Kamikaze Sith wrote:Cite your evidence that the person is in fact a clone, and explain how Barclay maintained consciousness throughout the transport.
I have finally reviewed the video in question -- several months after it was first suggested by you -- and let's just say that it's more open to interpretation than you seem to think it is. You suggest that it's fairly conclusive evidence of continuous consciousness; I submit that it could be something else.
Consider: Barclay-A steps onto the pad, shivers, and the transport cycle begins. He sees the shimmering, sparkly lights, which grow in intensity until the transporter room is completely obscured by them. According to my interpretation, this is the point at which Barclay-A's consciousness is interrupted, and he is dead. Barclay-B takes over, going from the completely obscured sparkly lights which quickly diminish in intensity to reveal the interior of the other ship. He shivers again, and greets Commander LaForge, etc.
Can you show my interpretation to be incorrect? I don't think so, though of course you're free to disagree with it, and I can see other interpretations which fit the facts just as well, starting with different assumptions. I can't imagine a test -- other than one which would reveal imperfections in the transport process, which I am assuming to be perfect in every detectable way -- that would reveal a difference between Barclay-A and Barclay-B, and yet according to my (reasonable, I think) interpretation the person that was Barclay-A has quite definitely ceased to be.
SCRawl wrote:But it's not that easy. The transporter (apparently) creates an exact copy of the person at the receiving end, and will for all available tests be examined to be identical -- as if you had a perfect fax machine. But the fax you receive is not the same piece of paper as the one that was sent; you can only do that by using something like a courier or the mail service.
You know, I thought I laid the "non-original matter" argument to rest earlier in this very thread. Yes, Yes, I did.
The transporter is not a fax machine, as the matter used at the other end is your original matter (assuming we know what that phrase means). It just got scrambled a bit on the way, then unscrambled at the end. The analogy is that the letter got ripped up on the way, and then glued back together.
And I also pointed out the fungibility of bare matter earlier in the thread too. If preserving your original matter is necessary to preserve yourself, then you are already dead, because that's what your body does over the course of years — replace your original matter with similar but different matter (again, assuming we know what that phrase means).
(I let this thread get away from me for some time, and only re-entered it recently.)
I never suggested that the original matter was required to maintain continuity of consciousness. It is completely irrelevant to my position, and my analogy with a fax machine, while not perfect, still illustrates the point I was making fairly well. And anyways, we know for certain that the original's matter is not always used to form the copy: if that were the case, then the episode where Cmdr Riker was duplicated would have resulted in two half-sized versions, and while that's an amusing thing to contemplate, it isn't what we saw on the screen.
Just to beat this thing on the head again, if we use the fax machine analogy (which uses the original paper to be torn up and re-assembled at its destination), I think we can agree that there must be a point, however brief, during which the thing being faxed is definitely not the way it started out: document ---> mangled something ---> exact copy of document. If the thing being transported is a person, then during that intermediate stage, however brief it is, there is no way it has a functioning brain to contain that person's mind (or consciousness, or whatever you want to call it). This is the basis for my siding on the "yes" answer to the OP's question.
SCRawl wrote:If my body were to be dissolved, my consciousness stopped, but an exact copy (with my exact memories and personality) were to take its place, then to the outside world nothing has been lost. To "me", the person who stepped on to the transporter pad, my life is over. I really don't see how else to resolve this.
UNDEFINED SYMBOL: "ME"
Yes, you really need to define what constitutes "you" before you can claim this. The way you appear to define it (original matter) would break badly in familiar circumstances, like living a couple of years.
It is a difficult thing to define, isn't it? I already tried this earlier in the thread, when I wrote this:
SCRawl from page 3 wrote: Simon_Jester wrote:
SCRawl wrote:If there's a transporter accident causing -- let's say me, for the sake of argument -- to both re-materialize at my destination and remain on the transporter pad, then are both "me"? If one of them subsequently dies, then is anything lost?
I would argue that they are both "you," and that if one of them dies, one of "you" is lost. There's another you, a slightly different version of you, but a
you still died. Just as if I destroy a computer running Microsoft Word, a
Microsoft Word is gone, but the program Microsoft Word still exists, both as an abstract entity and in millions of instances running on computers around the world.
This is the point on which we disagree, I think. By my definition there can't be more than one of "me", since what makes me "me" is the fact that I'm experiencing it right now, and adding those experiences to the sum of "my" existence. I can't see through my copy's eyes, or compel him to scratch his nose. My copy will appear to all external tests to be just like me, but in that one sense -- the one that is most crucial to me (or is it "me"?
) -- he is fundamentally different.
Clearly, if there really is such a thing as free will, and it isn't just an illusion on top of a completely deterministic universe, and if I as a person possess it, then I can define myself in something like this manner, as a separate entity from everything else. You don't see me like this, and you shouldn't; to you I'm just another person, but you probably define yourself in a manner something like I just described. Or you don't, I really can't say.
73% of all statistics are made up, including this one.
I'm waiting as fast as I can.