

These last days, we have witnessed the lively efforts of you brothers and sisters, old and young alike, from any social category, for the 10th presidential elections.

Our youth, hoping to see their rightful will fulfilled, came on the scene and waited patiently. This was the greatest occasion for the government’s officials to bond with their people.

But unfortunately, they used it in the worst way possible. Declaring results that no one in their right mind can believe, and despite all the evidence of crafted results, and to counter people protestations, in front of the eyes of the same nation who carried the weight of a revolution and 8 years of war, in front of the eyes of local and foreign reporters, attacked the children of the people with astonishing violence. And now they are attempting a purge, arresting intellectuals, political opponents and Scientifics.

Now, based on my religious duties, I will remind you :

1- A legitimate state must respect all points of view. It may not oppress all critical views. I fear that this lead to the lost of people’s faith in Islam.

2- Given the current circumstances, I expect the government to take all measures to restore people’s confidence. Otherwise, as I have already said, a government not respecting people’s vote has no religious or political legitimacy.

3- I invite everyone, specially the youth, to continue reclaiming their dues in calm, and not let those who want to associate this movement with chaos succeed.

4- I ask the police and army personals not to “sell their religion”, and beware that receiving orders will not excuse them before god. Recognize the protesting youth as your children. Today censor and cutting telecommunication lines can not hide the truth.

I pray for the greatness of the Iranian people.

Grand Ayatollah Montazeri is the most senior and influential cleric in the Shia hierarchy, he was also the handpicked successor to Khomeini and Khomeini's right hand man until 1988. He is very very well respected, and if he's coming out this publicly then there is a lot more brewing behind the facade in Qom.

[The Spartan]

It's a bad idea because Ahmadinejad has been declaring left, right and sideways that the opposition are tools of foreign powers. If Obama comes out strongly in their favor then he's legitimizing Ahmadinejad. Much better for Obama, and the west as a whole, to not say anything and play a waiting game for the playing field to get a little clearer.

That's more or less what I was thinking. My understanding of Iranian politics isn't remotely as good as your's apparently is, but I do remember that the last time we rattled our sabers at them during an election, it was Khatami(?) that lost and Amadinejad that landed in power. Though I may be confusing cause with correlation there.

Seeing your latest post as I type out the above, am I right in thinking that there is a revolution, for lack of a better word, in the works?

[[R_H]]

Revolutionary Guards Arrested in Iran

According to the Cyrus News Agency, Tuesday morning 16 senior members of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were arrested. "These commanders have been in contact with members of the Iranian army to join the people's movement," CNA reports. "Three of the commanders are veterans of Iran-Iraq war. They have been moved to an undisclosed location in East Tehran." This report has not been confirmed by other sources. If true, it shows that the regime is losing the loyalty of some members of its control appartus, which is necessary if the opposition has any chance of achieving fundamental change. Mass rallies can easily be broken up and revolutions crushed, as we saw at Tiananmen Square in 1989. But if members of the armed forces, police and especially Revolutionary Guards decided to switch sides, then one can begin speaking of revolution.

[Patrick Degan]

The hardliners have really painted themselves into a corner this time. If they kick Ahmadinejad to the curb now instead of when they should have done so more than a year ago, they make themselves look weak and embolden an increasingly popular opposition to the present regime. If they suppress dissent —especially by violence— they destroy their legitimacy outright and practically guarantee a revolution at some point down the line. About the only way they come out of this preserving more or less the present status-quo is to allow Ahmadinejad to take office under a cloud, decline to support him, and simply let his position erode publicly until he can be forced to resign.

MSNBC.com is reporting that McCain is saying that Obama needs to get tougher on Iran and come out in support of the people and against the "sham" of an election. (Quotation marks because that's the word he used, not because I think the election is Kosher, er, Halal)

McCain's an idiot. The last thing you do is stick your hand into a dogfight and that's what's brewing in Iran right now. If the hardliners lose, all the better for us. Even if they ultimately prevail, however, the U.S. still gains a political advantage by not interfering and making itself a ready target for Ahmadinejad's propaganda barrages. He'll launch them anyway, of course, but they will have far less credibility amongst a public who are becoming increasingly restive and sceptical. The hardliners are eroding their own position in Iranian society and the power structure. Best let them get on with it.

[Straha]

That's more or less what I was thinking. My understanding of Iranian politics isn't remotely as good as your's apparently is, but I do remember that the last time we rattled our sabers at them during an election, it was Khatami(?) that lost and Amadinejad that landed in power. Though I may be confusing cause with correlation there.

Khatami never lost, he always won by large landslides. Rafsanjani did lose, but that was because of a number of reasons. There have been a number of times where U.S. Sabre-rattling has backfired in PR disasters, and at least once (IIRC) in a Majlis election, but never in a presidential election, as far as I would hazard.

Seeing your latest post as I type out the above, am I right in thinking that there is a revolution, for lack of a better word, in the works?

I would say no. Almost all of the reformist leaders like Rafsanjani, Khatami, Golpayagani (I always mis-spell his name), including Mousavi are long time established members of the regime. Montazeri himself was once the mouthpiece of Khomeini himself and was his designated successor until his last days. These people have invested their lives to make this regime, and a revolution is the last thing they want.

It could be seen as a deep realignment movement. This is Straha original theorizing (as far as I know) so you wont get this theory anywhere else, and take that for what you will. The Mullahocracy that runs Iran is a result of the Iran-Iraq war. The revolution was in the middle of switching into a sedentary phase and trying to work out how it would turn itself into a government when Iraq invaded in 1980. This put the Clerics, and the supreme leader, in complete power because the nation needed the leadership during the war. But the leaders at the top knew things were going to go awry when they saw the war was coming to an end. They realized that the government as it stood couldn't survive peacetime, and that, in order to oversee the rebuilding of the nation, they'd need to make drastic structural changes. So in 1988 Khomeini, Khameni (who was President at the time), Rafsanjani (who was Prime Minister) and a few others got together and came up with a revised constitution that defrayed some of the power of the Iranian Parliament, removed one senior elected official (the Prime Minister), and gave a lot more power to the Supreme Leader. When the war ended and Khomeini died the senior leadership played a game of musical chairs, Khameni moved up to become Supreme Leader (something he was in no way qualified for) and Rafsanjani became President. The plan was that running the country together they'd smooth things out, hold on to power, and rebuild Iran.

Problem was that the legitimacy of the government in public eyes was that they were a republic. While Rafsanjani and Khameni tried to economically rebuild Iran a lot of people were left disadvantaged while others (mainly centered around Rafsanjani) got rich. The government acted in a veiled authoritarian manner, and in the mid nineties (I'm tempted to say '94, but I always get the timing wrong) there was some rather violent unrest as a result. In response they called out the troops. The troops, however, said "no". The commander of the Revolutionary Guard said that it was time that democracy get more say in Iran, and the clerics less. In response the clerics called out the Basiij militia and crushed the revolt on their own. But the experience left them deeply scared. As a result of this Khameni, and others, made a sort of Faustian bargain with the Revolutionary Guard and a number of hardline revolutionary clerics. The Revolutionary Guard and its commanders would enjoy the fruits of the regime, and in return they'd support the regime to the hilt.

The deal went smoothly until '97 when Khatami was elected President in a landslide over a regime shill (Nateq-nouri, who was expected to win by everyone.) Khatami started trying to reassert the republican foundation of the revolution and to try and undo some of this corrupt bargain (which had the Revolutionary Guard assassinating dissidents in the night.) For a while it worked, but after mass student protests in '99 the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council put an end to it. The fact that, even with Khatami in power, students would march in the streets and demand liberalization told some of the hardliners that any attempt to liberalize would only end up destroying the regime as a whole. After this the Republican Guard was given more and more influence, and more and more power. They started to actively expand their role in policy-making too, figuring that if they were going to profit from and support the regime they might as well take a part in choosing policies they were going to enforce. When Khatami's term ended the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) cemented their influence by the election of Ahmadinejad, who was a former Guard and came from within their circles.

But while Ahmadinejad was in power things got worse all over Iran. The economy stunk, they've been sanctioned to heck, there was gas rationing at the height of the Oil Price Boom when Iran should have been rolling in the dough, and there's been widespread unemployment. The reformers who emphasize the Republican nature of the government picked up a lot of steam, a lot of influence, and rolled back into the forefront (they'd boycotted the last election because of just how much they were sidelined) while the regime ignored them. They are the people behind this. They don't argue for a different regime, but the same structure with a different character and a much reduced role for the Revolutionary Guard. (Don't confuse this with westernizing. It's not. But it is liberalization.) That's essentially what they're fighting for. Is it a massive change to the political landscape? Yes. Will this destroy a lot of political powerbases? Yes. But will it fundamentally change/destroy the government? Not if they get their way.

The hardliners have really painted themselves into a corner this time. If they kick Ahmadinejad to the curb now instead of when they should have done so more than a year ago, they make themselves look weak and embolden an increasingly popular opposition to the present regime. If they suppress dissent —especially by violence— they destroy their legitimacy outright and practically guarantee a revolution at some point down the line. About the only way they come out of this preserving more or less the present status-quo is to allow Ahmadinejad to take office under a cloud, decline to support him, and simply let his position erode publicly until he can be forced to resign.

Except they can't even do that! The people aren't going to stop marching until Ahmadinejad is out of contention, and even if they did stop marching without massive bloodshed the government would still have lost any shred of credibility of being a popularly elected government. Either way they go the hardliners have to shoot themselves in a foot. The real question is will they have to amputate the leg too?

[CaptainChewbacca]

I know we all want Obama to do something, and I'm sure he does too, but he knows that he simply CAN'T do anything right now that wouldn't make it worse.

[Straha]

I know we all want Obama to do something, and I'm sure he does too, but he knows that he simply CAN'T do anything right now that wouldn't make it worse.

I don't. Obama has to worry about the future of American foreign policy. He can't let the urge to support the people interfere in established U.S. policy (including non-recognition of Iran) or future U.S. policy. To do "something" beyond express vague moral support would hamper him, hamper the people, and hamper us all.

[Straha]

This took guts: A report by Britain's Channel 4.

There are differing reports as to the nature of the protest today. Everything I've read says the strike went very well. Some people say there were more pro-Mousavi protesters today. Others less. They all agree that the protests today were much quieter, and they also say there was less brutality.

However, there have been a large number of arrests made, regardless. And people watching the famous Evin prison (which just keeps cropping up in every damn historical event Iran has had for the past 70 years) say that people are continuously being brought in and that it's filling up.

[phongn]

In general, combining the 2005 and 2009 data conveys the impression that a substantial core of the 2009 results reflected natural political processes. In 2009 Ahmadinejad tended to do best in towns where his support in 2005 was highest, and he tended to do worst in towns where turnout surged the most. These natural aspects of the election results stand in contrast to the unusual pattern in which all of the notable discrepancies between the support Ahmadinejad actually received and the support the model predicts are always negative. This pattern needs to be explained before one can have confidence that natural election processes were not supplemented with artificial manipulations. Also remaining is the need to see data at lower levels of aggregation and in general more transparency about how the election was
conducted.

[Elfdart]

MSNBC.com is reporting that McCain is saying that Obama needs to get tougher on Iran and come out in support of the people and against the "sham" of an election. (Quotation marks because that's the word he used, not because I think the election is Kosher, er, Halal)

This is the same Dungeon Master McCain who sang:

Bomb, Bomb, Bomb...Bomb, Bomb Iran!

I'm amused by all the concern-trolling in the media from fucktards like McCain and other war whores who were beating off at the idea of bombing Iran and killing large numbers of people, but who are now just so worried over the plight of the Iranian People. To the war whore, it's good to blow them up and burn them with napalm -just don't steal an election from them.

[Straha]

John Fisk in Iran

Important bits:

I've just been witnessing a confrontation, in dusk and into the night, between about 15,000 supporters of Ahmadinejad - supposedly the president of Iran - who are desperate to down the supporters of Mr Mousavi, who thinks he should be the president of Iran.

There were about 10,000 Mousavi men and women on the streets, with approximately 500 Iranian special forces, trying to keep them apart.

It was interesting that the special forces - who normally take the side of Ahmadinejad's Basij militia - were there with clubs and sticks in their camouflage trousers and their purity white shirts and on this occasion the Iranian military kept them away from Mousavi's men and women.

In fact at one point, Mousavi's supporters were shouting 'thank you, thank you' to the soldiers.

One woman went up to the special forces men, who normally are very brutal with Mr Mousavi's supporters, and said 'can you protect us from the Basij?' He said 'with God's help'.

It was quite extraordinary because it looked as if the military authorities in Tehran have either taken a decision not to go on supporting the very brutal militia - which is always associated with the presidency here - or individual soldiers have made up their own mind that they're tired of being associated with the kind of brutality that left seven dead yesterday - buried, by the way secretly by the police - and indeed the seven or eight students who were killed on the university campus 24 hours earlier.

There was 100 metres of no man's land between these thousands of people and I actually walked up and listened to a Basij guy urging his people on to attack the forces of the opposition, saying 'we fought and defended our country in the Iran-Iraq war and now we have to defend it again and we have to move forward'. You could actually just walk a few metres and talk to Mousavi's people.

Some of them came down and tried to embrace the Basij and indeed the leaders who support the man who indeed thinks he is the president. One man, in the Muslim tradition, tried to kiss him on both cheeks and the Basij man moved back irritably and angry, he didn't want to be touched by this man.

There was a great deal of anger on the part of Ahmadinejad's supporters.

I went to the earlier demonstration in the centre of the city, which was solely by Ahmadinejad's people, immensely boring, although I did notice one or two points where they were shouting 'death to the traitor'. They meant Mousavi.

You've got to realise that what's happening at the moment is that the actual authorities are losing control of what's happening on the streets and that's very dangerous and damaging to them.

It's interesting that the actual government newspapers reported at one point that Sunday's march was not provocative by the marchers. They carried a very powerful statement by the Chancellor of the Tehran University, condemning the police and Basij, who broke into university dormitories on Sunday night and killed seven students.

They've even carried reports of the seven dead after the march on Sunday ... almost as if, not to compromise but they're trying to get a little bit closer to the other side.

Someone, presumably the supreme leader, who is constitutionally the leader of all Iran and the clerical leader, Ayatollah Khamanei, he's going to have to work out a way of stopping these constant street confrontations.

We've got another great demonstration by the opposition tomorrow evening in the centre of the city. I suspect what they're going to have to do is think whether they can have a system where they reintroduce a prime ministership, so the president has someone underneath him.

Maybe we'd have President Ahmadinejad and a Prime Minister Mousavi or maybe a joint presidency.

All this is what people talk about but it means changing the constitution, it means having a referendum. They didn't believe that the opposition could be so strong and would keep on going.

[The protest] is absolutely not against the Islamic republic or the Islamic revolution.

It's clearly an Islamic protest against specifically the personality, the manner, the language of Ahmadinejad. They absolutely despise him but they do not hate or dislike the Islamic republic that they live in.

[The Spartan]

That's more or less what I was thinking. My understanding of Iranian politics isn't remotely as good as your's apparently is, but I do remember that the last time we rattled our sabers at them during an election, it was Khatami(?) that lost and Amadinejad that landed in power. Though I may be confusing cause with correlation there.

Khatami never lost, he always won by large landslides. Rafsanjani did lose, but that was because of a number of reasons. There have been a number of times where U.S. Sabre-rattling has backfired in PR disasters, and at least once (IIRC) in a Majlis election, but never in a presidential election, as far as I would hazard.

I see, I must have confused what happened.

Seeing your latest post as I type out the above, am I right in thinking that there is a revolution, for lack of a better word, in the works?

I would say no. Almost all of the reformist leaders like Rafsanjani, Khatami, Golpayagani (I always mis-spell his name), including Mousavi are long time established members of the regime. Montazeri himself was once the mouthpiece of Khomeini himself and was his designated successor until his last days. These people have invested their lives to make this regime, and a revolution is the last thing they want.

*snip details*

I knew revolution was the wrong word to use. So, probably a more of a power realignment then?

[CmdrWilkens]

I hate to say this but the model Nate presented proves the point and the counter argument about timeline...has no data just speculation.

That's a fair point, and I'll gladly give it to you. Considering all the other evidence for rigging I don't think this is that big of an issue, and I'll happily concede the point for now, until I get around to checking it against my suspicions.

Total aside on this but I do want to reiterate that I do believe the election was rigged its just that I don't think THIS paticular analysis (the vote versus time) is a sufficient statistical "smoking gun." As you mentioend there are far more obvious errors such as the 3rd and 4th party votes, the provincial level trends from 2005 and prior against the reported results, etc. Obviously there are plenty of suspicious numbers I just don't think this paticular graph (from the original branch point) is telling in any way.

[Prannon]

To clarify on revolutions, there are some very general principles to keep in mind.

1) Revolutions do not happen if the existing regime retains the ability to line people up against the wall and have them shot. This is something my history professors drilled in me very strongly.

2) Contrary to what many may think, revolutions do not happen purely from the ground up. They require a certain segment of the establishment to actually make a move to destroy the existing institutions and establish new ones. This happened during the French Revolution, and it happened in the American Revolution.

Currently in Iran we see a measure of impotence on the part of the Islamic and hardliner regime. They have been unwilling (or unable) to crush the protests in Iran because of the size of the crowds, fear of what may happen to their credibility if they do, and/or because certain segments of the armed forces are unwilling to go that far. Some reports earlier in the thread refer to members of the Revolutionary Guard - the Revolutionary Guard! - being arrested for purportedly supporting the protesters. This is extremely dangerous for the regime.

On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that the populace at large is not out to destroy the Islamic Republic, but merely wants a fair election and a rerun. This is not in doubt, however I want to point out that originally the Revolutionaries in the Americas and in France did not want to overthrow their systems either. It is possible, although unlikely, that if Moussavi and those who support him (established clerics like Rafsanjani and others) are frustrated at every turn and still angry enough to fight their enemies in the regime, then they will become Revolutionaries and will exploit the popular anger at Ahmadinejad to try and overthrow the Republic. We are an extremely long way from that since a lot of things would have to happen for revolution to occur, and I admit that my reasoning is based on popular assumptions about what's happening in Iran, but I can see one future where a revolution actually does occur there.

[Patrick Degan]

To clarify on revolutions, there are some very general principles to keep in mind.

1) Revolutions do not happen if the existing regime retains the ability to line people up against the wall and have them shot. This is something my history professors drilled in me very strongly.

2) Contrary to what many may think, revolutions do not happen purely from the ground up. They require a certain segment of the establishment to actually make a move to destroy the existing institutions and establish new ones. This happened during the French Revolution, and it happened in the American Revolution.

Currently in Iran we see a measure of impotence on the part of the Islamic and hardliner regime. They have been unwilling (or unable) to crush the protests in Iran because of the size of the crowds, fear of what may happen to their credibility if they do, and/or because certain segments of the armed forces are unwilling to go that far. Some reports earlier in the thread refer to members of the Revolutionary Guard - the Revolutionary Guard! - being arrested for purportedly supporting the protesters. This is extremely dangerous for the regime.

On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that the populace at large is not out to destroy the Islamic Republic, but merely wants a fair election and a rerun. This is not in doubt, however I want to point out that originally the Revolutionaries in the Americas and in France did not want to overthrow their systems either. It is possible, although unlikely, that if Moussavi and those who support him (established clerics like Rafsanjani and others) are frustrated at every turn and still angry enough to fight their enemies in the regime, then they will become Revolutionaries and will exploit the popular anger at Ahmadinejad to try and overthrow the Republic. We are an extremely long way from that since a lot of things would have to happen for revolution to occur, and I admit that my reasoning is based on popular assumptions about what's happening in Iran, but I can see one future where a revolution actually does occur there.

In his book 1984, George Orwell codified these observations into four ways by which a ruling group falls from power: Either it is conquered from without, or it governs so inefficiently that the masses are stirred to revolt, or it allows a strong and discontented Middle group to come into being, or it loses its own self-confidence and willingness to govern. These causes do not operate singly, and as a rule all four of them are present in some degree. A ruling class which could guard against all of them would remain in power permanently. Ultimately the determining factor is the mental attitude of the ruling class itself. In regards to the people, he also stated this observation: The masses never revolt of their own accord, and they never revolt merely because they are oppressed. Indeed, so long as they are not permitted to have standards of comparison, they never even become aware that they are oppressed. It is also demonstrably true that no revolution could have a chance of success without a significant portion of the military defecting to the rebels. Presumably, this would be part of the process Orwell outlined as the rising of a strong, discontented Middle group.

At present, only one of these conditions is operating in Iran: the stirring of a discontented middle class. The danger of external conquest or attack is only a far distant background element but one which continues to pressure the regime and ultimately colours it's worldview and could lead it to attempt outright oppression. It is then that the regime opens itself up to the other two dangers and puts itself in an increasingly deteriorating position. But events are nowhere near that stage as yet.

[Straha]

I knew revolution was the wrong word to use. So, probably a more of a power realignment then?

Yes. Tehran Bureau has their take on the struggle. Be warned of the quote of Khomeini. Khomeini was whatever he needed to be at the proper moment, so you can find a lot of quotes from Khomeini out there showing he supports just about anything.

Total aside on this but I do want to reiterate that I do believe the election was rigged its just that I don't think THIS paticular analysis (the vote versus time) is a sufficient statistical "smoking gun." As you mentioend there are far more obvious errors such as the 3rd and 4th party votes, the provincial level trends from 2005 and prior against the reported results, etc. Obviously there are plenty of suspicious numbers I just don't think this paticular graph (from the original branch point) is telling in any way.

I understood that and never thought you were defending the validity of the vote. And you're probably right. What makes me think that this could be evidence of rigging is that all accounts, even pro-Ahmadinejad accounts, say that the vote was going to come down to regional loyalty and if the vote was in any way as contentious as the campaign was I'd expect to see the lead bounce around alot during the count, like we saw in Missouri and Indiana during the 2008 Presidential election or like Florida in 2000. But that's just my gut talking, and one of the first rules of life should be "always know when to tell your gut to shut up."

[TimothyC]

Nightwatch Update:

Iran: The Guardian reported today at least 500 activists, including politicians, journalists and students, have been arrested over the past five days in the growing crackdown aimed at "decapitating" the protest movement against Ahmadi-Nejad's re-election. At least 100 have been arrested in Tabriz, a Mousavi strong-hold. About 200 were arrested at Tehran University over the 13 June weekend, although many were later released. More than 100 were arrested on 15 June after security forces engaged protesters at Shiraz University.

Update on the voter fraud allegations. The Guardian reported today that results from the 12 June presidential election posted today the Ayandeh website indicate that turnouts of over 100 percent were recorded in at least 30 towns; 26 provinces across the country showed participation levels either unheard of in democratic elections or in excess of the number of registered voters; and at least 200 polling stations recorded participation rates of 95 percent or above. Also, former Iranian interior minister, Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, said yesterday that 70 polling stations returned more completed ballot papers than the number of locally eligible voters.

Comment: The above data are the first details of the potential enormity of the electoral fraud, which pales Mugabe’s stratagems in Zimbabwe. Analysts have suggested that, if there was fraud, the fraud program had to be massive, coordinated and nationwide in order to produce a landslide. They added that it is difficult to maintain security on such a scale, ergo the Ahmadi-Nejad victory probably was legitimate. That was the initial NightWatch assessment—nationwide fraud is difficult to keep secret.

These new data, accepting them at face value, shed new light on this analysis. The Ministry of Interior and the Revolutionary Guards have the nationwide presence to organize and sustain a massive fraud. They also have the motive – Ahmadi-Nejad is one of their own. There were thousands of polling places. If two thirds of them reported more votes than living voters, a landslide could be engineered by decentralized fraud.

Most less developed countries rely on the Ministry of Education to supervise elections because schools are the polling places, even in the US. Relatively few countries rely on or trust the national police, i.e., the Interior Ministry. Even Education workers can be suborned, so that is no guarantee of integrity, but it looks better.

The usual tattle tale of voter fraud is a vote count that exceeds the number of living and registered voters and voter registration rolls that include a large number of dead people. This usually is the result of excessive exuberance or enthusiasm by local operatives. For example, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Indonesia at various times in their pasts and many communist states were notorious for this practice. This might be the undoing of the election.

Lengthy Note on Analysis of Instability. The Associated Press reported the following snippets about the demonstrations in Iran.

• “… It's not just young, liberal rich kids anymore: Whole families, taxi drivers, even conservative women in black chadors are joining Iran's opposition street protests. “
• “…support is growing to include grandmothers, government employees and hotel clerks.”
• "This (the Mousavi opposition) is completely different to 1999. That was between the students and the government. This is between the people and the government. This time it is all of Iran. This is a historic movement.".
• an accountant who declined to be identified said she joined the protests because she wanted her vote to count.

The key question most news services are trying to answer is whether the protests will lead to a change of government leadership or will sputter and die. The answer to that question determines whether a spontaneous uprising can convert into a self-sustaining political movement. It was the same question that analysts asked about the strikes at the Gdansk shipyard in 1980 that morphed into the Solidarnosc movement.

Readers might be on the lookout for the chief indicators of the transition from episodic protests to a self-sustaining, organized opposition capable of bringing down the leadership. All were present in the evolution of Solidarnosc. The event phenomenology is identical, despite the cultural differences.

First, a series of demonstrations mounted by a single occupational, functional or ethnic group almost never transitions into a nationwide movement. These demonstrations are responses to stress and the government usually has reserves of law enforcers and incentives to relieve the stress. Carrots and sticks usually succeed in ending them.

Second is geographic distribution. Protests in capital cities are normal. Power always resides in the capital. Instability is centripetal in that opposition groups that fail to take power or influence the power holders in the capital fail. If opposition starts in the countryside and spreads, it must move to the cities or it will fail. Multiple outbreaks outside the capital are a sign of widespread discontent which is essential for a sustained, effective opposition movement.

Third, political instability always begins on the periphery. The disenfranchised in the center of Tehran, the university students whose ballots were discarded are on the political periphery of power, as are the disenfranchised in Azerbaijan, Sistan Baluchistan and other cities outside Tehran. The government always has a harder time suppressing discontent on the geographic periphery than in the capital. Thus unrest in multiple outlying population centers represents a serious threat that governments usually underestimate.

Fourth and most important, stakeholders in the existing economic system must join the opposition portests. In an earlier era, one would write that those with the most to lose from change of political leaders must join in order to a movement to transition to self sustaining status. In Iran in 1979, when the bazaaris joined the ayatollahs in advocating the overthrow of the Shah, the Shah was overthrown and fled for his life. The clerics alone lacked the clout to effect political change.

Fifth, a group leadership must emerge that can coordinate with other groups in other cities. Groups will send or publish statements of solidarity with each other, building strength through unified action. Those kinds of publicity are the signature that more complex organization, leadership and cohesion are evolving.

The government leaders usually panic and then overreact by using excessive force and in effect bring themselves down, if the government collapses or concedes.

Finally the action will progress through phases of under-reaction, over-reaction and concession and then recycle.

Applying the above to Iran. The first days of the demonstrations looked like sour grapes among the youth and urban dwellers. That encouraged the government to under-react in hopes it would allow the demonstrations to burn themselves out.

When they continued on 13 and 14 June, TV news showed pictures of uniformed men beating unarmed people with sticks. Nevertheless, the crowds forced the uniforms to retreat. This was an over-reaction, serving up beatings as a response to voter fraud claims. Governments do stupid things like this, when an immediate call for investigations or appointment of a respected commission might have pulled the rug out from under the protestors.

In the past two days the composition of the demonstrators has diversified. That is the significance of the bullets above. They show that average, everyday folk have begun to register their concerns about dishonesty. Loss of support among this demographic cohort is perilous for an administration.

The most significant new information is that professional people have joined blue-collar working people. If businesses start to close and small business owners join the protests, especially outside Tehran, the administration must fall.

The government already made one set of concessions when it approved the Guardian Council order to recount votes. That concession was not enough, signified by the continuation of the protests. Thus, the crisis management cycle is now reset. The government is now assessing whether its actions to date will placate the crowds. The demonstrations have spread. New cohorts have joined, which include stakeholders in the economy – more important than the political leaders actually.

The next step for the opposition will be characterized by greater organization and communication outside individual cities. Without leadership that can coordinate the timing and location of protests, the movement will not succeed. It is not clear that Mousavi’s political organization is yet willing to take the risks of failure associated with that leadership role.

The authority and geographic dispersion of political/religious leaders calling for the votes to be counted against the rolls hints that some kind of leadership structure is forming. There are few public signs of a national organization forming, but it is early yet. If protests persist, that will emerge.

The next step for the government will be an attempt at a wider and harsher crackdown, almost certainly. Khamenei might try to finesse the unrest by skipping the next over-reaction step, though the Revolutionary Guards will oppose a finesse move without more head cracking. The finesse move would be aimed at dispersing demonstrations by agreeing to allow ballot boxes to be compared against voter registration rolls, a major concession and gamble. If this occurs, Khamenei would show he is willing to sacrifice Ahmadi-Nejad for the sake of the theocracy, assuming the Guardian reports are accurate.

Such a concession is more likely now that the protests are diversifying. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is most likely getting worried that a systemic change is threatened on his watch. Those worries will make a leader prone to try to settle things as quickly as he can and prone to make colossal blunders.

The theocracy itself is not challenged, only the honesty of the processes it set up. Its feet are being held to the fire, as it were. If the protests continue, which now seems likely for the first time based on the evidence, the theocracy will undergo significant change by becoming accountable to the electorate in an unprecedented fashion for Iran, at least for a short while. That is tentatively and potentially tonight’s good news.

[Surlethe]

Update on the voter fraud allegations. The Guardian reported today that results from the 12 June presidential election posted today the Ayandeh website indicate that turnouts of over 100 percent were recorded in at least 30 towns; 26 provinces across the country showed participation levels either unheard of in democratic elections or in excess of the number of registered voters; and at least 200 polling stations recorded participation rates of 95 percent or above. Also, former Iranian interior minister, Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, said yesterday that 70 polling stations returned more completed ballot papers than the number of locally eligible voters.

Hmm. Wasn't the buzz earlier that the fraud was hastily engineered when they realized Mousavi was kicking Ahmadinejad's ass? How does a massive nationwide fraud jive with the seeming incompetence of the operation?

[Plekhanov]

Update on the voter fraud allegations. The Guardian reported today that results from the 12 June presidential election posted today the Ayandeh website indicate that turnouts of over 100 percent were recorded in at least 30 towns; 26 provinces across the country showed participation levels either unheard of in democratic elections or in excess of the number of registered voters; and at least 200 polling stations recorded participation rates of 95 percent or above. Also, former Iranian interior minister, Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, said yesterday that 70 polling stations returned more completed ballot papers than the number of locally eligible voters.

Hmm. Wasn't the buzz earlier that the fraud was hastily engineered when they realized Mousavi was kicking Ahmadinejad's ass? How does a massive nationwide fraud jive with the seeming incompetence of the operation?

I don't see why you cant have hastily engineered and incompetent massive nationwide fraud. All it takes is for some national figure to see the incoming figures, panic and call up a series of regional underlings.

[Straha]

The standing theory is that the vote count was manufactured either by Ahmadinejad's allies in the Interior Ministry or by his in the Revolutionary Guard. It's quite possible that the Revolutionary Guard underlings were called up for local population totals and the total vote count was based off that or that people in the central office made up figures based on what they had on hand, explaining the discrepancies. Anyway, the fact that the entire country's vote was botched doesn't seem to disagree on the face of it with the idea that this was implemented as a last second coup.

[The Big I]

Nice updates but I`m going to ask could could this current fraud be perpretrated by an outside scource ie The US, Bush did ˝request˝ from congress 400 million to aid opposition groups in Iran.